MEMORANDUM OPINION

STEPHEN MITCHELL, Bankruptcy Judge

This adversary proceeding is before the court on cross-motions for summary judgment. The sole issue is whether, in a chapter 13 case, a debtor may avoid a second deed of trust against his or her principal residence if there is no equity in the property to which the deed of trust can attach. At a hearing held on January 12, 1999, the parties waived oral argument and submitted the motions for consideration on the pleadings and memoranda. Upon consideration of the record and of the authorities cited by the parties, the court concludes that the second deed of trust is void.

Facts

The facts are not in dispute. John E. Flowers and Debra L. Flowers, husband and wife ("the debtors"), filed a voluntary petition under chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code in this court on February 25, 1998. Among the assets listed on their schedules is their residence located at 6066 Meadow Crest Court, Centerville, Virginia, which is shown as having a fair market value of $96,750. It is encumbered by two deeds of trust. The first, in favor of Homeside Lending ("Homeside"), has a balance due of $104,836. The second, in favor of the defendant, FirstPlus Financial, Inc. ("FirstPlus"), has a balance due of $34,853.23. On September 29, 1998, an order was entered confirming the debtors' modified plan filed on August 18, 1998. That plan, which was confirmed without objection by FirstPlus, treats its claim as wholly unsecured.

The present adversary proceeding was commenced on June 15, 1998, and seeks entry of an order declaring that FirstPlus's claim is unsecured and that its deed of trust "shall be null and void upon Debtor's discharge from Chapter 13." FirstPlus concedes that the balance due on Homeside's first deed of trust exceeds the fair market value of the residence.

Discussion A.

This court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334 and 157(a) and the general order of reference from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dated August 15, 1984. Under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(K), this is a "core" proceeding in which final judgments and orders may be entered by a bankruptcy judge. Venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1409(a). The defendant has been properly served and has appeared generally.

B.

Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no dispute as to the material facts, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. F.R.Bankr.P. 7056 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

C.

As a threshold matter, the court was concerned that FirstPlus's failure to object to confirmation of the August 18, 1998, modified plan — which, like both previous plans proposed by the debtors, treated FirstPlus's claim as wholly unsecured — or to take an appeal from the order of confirmation effectively waived the defenses now asserted. The failure to object to confirmation is particularly curious in that FirstPlus did file an elaborate objection to the debtor's first plan, which proposed essentially the same treatment of its claim as the plan eventually confirmed.

The Fourth Circuit has held, however, that mere confirmation of a chapter 13 plan that fails to treat a creditor's claim as secured does not void the creditor's lien in the absence of an "appropriate affirmative action" brought for that purpose. Cen-Pen Corp, v. Hanson, 58 F.3d 89 (4th Cir. 1995); see also Piedmont Trust Bank v. Linkous (In re Linkous), 990 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1993) (bifurcation of secured creditor's claim under § 506 requires more than disclosure in the plan; the creditor must be notified that a hearing is going to be held and that the interest of the creditor may be affected). Subsequent to Cen-Pen and Linkous, this court adopted a required form of chapter 13 plan that incorporates into a single document the plan together with any motions to value collateral or to avoid liens and provides for a form of notice specifically advising affected creditors that their collateral is to be valued or their lien avoided and of their right to request a hearing. Local Bankruptcy Rule 3015-2(A) and Exh. 1 and 2. Since the adoption of the revised form of chapter 13 plan and related motions, two judges of this court have ruled that the plan and notice adequately satisfy the due process concerns voiced by the Fourth Circuit in Linkous and Cen-Pen. In re Thomas, 222 B.R. 524 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1998) (Tice, J.); In re Mabry, No. 98-23392-DHA (Bankr. E.D. Va., Sep. 9, 1998) (Adams, J.). I agree, although I do note that there is language in Keene v, Charles, 222 B.R. 511, 513 (E.D. Va. 1998) (Doumar, J.), suggesting, although not expressly holding, that nothing short of an adversary proceeding can result in the extinguishment of a secured creditor's lien in chapter 13, even where avoidance is based solely on valuation.

The "Chapter 13 Plan and Related Motions" confirmed by the court in this case conform to the revised form adopted by this court following Cen-Pen and Linkous, and the "Notice of Chapter 13 Plan and Related Motions" mailed to FirstPlus specifically states that the plan proposes to avoid its lien. The notice also states, however, "The Lien of First Financial Plus [sic] will be avoided through a separate Adversary Proceeding pursuant to Rule 7001" (emphasis added). The plan itself contains similar language. Plan, § B-6-c ("The lien [of FirstPlus] is wholly unsecured and will be avoided through An [sic] Adversary Proceeding"). Although, therefore, the confirmation order in this case is res judicata as to FirstPlus's entitlement to payments through the plan on account of its claim, confirmation did not, at least in light of the language in the plan and notice which contemplated a separate adversary proceeding brought for that purpose, have the effect of extinguishing FirstPlus's lien. Accordingly, the court turns to the merits of whether the lien is void under § 506, o j Bankruptcy Code.

D.

The controversy before the court arises from the tension between two provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Chapter 13 allows an individual debtor to obtain court approval of a plan for the repayment and adjustment of his or her debts Relevant to the present controversy, such a plan may "modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence, or of holders of unsecured claims, or leave unaffected the rights of holders of any class of claims." § 1322(b)(2), Bankruptcy Code (emphasis added). The Bankruptcy Code's definition of secured claim, however, is seemingly at odds with the no-modification rule:

An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an interest . . . is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property . . . and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor's interest . . . is less than the amount of such allowed claim. Such value shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property, and in conjunction with any hearing on such disposition or use or on a plan affecting such creditor's interest.

§ 506(a), Bankruptcy Code (emphasis added). Thus, a creditor whose claim is secured by property which is worth less than the amount of the debt is treated in bankruptcy as being secured only to the extent the value of the collateral, with the balance of the claim being treated as unsecured. Moreover, the Code provides that a secured creditor's lien, to the extent it exceeds the value of the collateral, is void. § 506(d), Bankruptcy Code.

The Supreme Court addressed the tension between claim-bifurcation under § 506(a) and the prohibition in § 1322(b)(2) on modification of mortgagee rights in Nobleman v, American Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 113 S.Ct. 2106, 124 L.Ed.2d 228 (1993). In Nobleman, the debtor sought to bifurcate the claim of a creditor which was secured by a mortgage against the debtor's principal residence into secured and unsecured claims. The Supreme Court held that to permit bifurcation of an undersecured creditor's claim under § 506(a) in a chapter 13 plan would modify the creditor's rights by changing the contractual rights contained within the underlying note. Id. at 331, 113 S.Ct. at 2111. The Court held that such modification is prohibited under § 1322(b)(2) when the creditor is secured solely by the debtor's principal residence. Id.

In Nobleman, the balance due on the mortgage was $71,335 and the fair market value of the property was $23,500, meaning that the claim would have been at least partially secured even in the absence of the no-modification language of § 1322(b)(2). The question left unanswered by Nobleman was whether a different result would be reached if there was no equity to which the mortgage could attach.

On this issue, the lower courts are divided. The majority position taken by courts post-Nobleman is that a chapter 13 plan may treat such creditors as unsecured. See, e.g., Wright v. Commercial Credit Corp. (In re Wright), 178 B.R. 703 (E.D. Va. 1995) (Doumar, J.), appeal dismissed, 77 F.3d 472 (4th Cir. 1996); Johnson v. Asset Mgt. Group, LLC, 226 B.R. 364 (D. Md. 1998); Lam v. Investors Thrift (In re Lam), 211 B.R. 36, 40-41 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1997); In re Geyer, 203 B.R. 726, 729 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1996); In re Lee, 177 B.R. 715, 716 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995); In re Kidd, 161 B.R. 769, 770-71 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1993); see also 8 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1322.06[1][a][i], at 1322-21 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. rev. 1998) ("The Nobleman opinion strongly suggests, however, that if a lien is completely undersecured, there would be a different result. . . . If the creditor has held a lien on property that had no value (perhaps because the property was fully encumbered by prior liens), then under [the Nobleman] analysis, the creditor would not have been a `holder of a secured claim' entitled to protection by section 1322(b)(2)."). Other courts, however, have concluded that § 1322(b)(2) "trumps" § 506(a) even when the claimed security interest might otherwise be thought illusory, and that under Nobleman a debtor is prohibited from stripping off the lien even of a wholly unsecured mortgage against the debtor's principal residence. See, e.g., In re Lewandowski, 219 B.R. 99 (Bankr. W.D.Pa. 1998); Fraize v. Beneficial Mortgage Corp. of N.H. (In re Fraize), 208 B.R. 311, 313 (Bankr. D. N.H. 1997); Barnes v. American General Finance, (In re Barnes), 207 B.R. 588, 593 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997); In re Jones, 201 B.R. 371 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1996); In re Barnes, 199 B.R. 256 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1996).

In this district, the only reported decision is In re Wright, in which Judge Doumar held that Nobleman does not apply when a creditor's claim is completely unsecured, and that a debtor is permitted to modify the rights of such a creditor, even though the claim was nominally secured by a deed of trust on the debtor's principal residence. Id. at 707. In response to the creditor's argument that the term "claim secured by a security interest" should be defined as any claim for which a mortgage lien exists, the court reasoned as follows:

If that definition were used, any claim for which a lien exists, regardless of the value (or lack thereof) underlying that lien, would be considered secured. However, § 506(a) does not define the term "secured claim" in that manner. Instead, pursuant to § 506(a), a secured claim is secured only to the extent of the value of the creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property. Where there is no value underlying the claim, there is not a secured claim, despite the existence of a document to the contrary.

Id.

This court will follow Wright, not only because it is the only reported precedent within this district, but because the court finds its reasoning persuasive. The court has carefully considered the arguments ably put forth by FirstPlus in its memorandum as to why Wright, as well as In re Yi (discussed below), were wrongly decided, but does not find them convincing. The facts of this case simply do not present a situation where the valuation issue is so close that a $1 difference, as hypothesized by FirstPlus, would determine whether or not a secured creditor's lien could be set aside. Nor do the facts of this case present a situation, also hypothesized by FirstPlus, where a debtor stopped making payments on a first trust in order to eat up the equity in the property, thereby rendering a second trust holder unsecured. It will be time enough, if such a case is ever presented, for the court to consider whether equitable considerations would prevent avoidance of a subordinate deed of trust. Here, it is sufficient to note that the first deed of trust is current and that there is no suggestion that the debtors have been guilty of inequitable conduct. The remaining arguments put forth by FirstPlus are fully addressed in Wright, Johnson, and Yi, and no purpose would be served merely by repeating them. Since it is undisputed in the present case that the value of the first deed of trust substantially exceeds the fair market value of the property, so that there is no equity to which FirstPlus's second deed of trust can attach, the lien of the deed of trust is void under § 506(d), Bankruptcy Code.

E.

One other point deserves brief comment. In a previous unpublished decision, In re Eastmead, I expressed a concern over a problem that could arise if the lien of a wholly unsecured creditor were avoided in a chapter 13 case and the case were later converted to one under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Slip. op. at 8, n. 8. Under § 1307(a), Bankruptcy Code, a debtor may convert a case to one under chapter 7 "at any time." In Dewsnup v, Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 112 S.Ct. 773, 116 L.Ed.2d 903 (1992), the Supreme Court held that § 506(d), Bankruptcy Code, does not allow a chapter 7 debtor to "strip down" a creditor's lien to a judicially-determined value of collateral. My concern was that a debtor might use chapter 13 to obtain an order avoiding a secured creditor's lien and then convert his or her case to chapter 7, thereby circumventing Dewsnup. However, subsequent to Eastmead, the District Court for this district ruled that Dewsnup prohibits only a "strip down" of a partially secured claim and not a "strip off" of a wholly unsecured claim. In re Yi, 219 B.R. 394, 400 (E. D. Va. 1998) (Ellis, J.). Accordingly, the debtors' right in this case to a decree avoiding FirstPlus's deed of trust would be the same whether they remain in chapter 13 or convert to chapter 7.

Nevertheless, the court notes that the complaint does not seek an order immediately extinguishing FirstPlus's lien, but only "upon Debtor's [sic] discharge from chapter 13." Conditioning avoidance upon the debtors' receipt of a discharge seems appropriate, since dismissal, whether voluntary or involuntary, of the debtors' case prior to discharge would have the legal effect of restoring FirstPlus's lien. § 349(b), Bankruptcy Code. ("Unless the court, for cause, orders otherwise, a dismissal of a case . . . reinstates . . . any lien voided under section 506(d) of this title"). Entry of an order immediately avoiding FirstPlus's lien could, at least in theory, prejudice its position if an intervening lien were to attach to the property and the case were then dismissed. For that reason, the avoidance of FirstPlus's lien will not be effective until the debtors receive a discharge under § 1328, Bankruptcy Code or, in the event the case is converted to chapter 7, under § 727, Bankruptcy Code.

Disposition

A separate order will be entered granting the debtor's motion for summary judgment, denying FirstPlus's motion for summary judgment, determining FirstPlus's claim in this case to be unsecured, and avoiding FirstPlus's lien against the debtors' residence effective upon their discharge.