Opinion
No. 91456–7.
10-06-2015
In re the DEPENDENCY OF G.G., Jr., J.D.G., S.M.M.
ORDER
¶ 1 This matter came before the Court on its October 1, 2015, En Banc Conference. The Court considered the motion and the files herein. A majority of the Court voted in favor of the following result:
¶ 2 Now, therefore, it is hereby
¶ 3 ORDERED:
¶ 4 That the motion for discretionary review is denied.
For the Court
/s/ Johnson , J.
ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE
¶ 5 I dissent from the court's order denying discretionary review in this case. I would grant limited review to address one issue.
¶ 6 In part, the Court of Appeals Division One opinion in this case states:
[Parent] next challenges the court's finding that her poor relationship choices render her unfit to parent. The trial court found:
2.24 The mother's parental deficiencies included impaired judgment in her relationship choices, which is likely a result of her cognitive impairments. The mother's relationship choices place her and her children at risk of domestic violence.
The record supports this finding. Although domestic violence victims face great challenges, a parent must exercise good judgment to avoid genuine risk of harm to her children. Here, the focus of the trial court's finding was not based on [parent's] status as a domestic violence victim; it was her failure to make appropriate choices and participate in recommended services to address parental deficiencies related to domestic violence trauma that placed her children at risk of harm.
In re Dependency of G.G., 185 Wash.App. 813, 830, 344 P.3d 234 (2015) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). To the extent the highlighted language can be read to hold that a domestic violence victim's “failure to make appropriate [relationship] choices” may serve as a basis for finding her an unfit parent and terminating her parental rights, the decision is in error and accordingly warrants this court's review.
¶ 7 The “appropriate choices” phrase implies that a woman can avoid domestic violence by carefully choosing her romantic partners, that by failing to do so she makes inappropriate choices, and that by making such poor choices she is an unfit mother. Such reasoning is at odds with the statutory definitions of “dependent child,” “abuse or neglect,” and “negligent treatment or maltreatment,” all relevant terms in this case. See RCW 13.34.030(6)(b) (dependent child based on abuse or neglect as defined in chapter 26.44 RCW); RCW 26.44.020(1), (16) (abuse or neglect of child based on negligent treatment or maltreatment expressly excludes exposing child to domestic violence against person other than the child). This court should grant review.
A woman's choice of domestic partner is not the cause of domestic violence. Battering can happen to anyone, and battered women cannot foresee that men they know will become batterers.
/s/ Madsen, C.J.
See, e.g., Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F.Supp.2d 153, 193 (E.D.N.Y.2002) (“It is now recognized that domestic violence occurs at all class levels, across all ethnic, racial, and religious lines, in all groups, among all educational backgrounds and sexual orientations, and in both rural and urban areas.”).