Gordon Goodman, Justice

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3 Fort Bend County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 20-CJV-023749

Panel consists of Justices Goodman, Rivas-Molloy, and Farris.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Gordon Goodman, Justice

The State seeks to adjudicate C.L.Z. delinquent on that ground that he has engaged in conduct that constitutes sexual assault. See Tex. Penal Code § 22.011. Pending a final adjudication of delinquency, the trial court imposed certain conditions of release on C.L.Z. He then applied for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging two of the pre-adjudication release conditions imposed by the trial court. Contending that the trial court erroneously denied the requested habeas relief, C.L.Z. now seeks to appeal from the trial court's denial of his application. Because the record does not contain a written order denying C.L.Z.'s habeas application, which is a jurisdictional prerequisite, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

BACKGROUND

Trial Court Proceedings

The trial court imposed certain conditions of pre-adjudication release on C.L.Z. Two of these conditions are at issue in this appeal. The trial court (1) required C.L.Z. to participate in a sex-offender risk assessment and (2) generally forbade him from being in the presence of a child younger than 14 years of age without adult supervision.

C.L.Z. applied for a writ of habeas corpus challenging these two conditions of pre-adjudication release. The trial court held a hearing on C.L.Z.'s habeas application.

Several days after the hearing, the court and parties reconvened so the trial court could state its ruling on the record. The trial court held there was no need to rule on the condition requiring a sex-offender risk assessment because the State had since withdrawn its request for the imposition of this condition. The trial court declined to remove the condition generally forbidding C.L.Z. from being in the presence of children younger than 14 without adult supervision. Consistent with these rulings, the trial court issued an order amending the conditions of C.L.Z.'s pre-adjudication release in part. But the record does not contain a written order expressly ruling on C.L.Z.'s application for habeas relief. The trial court's order amending the conditions of release does not refer to C.L.Z.'s habeas application, his objections to the two conditions at issue, or the court's rulings on them.

Appellate Proceedings

C.L.Z. filed a notice of appeal from the trial court's "order denying relief on the merits" with respect to his application for the writ of habeas corpus. But his designation of the items to be included in the clerk's record on appeal identifies the order from which he is appealing as "the Order for Conditions of Release."

We issued a notice of intent to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on the basis that the courts of appeals lack jurisdiction to hear appeals from pre-adjudication denials of habeas relief in juvenile-court proceedings. C.L.Z. has responded.

DISCUSSION

Jurisdiction to Hear Appeals from Pre-Adjudication Habeas Rulings

Though juvenile-court proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature, juvenile-court proceedings are generally categorized as civil matters. In re M.P.A., 364 S.W.3d 277, 282 n.2 (Tex. 2012). Thus, in juvenile-court proceedings, "[t]he requirements governing an appeal are as in civil cases generally." Tex. Fam. Code § 56.01(b).

In civil cases, the courts of appeals generally only have jurisdiction over final judgments, unless a statute authorizes an appeal before the entry of a final judgment. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.012 (courts of appeals have jurisdiction from final judgments of district or county courts in civil suits in which amount in controversy exceeds $250); CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444, 447 (Tex. 2011) (orders other than final judgments are appealable solely when appeal is allowed by statute). We are not aware of any statute that authorizes the courts of appeals to hear an appeal from a trial court's ruling on a pre-adjudication application for the writ of habeas corpus in a juvenile-court proceeding. Absent such a statute, there is no jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal. CMH Homes, 340 S.W.3d at 447.

The Family Code specifies the orders from which a juvenile may appeal. Fam. § 56.01(d)(1). In general, it allows a juvenile to appeal from an order entered under:

(A) Section 54.02 respecting transfer of the child for prosecution as an adult;

(B) Section 54.03 with regard to delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision;

(C) Section 54.04 disposing of the case;

(D) Section 54.05 respecting modification of a previous juvenile court disposition; or

(E) Chapter 55 by a juvenile court committing a child to a facility for the mentally ill or intellectually disabled.

The courts of appeals are divided as to whether they have subject-matter jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a trial court ruling on a pre-adjudication application for habeas relief in juvenile-court proceedings. Our court and at least two others have held that the courts of appeals do not have jurisdiction to hear appeals from pre-adjudication habeas rulings in juvenile-court proceedings. See Mendoza v. Baker, 319 S.W.2d 147, 147-51 (Tex. App.-Houston 1958, no writ) (dismissing appeal from denial of pre-adjudication application for habeas relief for lack of jurisdiction); see also In re J.L.D., 704 S.W.2d 395, 396-97 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, no writ) (per curiam) (same); Stephenson v. State, 515 S.W.2d 362, 363 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1974, writ dism'd) (same). As the Thirteenth Court has explained, the statute authorizing appeals in juvenile cases mandates that "the appeal must include the juvenile court adjudication and all rulings contributing to that adjudication." Fam. § 56.01(b); In re O.D.T., No. 13-12-00518-CV, 2013 WL 485754, at *1-2 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Feb. 7, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing said statutory provision in support of decision holding that appellate court has no jurisdiction to hear appeal from juvenile court's denial of pre-adjudication habeas relief). Section 56.01(b) therefore indicates that an adjudication is a necessary prerequisite to an appeal, which also comports with the general rule applicable in civil cases that appellate courts only have subject-matter jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a final judgment. In re O.D.T., 2013 WL 485754, at *1.

However, at least two other courts of appeals have held the contrary, reasoning that a trial court's denial of pre-adjudication habeas relief constitutes a final judgment in itself and therefore is appealable. See In re J.C.L., No. 10-11-00407-CV, 2011 WL 5221766, at *2 (Tex. App.-Waco Oct. 28, 2011, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (denying petition for writ of mandamus because habeas application challenging same pre-adjudication detention order was pending in trial court and juvenile could appeal from any adverse habeas ruling); In re S.G., Jr., 935 S.W.2d 919, 923 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (appellate court had jurisdiction in appeal from denial of habeas relief where juvenile applied for writ on ground that second adjudication after mistrial would violate constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy); In re M.C., 915 S.W.2d 118, 119 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, no writ) (appellate court had jurisdiction to review trial court's ruling on merits concerning pre-adjudication application for writ of habeas corpus in juvenile-court proceeding). This position comports with how the Court of Criminal Appeals treats pretrial habeas applications in criminal cases. Greenwell v. Court of Appeals for Thirteenth Jud. Dist., 159 S.W.3d 645, 649-50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also Ex parte Lee, 617 S.W.3d 154, 160 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet. ref'd) (citing Greenwell for proposition that denial of pretrial habeas application is final appealable order in criminal proceedings).

In C.L.Z.'s response to our notice of intent to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, he makes two general arguments in favor of jurisdiction. First, he argues the Court of Criminal Appeals has correctly held that an application for habeas relief is an independent suit, and a ruling on a habeas application thus is a final judgment, not an interlocutory order. Second, C.L.Z. argues that even if pre-adjudication habeas rulings are not final judgments, they remain subject to interlocutory appeal.

C.L.Z.'s second argument is untenable. The lone authority he cites for this proposition is Ex parte McIntyre, 558 S.W.3d 295, 301 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2018, pet. ref'd) (per curiam). In McIntyre, the court characterized an appeal from the trial court's denial of a pretrial application for habeas relief as interlocutory and then decided the appeal on the merits. Id. at 296, 303. But McIntyre was a criminal proceeding, not a juvenile-court proceeding, and the court of appeals therefore had no occasion to consider whether it had jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the denial of a pre-adjudication application for the writ of habeas corpus. In civil matters, like juvenile-court proceedings, interlocutory orders are appealable only if an appeal is statutorily authorized. CMH Homes, 340 S.W.3d at 447; see In re D.B., 80 S.W.3d 698, 699-703 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2002, no pet.) (applying this rule in context of juvenile-court proceeding and with respect to pre-adjudication ruling). Thus, if pre-adjudication habeas rulings are correctly characterized as interlocutory, a statute must authorize an interlocutory appeal. C.L.Z. does not identify a statute.

C.L.Z.'s first argument-that pre-adjudication habeas rulings in juvenile-court proceedings are final judgments rather than interlocutory orders-is more compelling. The approach adopted by the Court of Criminal Appeals as to pretrial habeas rulings in criminal cases makes good sense and arguably would be just as sensible in juvenile-court cases. But our court has held the opposite. Mendoza, 319 S.W.2d at 147-51. And we are bound to follow the holdings of prior panels of this court absent a contrary decision from the Supreme Court of Texas, a contrary decision from our own court sitting en banc, or a material statutory change. Medina v. Tate, 438 S.W.3d 583, 588 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.).

Assuming for argument's sake that we could abandon Mendoza on one of the three preceding bases, we need not decide whether we ought to do so today because this case features another jurisdictional defect. In the criminal context, a defendant may appeal from the denial of a pretrial habeas application only if the trial court enters a written order ruling on the request for habeas relief. Ex parte Robles, 612 S.W.3d 142, 146 n.2 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.); Ex parte Evans, 611 S.W.3d 86, 88 (Tex. App.-Waco 2020, no pet.). Without that written order, the courts of appeals lack subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Ex parte Robles, 612 S.W.3d at 146 n.2; Ex parte Evans, 611 S.W.3d at 88; see also Ex parte Fry, No. 07-12-00156-CR, 2012 WL 1694362, at *1-2 (Tex. App.-Amarillo May 15, 2012, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction attempted appeal from oral ruling denying application for habeas relief seeking reduction in pretrial bail or bond); Broussard v. State, No. 01-10-00458-CR, 2010 WL 4056861, at *1-2 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 14, 2010, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (same); Wallace v. State, Nos. 12-01-00353-54-CR, 2002 WL 657396, at *1 (Tex. App.-Tyler Apr. 12, 2002, no pet.) (per curiam) (not designated for publication) (same).

The written-order requirement derives from our appellate procedural rules. Broussard, 2010 WL 4056861, at *1. The rule governing the perfection of criminal appeals provides that a defendant must appeal within a specified number of days "after the day the trial court enters an appealable order." Tex.R.App.P. 26.2(a)(1). The Court of Criminal Appeals has interpreted this rule to require a signed, written order. See Broussard, 2010 WL 4056861, at *1 (collecting cases). The corresponding rule governing the perfection of civil appeals is explicit on this point, providing that appeals must be filed within a specified number of days after the judgment or appealable order "is signed." Tex.R.App.P. 26.1(a)-(c). Under both rules, parties may appeal solely from a written order. Broussard, 2010 WL 4056861, at *1-2. An oral ruling made by the trial court from the bench is not an appealable ruling, even if it is transcribed by a court reporter and that transcript is included in the record. Id.

In this case, the trial court did not enter a written order ruling on C.L.Z.'s application for the writ of habeas corpus. Instead, the trial court ruled from the bench, and then it entered an order setting forth amended conditions of release. That order does not make any reference to C.L.Z.'s application for habeas relief whatsoever, let alone the trial court's rulings on C.L.Z.'s objections to the conditions of his release. Therefore, even if we accepted C.L.Z.'s position that a trial court's denial of pre-adjudication habeas relief in juvenile-court proceedings constitutes a final judgment just like the denial of pretrial habeas relief in criminal cases does, we nonetheless lack subject-matter lack jurisdiction to hear C.L.Z.'s appeal because the trial court did not enter a written order ruling on C.L.Z.'s habeas application. See id.

Pending Motion to Unseal the Record

C.L.Z. has moved to unseal the appellate record so that certain parties that wish to file amicus briefs may have access to the record on appeal. Because we must dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction, we deny C.L.Z.'s motion as moot.

CONCLUSION

We dismiss this appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.