Opinion
05-25-2016
In the Matter of a Miscellaneous Application by CLARA F., in relation to an application for issuance of a Visa under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U).
Thomas Cheung, Latin Women In Action, Inc., Corona, for petitioner. (Ex Parte application. No respondent).
Thomas Cheung, Latin Women In Action, Inc., Corona, for petitioner.
(Ex Parte application. No respondent).
I
JOHN M. HUNT, J. Clara F., who was the petitioner in a family offense petition filed in the Family Court, Queens County on April 23, 2013, has submitted this ex parte application requesting that the Family Court execute a "Form I–918, Supplement B, U Nonimmigrant Status Certification Form" certifying that she is an alien who is or has been the victim of certain qualifying criminal activity.
Counsel for Ms. F. indicates in his written communication to the Family Court that Ms. F. intends to submit the Form I–918, Supplement B certification form to the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS") of the United States Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") in connection with her application for issuance of a "U Visa". A U Visa is a type of nonimmigrant visa which may be issued by USCIS to an alien who is the victim of specific criminal acts enumerated in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U) ( Torres–Tristan v. Holder, 656 F.3d 653, 656 [7th Cir.2011] ; In re Nunez–Ramirez, 2013 WL 6273961 at *2 [S.D.Tex.2013] ). The family offense proceeding in this Court was commenced on April 23, 2013 when Clara F. filed the underlying family offense petition against Wilson M. pursuant to Family Court Act § 821. That petition alleged, in pertinent part, that the petitioner's address "is confidential", that the respondent's address is "unknown", that the parties have a child in common, and that respondent committed multiple acts between 2009 and up until March 2013 which, if true, would constitute one or more of the family offenses enumerated in Family Court Act § 812(1). Notably, these allegations involved threats by the respondent "to take away your daughter", "to beat you up", "to kill you", and also included physical abuse including pushing petitioner to the floor which caused a "painful bruise on my leg that lasted for about a week."
For purposes of immigration law, "[t]he term alien' means any person not a citizen or national of the United States" (8 U.S.C. § 1101 [a][3]; see also United States v. Claussen, 279 U.S. 398, 400, 49 S.Ct. 354, 73 L.Ed. 758 [1929] ; United States v. Mendez, 514 F.3d 1035, 1042 [10th Cir.2008], cert. denied 553 U.S. 1044, 128 S.Ct. 2455, 171 L.Ed.2d 250 [2008] ).
The petition further states that petitioner has not filed any criminal complaint concerning the alleged incidents, and also states that "[t]he following court cases are pending between me and the respondent: Westchester County Family Court–O–6060/10 (petition withdrawn) and O–3113/11 (order of protection-expired 7/20/12). Queens Family Court–V–1233/13 (case is adjourned to 6/4/13–Part 40)", and a child support proceeding being heard by a Family Court Support Magistrate.
Preliminary proceedings upon the petition were conducted before Court Attorney—Referees. The case was subsequently transferred to then—Judge Dennis Lebwohl after Mr. M. appeared and entered a denial to the allegations. Following proceedings before Judge Lebwohl on July 31, 2013 and August 12, 2013 for which both parties apparently appeared along with petitioner's assigned attorney, Judge Lebwohl subsequently proceeded to an inquest upon the default of Mr. M. on October 31, 2013. At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Lebwohl determined by a preponderance of the evidence ( Fam. Ct. Act § 832 ), that Mr. M. committed the family offenses of Attempted Assault in the Third Degree (P.L. §§ 110.00/120.00) and Harassment in the Second Degree (P.L. § 240.26). Judge Lebwohl proceeded to an immediate disposition of the proceeding and he issued an order of protection in favor of Ms. F. for a period of two years. The order directed that respondent commit no further family offenses, that he refrain from communicating with Ms. F. by any means, and that he stay away from her, her residence and place of employment ( Fam. Ct. Act §§ 841[d] ; 842).
The order of protection expired on October 31, 2015 and Judge Lebwohl's term of office expired on December 31, 2015. Petitioner submitted her initial request for the U Visa certification on or about February 9, 2016 and her second request was filed with the Clerk of Court on May 18, 2016. Apparently, for reasons of "administrative convenience", the application was referred to this Court which has had absolutely no contact with either of the parties and no involvement with any of their judicial proceedings.
II
"The Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (VTPA) amended the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) in part to create a new type of visa, known as the U–Visa' ... U–Visas can be granted to victims of certain listed crimes who later help United States law enforcement officials investigate or prosecute those crimes" ( Ordonez Orosco v. Napolitano, 598 F.3d 222, 224 [5th Cir.2010], cert.
denied 562 U.S. 863, 131 S.Ct. 389, 178 L.Ed.2d 87 [2010] ; see also Linares v. Sheriff's Office of Broward County, 588 Fed.Appx. 363 [5th Cir.2014] ).
The U Visa is "an immigration benefit available to certain victims of crime" ( Catholic Charities CYO v. Chertoff, 368 Fed.Appx. 750, 752 [9th Cir.2010] ; Aguirre–Palacios v. Doe, 2014 WL 584265 at *5 [S.D.Cal.2014] ). The statute creating the U visa ( 8 U.S.C. § 1101 [a][15][U] ) "simply sets forth eligibility standards, which determine who may file for U' visa status" ( Catholic Charities CYO v. Chertoff, 622 F.Supp.2d 865, 884 [N.D.Cal.2008] ). The statute and regulations vest USCIS with "sole discretion to determine eligibility for U–Visas" ( Shukhrat v. Secretary, U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec., 634 Fed.Appx. 880, 884 [3rd Cir.2015] ; see also Lee v. Holder, 599 F.3d 973, 974–975 [9th Cir.2010] ; Mondragon v. United States, 839 F.Supp.2d 827, 829 [W.D.N.C.2012] ; Aguirre–Palacios, 2014 WL 584265 at *5 ). There is no right to judicial review of the determination of USCIS ( Fonseca–Sanchez v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 439, 444–445 [7th Cir.2007] ; Catholic Charities, 368 Fed.Appx. at 753 ; Torres–Tristan, 656 F.3d at 658 ; Semiani v. United States, 575 F.3d 715 [D.C.Cir.2009] ; Mondragon, 839 F.Supp.2d at 829 ), and courts may not compel the USCIS to issue a U Visa (Catholic Charities CYO, 368 Fed.Appx. at 753 ). "The nonimmigrant U visa classification was intended to encourage law enforcement officials to better serve immigrant crime victims and to prosecute crimes committed against aliens, [to] facilitate the reporting of crimes to law enforcement officials by trafficked, exploited, victimized, and abused aliens who are not in lawful immigration status, and [to] give law enforcement officials a means to regularize the status of cooperating individuals during investigations or prosecutions" ( Romero–Hernandez v. District of Columbia, 141 F.Supp.3d 29, 32 [D.D.C.2015] ; see also Mondragon, 839 F.Supp.2d at 828 ; Villegas v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville, 907 F.Supp.2d 907, 909 [M.D.Tenn.2012] ).
In order to qualify for the issuance of a U visa, "an applicant must demonstrate that she (i) has suffered substantial physical or mental abuse as the result of having been the victim of qualifying criminal activity; (ii) possesses information concerning the qualifying criminal activity; and (iii) has been helpful, is being helpful or is likely to be helpful in investigating or prosecuting the qualifying criminal activity" ( Romero–Hernandez, 141 F.Supp.3d at 32 ; see also Bejarano v. Department of Homeland Security, 300 Fed.Appx. 651, 652 [11th Cir.2008] ; Lee, 599 F.3d at 974 ; Torres – Tristan 656 F.3d at 656 ; Geminiano–Martinez v. Beers, 2013 WL 6844717 at *2 [D.Nev.2013] ; in rE namE redacted, USDHS, USCIS, admin. appealS officE, 2014 WL 3898996 at *1 ).
"In order to obtain a U–Visa, an alien who was the victim of an enumerated crime must obtain a certification' from law enforcement officials confirming that [s]he was helpful to the investigation of prosecution of the crime" ( Ordonez Orosco, 598 F.3d at 224 ; see Mondragon, 839 F.Supp.2d at 828 ; Romero–Hernandez, 141 F.Supp.3d at 33 ). "The petition filed by an alien under section 1101(a)(15)(U)(i) of [8 U.S.C.] shall contain a certification from a Federal, State, or local authority investigating criminal activity described in section 1101(a)(15)(U)(iii) of this title. This certification may also be provided by an official of the Service whose ability to provide such certification is not limited to information concerning immigration violations. This certification shall state that the alien has been helpful, is being helpful, or is likely to be helpful' in the investigation or prosecution of criminal activity described in section 1101(a)(15)(U)(iii) of this title" ( 8 U.S.C. § 1184 [p][1]; see 8 C.F.R. § 214.14 [c][2][i]; Linares 588 Fed.Appx. at 363 ; Romero–Hernandez, 141 F.Supp.3d at 33 ; In re Name Redacted, 2014 WL 3898996 at *1 ).Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(1) and 8 C.F.R. § 214.13, the certification required under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(i) may be made, inter alia, by "a Federal, State, or local law enforcement official, prosecutor, judge, or other Federal or State, or local authority investigating criminal activity". While judges do not conduct criminal investigations or prosecute offenders, they are specifically designated as qualified certifying officials for purposes of Form I–918, Supplement B ( 8 CFR § 214.13 [3][ii]; Villegas,
907 F.Supp.2d at 910 ; Shukhrat v. Napolitano, 2013 WL 6210264 at *1 [E.D.Pa.2013] ).
The decision of a law enforcement official to grant or deny a request for certification is discretionary, and there is no right of judicial review from a refusal to grant the certification ( Ordonez, 598 F.3d at 226 ; Linares, 588 Fed.Appx. at 363 ; Bejarano, 300 Fed.Appx. at 653 ; Trevino v. Benton County, Arkansas, 578 Fed.Appx. 626, 627 [8th Cir.2014] ; United States v. Biao, 2011 WL 607087 [S.D.Cal.2011] ; Romero–Hernandez, 141 F.Supp.3d at 33 ).
With respect to the application for issuance of the Form I–918, Supplement B certification submitted by Ms. F., the Court makes the following observations.
The certification required by Form I–918, Supplement B, which must accompany any U–Visa application filed with the USCIS, and which is executed "under penalty of perjury" by the law enforcement official, must:
state that: the person signing the certificate is the head of the certifying agency ... or is a Federal, State, or local judge; the agency is a Federal, State, or local law enforcement agency, or prosecutor, judge or other authority, that has the responsibility for the detection, investigation, prosecution, conviction, or sentencing of qualifying criminal activity; the applicant has been a victim of qualifying criminal activity that the certifying official's agency is investigating or prosecuting; the petitioner possesses information concerning the qualifying criminal activity of which he or she has been a victim; the petitioner has been, is being, or is likely to be helpful to an investigation or prosecution of that qualifying criminal activity; and the qualifying criminal activity violated U.S. law, or occurred in the United States ... ( 8 C.F.R. § 214.14 [c][2][i] ).
In the view of this Court, the family offense proceeding adjudicated by Judge Lebwohl did not constitute a criminal action ( Criminal Procedure Law § 1.20 [16 ]; Fam. Ct. Act §§ 812[2][b], [c] ; 813[3]; see People v. Wood, 95 N.Y.2d 509, 512–513, 719 N.Y.S.2d 639, 742 N.E.2d 114 [2000] ; Matter of
Richardson v. Richardson, 80 A.D.3d 32, 36–37, 910 N.Y.S.2d 149 [2010] ; Matter of Molloy v. Molloy, 137 A.D.3d 47, 50–51, 24 N.Y.S.3d 333 [2016] ). Thus, the Family Court had no role in presiding over any prosecution, conviction, or sentencing of a defendant. As one court has observed, "there have been no cases in this circuit in which a federal judge has granted U–Visa certification to a party involved in a civil proceeding before the court" ( Baiju v. U.S. Department of Labor, 2014 WL 349295 at *19 [E.D.N.Y.2014],app. dismissed 14–394 [2nd Cir.2014]; see also, Aguirre–Palacios v. Doe No. 1, 2014 WL 584265 [S.D.Cal.2014] ).
Additionally, "[t]he fact that the regulations allow judges to grant U visa certifications does not mean that judges possess unfettered discretion to do so. Rather, the regulations require that a certifying judge be connected to an underlying criminal prosecution or investigation" ( Romero–Hernandez, 141 F.Supp.3d at 33 ; see also Linares v. Sheriff's Office Broward County, 2014 WL 1787980 at *2 [W.D.La.2014] ; Nunez–Ramirez, 2013 WL 6273961 at *5 ; Agaton v. Hospitality & Catering Services, Inc., 2013 WL 1282454 at *4 [W.D.La.2013] ; Baiju, 2014 WL 349295 at *19–20 [E.D.N.Y.2014] ; People v. Hampton, 21 N.Y.3d 277, 287, 970 N.Y.S.2d 716, 992 N.E.2d 1059 [2013] [under Judiciary Law § 21 trial judge shall not decide factual issues tried before different judge] ).
Lastly, the signing of a Form I–918, Supplement B certification is not a simple ministerial act, that is an act not involving the exercise of reasoned judgment (e.g.
Lauer v. City of New York, 95 N.Y.2d 95, 115, 711 N.Y.S.2d 112, 733 N.E.2d 184 [2000] ). To the contrary, the judge or other law enforcement official is stating under the penalty of perjury, a sworn declaration, that certain facts exist and that certain conditions exist. Here, this Court had absolutely no role in the adjudication of the underlying family offense proceeding, and this Court is unable to execute the required certification.
This does not mean that Ms. F. is without remedy, notwithstanding this Court's determination that it should not execute the certification. On February 28, 2011 Ms. F. filed a family offense petition against Mr. M. in the Family Court, Westchester County. That petition was assigned to a Family Court Judge who granted the petition and issued an order of protection on July 20, 2011 in favor of Ms. F. for a period expiring July 20, 2012. Unlike Judge Lebwohl who has retired, the Family Court Judge sitting in Westchester County continues to preside in the Family Court. Nothing in this Court's decision and order prevents Ms. F. from presenting her request to the Judge in Westchester County for his consideration based upon then family offense proceeding adjudicated before him.
It is therefore
ORDERED, that this miscellaneous application is denied for the reasons stated herein.