MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

GREGORY M. SLEET, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

On November 22, 2000, the Debtors, Big V Holding Corp., et al., filed voluntary petitions for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(a), the bankruptcy cases were referred from the United States District Court for the District of Delaware to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware ("the Bankruptcy Court"). Since the petition date, the Debtors have continued in possession of their properties and the management and operation of their businesses as debtors in possession pursuant to sections 1107 and 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code. On December 6, 2000, an Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors ("the Creditors' Committee") was appointed by the United States Trustee pursuant to § 1102 of the Bankruptcy Code. Presently before the court is the Creditors' Committee's March 20, 2001 motion to withdraw the reference to the Bankruptcy Court. Since Wakefern has yet to assert a proper jury demand, and since considerations of judicial economy favor leaving the adversary proceeding in the Bankruptcy Court until it is ready for trial, Wakefern's motion to withdraw the reference will be denied at this time.

II. FACTS

Wakefern Food Corporation ("Wakefern"), the plaintiff in this adversary proceeding (the "CS Action"), is a food cooperative wholesaler that centralizes the purchasing of inventory and supplies for its members. The Debtors have been a member of the Wakefern cooperative since 1959. Pursuant to the stockholder agreement and by-laws governing Wakefern members, the Debtors are obligated to purchase approximately 85% of their products from Wakefern.

On August 3, 2000, the Debtors decided that their continued participation in Wakefern was detrimental to their business and, as a result, entered into a supply agreement with CS Wholesale Grocers, Inc. ("CS"), a direct competitor of Wakefern. On November 28, 2001, six days after the Debtors filed for relief under chapter 11, Wakefern filed suit against CS in New Jersey state court. The complaint alleged that CS, by executing an agreement with the Debtors, had engaged in tortious interference with Wakefern's contractual relations and had aided and abetted the Debtors' breach of fiduciary duty. The complaint seeks preliminary and permanent injunctions as well as damages. The CS Action was removed to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey and was subsequently transferred to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, the Honorable Raymond T. Lyons presiding.

On March 20, 2001, Wakefern filed a motion to withdraw the reference of the CS Action to the Bankruptcy Court. CS objected, arguing that Wakefern had failed to make a simultaneous motion to the Bankruptcy Court for a determination of whether the CS Action was a "core" or "non-core" proceeding as required by Delaware Local Bankruptcy Rule 5011-1. On May 25, 2001, the Bankruptcy Court issued an order designating the CS Action as a "non-core" proceeding. Therefore, CS withdrew its objection to Wakefern's motion to withdraw the reference. The Debtors and the Creditors' Committee, however, have continued to oppose the motion. On January 31, 2001, the Creditors' Committee filed a motion to intervene in the CS Action, which was granted by the bankruptcy court on February 15, 2001. The court has no record of a motion to intervene being filed by the Debtors.

Central to the CS Action is the Debtors' termination of the Wakefern supply agreement and execution of the CS Supply agreement. Before proceeding with the CS supply agreement, the Debtors sought a declaratory judgment from the Bankruptcy Court in order to determine whether the Debtors would owe a large withdrawal payment to Wakefern if they proceeded with the CS supply agreement. On September 14, 2001, in Big V Supermarkets, Inc. v. Wakefern Food Corp., 267 B.R. 71, 111 (Bankr.D.Del. 2001), the Bankruptcy Court held that the Debtors would be obligated to make the withdrawal payment. The Bankruptcy Court also made specific findings as to what would constitute a breach of good faith and fair dealing with regards to the Debtors' attempts to abandon the Wakefern supply agreement.

Apart from the declaratory judgment action, the Bankruptcy court has presided over numerous scheduling and pretrial conferences and disputes, including Wakefern's February 9, 2001 motion to compel the Debtors' assumption/rejection of the Wakefern Agreement and CS's March 28, 2001 motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, to stay proceedings. In sum, the CS Action is intertwined with several proceedings and matters which are or were before the Bankruptcy Court. Furthermore, Bankruptcy Court Judge Lyons stated that he believes the CS Action should be adjudicated together with the other actions relating to the bankruptcy case. During a March 28, 2001 scheduling conference, Judge Lyons stated, "I think this is a three party dispute that should be dealt with together."

One final fact is crucial to the court's analysis of Wakefern's motion. To date, Wakefern has not made any formal demand for a jury trial. However, Wakefern has indicated that they plan to file an amended complaint with the formal jury trial demand after the court decides this motion to withdraw the reference. Wakefern refuses to file the amended complaint for fear that filing a claim in the Bankruptcy Court could constitute consent to the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court and consequently, waiver of the right to a jury trial.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Intervention

Neither the Debtors or the Creditors' Committee are parties to the CS Action. Therefore, in order for their objection to be heard, they must have properly intervened in the adversary proceeding.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(1) provides that upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action "when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional right to intervene." Both the Debtors and the Creditors Committee believe that they have an unconditional right to be heard under 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b), which states, in part, "A party in interest, including the debtor, . . . [or] a creditors' committee . . . may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue in a case under this chapter." Wakefern argues that the CS Action, an adversary proceeding, is not a "case under this chapter" as required by the statute. Although the circuits are split on whether section 1109(b) confers an unconditional right to intervene, the Third Circuit has taken a clear position on the issue. In Phar-Mor, Inc. v. Coopers Lybrand, 22 F.3d 1228, 1241 (3d Cir. 1994), the Third Circuit held that section 1109(b) gives a creditors' committee an unconditional right to intervene in a non-core adversarial proceeding in federal district court which is "related to" a bankruptcy case.

A civil proceeding is "related to" bankruptcy when the outcome of that proceeding could conceivably have any effect on the estate being administered. See Halper v. Halper, 164 F.3d 830, 837 (3d Cir. 1999). The complaint in the adversary proceeding between Wakefern and CS seeks an injunction against the Debtors' supply agreement with CS. Thus the adversary proceeding clearly affects the Debtors' estate and their ability to reorganize. Moreover, the procedural history of the CS Action indicates that it is "related to" the bankruptcy. The proceeding was removed from state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1452(a), which allows a party to remove a cause of action that is "related to" a bankruptcy case. Furthermore, the CS Action was referred to the Bankruptcy Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(a), which mandates that proceedings "related to" a case under title 11 shall be referred to the bankruptcy judges for the district. Therefore, the CS Action clearly satisfies the "related to" requirement.

Since the CS Action is "related to" the bankruptcy, the Phar-Mor holding dictates that the Debtors and Creditors' Committee have an unconditional right to intervene under section 1109(b). In the instant proceeding, the Creditors' Committee has properly filed a motion to intervene and has otherwise complied with the requirements for intervention pursuant to Rule 24(c). Therefore, since 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) gives a creditors' committee an unconditional right to intervene in light of Phar-Mor, the Creditors' Committee is a proper intervenor in this matter pursuant to Rule 24(a)(1).

B. Mandatory v. Permissive Withdrawal of the Reference

The CS Action was referred to the Bankruptcy Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(a). The procedure governing withdrawal of the reference to the Bankruptcy Court is stated in 28 U.S.C. § 157(d), which reads,

"The district court may withdraw, in whole or in part, any case or proceeding referred under this section, on its own motion or on timely motion of any party, for cause shown. The district court shall, on timely motion of a party, so withdraw a proceeding if the court determines that resolution of the proceeding requires consideration of both title 11 and other laws of the United States regulating organizations or activities affecting interstate commerce." 28 U.S.C. § 157(d).

The first sentence of this statute describes the conditions under which withdrawal is permissive, while the second sentence describes the conditions under which withdrawal is mandatory. Since the CS Action involves only state law tort and contract claims, it clearly does not meet the requirements for mandatory withdrawal. Therefore, the permissive withdrawal standard applies. Under this standard, the court may withdraw the reference of the adversary proceeding "for cause shown." See 28 U.S.C. § 157(d).

As the movant in this case, Wakefern bears the burden to show cause. NDEP Corp. v. Handl-It, Inc., 203 B.R. 905, 907 (D.Del. 1996). The statute does not define "cause," but guideposts exist to elucidate the meaning of the word. The Third Circuit has stated that a court should consider: "the goals of promoting uniformity in bankruptcy administration, reducing forum shopping and confusion, fostering the economical use of the debtors' and creditors' resources, and expediting the bankruptcy process." In re Pruitt, 910 F.2d 1160, 1168 (3d Cir. 1990). However, the "factors listed in Pruitt were not designed to be exhaustive; they are only minimal standards." NDEP Corp., 203 B.R. at 908. Relevant considerations might also include "the nature of the proceedings (i.e., core or non-core) and judicial economy." Hatzel Buehler, Inc. v. Orange Rockland Utils., Inc., 107 B.R. 34, 39 (D.Del. 1989). Another factor which should be considered is "whether the parties have requested a jury trial." Hatzel Buehler, Inc. v. Central Hudson Gas Elec. Corp., 106 B.R. 367, 371 (D.Del. 1989). The court will now consider these factors.

C. Factors to Consider in Determining Whether to Withdraw the Reference

1. Core v. Non-Core and Judicial Economy

There are strictures upon the Bankruptcy Court's authority to hear and determine non-core proceedings that do not apply in the instance of core proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1). Thus, a determination of whether the CS Action is a core or non-core proceeding is crucial to the determination of the Creditors' Committee's motion. In an Order dated May 25, 2001, the Bankruptcy Court declared that the current adversary proceeding is non-core. No party has challenged the Bankruptcy Court's ruling, therefore, the court concludes the CS Action is a non-core proceeding.

Moving to the question of judicial economy, the court believes the goals of promoting uniformity in bankruptcy administration, reducing forum shopping and confusion, fostering the economical use of the debtors' and creditors' resources, and expediting the bankruptcy process, as set forth in Pruitt, 910 F.2d at 1168, would seem to be best served by leaving the CS Action in the Bankruptcy Court.

The Bankruptcy Court is intimately familiar with the numerous complex issues surrounding the CS Action. In fact, on September 14, 2001, the Bankruptcy Court issued a declaratory judgment in a separate adversary proceeding to this bankruptcy case which is interrelated with the CS Action. See Big V Supermarkets, Inc., 267 B.R. 71. In that proceeding, the Bankruptcy Court held that Wakefern would be entitled to a withdrawal payment if the Debtors were to proceed with their supply agreement with CS. Id. at 111. Furthermore, the Bankruptcy Court made specific findings as to what would constitute a breach of good faith and fair dealing with regard to the Debtors' attempts to abandon the Wakefern supply agreement. Id. Thus, it is apparent that the Bankruptcy Court is very familiar with the facts and issues which are crucial to the determination of the CS Action. Specifically, the Bankruptcy Court has become familiar with important provisions of Wakefern's By-Laws and Stockholders' Agreement, all of which are crucial to the CS Action. In sum, the Bankruptcy Court has already expended invaluable time and energy familiarizing itself with the facts and issues surrounding the CS Action. Considerations of judicial economy thus weigh in favor of leaving the case with the Bankruptcy Court. See Northwestern Institute of Psychiatry, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 272 B.R. 104, 109 (E.D.Pa. 2001) ("The bankruptcy court is familiar with the parties, the factual background of the case and the legal issues involved. Therefore, this court finds no reason to disturb the present course and it declines to withdraw the reference as judicial economy will be served by allowing the adversary action to remain in bankruptcy court").

2. Right to a Jury Trial

The right to a jury trial is an important factor in determining a motion to withdraw the reference. This is so because absent the express consent of both parties and a special designation of jurisdiction by the district court, the Bankruptcy Court may not hold a jury trial in a non-core proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(e).

It is clear that Wakefern has a constitutional right to a jury trial in this case. The Seventh Amendment states, "In Suits at common law where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. VII. In Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 41 (1989), the Supreme Court explained that "suits at common law" referred to controversies in which legal rights were to be determined, as distinguished from cases in which only equitable rights were recognized and only equitable remedies were administered. Furthermore, the Court stated that the Seventh Amendment only requires a jury trial if a cause of action is legal in nature and it involves a matter of private right. Id. at 42 n. 4. The CS Action, a contract and tort action for damages, is clearly legal in nature and involves a matter of private right. See NDEP Corp., 203 B.R. at 909.

However, although Wakefern has a right to a jury trial of the CS Action, a proper jury demand has not been made. Wakefern has stated that upon the court's determination of this motion to withdraw the reference, it will file the amended complaint containing a demand for a jury trial. While Wakefern's intention to formally demand a jury trial is duly noted, the fact remains that they have not yet done so. Wakefern is reluctant to file an amended complaint with a jury demand because it believes, not without reason, that filing an amended complaint could quite possibly constitute waiver of their Seventh Amendment right to have their claims tried by jury. See Billing v. Ravin, Greenberg Zackin, P.A., 22 F.3d 1242, 1250-1253 (3d Cir. 1993) (identifying two theories whereby courts have divested parties of their rights to a jury in the bankruptcy context. Under the "waiver theory," a party can lose its right to a jury trial by voluntarily submitting to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court through the filing of a petition or claim in the bankruptcy court).

Although Wakefern may be entitled to a jury trial, their potential entitlement at some future date is not sufficient grounds to withdraw the reference at this time. Withdrawal of the reference based on the ground that a party is entitled to a jury trial should be deferred until the case is "trial ready." See In re Northwestern Institute of Psychiatry, Inc., 268 B.R. 79, 84 (E.D.Pa. 2001) (citing In re Commercial Financial Services, Inc., 239 B.R. 586, 596 (N.D.Okla. 1999); see also Barlow Peek, Inc. v. Manke Truck Lines, Inc., 163 B.R. 177, 179 (D.Nev. 1993) (refusing to withdraw reference until "it is clear that a jury trial will be necessary and that the case is prepared and ready for such trial to commence"). It would be premature to withdraw the reference to the bankruptcy court based upon the unfixed proposition that a jury trial may occur in the future. At the present time, the case is not ready for trial. Assuming that Wakefern does file the amended complaint containing a proper jury demand, a jury trial may not be necessary in order to resolve the CS Action. During the March 28, 2001 scheduling conference in connection with the CS Action, Bankruptcy Court Judge Lyons stated that this case "cries out for settlement." Until Wakefern properly asserts their right to a jury trial, the CS Action should remain in the Bankruptcy Court.

The court is persuaded that Wakefern's right to a jury trial, if properly asserted in the future, will not be adversely affected by having the Bankruptcy Court preside over pretrial matters until the case is ready to be tried in the District Court. Until that time, the bankruptcy judge can serve basically the same function as a magistrate. See In re Delaware and Hudson Ry. Co., 122 B.R. 887, 897 (D.Del. 1991).

IV. CONCLUSION

In this case, judicial economy weighs heavily in favor of leaving the CS Action in the Bankruptcy Court, since that court has already issued a declaratory judgment in an adversarial proceeding which is factually and legally interrelated with the CS Action. Withdrawal of the reference at this point based on Wakefern's right to a jury trial would be premature, since Wakefern has yet to officially file a jury demand.

The court will deny Wakefern's motion to withdraw the reference, but will do so without prejudice. When the CS Action is ready for trial, Wakefern may file a renewed motion to withdraw the reference.

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Wakefern's request for withdrawal of the reference to bankruptcy is DENIED;

2. This denial is without prejudice to Wakefern's ability to renew its request for withdrawal of the reference at a later time, when a jury trial has been properly demanded and the case becomes ready for trial.