OPINION

JOHN ARCUDI, CHAIRMAN.

Throughout the history of workers' compensation in our state the conflict between independent contractor and employee status has been a recurrent theme. In this appeal the claimant is contesting the Fourth District ruling that she was an independent contractor and not an employee.

Claimant was hired as a proofreader by the respondent employer, General Electric, in September, 1984. She was paid by the hour. The employer furnished claimant with whatever supplies and implements were needed for her work. Claimant had no business of her own nor did any other entities beside General Electric engage her services. No income taxes or F.I.C.A. taxes were deducted from her remuneration. Nor were medical benefits, sick pay, holiday pay or vacation pay paid her. Sixteen months after she started with General Electric a Freelance Agreement was executed between her and the respondent on January 6, 1986 it declared that the claimant was an independent contractor and not an employee. On October 24, 1989, she slipped and fell on a linoleum floor in the course of her G.E. services and sustained personal injuries.

A determination of whether a claimant is an employee or not is a question of fact. Frances v. Franklin Cafeteria, Inc. 123 Conn. 320 (1937). As such it is to be determined by the trier and will ordinarily not be disturbed on review unless "so unreasonable as to justify judicial interference." Bailey v. Mitchell, 113 Conn. 721, 725 (1931). As was held in Fair v. People's Savings Bank, 207 Conn. 535, 539 (1988), on appeal we cannot reassess the facts. Our role is limited to determining whether there was evidence to support the commissioner's conclusion, whether the conclusion was based on unreasonable or impermissible factual inferences, or whether the conclusion was an incorrect application of the law.

Central to the employee status is the employers right to control the individual's work activity. Kaliszewski v. Weathermaster Alsco Corp., 148 Conn. 624, 629 (1961). Here the findings which support the commissioner's conclusion that claimant was an independent contractor are found in paragraphs 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18. Those paragraphs state:

14. On January 6, 1986, the claimant, who has professional skills and understands the meaning of words and phrases, executed a "FREELANCE AGREEMENT" which set forth that she was an independent contractor and not an employee. 15. The claimant was paid for her work at G.E. following the submission of a purchase order at an agreed rate. 16. The respondent did not deduct any income taxes or F.I.C.A. taxes from the monies paid to the claimant. 17. No medical benefits were provided to the claimant by the respondent and the claimant did not receive sick pay, vacation pay or holiday pay. 18. The claimant, as a professional in a specialized occupation, performed the work by her own methods and without control of the employer-respondent except as to the result of her work.

Neither paragraphs 15, 16, or 17 are proof positive of independent contractor status. Cf. Kaliszewski, supra. Nor does the existence of a "FREELANCE AGREEMENT" between the parties declaring that claimant is not an employee compel a conclusion that she was indeed an independent contractor. Certainly the testimony of the claimant supports a strong inference that at the very least, she was pressured into accepting the designation.

Kaliszewski stated:

One is an employee of another when he renders a service for the other and when what he agrees to do, or is directed to do, is subject to the will of the other in the mode and manner in which the service is to be done and in the means to be employed in its accomplishment as well as in the result to be attained. Bieluczyk v. Crown Petroleum Corporation, 134 Conn. 461, 465.

Kaliszewski, supra at 629.

The fact that claimant was a professional in and of itself does not make her an independent contractor. Besides, there were findings that she was paid by the hour, was expected to report daily to the respondent's graphics department and remain there between 9:00 and 5:00 pm. She was also paid time and a half for hours worked in excess of forty hours. Although the Finding does not specifically address it, it seems to suggest there was no change in claimant's status when she executed the "Freelance Agreement". Similarly, despite the conclusion in paragraph #22 that the L.J. Gonzer Associates contract of employment April 23, 1990 was irrelevant, neither does it appear that there was really any change in claimant's work status when that occurred.

Apart from the fact that no income taxes and no F.I.C.A. taxes were deducted and no medical benefits were provided, there are no findings to support the legal conclusion in paragraph #18 that claimant "performed the work by her own methods and without control of the employer-respondent." There are many professionals who are employees, e.g. teachers in a school system, lawyers in a law firm, architects in an architectural firm, etc. Further, the other facts found, a nine to five working day, pay by the hour, time and a half for overtime, seem inconsistent with the conclusion that she exercised control over her work or that the employer exercised no control.

We must remand the matter to the Fourth District so that further factual findings may be made on the issue of control. The commissioner may reach the same ultimate conclusion, but more facts must be found too justify any legal conclusion reached.

The appeal is sustained and the matter is remanded to the Fourth District for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Commissioners Doyle and Frankl concur.