Summary
In Huff v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 40 Pa. Commw. 11, 396 A.2d 94 (1979), aff'd per curiam, 487 Pa. 448, 409 A.2d 854 (1980), this Court held that a truck driver who was discharged because his state driver's license had been suspended for driving under the influence of intoxicants was ineligible for benefits because he failed to meet the "no fault" requirement of 43 P. S. § 752.
Summary of this case from Varmecky v. Commonwealth, Unemployment Compensation Board of ReviewOpinion
Argued December 8, 1978
January 17, 1979.
Unemployment compensation — Scope of appellate review — Questions of law — Findings of fact — Substantial evidence — Unemployment Compensation Law, Act 1936, December 5, P.L. (1937) 2897 — Fault of employe — Vagueness.
1. In an unemployment compensation case review by the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania is limited to questions of law and a determination of whether findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. [13]
2. A truck driver, who is discharged because of his inability to drive following the suspension of his motor vehicle operator's license for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, is properly found to be unemployed through his own fault and ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits. [13]
3. Provisions of the Unemployment Compensation Law, Act 1936, December 5, P.L. (1937) 2897, which have been held to disqualify from the receipt of benefits a person whose unemployment is through fault of his own, are not unconstitutionally vague. [13]
Argued December 8, 1978, before Judges CRUMLISH, JR., BLATT and MacPHAIL, sitting as a panel of three.
Appeal, No. 1604 C.D. 1977, from the Order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review in case of In Re: Claim of Harold F. Huff, Sr., No. B-147592.
Application to the Bureau of Employment Security for unemployment compensation benefits. Application denied. Applicant appealed to the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review. Denial affirmed. Applicant appealed to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. Held: Affirmed.
George Price, with him Warren R. Baldys, Jr., for petitioner. Michael D. Klein, with him James K. Bradley, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel R. Schuckers, Assistant Attorney General, and Gerald Gornish, Acting Attorney General, for respondent.
Harold F. Huff (claimant) appeals from a decision of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review that he was ineligible for benefits under Section 3 of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Act) because his unemployment did not result "through no fault of [his] own."
Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P. S. § 752. This section provides:
Economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the people of the Commonwealth. Involuntary unemployment and its resulting burden of indigency fall with crushing force upon the unemployed worker, and ultimately upon the Commonwealth and its political subdivisions in the form of poor relief assistance. Security against unemployment and the spread of indigence can best be provided by the systematic setting aside of financial reserves to be used as compensation for loss of wages by employes during periods when they become unemployed through no fault of their own. The principle of the accumulation of financial reserves, the sharing of the risks, and the payment of compensation with respect to unemployment meets the need of protection against the hazards of unemployment and indigency. The Legislature, therefore, declares that in its considered judgment the public good and the general welfare of the citizens of this Commonwealth require the exercise of the police powers of the Commonwealth in the enactment of this act for the compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own. (Emphasis added.)
The claimant was employed as a truck driver for Maislin Transportation of Delaware, Inc. (employer), when his driver's license was suspended for one year as a result of his driving while not in the course of his employment but under the influence of intoxicants. Because his employer had no work for him other than that which would require having a valid driver's license, he was discharged. He then applied to the Bureau of Employment Security for unemployment compensation benefits which were denied on the basis that he was ineligible under Section 402(e) of the Act, 43 P. S. § 802(e) because his discharge was due to his own willful misconduct. On appeal, the referee concluded that the claimant was not disqualified under Section 402(e) because the conduct which led to his discharge was not connected with his work, but the referee did deny benefits on the ground that the claimant's unemployment was not "through no fault of his own" as required by Section 3 of the Act.
Our scope of review in an unemployment compensation case is limited to questions of law and, absent fraud, to a determination of whether or not the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Owen v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 26 Pa. Commw. 278, 363 A.2d 852 (1976).
It is uncontroverted here that the claimant lost his job solely through his own fault. The issue, therefore, is whether or not Section 3 provides an independent substantive basis upon which to deny benefits under the Act. And, because we have previously held in Unemployment Compensation Board of Review v. Ostander, 21 Pa. Commw. 583, 347 A.2d 351 (1975) that it does, we are bound to affirm the decision of the Board.
The claimant's contention that Section 3 used as a disqualifying provision is unconstitutionally vague has also been refuted by this Court in Strokes v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 29 Pa. Commw. 584, 372 A.2d 485 (1977).
Accordingly, we affirm.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 17th day of January, 1979, the decision of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review in the above-captioned matter is affirmed.