Summary
In Strokes v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 29 Pa. Commw. 584, 372 A.2d 485 (1977), a truck driver had his motor vehicle license suspended for failure to pay a judgment.
Summary of this case from Duquesne Light Co. v. CommonwealthOpinion
Argued January 31, 1977
April 15, 1977.
Unemployment compensation — Unemployment without fault — Unemployment Compensation Law, Act 1936, December 5, P.L. (1937) 2897 — Liberal construction — Culpability — Failure to satisfy judgment — The Vehicle Code, Act 1959, April 29, P.L. 58 — Suspension of motor vehicle operator's license — Vagueness.
1. An employe is not entitled to benefits under the Unemployment Compensation Law, Act 1936, December 5, P.L. (1937) 2897, when his unemployment is brought about through his own fault. [585-6-7]
2. The requirement that the Unemployment Compensation Law, Act 1936, December 5, P.L. (1937) 2897, be liberally construed in aid of its remedial purposes does not mean that an employe whose unemployment is the result of his own fault is not disqualified from the receipt of benefits unless his actions constituted a crime of serious nature. [587-8]
3. In order to find that an employe is ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits because his unemployment occurred through his own fault, it is necessary that the act of the employe resulting in unemployment be one to which blame, censure, impropriety, shortcoming or culpability attaches. [588-9]
4. A driver whose employment is terminated because his motor vehicle operator's license was suspended under The Vehicle Code, Act 1959, April 29, P.L. 58, for failure to satisfy a judgment rendered against him, is properly found to be unemployed through his own fault and ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits. [588-9]
5. Provisions of the Unemployment Compensation Law, Act 1936, December 5, P.L. 1937, rendering one ineligible for benefits whose employment is terminated through his own fault, are not unconstitutionally vague. [589]
Argued January 31, 1977, before Judges KRAMER, ROGERS and BLATT, sitting as a panel of three.
Appeal, No. 624 C.D. 1976, from the Order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review in case of In Re: Claim of James Strokes, No. B-130211.
Application to Bureau of Employment Security for unemployment compensation benefits. Benefits denied. Applicant appealed to the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review. Denial affirmed. Applicant appealed to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. Held: Affirmed.
David A. Searles, with him James B. Lieber, for appellant.
David Bianco, Assistant Attorney General, with him Sydney Reuben, Assistant Attorney General, and Robert P. Kane, Attorney General, for appellee.
This is an appeal filed by James Strokes (Strokes) from an order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board), dated March 1, 1976. The order denies Strokes benefits under Section 3 of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Act), Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P. S. § 752, for the reason that his unemployment did not result "through no fault of his own."
This Court held in Unemployment Compensation Board of Review v. Ostrander, 21 Pa. Commw. 583, 347 A.2d 351 (1975), that Section 3 provides a substantive basis upon which to deny unemployment benefits.
Strokes was a truck driver for the Delaware Valley Hospital Laundry. His weekly salary was $170. On April 28, 1975, Strokes was informed by his employer that its insurance carrier had received notice that Strokes' motor vehicle license had been suspended. Strokes produced a valid driver's license and stated that he was unaware of any suspension. His employer thereupon told him to clear the matter up. He continued working and next met with his employer on May 12, 1975. Strokes stated at this meeting that he did not wish to drive on a license that was not valid. He was told by his employer that there were no other positions available and that he had until May 16 to clear up the matter of the suspension. He then drove to Harrisburg and learned the basis for the suspension. A judgment obtained by a third party in an unrelated civil action had been entered against him in the amount of $394. Because Strokes had not satisfied the judgment, his operator's license had been suspended pursuant to Section 1413 of The Vehicle Code, Act of April 29, 1959, P.L. 58, as amended, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1413. Strokes did not return to see his employer until some time after June 3, 1975. At this time, he asked for employment which would not require driving and was once again informed that there was no other position available. Because Strokes was unable to drive, his employment was terminated.
The record does not indicate why Strokes did not receive official notification of the suspension of his operator's license.
It should be noted that The Vehicle Code has been newly codified under 75 Pa. C.S. § 1550, effective July 1, 1977.
Section 3 of the Unemployment Compensation Act, 43 P. S. § 752, provides:
Economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the people of the Commonwealth. Involuntary unemployment and its resulting burden of indigency falls with crushing force upon the unemployed worker. . . . Security against unemployment and the spread of indigency can best be provided by the systematic setting aside of financial reserves to be used as compensation for loss of wages by employes during periods when they become unemployed through no fault of their own. . . . The Legislature, therefore, declares that in its considered judgment the public good and the general welfare of the citizens of this Commonwealth require the exercise of the police powers of the Commonwealth in the enactment of this Act for the compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own. (Emphasis added.)
Strokes contends that because the referee and the Board misconstrued the meaning of the word "fault" as found in the phrase "through no fault of their own," Section 3 was misapplied to deny him benefits. Alternatively, he argues that even if the Section was properly applied, he cannot be denied benefits under its provisions as the term "through no fault of their own" is unconstitutionally vague. We find these arguments to be without merit.
Strokes contends that upon application of Section 3 as a substantive basis upon which to deny benefits, the word "fault" as found therein must be strictly construed to entail a crime of a serious nature. Such an argument is contrary to the fundamental intent of the Act. The Supreme Court of this Commonwealth stated in Lybarger Unemployment Compensation Case, 418 Pa. 471, 477, 211 A.2d 463, 466 (1965), that the Act is aimed at helping those in a situation of "involuntary unemployment." The Court equated "involuntary unemployment" with the term in Section 3 "through no fault of their own." Admittedly, actions resulting in unemployment deemed to be the "fault" of a claimant under the Act require a degree of culpability. See Mills Unemployment Compensation Case, 164 Pa. Super. 421, 65 A.2d 436 (1949), rev'd. on other grounds, 362 Pa. 342, 67 A.2d 114 (1949). Nowhere, however, does the Act require the degree of culpability urged by Strokes. The Court in Lybarger stated that workers who had entered into a contract which provided for an automatic layoff after earning a specified amount, were not unemployed "through no fault of their own." Certainly the degree of "fault" demonstrated by the workers in Lybarger is no greater than that of Strokes. We are aware that the Unemployment Compensation Act is a remedial statute and therefore requires a liberal and broad construction to achieve its objective. MacFarland v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 158 Pa. Super. 418, 422, 45 A.2d 423, 426 (1946). It is incongruous, however, to require a greater degree of culpability in finding "fault" in a claimant under Section 3 than under any other section of the Act. Strokes had adequate time to either pay the judgment or make arrangements to settle his differences with the successful third party claimant. As he did not do either, it cannot be said that his unemployment was through "no fault of his own." The record supports a denial of benefits under Section 3 of the Act.
Strokes also contends that the term "through no fault of their own" does not provide an adequate standard to inform an unemployment compensation claimant of the burden of proof needed to establish eligibility for benefits. The key to understanding the phrase is the word "fault." The consistent meaning of this word as used in the Act has been explained at various times by the courts of this State. For example, in Mills Unemployment Compensation Case, supra, the Superior Court stated, "Fault is more than volition, more than a voluntary act. . . . '[F]ault' always connotes an act to which blame, censure, impropriety, shortcoming, or culpability attaches." This Court held, in dismissing a similar due process argument in Daniels v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 10 Pa. Commw. 241, 309 A.2d 738 (1973), that the word "fault" as used in the Act was not such an indefinite and vague word as to be constitutionally defective.
We affirm.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 15th day of April, 1977, the order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, dated March 1, 1976, denying benefits to James Strokes, is hereby affirmed.