Opinion
C. A. 9:24-00322-TMC-MHC
04-12-2024
George Holmes, Plaintiff, v. Issac M. Stone, III; Samantha Molina; Jared Shedd, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Molly H. Cherry United States Magistrate Judge.
This is a civil action filed by Plaintiff George Holmes, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), pretrial proceedings in this action have been referred to the assigned United States Magistrate Judge. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on February 21, 2024. ECF No. 6.
In an Order dated March 11, 2024, Plaintiff was notified of pleading deficiencies in his Amended Complaint and given the opportunity to file a second amended complaint. ECF No. 7. Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint on March 25, 2024. ECF No. 11.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is an inmate at the Turbeville Correctional Institution of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC). Records from Beaufort County indicate that Plaintiff was found guilty at a jury trial in May 2022 on the charges of burglary/burglary (violent) second degree (case number 2018A0710200399) and burglary/safecracking (case number 2018A0710200400) on May 18, 2022. Plaintiff appealed his convictions and these appeals are still pending. See Beaufort County Fourteenth Judicial Circuit Public Index, https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Beau fort/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx [search case numbers listed above] (last visited Apr. 9, 2024).
The charges were true bill indicted on April 18, 2019.
This Court may take judicial notice of factual information located in postings on government websites. See Tisdale v. South Carolina Highway Patrol, No. 0:09-1009-HFF-PJG, 2009 WL 1491409, at *1 n. 1 (D.S.C. May 27, 2009), aff'd, 347 Fed.Appx. 965 (4th Cir. 2009); In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., No. 05-4182, 2008 WL 4185869, at * 2 (E.D. La. Sept. 8, 2008) (noting that courts may take judicial notice of governmental websites including other courts' records).
Plaintiff appears to bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (§ 1983) for alleged violations of his constitutional rights. He claims that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated and alleges malicious prosecution. Plaintiff also may be attempting to allege state law claims. See ECF No. 11 at 4. Defendants are Beaufort County Solicitor Issac M. Stone, III (Stone); Assistant Solicitor Samantha Molina (Molina); and Assistant Solicitor Jared Shedd (Shedd).
Plaintiff appears to bring claims concerning his trial held in May 2022 in the Beaufort County Court. ECF No. 11 at 5. His entire statement of the facts underlying his claim is that:
I was released on bond prior to start of my trial. Covid-19 non-violent release[.] I went to trial. The Prosecutors[] talk to grand Jury of finding me[] guilty. Judge Carmen T Mullen was the presiding[.] At the conclusion of the two-day trial, the Jury convicted me as indicted[.] [F]ollowing the verdict of the trial Judge sentenced me to concurrent terms of imprisonment of 15 years for 2nd degree burglary violent and twenty years suspended to 15 years and five years of probation for Safe Cracking. I filed for Appeal.ECF No. 11 at 5-6 (errors in original).
In the “Injuries” section of his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he is suffering from mental and physical health problems. ECF No. 11 at 6. He requests monetary damages. Id.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A pro se Complaint is reviewed pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992), Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989), Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), and Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983). Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, and a court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). However, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that this Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).
III. DISCUSSION
It is recommended that this action be summarily dismissed for the reasons discussed below.
A. Failure to State a Claim/Malicious Prosecution
This action is subject to summary dismissal because Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable federal claim. Plaintiff appears to allege that Defendants maliciously prosecuted him. To state a Fourth Amendment claim under § 1983 for malicious prosecution, Plaintiff must allege (1) the defendant seized him pursuant to legal process (e.g., a warrant) not supported by probable cause and (2) the criminal proceedings have terminated in his favor. Smith v. Munday, 848 F.3d 248, 253 (4th Cir. 2017).
Here, Plaintiff has not stated a claim for malicious prosecution because he cannot show that his criminal proceedings terminated in his favor. A termination in Plaintiff's favor is one where “the criminal prosecution ended without a conviction.” Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 49 (2022).
Plaintiff generally alleges that he has been subjected to unlawful imprisonment. ECF No. 11 at 4. However, he has alleged no facts to support such a claim. As he admits, and the Beaufort County records indicate, he was indicted by the Grand Jury on the criminal charges, and was later convicted on these charges.
Plaintiff also generally asserts he is bringing claims under the Eighth Amendment. ECF No. 11 at 4. However, he has alleged no facts as to any Eighth Amendment claim. In the injuries section, he appears to assert that he is suffering from some mental and physical health problems, but has failed to allege any facts to state a claim against Defendants. Plaintiff is currently at the SCDC and there is no indication that Defendants are involved in or responsible for Plaintiff's medical care there.
B. Request for Monetary Damages Barred by Heck v. Humphrey
Plaintiff's claims for monetary damages are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the Supreme Court established the following test to determine whether a prisoner's claim for violation of due process in the context of a criminal proceeding is cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983:
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. But if the district court determines that the plaintiff's action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit.Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-487 (internal footnotes omitted). As noted above, public records indicate that Plaintiff was found guilty on the burglary/burglary (violent) second degree and burglary/safecracking charges. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint includes no indication that these convictions or sentences have been overturned through a direct appeal, state post-conviction relief application, or habeas corpus proceeding or otherwise invalidated. Thus, because any claims where a judgment in Plaintiff's favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his convictions and/or sentences, his requests for monetary damages should be summarily dismissed.
C. Prosecutorial Immunity
Defendants are also subject to summary dismissal because they are entitled to prosecutorial immunity. Prosecutors have absolute immunity from damages for activities performed as “an officer of the court” where the conduct at issue was closely associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process. See Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 341-343 (2009). For example, when a prosecutor “prepares to initiate a judicial proceeding,” “appears in court to present evidence in support of a search warrant application,” or conducts a criminal trial, bond hearings, grand jury proceedings, and pre-trial “motions” hearings, absolute immunity applies. Id. at 343; see also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993); Dababnah v. Keller-Burnside, 208 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2000); Here, Plaintiff is attempting to assert claims against Defendants based on their participation in Plaintiff's criminal proceedings. Thus, his claims against Defendants are barred. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (absolute immunity “is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability”).
In South Carolina, regional prosecutors are called solicitors and assistant solicitors. See S.C. CONST Art. V, § 24; S.C. Code Ann. § 1-7-310.
D. Interference with Pending Criminal Prosecution/ Younger
To the extent Plaintiff may be requesting that this Court intervene in his criminal cases, both of which have appeals pending, this action is subject to summary dismissal. Federal courts, absent extraordinary circumstances, are not authorized to interfere with a State's pending criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971); Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc. v. Gilchrist, 887 F.2d 49, 50-53 (4th Cir. 1989). Specifically, the Younger Court noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44; see also Howell v. Wilson, No. 4:13-2812-JFA-TER, 2014 WL 1233703, at *3 (D.S.C. Mar. 25, 2014) (Plaintiff's “pending DNA application and his PCR applications are still part of his ‘pending criminal case' as that terminology is understood under Younger and its progeny.”); Smith v. Bravo, No. 99 C 5077, 2000 WL 1051855, *5 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (presuming that Younger abstention would apply to civil case that could interfere with post-conviction proceedings); Lockheart v. Chicago Police Dept., No. 95 C 343, 1999 WL 639179, *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 17, 1999) (applying Younger because post-conviction proceedings were pending).
E. State Law Claims
Plaintiff may also be attempting to assert claims under South Carolina law. However, if Plaintiff fails to state any federal claim, only his state law claims would remain, and federal courts are allowed to hear and decide state-law claims only in conjunction with federal-law claims, through the exercise of “supplemental jurisdiction.” See 28 U.S.C. §1367; Wisconsin Dep't of Corrs. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 387 (1998). Of course, a district court may have jurisdiction of a civil action “where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000...and is between - (1) citizens of different States....” 28 U.S.C. § 1332. However, Plaintiff has not alleged complete diversity of the parties. See Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372-374 (1978) (Complete diversity of parties means that no party on one side may be a citizen of the same State as any party on the other side). In this case, Plaintiff and Defendants all appear to be citizens of South Carolina. See ECF No. 11 at 2-3.
Thus, there is no complete diversity, and Plaintiff may not bring his claims p § 1332. If Plaintiff asserts no valid federal claim and there is no diversity jurisdiction, should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § also United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); Tigrett v. Rector and the Univ. of Va., 290 F.3d 620, 626 (4th Cir. 2002) (affirming district court's dismissal o claims when no federal claims remained in the case); Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 64 Cir. 1999) (“[T]he Constitution does not contemplate the federal judiciary deciding issu law among non-diverse litigants”).
IV. RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Court dismiss this actio prejudice, without further leave to amend,4 and without issuance and service of process
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the following pag
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).