Opinion
C.A. No. 15A-09-002 RBY C.A. No. 15A-09-003 RBY C.A. No. 15A-09-004 RBY
03-11-2016
Dana L. Hockensmith, Pro se. Paige J. Schmittinger, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware for Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board. Victoria W. Counihan, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware for Delaware Division of Unemployment Insurance.
Upon Consideration of Appeal from Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board
Affirmed
OPINION
Dana L. Hockensmith, Pro se. Paige J. Schmittinger, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware for Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board.
Victoria W. Counihan, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware for Delaware Division of Unemployment Insurance. Young, J.
SUMMARY
Dana L. Hockensmith ("Appellant") appeals three decisions of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board ("the Board") finding that she had been overpaid benefits, and that Appellant was liable to the Division of Unemployment Insurance ("the Division") for recoupment. Because the Board's decisions are supported by substantial evidence and free from legal error, the decisions below are AFFIRMED.
FACTS
Appellant was employed at Oakcrest Furniture ("Employer") during the relevant time period, the weeks ending in April 6, 2013 to January 11, 2014. Appellant filed claims for unemployment insurance benefits effective November 17, 2013. Appellant reported reduced hours with Employer, beginning in April 2013, as the basis for her collection of benefits from the Division.
While Appellant was reporting reduced wages from Employer, she earned wages from Jevs Supports Independence ("Jevs"), an organization which paid Appellant to house and serve as a care-giver for an individual in need of home care. Appellant did not report these wages to the Division. Through a wage audit investigation, the Division found that Appellant earned unreported wages from Jevs while collecting unemployment benefits. Thus, in three decisions in April and May 2014, a Claims Deputy found that Appellant was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits due to fraud, because she had under reported her wages from April 6, 2013 to January 11, 2014. When Appellant failed to file a timely appeal to each disqualification determination, the disqualification determinations became final and unreviewable.
Following the disqualification determinations, the Division began three separate administrative proceedings to establish overpayment amounts and require repayment by Appellant. According to the Division, Appellant received benefit overpayments totaling $2,970 for the ten weeks ending April 6, 2013 to November 16, 2013, $660 for the two weeks ending November 23, 2013 to November 30, 2013, and $1,980 for the six weeks ending December 7, 2013 to January 11, 2014. In all three cases, a Claims Deputy issued an overpayment determination, Appellant appealed, an Appeals Referee upheld the determination, and the Board affirmed.
Appellant filed three appeals of the Board's decisions, one for each of the overpayment determination proceedings below. Appellant stated the following grounds for appeal: the Division claimed that it overpaid unemployment benefits to Appellant, despite the fact that, she reported wages earned during the relevant time period from Employer as required. Appellant also raised the issue of timeliness, which has been rendered moot by the Board's consideration of the case on the merits.
In Appellant's opening brief, she stated that she does not feel responsible for repayment of benefits, because she was told that she need not report wages paid by Jevs for her work as a care-giver in her own home. The Board declined to file an answering brief. The Division filed an answering brief explaining the proceedings below, reiterating its position that Appellant received overpayments of benefits which she must now repay.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
An appeal from an administrative board's final order to this Court is restricted to a determination of whether the Board's decision is free from legal error and supported by substantial evidence. "In reviewing the record for substantial evidence, the Court will consider the record in the light most favorable to the party prevailing below." "The Court does not weigh the evidence, determine credibility or make its own factual findings." Questions of law are reviewed de novo. If there is substantial evidence and no error of law, the Board's decision will be affirmed, unless the Board committed an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when the Board "acts arbitrarily or capriciously, or exceeds the bounds of reason in view of the circumstances and has ignored recognized rules of law or practice so as to produce injustice."
29 Del. C. § 10142(d); Wilson v. Breakers Hotel & Suites, 2010 WL 2562214 (Del. Super. June 24, 2010).
Pochvatilla v. U.S. Postal Service, 1997 WL 524062, at *2 (Del. Super. June 9, 1997).
Bd. of Educ. of Capital Sch. Dist. v. Johns, 2002 WL 471175, at *2 (Del. Super. Mar. 27, 2002).
Am. Fed'n of State, County and Mun. Employees, Council 81 v. State Pub. Employees Relations Bd., 2011 WL 2176113 (Del. Super. May 25, 2011).
See PAL of Wilmington v. Graham, 2008 WL 2582986, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. June 18, 2009); Sikorski v. Boscov's Dept. Store, 1995 WL 656831, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 22, 1995).
PAL of Wilmington, 2008 WL 2582986, at *1.
DISCUSSION
Pursuant to 19 Del. C. § 3314(6), an individual is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits: "If the Department determines such individual has made a false statement or representation knowing it to be false or knowingly has failed to disclose a material fact to obtain benefits to which the individual was not lawfully entitled. . . ." 19 Del. C. § 3325 mandates bifurcated proceedings for a claimant's disqualification determination and her overpayment/recoupment determination.
Bradfield v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 53 A.3d 301, at *2 (Del. 2012).
Here, a Claims Deputy found repeatedly that Appellant was disqualified from receiving benefits according to 19 Del. C. § 3314(6). The Claims Deputy based these decisions on Appellant's technically fraudulent actions in failing to report her wages from Jevs, thereby under reporting her total earnings. Thereafter, a Claims Deputy issued an overpayment determination for each of the three payment periods, as required by 19 Del. C. § 3325. As a result, Appellant was liable to repay the overpayment amounts to the Division.
Appellant cannot now attack the final disqualification decisions through her appeal of the overpayment decisions. Thus, the only issues before this court are whether Appellant received notice of the overpayment determination as required by statute, and whether the amounts were calculated correctly. Here, Appellant admits that she received notice of the overpayment determination. Appellant does not dispute the fact that she received the payments, nor does she dispute the Division's calculations of amounts overpaid. Instead, Appellant merely restates the same argument that she made throughout the proceedings below: that she did not commit fraud by receiving overpayments from the Division, because she was not told to report her wages from Jevs. While Appellant could have raised this argument as a defense to the disqualification determination, it is not relevant to the overpayment determination.
19 Del. C. § 3320 and § 3322(a); Tomer v. Jobe's Landscape, Inc., 2012 WL 2344638, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. June 14, 2012).
19 Del. C. § 3325 states in relevant part:
The Department shall issue a notice of overpayment and an order for recoupment, stating its grounds therefor, before initiating action to collect the overpayment.
Based on the testimony and evidence available on the record, the Board found that Appellant received benefit overpayments. The Board's determinations are supported by substantial evidence and free from legal error.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Board's decisions are AFFIRMED.
/s/ Robert B. Young
J. RBY/dsc
Via File & ServeXpress & U.S. Mail
oc: Prothonotary
cc: Counsel
Dana L. Hockensmith