Memorandum Opinion and Order

RICHARD J. HOLWELL, District Judge

Plaintiff Martin Hochroth ("Plaintiff) filed this action against defendant William Penn Life Insurance Company of New York ("Penn") to recover damages that allegedly arose from a life insurance policy issued by Penn. Penn has moved to dismiss the first count of Plaintiff s complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or, in the alternative, to strike portions of the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(f). For the reasons stated below, Penn's motion is denied in its entirety.

Background

The following facts are alleged in the complaint and are presumed true for the purposes of this motion. In 1986, Plaintiff obtained a life insurance policy valued at $500,000 on the life of his father. (Compl. ¶¶ 4, 5.) The terms of the policy, issued by Penn, required only that Plaintiff pay $8,000 every year for 10 years. ( Id.) Plaintiff paid the premiums from 1986 through 1996. ( Id. ¶ 7.) However, at the end of the 10 years (specifically starting in 2002), Penn required Plaintiff to make additional payments to maintain the policy. ( Id. ¶¶ 8, 9.) Plaintiff made the payments under protest and filed this lawsuit. ( Id.) The complaint alleges two causes of action. ( Id. ¶¶ 10-16.) The first cause of action seeks the return of all premiums Plaintiff paid since 2002. ( Id. at 4-5.) The second cause of action seeks a declaratory judgment as to the terms of the policy and punitive damages of one million dollars. ( Id. at 5.)

On October 16, 2003, Penn filed a motion to dismiss the first cause of action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Penn argues that Plaintiff has not alleged all the necessary elements of a fraudulent inducement claim. (Mem. of Law in Supp. at 5.) Plaintiff responded with an affidavit arguing that his first cause of action is for breach of contract, not fraudulent inducement. (Affirm in Opp. ¶ 2.) In reply, Penn argues that Plaintiffs allegations sound in fraud and that "if the Court declines to dismiss the claim in its entirety, the Court should strike those allegations that sound in fraudulent inducement and are completely unrelated to any breach of contract claim". (Reply Mem. at 4.)

Discussion

In ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court is required to read a complaint generously, accepting all the alleged facts as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See LaBounty v. Adler, 933 F.2d 121, 123 (2d Cir. 1991); Frasier v. Gen. Elec. Co., 930 F.2d 1004, 1007 (2d Cir. 1991). The court must deny the motion unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46(1957).

It is well established that the plaintiff is the "master of his complaint" and may characterize his causes of action as he pleases. See Mizuho Corp. Bank (USA) v. Cory Assocs., Inc. 341 F.3d 644, 651 (7th Cir. 2003); Porzilli v. CBS Inc., No. Civ. A. 97-897, 1998 WL 398243, at *13 (D.N.J. July 13, 1998). This Court cannot dismiss Plaintiffs first cause of action for failing to adequately plead fraudulent inducement when Plaintiff states that his first cause of action, in fact, is for breach of contract, not fraudulent inducement. Moreover, Plaintiffs characterization of his complaint is a fair one in light of the explicit allegation that Penn's demand for additional premiums was "in violation of the contract of insurance". (Compl. ¶ 10.) While Plaintiff also employs the term "inducement" ( id.), it is certainly now clear that his first cause of action does not sound in fraud.

Motions to strike are generally disfavored. See Forschner Group, Inc. v. B-line A.G., 943 F. Supp. 287, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). "There rarely is reason to restrict the pleadings unless it can be shown that the statements sought to be stricken would prejudice the defendant." Am. Buying Ins. Servs., Inc. v. S. Kornreich Sons, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 240, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Thus, although language may literally fall within the categories set forth in Rule 12(f), motions to strike are nonetheless often denied if no prejudice could result from the challenged language. See id. Defendant has failed to identify any prejudice that might result from the challenged language in the complaint.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion to dismiss the first cause of action or, in the alternative, to strike language from the complaint [8-1] is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.