MEMORANDUM OPINION

FELIPE REYNA, Justice.

Pamela Hirst appeals the grant of Johnson County's plea to the jurisdiction and summary judgment motion premised on governmental immunity. Hirst contends in three points that the court erred by: (1) granting the plea to the jurisdiction because she has alleged that her injuries were caused by a special defect; (2) granting the summary judgment motion because the summary judgment evidence conclusively establishes the existence of a special defect; and (3) granting the summary judgment motion because genuine issues of material fact remains on the questions of whether the County had actual or constructive notice and whether the County failed to exercise reasonable care. We will reverse and remand.

Background

Much of the pertinent evidence is not in dispute. Hirst sustained her injuries when a car in which she was riding drove into the bed of Mustang Creek because of a collapsed bridge maintained by the County. It is undisputed that above average rainfall during the pertinent time period caused higher-than-normal water levels in the creek. The parties dispute whether the bridge span was washed out because of erosion due only to the recent rainfall or because of inadequate maintenance over time exacerbated by the recent rainfall.

On the date in question, the County received a telephone call at 9:20 a.m. from a citizen who called to report a problem with the bridge. The road supervisor for the precinct in which the bridge is located advised the office manager by radio to send two county employees who were at the shop to go barricade the road. The employees did not arrive at the bridge until after Hirst's car went into the creek bed. According to a DPS accident report, this occurred at 9:45 a.m.

Hirst alleges in her first amended petition that the washed-out bridge constitutes a special defect for which governmental immunity from suit is waived by the Tort Claims Act. She alleges in the alternative that governmental immunity is waived because of the County's failure to post adequate warning devices within a reasonable period of time after it received notice.

The County alleges in its plea to the jurisdiction/summary judgment motion that: (1) the condition of the bridge does not qualify as a special defect; (2) even assuming the existence of a special defect, the County exercised reasonable care when it received notice.

Special Defect

Hirst contends in her first point that the court erred by granting the County's plea to the jurisdiction because her pleadings allege that the washed-out bridge constitutes a special defect. She contends in her second point that the court erred by granting the County's summary judgment motion because the summary judgment evidence conclusively establishes the existence of a special defect.

"When we consider a trial court's order on a plea to the jurisdiction, we construe the pleadings in the plaintiff's favor and look to the pleader's intent." County of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002). When a plaintiff presents summary judgment evidence to establish jurisdiction, we must also examine that evidence. Tex. Dept. of Crim. Just. v. Miller, 51 S.W.3d 583, 587 (Tex. 2001). The focus of our inquiry is whether the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to establish a waiver of immunity. See County of Cameron, 80 S.W.3d at 555; Cozby v. City of Waco, 110 S.W.3d 32, 36 (Tex.App.-Waco 2002, no pet.).

To prevail on a summary judgment motion, the movant must demonstrate that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. Grant, 73 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2002); Fletcher v. Edwards, 26 S.W.3d 66, 73 (Tex.App.-Waco 2000, pet. denied). We take all evidence favoring the nonmovant as true. Sw. Elec. Power Co., 73 S.W.3d at 215; Fletcher, 26 S.W.3d at 73. We indulge every reasonable inference from the evidence in favor of the nonmovant and resolve any doubts in its favor. Id. Dallas Sales Co. v. Carlisle Silver Co., 134 S.W.3d 928, 931 (Tex.App.-Waco 2004, pet. denied).

We apply the same standard in reviewing a no-evidence summary judgment as we would in reviewing a directed verdict. See Robinson v. Warner-Lambert, 998 S.W.2d 407, 410 (Tex.App.-Waco 1999, no pet.); Moore v. K Mart Corp., 981 S.W.2d 266, 269 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied). We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, disregarding all contrary evidence and inferences. See Morgan v. Anthony, 27 S.W.3d 928, 929 (Tex. 2000) (per curiam); Robinson, 998 S.W.2d at 410; Moore, 981 S.W.2d at 269. A no-evidence summary judgment will be defeated if the non-movant produces more than a scintilla of probative evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact on the elements challenged by the movant. Id.

Hirst's first amended petition alleges in pertinent part that "[t]he bridge and roadway over a stream had washed out and had fallen leaving a gap in the roadway." The summary judgment record contains additional evidence regarding the reasons the bridge washed out and the County's response. However, it is undisputed that the bridge washed out.

Construed in Hirst's favor, we hold that her first amended petition alleges the existence of a special defect. See Taylor v. Wood County, 133 S.W.3d 811, 813-14 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2004, no pet.); State v. Nichols, 609 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Thus, the court erred by sustaining the County's plea to the jurisdiction. Viewing in the light most favorable to Hirst, the summary judgment evidence conclusively establishes that the washed-out bridge constitutes a special defect. Id. Accordingly, we sustain Hirst's first and second points.

Notice

Hirst contends in her third point that the court erred by granting the County's summary judgment motion because a genuine issue of material fact remains on the question of "whether the negligence of Johnson County was a proximate cause of the accident." Although Hirst uses the term "proximate cause" in stating her third point, a closer reading of the substance of her argument reveals that her third point addresses two other elements of her claim: (1) whether the County had actual or constructive notice of the washed-out bridge when her car went into the creek; and (2) whether the County failed to exercise reasonable care. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(e) ("The statement of an issue or point will be treated as covering every subsidiary question that is fairly included.").

Because the washed-out bridge constitutes a special defect, the County owed Hirst the same duty a private land owner owes an invitee. State Dept. of Hwys. Pub. Transp. v. Payne, 838 S.W.2d 235, 237 (Tex. 1992); Taylor, 133 S.W.3d at 814; Tex. Dept. of Transp. v. Abilez, 962 S.W.2d 246, 251 (Tex.App.-Waco 1998, pet. denied). To prevail then, Hirst must establish:

• actual or constructive knowledge of a condition on the premises by the owner or occupier;

• that the condition posed an unreasonable risk of harm;

• that the owner or occupier did not exercise reasonable care to reduce or eliminate the risk; and

• that the owner or occupier's failure to use such care proximately caused the plaintiff's injury.

CMH Homes, Inc. v. Daenen, 15 S.W.3d 97, 99 (Tex. 2000); Taylor, 133 S.W.3d at 814. Hirst's third point concerns the first and third of these elements.

According to the County, it had notice of only a premise defect because it received notice of only a "sunken spot" in the bridge rather than a washed-out bridge. Thus, the County contends that it did not have actual or constructive notice that the bridge had washed out when Hirst's car drove into the creek.

It is undisputed that the County received a telephone call reporting a problem with the bridge approximately twenty-five minutes before Hirst's car drove into the creek.

James Roller, the road supervisor for the precinct, stated in an affidavit that his secretary, Lana Miller, notified him by radio "that a `sunken spot' on the bridge had been reported." In a deposition, Roller used other phrases to describe the reported condition including: a "hole in the road"; and the "low water crossing ha[d] sunk."

Miller used the same "sunken spot" terminology in both her affidavit and her deposition testimony.

The two county employees instructed to go erect barricades were Johnny Stout and Clyde Bishop. Stout did not recall what had been reported on the date in question. Bishop stated in his deposition that Miller informed them that she had received a report "that the road had collapsed."

Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Hirst, a genuine issue of material fact remains on the question of whether the County had actual or constructive notice that the bridge had washed out approximately twenty-five minutes before Hirst's car drove into the creek.

Reasonable Care

Hirst also contends that a genuine issue of material fact remains on the question of whether the County exercised reasonable care to reduce or eliminate the risk posed to Hirst.

Viewed in the light most favorable to Hirst, the summary judgment record establishes the following timeline of events:

9:20

9:20 — 9:40

9:40

9:45

9:50

9:52

10:05

10:07

10:??

County notified of washed-out bridge; Miller discusses with Roller

Stout and Bishop load equipment

Stout and Bishop leave county barn for site

Hirst's car drives into creek

DPS notified

Rio Vista Fire Department notified

Rio Vista Fire Department arrives at scene

DPS trooper arrives at scene

Stout and Bishop arrive and erect barricades

Under this timeline, County employees did not arrive on the scene until approximately fifty minutes after being notified. Conversely, the fire department responded within thirteen minutes, and the DPS trooper within seventeen. Hirst suggests that the immediacy of the fire department's response and that of the trooper, support an inference that the County failed to exercise reasonable care.

Roller was asked in his deposition whether he had ever contacted the sheriff's department to ensure a quicker response in this type of situation. He responded that he had never done so and that he would not want to call the sheriff's department for something which "wasn't nothing major."

Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Hirst, a genuine issue of material fact remains on the question of whether the County failed to exercise "reasonable care to reduce or eliminate the risk."

Accordingly, we sustain Hirst's third issue.

We reverse the judgment and remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.