MEMORANDUM OPINION

RICHARD BARAJAS, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from jury convictions for two counts of sexual assault of a child and five counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child. The jury assessed punishment at twenty years' imprisonment on the two counts of sexual assault of a child and fifty years' imprisonment on the five counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I. SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE

At Appellant's evidentiary hearing to suppress his confession, Detective Mario Chaides testified that he met Appellant on February 29, 2000, at the Northeast Regional Command Center in El Paso, Texas. On that date, Detective Chaides interviewed Appellant's mother-in-law who complained that Appellant sexually assaulted her granddaughter, S.H., the victim. At about 11:55 p.m., Appellant drove himself and his wife to the command center where he was placed under arrest and was read his Miranda rights by Detective Chaides. Chaides repeated those rights and, one by one, asked if Appellant understood them. Appellant signed a Miranda card indicating that he understood each right.

Appellant was then taken into an interview room where he and Chaides discussed the accusations. At first, Appellant denied that he sexually assaulted S.H. He later recanted in a written statement taken by Chaides. Chaides typed the statement as Appellant dictated to him. Chaides then printed out the statement so Appellant could read it and make any changes he wished. Appellant agreed with the printed statement and signed it at approximately 2:43 a.m. Chaides testified that Appellant never asked for an attorney; if he had done so, he would have stopped the interview. The witness stated that the statement was given voluntarily. Detective Max Zimmerly and Officer Bernie Salinas witnessed Appellant sign the statement. Another detective asked if Appellant wanted to say anything to his daughter and provided Appellant with a pen and paper, although he was not forced to write to his daughter.

Appellant testified that he understood his rights but that he had asked for an attorney on two occasions by saying "what about an attorney?" He testified that Chaides said that he did have a right to an attorney but "he continued on with talking." Appellant testified that he was told that the complaining witness, his daughter, was pregnant and was on the way to the hospital. He reasoned at the time that this would prove his innocence because it would be revealed that he was not the father. Appellant also testified that he was told that his other children would be taken away from his wife as his wife would become a suspect if he remained silent. Appellant also testified that Chaides used his handcuffs in a threatening manner. He testified that he was afforded the opportunity to consult with his wife two or three times during the interview. Also, he testified that he found the presence of Chaides gun and his posture to be threatening.

In turn, Chaides testified that he did not mention anything about the consequences of Appellant's statement with regard to what would happen to the wife or the children or that the wife was under investigation. The detective denied ever mentioning that the complaining witness was pregnant. Chaides testified that he did not have his handcuffs out while he interviewed Appellant.

The court filed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court found that no threats were made by the detectives with regard to the letter Appellant wrote to the complaining witness. The court further found that Appellant received the appropriate warnings and that Appellant did not invoke his right to an attorney, his right to remain silent, or his right to terminate the interview at any time. It was found that Appellant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights. Further, the court found that Chaides did not promise any leniency or good result regarding the reunification of his family as a result of providing a statement or giving a letter. Also no force or threats were utilized in obtaining the statement. The court suppressed the letter as not comporting the statutory requisites while allowing its use for possible impeachment purposes.

Trial commenced on March 5, 2001. At trial, the complainant, who was seventeen years old at the time of trial, testified regarding a series of sexual assaults by her father, Appellant, that began when she was approximately seven or eight years old. Defense counsel established that there were positive things in the complainant's life such as school and church activities notwithstanding her assertions that she was being sexually assaulted during this time. She testified that she never told anyone about the sexual incidents because Appellant told her that he would kill her and anyone she told. During cross-examination, the complainant was asked if she told a nurse that she was not sexually active during an examination in 1999. She stated she did not remember the conversation but she did state that she would have been lying to the nurse if she denied being sexually active. She was asked what the term "virgin" meant and she related that was someone who had not had sex. She stated that she had not had sex with anyone prior to February 1999.

The complainant testified that she wrote about the assaults in her diaries or journals. Someone found them and tore them up and she stopped writing journals three or four years prior to trial. She was confronted with a journal she had written a year earlier in 1999, and she admitted having lied about not continuing to write the journals. She read from a journal entry from October 15, 1999 which stated, "Tonight Larry wanted me to come over to his house so we could spend some time together." He was her boyfriend at the time and she admitted that she wrote in the journal, "We had sex" and "I am not a virgin anymore." Defense counsel moved to admit the complainant's three journals and this request was denied. She agreed that she did not write anything in the journals about her father sexually abusing her. When asked, the complainant stated that she did not know that her parents were considering moving the family to Albuquerque.

Outside the presence of the jury, the court ruled that Appellant could cross-examine the complainant concerning the October 15 entry because her understanding of the term "virgin" was important to the defensive theory that she lost here virginity to her boyfriend and therefore was never assaulted by her father. The court ruled that the other entries were not relevant. Appellant then requested to cross-examine the complainant concerning a September 11, 1999 entry where she wrote that the only person she would have sex with was "Ricky." The court denied this request as being a collateral matter not relevant to whether or not her father sexually assaulted her. In front of the jury, the complainant testified fully regarding the October 15 incident.

II. DISCUSSION

In Issue No. One, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his confession because of his invocation of the right to counsel. Appellant argues that his requesting phrase, "what about a lawyer?" should be held equivalent to "I think I want a lawyer" which was held sufficient enough to invoke a person's right under the Fifth Amendment to invoke the right to counsel in Jones v. State, 742 S.W.2d 398 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987).

We review the trial court's decision on a motion to suppress under an abuse of discretion standard. See Villarreal v. State, 935 S.W.2d 134, 138 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). When there is conflicting evidence about whether a confession was voluntary, the trial court is the sole judge of facts at the suppression hearing, and an appellate court may not disturb any finding supported by the evidence. Dunn v. State, 721 S.W.2d 325, 336 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986). Whether a confession is voluntary is a mixed question of law and fact. Garcia v. State, 15 S.W.3d 533, 535 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). Appellate courts should give almost absolute deference to trial court determinations of historical fact supported by the record, especially when those findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). Appellate courts should afford the same amount of deference to trial court rulings on mixed questions of law and fact when the resolution of those ultimate issues turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id. However, an appellate court may review de novo mixed questions of law and fact that do not fit within that category. Id. In the instant case, the trial court's ruling at the suppression hearing was based on its evaluation of the credibility and demeanor of Appellant and Chaides. Therefore, we afford almost complete deference to the trial court's ruling. A request for counsel must be unambiguous, meaning the suspect must "articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney." Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994). If the suspect's statement is not an unambiguous or unequivocal request for counsel, the officers have no obligation to stop questioning him. Id. at 460-61. Whether a suspect has unequivocally requested an attorney depends on whether he expressed a definite desire to speak to someone, and that person be an attorney. Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 350 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995). Once an accused invokes his right to counsel, interrogation must cease until counsel has been made available, unless the accused himself initiates further communication. Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 151-52, 111 S.Ct. 486, 112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990). In Dinkins, the phrase, "`Maybe I should talk to a lawyer'" had been held too equivocal to constitute an invocation of the right to counsel. Id. at 352. However, the statement, "`I think I want a lawyer'" was held to be a clear and unequivocal assertion of right to counsel. Id. In a more recent case, the appellate court in Fort Worth held that merely asking an officer if an attorney could be present did not constitute a clear and unambiguous invocation of the right to counsel. Halbrook v. State, 31 S.W.3d 301, 304 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2000, no pet.).

Detective Chaides testified both at the suppression hearing that Appellant never asked to speak with an attorney. He further said that had Appellant requested an attorney he would have stopped the interview. Appellant testified that he understood his rights. Appellant also said that he asked twice: "what about an attorney?" but that the detective, "just went on talking." Appellant made no changes to the printed copy of his confession and admitted that he knew he could have stopped the interview anytime. The trial court was in a position to judge and weigh the credibility of the witnesses and chose to believe the detective. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). Its finding is supported by the record and may not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Cantu v. State, 817 S.W.2d 74, 77 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991).

Further, even if the trial court chose to believe that Appellant said, "what about an attorney?," case law does not support Appellant's contention that those words suffice for a request of counsel. Once a suspect invokes his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, he cannot be further interrogated by law enforcement officers until counsel has been provided or the suspect initiates further communication with the police. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1884-85, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981); Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d 92, 97 (Tex.Crim. App. 1996). As stated, the mere mention of the word "attorney" or "lawyer" without more does not automatically invoke the right to counsel. Etheridge v. State, 903 S.W.2d 1, 18 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994). In this case, Appellant's statement, "What about an attorney" did not serve to invoke the right to counsel and there was no need to stop the interview. Issue No. One is overruled.

In Issue No. Two, Appellant contends that his confession to Chaides was obtained involuntarily in violation of Article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Tex. Code. Crim. Proc. Ann. § art. 38.22 (Vernon 2004). He argues that his confession was involuntary because Chaides assured him that his family would stay together and his wife would not face criminal charges if he confessed to sexually assaulting his daughter.

Since this issue was also in the context of a motion to suppress hearing, the standard of review is the same as articulated above in Appellant's first issue. The ultimate question is whether Appellants will was overborne. Creager v. State, 952 S.W.2d 852, 856 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). This determination is made based on the totality of the circumstances which include length of detention; incommunicado or prolonged interrogation; denial of access of family member; refusal of request to telephone lawyer or family member; and physical brutality. State v. Terrazas, 970 S.W.2d 157, 162 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1998), aff'd, 4 S.W.3d 720 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999).

In this case the trial court made findings of fact. It found that Appellant received the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona and Article 38.22 before giving his confession. The trial court also found that Appellant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the rights articulated in Article 38.22 and did not invoke any of them. It additionally found that Chaides did not promise reunification with his family nor any leniency for giving a statement. These findings are further supported by the record. Appellant drove himself to the police station. Chaides denied ever making promises in return for statements. Appellant was not subject to physical brutality and he was allowed to consult with a family member. Because the trial courts findings are supported by the record, they should not be disturbed on review. Ross, 32 S.W.3d at 858. Appellant's Issue No. Two is overruled.

In Issue No. Three, Appellant avers that the trial court erred by denying him his right to confrontation. He argues that the trial court failed to permit him to question the victim about entries to her diaries relating to her sexual activity with persons other than Appellant in violation of Texas Rules of Evidence 412(b)(2)(C). Specifically, Appellant contends that her sexual activity with others was pertinent to show motive and bias in that it showed that she had sexual relations with boys and she concocted the fact of the sexual assaults by her father to prevent the family from moving away thereby ending those relationships and ending her activities at school and church.

We review a trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. Weatherred v. State, 15 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). Under this standard, the trial court's findings of fact are given "almost total deference"; however, we review the trial court's application of the law to these facts de novo. Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327-28 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). The trial court's ruling will be upheld as long as it is within the "zone of reasonable disagreement." Weatherred, 15 S.W.3d at 542. The credibility of a witness may not be attacked with specific instances of conduct other than conviction of crime. Tex. R. Evid. 608(b). In a prosecution for aggravated sexual assault, evidence of specific instances of an alleged victim's past sexual behavior is not admissible, unless such evidence "relates to the motive or bias of the alleged victim" and the probative value of such evidence outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice. See Tex. R. Evid. 412(b)(2)(C), (B)(3).

Any motive the complainant may have had to concoct a sexual assault charge against Appellant was well developed by Appellant's counsel at trial, without resort to evidence of the other alleged sexual liaisons with other boys. Defense counsel established the facts if the October 15 journal entry-a matter relevant in that the complainant's concept of virginity became relevant at trial. Appellant was able to fully develop the issue of the family's move to Albuquerque as a motive for the complainant to lie. Further, Appellant was able to elicit the fact of her prior sexual conduct on the October 15 entry and was able to advance his defensive theory that she had lied about her sexual history and was allegedly involved in a sexual relationship when she made her outcry. Testimony was elicited from the victim that she had observed Appellant hitting her mother, threatening her mother with an axe, and blackening her mother's eye. Further, the victim testified that she herself had suffered various depredations at Appellant's hands, and was still so angry at Appellant that she would like to hit him. Thus, the complainants possible bias against Appellant was well established. We conclude, therefore, that the trial court did not err in excluding evidence of other possible sexual involvements on the part of the complainant. Appellant's Issue No. Three is overruled.

Having overruled each of Appellant's issues on review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.