Opinion
Civil No. 01-783 (DSD/JMM)
July 27, 2001
Richard N. Hendricks, Twin Lakes, WI, pro se.
Thomas S. Fraser, Esq., Lora E. Mitchell, Esq., and Fredrikson Byron, Minneapolis, MN counsel for defendant.
ORDER
This matter is before the court on defendant's motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. Based on a review of the file, record, and proceedings herein, and for the reasons stated, the court grants defendant's motion.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Richard N. Hendricks ("Hendricks") filed this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Keith G. Rasmussen, M.D. ("Rasmussen") deprived him of his civil rights and violated Minnesota State law by ordering his involuntary commitment. On April 4, 2000, Hendricks met with Rasmussen, a psychiatrist at the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota, at the request of Hendricks's neurologist, Allan Aksamit. (Compl. ¶ 1.) During his meeting with Rasmussen, Hendricks became annoyed that Rasmussen left the room twice to answer pages and kept checking his watch. (Id. ¶ 3.) Hendricks left before Rasmussen had completed his interview. (Id.) Shortly after ending his meeting with Rasmussen but before he had left the clinic, Hendricks was intercepted by six Mayo Clinic security guards and two Rochester police officers and taken to St. Mary's Hospital in Rochester. (Id. ¶ 4.) Pursuant to Rasmussen's directive, Hendricks was placed on an involuntary 72-hour hold at the hospital. (Id.)
Hendricks alleges that Rasmussen's decision to initiate involuntary commitment against him was an act of bad faith in violation of his civil rights and the Minnesota Civil Commitment Act ("MCCA"), Minn. Stat. Ann. § 253B.05. Rasmussen moves to dismiss plaintiff's claims or for summary judgment.
DISCUSSION
Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party may move to dismiss a complaint on various grounds, including failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court takes all facts alleged in plaintiff's complaint as true. Westcott v. City of Omaha, 901 F.2d 1486, 1488 (8th Cir. 1990). In addition, the court must construe the allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences arising from the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1986).
When matters outside the pleadings are presented on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and are not excluded by the court, the court must convert the motion to one for summary judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); Hamm v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharm., Inc., 187 F.3d 941, 948 (8th Cir. 1999). In this case, defendant has submitted a declaration and curriculum vitae from Rasmussen and various medical records regarding Hendricks and plaintiff has presented a news article about himself for the court's consideration. To the extent that the court relies on these additional documents in making its determination, defendant's motion will be treated as a motion for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.
Rule 56(c) provides that summary judgment should be granted if the evidence shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). If a plaintiff cannot support each element of its claim, summary judgment must be granted, because a complete failure of proof regarding an essential element necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. Id. at 322-23. With these standards at hand, the court considers defendant's motion.
Rasmussen first contends that Hendricks's complaint must be dismissed because it does not adequately set forth the basis for the court's jurisdiction. The court has reviewed the complaint which briefly describes the events of April 14, 2000, including Hendricks's commitment to St. Mary's Hospital. In the concluding paragraphs, Hendricks asserts that Rasmussen "had no valid reason to take me prisoner" and claims that his "civil rights were taken away without probable cause" by Rasmussen. (Compl. ¶¶ 5-6.) Although there is no specific reference to constitutional rights or to a potential claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court is obliged to liberally construe a pro se complaint in favor of the pro se plaintiff. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Haggy v. Solem, 547 F.2d 1363, 1364 (8th Cir. 1977). Under this generous standard, the court finds that the cited language of the complaint sufficiently establishes that Hendricks is claiming a deprivation of his civil rights, therefore the court has federal question jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any State . . . subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.42 U.S.C. § 1983.
A plaintiff alleging a Section 1983 claim must establish two elements: (1) a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) that the deprivation was committed "under color of" state law. Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 930-31 (1982). The Supreme Court interprets the phrase "under color of" state law as the equivalent of the "state action" required under the Fourteenth Amendment. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 840, 838 (1982). In other words, "the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor." Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937.
It is undisputed that involuntary confinement or civil commitment constitute a significant deprivation of liberty requiring due process protection. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979). However, it is not clear whether Rasmussen, by signing the Notice to a Patient Examiner's Statement in Support of Emergency Hospitalization, can be considered a state actor. Although the Eighth Circuit has not addressed the issue, the clear majority of courts that have considered the question agree that such conduct typically does not constitute state action. See Rockwell v. Cape Cod Hosp., 26 F.3d 254, 257-60 (1st Cir. 1994); Okunieff v. Rosenberg, 996 F. Supp. 343, 346-47 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, 166 F.3d 507 (2nd Cir. 1999); Janicsko v. Pellman, 774 F. Supp. 331, 334-339 (M.D.Pa. 1991), aff'd without opinion, 970 F.2d 899 (3rd Cir. 1992); S.P. v. City of Takoma Park, 134 F.3d 260, 268-69 (4th Cir. 1998); Bass v. Parkwood Hosp., 180 F.3d 234, 241-43 (5th Cir. 1999); Ellison v. Carbarino, 48 F.3d 192, 195-97 (6th Cir. 1995); Spencer v. Lee, 864 F.2d 1376, 1378-82 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc); Pino v. Higgs, 75 F.3d 1461, 1465-67 (10th Cir. 1996); Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1130-32 (11th Cir. 1992). Only the Ninth Circuit has found circumstances under which the private actor's conduct constitutes state action. See Jensen v. Lane County, 222 F.3d 570 (9th Cir. 2000).
In Jensen, the appellate court was asked to determine whether contract services provided by licensed private physicians to municipal governments in the detention and examination of persons brought into treatment facilities by police officers as possible mental patients constitutes state action within the meaning of § 1983. The court noted that county employees initiated the evaluation process and there was significant consultation among various mental health professionals (including both private psychiatrists and county crisis workers). Under these facts, the court found that the defendant doctor and the county government had "undertaken a complex and deeply intertwined process of evaluating and detaining individuals who are believed to be mentally ill." Using the close nexus/joint action test, the court concluded that the private physician defendant performing the evaluative services for the municipality was state actor for purposes of Section 1983 liability. Jensen, 222 F.3d at 575.
The Supreme Court has articulated several tests for determining whether a private party's conduct may constitute state action, including (1) the state compulsion test, (2) the close nexus/joint action test, and (3) the public function test. Under the state compulsion test, "a State normally can be held responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State." Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982). Under the close nexus/joint action test, state action may be found where the government has "so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the [private actor] that it was a joint participant in the enterprise." Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974). Finally, the public function test is satisfied if the private party performs a function that is "`traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State.'" Blum, 457 U.S. at 1005 (quoting Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353).
The instant case is easily distinguished from Jensen because there is no evidence of an intertwining relationship between the state of Minnesota and Dr. Rasmussen. No governmental employee initiated the evaluation of Hendricks, nor was there significant consultation between Rasmussen and public health officials before committing Hendricks. (Decl. of Keith Rasmussen, Exh. B, D.) The facts of this case are more similar to those of Bass and Okunieff, both cases in which the appellate court found no state action.
In Okunieff, the plaintiff (like Hendricks) initially visited the hospital for a physical consultation, was asked to see a psychiatrist by the physician, failed to maintain the appointment with the psychiatrist and was intercepted by security guards on the physician's orders. 996 F. Supp. at 346-47. In Bass, the plaintiff initially sought counseling from a private hospital and was referred to a psychologist. After the psychologist confirmed that plaintiff was experiencing psychotic and paranoid delusions, the hospital initiated a temporary involuntary commitment. 180 F.3d at 234. The court also notes that the relevant state statutes in Okunieff and Bass, like the MCCA, merely authorize private physicians to initiate involuntary commitments and in no way influence the decisions to commit. Okunieff, 996 F. Supp. at 349-350; Bass, 180 F.3d at 242.
Based on the similarity of this case to Okunieff and Bass, the court finds it appropriate to adopt the rationale of the Second and Fifth Circuits. Therefore, the court concludes that Rasmussen's act of initiating the 72-hour involuntary commitment of Hendricks does not qualify as state action. Accordingly, summary judgment as to Hendricks's federal civil rights claim is appropriate.
Hendricks also alleges that Rasmussen's actions violated the Minnesota Civil Commitment Act, Minn. Stat. Ann. § 253B.05. Since the lone federal claim has been dismissed, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this state law claim and dismisses the claim without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Marshall v. Green Giant Co., 942 F.2d 539, 549 (8th Cir. 1991); see also Condor Corp. v. City of St. Paul, 912 F.2d 215, 220 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that courts should "exercise judicial restraint and avoid state law issues wherever possible").
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 4) is granted.
2. Plaintiff's civil rights claim (Doc. No. 4) is dismissed with prejudice.
3. Plaintiff's state law claim (Doc. No. 4) is dismissed without prejudice.
LET THE JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY