ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT

CECILIA ALTONAGA, District Judge

THIS CAUSE came before the Court on Defendant, Carnival Corporation's ("Carnival['s]") Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint [D.E. 10], which the Court converted to a motion for summary judgment on April 26, 2005 [D.E. 18]. On March 1, 2005, Plaintiff, Ashley Harts, filed a civil action to recover for injuries that she allegedly suffered aboard Carnival's ship, the Carnival Legend, during a vacation cruise. Ms. Harts' Amended Complaint [D.E. 7] contains one count of negligence against Carnival. Carnival now moves for summary judgment, claiming that the action is time-barred because Ms. Harts failed to provide full particulars of her claim in writing within 185 days after the date of her injury and failed to file her lawsuit within one year of the injury, as required by the terms of her Guest Ticket Contract. Ms. Harts claims that the Guest Ticket Contract's time limitations are inapplicable because she was a minor at the time she was injured.

I. BACKGROUND

Ms. Harts alleges the following facts in her Amended Complaint. On or about March 18, 2003, while Ms. Harts was passenger on board the Carnival Legend, a member of the ship's crew sexually assaulted and raped her. (Amend. Compl. ¶ 10.) At the time, the vessel was in navigable waters, and Ms. Harts was a paid passenger, although she did not receive a copy of her ticket for the cruise. ( Id. ¶ 6.) Ms. Harts was born on August 2, 1985; therefore, she was 17 years old at the time of the alleged assault. ( Id.)

Suzanne Vazquez, a Manager of Guest Claims for Carnival, submitted an Affidavit stating that Carnival's usual custom and practice is to mail passengers a Guest Ticket Contract after passage is booked and that passengers must present a ticket prior to boarding. (Vazquez Aff. [D.E. 10 Ex. A] ¶ 3.) Ms. Vazquez states that in this case, Ms. Harts' ticket was mailed by February 10, 2003. ( Id. ¶ 4.) Attached to Ms. Vazquez's Affidavit is an example of the Guest Ticket Contract applicable to Ms. Harts' voyage. Article 14(a) of this Contract provides the following:

Carnival shall not be liable for any claims whatsoever for personal injury, illness or death of the guest, unless full particulars in writing are given to Carnival within 185 days after the date of the injury, event, illness or death giving rise to the claim. Suit to recover on any such claim shall not be maintainable unless filed within one year after the date of the injury, event, illness or death, and unless served on Carnival within 120 days after filing. Guest expressly waives all other potentially applicable state or federal limitations periods.

(Guest Ticket Contr. [D.E. 10 Ex. 1] at 9.)

Based on this provision of the Guest Ticket Contract, Carnival moved to dismiss Ms. Harts' suit as time-barred. Carnival points out that Ms. Harts commenced her action more than one year from the date of her injury as well as more than one year from her eighteenth birthday. Furthermore, Ms. Vazquez states that upon review of Carnival's records, she could find no indication that Ms. Harts provided written notice of the particulars of her claim within 185 days of her alleged injury. (Vazquez Aff. ¶ 6.)

Ms. Harts does not argue that she, or someone acting on her behalf, lacked notice of the Guest Ticket Contract's terms prior to boarding the ship. Rather, she takes the position that the Guest Ticket Contract's limitation period and notice requirements are inapplicable to her because she was a minor at the time of her injury. She argues that instead of the Guest Ticket Contract's limitations period, the general three-year statute of limitations for maritime torts applies in her case. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 763a ("Unless otherwise specified by law, a suit for recovery of damages for personal injury or death, or both, arising out of a maritime tort, shall not be maintained unless commenced within three years from the date the cause of action accrued.").

Carnival counters by arguing that its Guest Ticket Contract legally shortens the statutory limitations period from three years to one year. Furthermore, it contends that because Ms. Harts is no longer a minor, she may not take advantage of statutory tolling provisions which apply only to minors, mentally incompetent persons, and deceased individuals for whom a legal representative has not been appointed. Therefore, based on the limitations period and notice requirements of the Guest Ticket Contract with which Ms. Harts failed to comply, Carnival maintains that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment shall be rendered "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In making this assessment, the Court "must view all the evidence and all factual inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party," Stewart v. Happy Herman's Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1285 (11th Cir. 1997), and "must resolve all reasonable doubts about the facts in favor of the non-movant," United of Omaha Life Ins. Co. v. Sun Life Ins. Co. of America, 894 F.2d 1555, 1558 (11th Cir. 1990).

"By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original). "As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Id. at 248. Likewise, a dispute about a material fact is a "genuine" issue "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id.

The moving party "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Summary judgment is proper "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Id. at 322. In those cases, there is no genuine issue of material fact "since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. at 323.

III. ANALYSIS

In general, a three-year statute of limitations applies to a suit for a maritime tort resulting in personal injury or death. 46 U.S.C. app. § 763a. However, a shipowner may impose by contract a shorter period for filing claims, giving notice of injury, or filing suit, but not below time limits established by Congress:

It shall be unlawful for the manager, agent, master, or owner of any sea-going vessel (other than tugs, barges, fishing vessels and their tenders) transporting passengers or merchandise or property from or between ports of the United States and foreign ports to provide by rule, contract, regulation, or otherwise a shorter period for giving notice of, or filing claims for loss of life or bodily injury, than six months, and for the institution of suits on such claims, than one year, such period for institution of suits to be computed from the day when the death or injury occurred.

46 U.S.C. app. § 183b(a).

In this case, Carnival's Guest Ticket Contract requires an injured passenger to provide notice of the injury within 185 days, which is greater than the six-month statutory minimum of 46 U.S.C. app. § 183b (a). Likewise, the Guest Ticket Contract's one-year limitations period for bringing suit to recover for personal injuries is consistent with § 183b(a)'s statutory minimum. Accordingly, as the Guest Ticket Contract comports with the minimum statutory requirements, Carnival argues that Ms. Harts' suit must be dismissed because she failed to comply with its valid limitations periods.

Ms. Harts argues, however, that because she was a minor at the time of her injury, she is entitled to a waiver of the Guest Ticket Contract's limitations period. Specifically, she relies on the following statutory language:

If a person who is entitled to recover on any such claim is mentally incompetent or a minor, or if the action is one for wrongful death, any lawful limitation of time prescribed in such contract shall not be applicable so long as no legal representative has been appointed for such incompetent, minor, or decedent's estate, but shall be applicable from the date of the appointment of such legal representative: Provided, however, That such appointment be made within three years after the date of such death or injury.

46 U.S.C. app. § 183b(c) (emphasis in original). Ms. Harts contends that because a legal representative was never appointed for her, the Guest Ticket Contract's limitations periods never became applicable to her.

To accept Ms. Harts' position, however, would require one to overlook the present tense of the verb "is" in the first sentence of § 183b(c): "If a person who is entitled to recover on any such claim is mentally incompetent or a minor. . . ." Ms. Harts, who is no longer a minor, contends that this sentence should be read as follows: "If a person who is entitled to recover on any such claim was mentally incompetent or a minor at the time of her injury. . . ." Ms. Harts' interpretation would mean that an injured minor would always retain the protection of § 183b(c), unless a legal representative were appointed, even if the minor achieved the age of majority and no longer satisfied the text of § 183b(c), which applies to a person who "is" a minor. No authority exists, however, for such an expansive reading of § 183b(c).

Ms. Harts claims that the relevant time period to determine whether someone "is" a minor is the moment at which the person becomes "entitled to recover" on a claim, which is the time of injury, rather the time of filing a lawsuit. She contends that she became "entitled to recover" when she was a minor and, accordingly, is covered by § 183b(c). Even accepting Ms. Harts' argument, though, that she became "entitled to recover" for her claim when she was a minor does not mean that she currently fits into one of § 183b(c)'s three categories of potential litigants: incompetents, minors, or decedent's estates, for which no legal representative has been appointed.

Ms. Harts also argues that § 183b(c) was enacted because, historically, admiralty law did not enforce maritime contracts against minors. See Sheafe v. Kimball, 21 F. Cas. 1208, 1209 (S.D.N.Y. 1851) ("[T]he respondent was a minor, and not bound by the contract, even if entered into by him personally. There is no distinction between the maritime law and common law in respect to the construction and obligation of contracts."). She therefore contends that she was never bound by the General Ticket Contract's terms and conditions and that § 183b(c) recognizes this fact.

A close reading of § 183b(c), however, reveals that Congress did intend persons, who may otherwise lack capacity to enter into a contract, to be bound by a maritime contract's lawful time limitations, under certain conditions. Specifically, a lawful limitation of time prescribed in a maritime contract is applicable to a mentally incompetent person, a minor, or a deceased individual (persons who generally lack capacity to enter into contracts) once a legal representative is appointed for the person. This evinces Congress's intent to provide relief from a maritime contract's time limitations period only in those cases where an individual is most in need of protection — that is, when the individual is incompetent, a minor, or deceased and has no legal representative to act on his or her behalf.

In this case, Ms. Harts is not one of those individuals, specified by Congress in § 183b(c), most in need of protection from a maritime contract's time limitation provisions. Upon reaching the age of majority, Ms. Harts achieved the capacity to act on her own behalf. She no longer fit into one of § 183b(c)'s three categories of incompetents, minors, and deceased individuals with no legal representative. Her reliance on Boehnen v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 778 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), is therefore misplaced. In Boehnen, the plaintiff was "a mentally incompetent person and, as such, was protected by § 183b(c) when she filed her original complaint within three years from the date of her injury." Id. at 1085. In this case, Ms. Harts was not a minor (or incompetent person or deceased individual) when she filed her original complaint. She was therefore not protected by § 183b(c).

Because Ms. Harts is not a minor acting without an appointed legal representative, she may not claim the protection of § 183b(c). Accordingly, the limitations periods in Carnival's Guest Ticket Contract apply to Ms. Harts' claim. There is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Ms. Harts complied with these limitations periods. The undisputed facts of this case show that she has not. Accordingly, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Carnival's Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint [D.E. 10], which the Court converted to a motion for summary judgment on April 26, 2005 [D.E. 18] is GRANTED. Summary judgment is entered in favor of Carnival, and the Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

DONE AND ORDERED.