William T. Lawrence

ENTRY ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

This cause is before the Court on the Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings (dkt. no. 49). The motion is fully briefed, and the Court, being duly advised, DENIES IN PART and GRANTS IN PART the Defendants' motion for the reasons set forth below.

I. STANDARD

In reviewing a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court applies the same standard as that of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), and therefore takes the facts alleged in the complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. The complaint must contain only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and there is no need for detailed factual allegations. However, the statement must "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests" and the "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Pisciotta v. Old Nat. Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007)).

II. BACKGROUND

In late 2008, Defendants Christine Mannina, Lesia Moore, Jeff Breedlove, and Tom Tudor (the "Detectives"), detectives with the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (the "IMPD"), were being filmed for a reality television show produced by Lucky Shift, Inc., Discovery Communications, LLC, and Discovery Communications, Inc. (collectively "Discovery"), titled The Shift. The Defendants worked under the guidance of Defendants Detective William Benjamin and Detective Kevin Kelly (the "Supervisors"). All four of the Detectives and at least one supervisor, Defendant Kelly, were being paid by Discovery for their participation in The Shift. Defendant Benjamin was the IMPD's authorized representative for purposes of The Shift, and as such he signed a production contract and an Access and Location Release.

On the night of November 3, 2008, three armed men approached the residence of 2710 Bluffwood Drive, Indianapolis, Indiana. Richard Miller and Duane Miller were inside the residence, and Ricky Blueitt and Kourtney Glasscock were sitting in a car outside the home. As the armed men approached, one man held Glasscock at gunpoint while the other two men and Blueitt entered the residence. Inside the residence, one of the men, wearing a mask, shot Richard Miller. The other man, wearing a hooded sweatshirt, shot Duane Miller. Duane Miller survived his injuries, but Richard Miller died that evening as a result of his injuries. Ultimately, there were four witnesses to the crime: Duane Miller, Blueitt, Glasscock, and Tamela Daniels, who was inside the house at the time of the shootings.

Mannina, Moore, Breedlove, and Tudor investigated the events that occurred at the Bluffwood residence on November 3 under the guidance of the Supervisors. As part of their investigation, the Detectives obtained video surveillance footage from outside the Bluffwood residence and solicited statements from Duane Miller, Blueitt, Glasscock, and Daniels. All four witnesses informed the Detectives that they did not clearly see the perpetrators, though they suspected that the shooters were in their twenties, and Blueitt stated that he and the victims likely knew the shooters. Based on this initial investigation, the Detectives and Duane Miller both suspected that Blueitt knew the shooters and was involved in the crime.

After seeing some surveillance footage stills, a friend of Blueitt who was not a witness to the shootings noticed similarities between the image of one of the shooters and an image he had seen on the social networking page of Samuel Swavely. Blueitt's friend then identified Swavely as the man who had shot Richard Miller. Swavely, a minor at the time, had also posted a music video on the same webpage that included brief images of the Plaintiff, Carlton Hart. After hearing about the resemblance between the man in the music video on Swavely's webpage and the image of Richard Miller's shooter from the surveillance footage, Duane Miller watched the music video on Swavely's webpage and subsequently identified Hart as the man who had shot him.

After Miller notified the Detectives of his belief that Hart was one of the shooters, the Detectives created a photo line-up, which included a photograph of Hart, to show to the witnesses despite their previous statements that they were not able to see the faces of the shooters. All four witnesses had also already viewed Hart's image on the webpage. Although the witnesses' earlier descriptions were not consistent with Hart's appearance, and Hart's appearance was not consistent with the surveillance images of the shooters, each witness then identified Hart as one of the perpetrators of the shooting. The Detectives knew that the witnesses had already viewed Hart's image, but they only conducted a single photo line-up for each witness, did not alter the photo line-up for any of the witnesses, and did not assure that the witnesses did not communicate with each other prior to their individual photo line-up analyses.

The Detectives knew that no probable cause existed for Hart's arrest, and they knew they could only secure a warrant for his arrest by withholding information about the deficiencies in the photo line-up identification. Although the Detectives knew that Hart was likely not involved in the shootings, the Detectives applied for a warrant for Hart's arrest on December 3, 2008, which was supported by the Detectives' own probable cause affidavit. The Detectives were granted an arrest warrant for Hart, and Hart was arrested the same day.

Upon his arrest, the Detectives interviewed Hart, who maintained his innocence and offered an alibi as to his whereabouts on the night of November 3, 2008. The Detectives did not investigate, verify, or discredit Hart's proffered alibi. Furthermore, the Detectives discovered and then suppressed evidence that tended to exculpate Hart, including phone and computer records, witness testimony confirming Hart's alibi, and DNA samples taken from bullet shells found at the Bluffwood residence that did not match Hart. Further, in support of his innocence, Hart underwent and passed three polygraph examinations in February 2009. Nonetheless, the Detectives urged Hart's prosecution, with the support of their Supervisors, who knew about the Detectives' conduct in securing the identification of Hart.

In March 2009, Adrian Rocket informed the Detectives that he had sold Hart a gun matching the type used to shoot Miller, but he did so only after coaching by the Detectives.

In late 2009, Blueitt told the Detectives that he was unsure whether Swavely and Hart were the shooters. The Detectives encouraged Blueitt to maintain his identification, and did not inform Noah Schaffer, the deputy prosecutor overseeing the case, or defense counsel that Blueitt was having second thoughts. Blueitt later gave a taped statement to another officer regarding his doubt about the identifications, and stated that Mannina had pressured him to stand firm in his identification. On December 14, 2009, Blueitt made these same statements in court. Nevertheless, the Detectives, with the Supervisors' knowledge and acquiescence, continued to urge Hart's prosecution.

On October 20, 2010, the charges against Hart were dismissed for an "insufficient nexus between defendant and crime," and Hart was released, having spent almost two years in jail awaiting trial.

Hart filed suit against the Defendants on December 2, 2010, and the Defendants removed the case to this Court on December 23, 2010. Three months later, on March 31, 2011, Hart filed his amended complaint, setting forth seven claims for relief. Specifically, Hart alleges claims against the Defendants for (1) making false or misleading statements in support of a probable cause affidavit; (2) false arrest/false imprisonment; (3) malicious prosecution; (4) abuse of process; (5) speedy trial violation; (6) making false or misleading statements in support of opposition to bail; and (7) defamation. Hart seeks compensatory, consequential, reputation, and punitive damages, as well as attorney fees and costs. He seeks injunctive relief from only Defendants Lucky Shift, Inc., Discovery Communications, LLC, and Discovery Communications, Inc.

The Defendants now seek judgment on the pleadings as to Hart's claims against the Detectives in their official capacities, the Supervisors in their individual and official capacities, the city officials in their official capacities, the IMPD, the Indianapolis Department of Public Safety, and the City of Indianapolis.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Claims against the City of Indianapolis, the IDPS, and

the Individual Defendants in their Official Capacities

The Defendants seek judgment on the pleadings regarding Hart's claim against the City of Indianapolis, IDPS, and all named individual Defendants in their official capacities because, they assert, Hart has not sufficiently pled a municipal policy or custom pursuant to Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).

Claims against officials in their official capacities are treated as claims against the governmental entity itself. Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 771(7th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, a claim against an official in his official capacity must satisfy the standards set out in Monell. E.g., id. A local governmental entity is only liable under § 1983 "when execution of a government's policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury." 436 U.S. at 694. To state a claim under Monell, a plaintiff must plead "(1) an express policy that, when enforced, causes a constitutional deprivation; (2) a widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a 'custom or usage' with the force of law; or (3) an allegation that the constitutional injury was caused by a person with 'final policymaking authority.'" McTigue v. Chicago, 60 F.3d 381, 382 (7th Cir. 1995).

The Defendants argue that Hart's claim fails because he does not plead an injury caused by an express policy or policymaker, and because Hart's claim that a custom or usage exists is deficient. Hart argues that there exists a "general custom of permitting Defendant Detectives to disregard constitutional limitations in favor of securing arrests and convictions." The Defendants argue that, even if this custom existed, Hart's claim fails because he must plead more than a single incident to establish municipal liability.

Before Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, the United States Supreme Court held that complaints against municipal corporations asserting liability under § 1983 needed only to set forth a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Leatherman v. Tarrant Co. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (citing Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a)(2)) (striking down the Fifth Circuit's "heightened pleading standard" in municipal liability cases, which required a plaintiff to plead more than a single instance of misconduct). District courts in this Circuit have affirmed this standard since Twombly, applying it through the new lens set forth in Twombly: "an official capacity claim can survive even conclusory allegations that a policy or practice existed, so long as facts are pled that put the defendants on proper notice of the alleged wrongdoing." Riley v. County of Cook, 682 F.Supp.2d 856, 861 (N.D. Ill. 2010). In assessing whether the complaint meets this standard, the court undertakes "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).

To this end, Hart has specifically alleged that the Defendants pressured witnesses, relied on identifications obtained by faulty procedures, suppressed evidence, and failed to investigate Hart's alibi. Hart has supported these assertions with detailed accounts of the manner and timing of these actions. Insofar as these specific factual allegations, if true, detail the underlying acts constituting Hart's overarching enumerated claims, the Court finds that Hart's allegations rise above a speculative level. It is certainly plausible that a group of police detectives who pressured witnesses, relied on faulty identifications, suppressed evidence, and failed to investigate alibis were acting according to an unwritten custom within their department if their supervisors were condoning such actions. Hart's detailed allegations thus provide the Defendants notice of the nature of the custom alleged to exist. For this reason, the Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the City of Indianapolis, IDPS, and all individual defendants in their official capacities is DENIED.

B. Claims Against the Defendant Supervisors in Their Individual Capacities

The Defendants next seek judgment on the pleadings as to Hart's claims against the Defendant Supervisors in their individual capacities. In support, the Defendants argue that Ashcroft v. Iqbal established that in a § 1983 suit, government officials are only liable for their own misconduct. 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Indeed, Iqbal established that government officials must be personally responsible to be held liable, but Iqbal further clarified the ways in which a government official could incur personal responsibility. Notably, supervisors may be personally liable for the acts of their subordinates if they knew "about the conduct and facilitate[d] it, approve[d] it, condone[d] it, or turn[ed] a blind eye for fear of what they might see. They must in other words act either knowingly or with deliberate, reckless indifference." Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 992-93 (7th Cir. 1988), cited with approval in Backes v. Village of Peoria Heights, Ill., - - - F.3d - - -, 2011 WL 5505348 at *2 (7th Cir. Nov. 10, 2011).

The Defendants argue that Hart fails to allege knowledge and facilitating, approving, or condoning of the Detectives' conduct that rises above a speculative level. In reviewing the pleadings for sufficiency under Iqbal and Twombly, the Court first separates legal conclusions from factual allegations. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1951. Legal conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth, while factual allegations contribute to the plausibility of the plaintiff's claim. See id.

In this case, Hart's underlying factual allegations, which are entitled to the assumption of truth, detail conduct specific enough to permit the inference that the Defendant Supervisors did know about the Detectives' conduct, and turned a blind eye to it. Specifically, Hart alleges that "other police officers expressed concern about Defendant Detectives' tactics to Defendant Supervisors. . . . [but] Defendant Supervisors continued to support the Defendant Detectives in pressing for Mr. Hart's continued incarceration and prosecution." Furthermore, Hart alleges that the Supervisors were aware of Hart's innocence and suppressed evidence of it. These allegations close the inferential gap between Hart's explanation and alternative explanations for the Detectives' ability to conduct themselves as alleged and provide the requisite notice to the Defendant Supervisors regarding the alleged conduct. Cf. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951-52. For this reason, the Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Hart's claims against the Defendant Supervisors in their individual capacities is DENIED.

C. Defendant Supervisors' Entitlement to Qualified Immunity

The Defendants argue that the Supervisors are also shielded from liability by the doctrine of qualified immunity. Government officials are protected from liability for civil damages by qualified immunity "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Determining whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity requires a two-part analysis: the court must decide (1) whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged or shown make out a violation of a constitutional right, and (2) whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time of defendant's alleged misconduct. E.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).

The Defendants argue that, because there is no supervisory liability under § 1983, there can be no constitutional violation, much less a violation of a constitutional right that is clearly established. However, by virtue of the analysis above, the Court finds that Hart has sufficiently alleged a constitutional violation by the Defendant Supervisors insofar as they are alleged to have known about the Detectives' conduct and facilitated it, condoned it, approved it, or turned a blind eye to it. Moreover, this right was clearly established as early as 1988. See Jones, 856 F.2d at 992-93. For this reason, the Court DENIES the Defendants' claim for judgment on the pleadings as to the Defendant Supervisors on the basis of qualified immunity.

D. Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process Claims

The Defendants argue that Hart cannot state a claim for malicious prosecution or abuse of process arising from the Due Process Clause under § 1983 because state law remedies exist.

Assuming "that some of the interests granted historical protection by the common law of torts (such as the interest[ ] in freedom from . . . malicious prosecution) are protected by the Due Process Clause[,] . . . [Supreme Court] precedents make clear that a state actor's random and unauthorized deprivation of that interest cannot be challenged under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 so long as the State provides an adequate postdeprivation remedy." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 283-84 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring) cited in Newsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 751 (7th Cir. 2001)(explaining that Kennedy's opinion, "as the narrowest ground of decision, constitutes the effective holding of the Court"). When a state law remedy exists, due process of law is afforded by the opportunity to pursue a claim in state court. Newsome, 256 F.3d at 751 (analyzing Albright). Thus, "satisfying the elements of the state-law tort of malicious prosecution knocks out any constitutional tort of malicious prosecution." Id. (emphasis in original). The same can be said for the tort of abuse of process.

Indiana provides for claims for malicious prosecution and abuse of process. E.g., Lindsay v. Jenkins, 574 N.E.2d 324 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); Livingston v. Indianapolis, 398 N.E.2d 1302 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979). In this case, however, these claims are barred by official immunity. Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(8). Hart contends that because Indiana has granted its officials immunity from state law malicious prosecution and abuse of process claims, state law remedies have been withheld and his due process claim is therefore cognizable under § 1983.

To state a due process claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege that the state procedures for redressing injuries of this kind are constitutionally inadequate. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S. Ct. 677, 679-80 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring). The existence of immunity from certain types of claims does not render a State law remedy constitutionally defective. Id. at 680. As Justice Stevens has explained,

In my judgment, a state policy that defeats recovery does not, in itself, carry that consequence. Those aspects of a State's tort regime that defeat recovery are not constitutionally invalid, so long as there is no fundamental unfairness in their operation. Thus, defenses such as contributory negligence or statutes of limitations may defeat recovery in particular cases without raising any question about the constitutionality of a State's procedures for disposing of tort litigation. Similarly, in my judgment, the mere fact that a State elects to provide some of its agents with a sovereign immunity defense in certain cases does not justify the conclusion that its remedial system is constitutionally inadequate. There is no reason to believe that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the legislation enacted pursuant to § 5 of that Amendment should be construed to suggest that the doctrine of sovereign immunity renders a state procedure fundamentally unfair.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the Defendants' motion for partial judgment on the pleadings as to Hart's claims (1) against the City of Indianapolis, IDPS, and all officials in their official capacities, and (2) the Defendant Supervisors in their individual capacities. The Court GRANTS the Defendants' motion for partial judgment on the pleadings as to Hart's § 1983 claims based on malicious prosecution and abuse of process.

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Hon. William T. Lawrence, Judge

United States District Court

Southern District of Indiana
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