MEMORANDUM ORDER

J. THOMAS MARTEN, JUDGE

This case arises following prior, unsuccessful state court litigation between plaintiff Shirley Hall and the estate of her late aunt. Hall, appearing pro se, has instituted the present litigation against beneficiaries of the estate, and the attorneys in that prior litigation (both her own attorneys as well as those of the beneficiaries.)

Hall brought the present action in the Wichita Division of the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, although the litigation has no connection with the area. No parties or potential witnesses reside in or near Wichita. Instead, all potential witnesses and all Kansas parties reside in or near Johnson County, Kansas. On July 16, 1999, the undersigned granted the motion by defendants to transfer, and the court's order provided that the court clerk was directed to transfer the case to Kansas City, Kansas for random assignment there. (Dkt. No. 51). The matter was separately and subsequently assigned by the clerk to Judge Vratil. (Dkt. No. 55). On February 4, 2000, Judge Vratil recused herself from the present action. The matter was recently reassigned to the undersigned, but the matter remains scheduled for trial in Kansas City, Kansas.

Defendants Beam-Ward and Hill, Beam-Ward, Kruse were dismissed by the court's order of August 20, 1999. The court gave plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint on or before August 31, 1999. The day before this deadline, plaintiff requested extending the deadline until September 14, 1999. On September 13, 1999, plaintiff moved to extend the deadline indefinitely. On January 19, 2000, the court dismissed the claims against defendants James, Hart, Lytle and Logan. The court gave leave for plaintiff to file an amended complaint against Beam-Ward and his firm on or before January 26, 2000. On December 27, 1999, plaintiff Hall moved to amend her complaint, adding an additional complaint against Martin and Payne Jones. Plaintiff has never filed any amended complaint against Beam-Ward or Hill, Beam-Ward, Kruse.

The leading motion before the court is the Motion to Dismiss by defendants Martin and Payne Jones. These defendants have moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and for failure to state a claim. With respect to any constitutional claims advanced by Hall against defendant Martin, the court is without subject matter jurisdiction to entertain these claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Such claims thus must be dismissed on the same grounds similar claims were dismissed by Judge Vratil. The remaining claims for fraud are inadequate as a matter of law, failing to identify untrue statements of fact by defendants which plaintiff justifiably relied upon. The court will deny plaintiff's Motion to Amend to add additional claims against Martin and Payne Jones. This denial is required for two reasons. First, plaintiff has failed to offer any justification for addition to the complaint, after previously filing her first complaint on March 12, 1999, and subsequently a voluminous Amended Complaint on April 26, 1999. Hall failed to assert this claim in a timely fashion, even though the general nature of the claim suggests Hall previously knew or should have known of the (alleged) fact basis for the amendment. The court denies the requested amendment on grounds of untimeliness. Further, the proposed amendment must in any event be denied as futile. The new claim against the defendants is subject to the same Rooker-Feldman doctrine which has justified the previous dismissal of other claims advanced by Hall. See August 20, 1999 Order, at 4.

In her Motion to Deny, Hall not only seeks denial of the Martin motion to dismiss, she also asks for leave to amend her complaint, and to compel production of telephone records. The requested amendment is denied for the reasons previously stated. The motion to compel is denied. Such a motion may not be filed where the parties have yet to have their Rule 26(f) meeting. Fed.R.Civ.Pr. 26(d). Here, Hall has avoided any such meeting with defendants. Further, there is no indication that Hall has attempted to confer with the defendants in an attempt to obtain the discovery, as required by Fed.R.Civ.Pr. 37(a)(2)(B).

Hall's Motion to Strike and Motion for Sanctions are premised on the grounds that pleadings submitted by defendants Hall and James did not bear signatures of an attorney of record. However, the pleadings in question were signed by an attorney. According to counsel of record, this signature was made with her explicit authorization, and was formally adopted by her. Plaintiff's motion will be denied.

Next, plaintiff Hall has moved to vacate certain orders of the court under Rule 60(b)(6). Hall argues that Judge Vratil's prior adverse rulings should be vacated, and that Judge Vratil should have recused herself since the judge's ex-husband was a law firm partner of one of the defendants. Judge Vratil recused herself on February 4, 2000, noting that she had retained the services of the law firm (Lathrop and Gage) for work on a separate project. The order does not note the arguments made in Hall's motion to recuse, filed the same day, that her relationship with her ex-husband would justify recusal.

The court must reject Hall's arguments for several reasons. First, Rule 60(b) by its terms applies only to a "final judgment, order, or proceeding." Kapco Manufacturing v. CO Enterprises, 773, F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1985). Its purpose is to ensure that all cases are resolved on the merits. Patapoff v. Vollstedt's Inc., 267 F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1959). Thus, the rule has no application where the challenged ruling is not final. Interstate Power v. Kansas City Power, 992 F.2d 804 (8th Cir. 1993). This is because, in the absence of a final ruling, the trial court retains the power to change prior rulings for good cause. Greene v. Union Mutual Life Insurance, 764 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 1985). Here, of course, the rulings Hall challenges are not final orders. Additional claims and other parties remained in the action at the time of Hall's motion.

Second, even assuming the issues were correctly before the court, the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that recusal was justified on the grounds set forth in her motion. The court finds that plaintiff's argument fails to satisfy 28 U.S.C. § 455, which sets forth the standard for recusal. The court notes that a motion to recuse must be filed in a timely fashion. Singer v. Wadman, 745 F.2d 606, 608 (10th Cir. 1984). Such motions are disfavored where they are not only untimely, but filed only after adverse rulings by the court. Id. Here, of course, Hall began to suggest the need for recusal only after the case had been assigned to Judge Vratil for nearly one year, and only after several adverse rulings.

In addition, the court finds that the proffered rationale fails to support recusal. Hall cites to many cases setting forth the general standard for recusal, but fails to note any case in which recusal has found to be justified on the grounds of the judge's relationship to a former spouse. One court has concluded that the relationship to a former spouse does not automatically justify recusal. See Independent Order of Foresters v. Donald, Lufkin Jenrette, 157 F.3d 933 (2nd Cir. 1998). Here, Hall has shown nothing more than the bare fact that Judge Vratil's former spouse was a partner of Lathrop and Gage. In a manner exemplifying her prosecution of the case generally, Hall then immediately proceeds to speculate about the possible existence of a conspiracy among Judge Vratil, her former husband, and the defendants. (Plf. Mem. Dkt. No. 120, at 2). As the party seeking recusal, it is the plaintiff's burden to present specific facts which would cause a reasonable person to question the impartiality of the judge. Here, plaintiff's unsupported innuendo and speculation fails to meet this standard.

Hall's motions to stay and for certification are moot in light of the other decisions herein. Plaintiff's claims against defendants Beam-Ward and Hill, Beam-Ward, Kruse, L.L.C. are dismissed pursuant to the court's order of January 19, 2000. Although not styled as a motion, these defendants suggest this relief in their Suggestions in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Stay (Dkt. No. 106), and the court finds the relief is appropriate under the circumstances of the case. The action is dismissed as to these defendants for failure to state a claim.

IT IS ACCORDINGLY ORDERED this day of July, 2001, that the plaintiff's Motions for Stay, Certification, Amendment, Relief, Sanctions, Striking, and Denial (Dkt. No's 99, 113, 118, 119, 90, 82) are hereby denied; defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 76) is granted. Plaintiff's claims against defendants Beam-Ward and Hill, Beam-Ward, Kruse, L.L.C. are dismissed.