Summary
denying jurisdictional discovery where plaintiff "failed to make a sufficient start on a showing of jurisdiction," because it failed to allege injury in New York or that defendant received substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce
Summary of this case from NYC Police Pension Fund v. PlinnekeOpinion
9830 Index 656717/17
07-09-2019
GREENBACKER RESIDENTIAL SOLAR LLC., Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ONEROOF ENERGY, INC., et al., Defendants, Dalton William Sprinkle, Defendant-Appellant.
Pierce Bainbridge Beck Price & Hecht LLP, New York (Aaron J. Gold of counsel), for appellant. Law Office of Mark E. Goidell, Garden City (Mark E. Goidell, Hauppauge, of counsel), for respondent.
Pierce Bainbridge Beck Price & Hecht LLP, New York (Aaron J. Gold of counsel), for appellant.
Law Office of Mark E. Goidell, Garden City (Mark E. Goidell, Hauppauge, of counsel), for respondent.
Sweeny, J.P., Manzanet–Daniels, Webber, Gesmer, Kern, JJ.
The complaint fails to state a cause of action as against Sprinkle for tortious interference with contract, because there is no allegation that Sprinkle personally benefitted from the corporations' alleged breach of contract; the only benefit he is alleged to have received is his salary from the corporations (see G.D. Searle & Co. v. Medicore Communications, Inc., 843 F Supp 895, 912 [S.D N.Y. 1994] ). Plaintiff failed to make a sufficient start on a showing of jurisdiction over Sprinkle to entitle it to jurisdictional discovery (see Venegas v. Capric Clinic, 147 A.D.3d 457, 458, 47 N.Y.S.3d 13 [1st Dept. 2017] ). Because the conduct complained of involved the diversion of funds from outside New York to recipients outside New York, the "critical events," and thus the situs of injury, were not in New York (see Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, 163 A.D.3d 414, 415, 81 N.Y.S.3d 18 [1st Dept. 2018] ; CPLR 302[a][3][ii] ). Moreover, plaintiff does not allege that Sprinkle received substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce (see CPLR 302[a][3][ii] ). Because Sprinkle did not personally benefit from the breach of contract, the corporations' contacts with New York cannot be imputed to him (see Charles Schwab Corp. v. Bank of Am. Corp., 883 F.3d 68, 85 [2d Cir. 2018] ).
Nor can Sprinkle be said to have "reasonably expected" his actions to have consequences in New York (see LaMarca v. Pak–Mor Mfg. Co., 95 N.Y.2d 210, 214–215, 713 N.Y.S.2d 304, 735 N.E.2d 883 [2000] ; CPLR 302[a][3][ii] ), as he neither did anything to avail himself of New York nor took any steps to project himself into New York. Given that Sprinkle had no contact with New York and did not purposefully avail himself of New York, the constitutional guarantee of due process bars New York courts from exercising personal jurisdiction over him.