Opinion
Civil Action 2:22-02552-BHH-MGB
07-13-2023
Stephen J. Green, Plaintiff, v. Brian Sterling, Charles Williams, John Palmer, Amy Enloe, Natasha Harper, Mr. Martin, Ms. Boyd, Ms. Wyant, D. Lee., Defendants.
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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Stephen J. Green, appearing pro se, originally filed this action in the Court of Common Pleas for Greenville County on or about June 20, 2022. (Dkt. No. 1-1.) Plaintiff alleges claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the South Carolina Tort Claims Act (“SCTCA”), SC Code Ann. §§ 15-78-10 et seq. (Id.) On August 3, 2022, Defendants Brian Stirling, Charles Williams, John Palmer, Amy Enloe, Natasha Harper, Mr. Martin, Ms. Boyd, Ms. Wyant, and D. Lee(“Defendants”) removed this action to Federal Court. (Dkt. No. 1.) This matter is now before the Court upon Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 62). For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends granting in part the Motion for Summary Judgment. Specifically, summary judgment should be granted as to Plaintiff's federal claims and those claims should be dismissed. The undersigned further recommends the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state-law claims and remand those claims to Greenville County.
Here, the undersigned uses the correct last names for Defendants Stirling and Wyant. (Dkt. No. 62-1.)
Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e), D.S.C., all pretrial matters in cases involving pro se litigants are referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for consideration.
BACKGROUND
This civil action arises from events that occurred while Plaintiff was an inmate housed at Perry Correctional Institution (“Perry”). (Dkt. No. 1-1.) In his verified Complaint,Plaintiff alleges that after his transfer “from Mississippi” on July 1, 2021, he was eventually sent to Perry on July 9, 2021. (Id. at 5.) According to Plaintiff, he was housed in D-Dorm where he observed that “the desk/sitting/writing area was stripped out [of] the room as well as the bed frame, and the bed frame was replaced with a five-inch concrete slab.” (Id. at 6.) Additionally, “the room window was completely covered over by sheet metal and that said sheet metal completely prevented Plaintiff from viewing any of the natural surroundings,” including the sun and sky. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he was moved to a different wing in the same building on July 13, 2021, and his new room was in the same condition. (Id.) The documents attached to the Complaint indicate that the rooms in which Plaintiff was housed were in the Restrictive Housing Unit. (Id. at 25-37.)
“A complaint is ‘verified' if it is ‘signed, sworn, and submitted under penalty of perjury.'” Goodman v. Diggs, 986 F.3d 493, 495 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting James v. Hale, 959 F.3d 307, 314 (7th Cir. 2020)).
Plaintiff alleges he “sought to address the decor requirements with staff by sending a request to both [Defendants] Warden Charles Williams and Deputy Warden John Palmer.” (Id. at 6.) He has attached to the Complaint request to staff member forms directed to these Defendants. (Id. at 25-26, 29.) In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges his requests to Defendant Williams “noted that the room decor was not within ACA/CAC state or federal mandates or standards.” (Id. at 6.) He also “noted that the 5-inch concrete slab that replaced the bed frame was so low to the ground that it caused the Plaintiff to sit in the ‘V' position,” causing Plaintiff severe lower back pain. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff alleges that in his requests to Defendant Palmer, Plaintiff “noted that the room lights go out at 11:30PM at night and come back on at 4:00AM.” (Id. at 6.)
Plaintiff also alleges that at some point he was “signed up to see [Defendant] Nurse Practitioner Amy Enloe.” (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff saw Defendant Enloe, and he “was told he would be signed up for an MRI.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that “after an excessive amount of time went by without any other medical treatment (MRI, etc), Plaintiff submitted a request to staff to Nurse Practitioner Amy Enloe.” (Id.) According to Plaintiff, in the request, he let Enloe know the prescribed medication was not working and he wanted to know when he would see a doctor or receive an MRI. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges he did not receive a timely response from Defendant Enloe. (Id. at 9-10.)
Plaintiff alleges that he had an MRI in November 2021, and in March 2022, he saw an orthopedist “who informed Plaintiff that there was a severely pinched nerve in his lower back.” (Id. at 10.) Plaintiff alleges he saw another doctor who advised him to stretch to relieve his back pain. He was also prescribed ibuprofen. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges he has not received any other medical treatment since April 9, 2022, and his condition has “only gotten worse due to the conditions of the cells.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges “pain and suffering, . . . accompanied by psychological harm.” (Id. at 11.)
Plaintiff further alleges that he “began having suicidal thoughts due to the Defendants' illegal and grossly negligent acts” and deliberate indifference and he was placed on crisis intervention “on or about” October 2021 for 30 days. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that while in crisis intervention, he did not eat or drink anything for eight days. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that during this time he was seen by “Mental Health” Defendants Natasha Harper, Ms. Boyd, and Mr. Martin. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, Defendants Harper and Boyd failed to “ever interview the Plaintiff with pen and paper present to take notes.” (Id. at 12.) Plaintiff alleges he was denied referral to the crisis stabilization unit because Deputy Director Joel Anderson wanted to deal with Plaintiff's “mental illness ‘in house.'” (Id. at 11.)
Plaintiff alleges that when Defendant Mental Health Coordinator Ms. Wyant “did a walk through” in February 2022, Plaintiff “pointed to both the bed (five-inch concrete slab) and the covered up window.” (Id. at 12.) Plaintiff alleges he told Defendant Wyant about his severe back pain due to the five-inch slab that replaced the bed, and he also “pointed out” that he “was suffering from a low white blood cell count from a lack of vitamin D.” (Id. at 13.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant Wyant “shrugged off everything the Plaintiff reported.” (Id.) Plaintiff also generally alleges that Defendant Grievance Coordinator D. Lee “refus[ed] to process Plaintiff's grievances on more than one occasion even though Plaintiff clearly and undeniably met the grievance requirements.” (Id. at 19.)
The Complaint alleges Defendants were grossly negligent under South Carolina law and that Defendants violated Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights by showing deliberate indifference to a prison condition and deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. (Id. at 14-22.) He asks for a “preliminary and permanent injunction ordering Defendants” Stirling, Palmer, and William to cease the above-complained of conditions and also to “cease denying inmates a means or method to see as well as hear the TVs provided.” (Id. at 23.) Plaintiff asks for compensatory and punitive damages. (Id.)
On January 20, 2023, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 62.) On January 23, 2023, this Court issued an Order pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of the dismissal procedure and the possible consequences if he failed to adequately respond to the motion. (Dkt. No. 64.) Plaintiff filed a response in opposition on June 5, 2023, and Defendants filed a reply on June 20, 2023. (Dkt. Nos. 95; 102.) Plaintiff filed a sur-reply on July 10, 2023. (Dkt. No. 104.) The Motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for review.
Plaintiff's response deadline was extended several times in part to allow additional discovery.
STANDARDS
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment “shall” be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “Facts are ‘material' when they might affect the outcome of the case, and a ‘genuine issue' exists when the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” The News & Observer Publ'g Co. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 597 F.3d 570, 576 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, “‘the nonmoving party's evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in that party's favor.'” Id. (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999)); see also Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 123-24 (4th Cir. 1990). Conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of the summary judgment motion. Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365 (4th Cir. 1985). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
Because Plaintiff is representing himself, these standards must be applied while liberally construing his filings in this case. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
DISCUSSION
In their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants argue: (1) Defendants Enloe, Harper, Boyd, Martin, Wyant, and Lee are entitled to dismissal as a matter of law because Plaintiff has not served these Defendants with process; (2) Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to all claims except his claim concerning “the height of the concrete slab on which a mattress is placed in his cell in the RHU”; (3) Defendants are entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to the extent they are being sued in their official capacities for any § 1983 claims; (4) Plaintiff's § 1983 claims fail as a matter of law; (5) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to any § 1983 claims; and (6) Plaintiff's gross negligence claim fails as a matter of law. (Dkt. No. 62-1.)
The undersigned considers these arguments, below.
A. Exhaustion
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to all § 1983 claims except his claim concerning “the height of the concrete slab on which a mattress is placed in his cell in the RHU” (Dkt. No. 62-1 at 5-11.) Section 1997e(a) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Through the enactment of this statute, “Congress has mandated exhaustion clearly enough, regardless of the relief offered through administrative procedures.” Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001); see also Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002).
The purpose of the exhaustion requirement is twofold. First, it gives an administrative agency “an opportunity to correct its own mistakes with respect to the programs it administers before it is haled into federal court.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 89 (2006) (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992)). Second, “[c]laims generally can be resolved much more quickly and economically in proceedings before an agency than in litigation in federal court.” Id.
Exhaustion is defined by each prison's grievance procedure, not the PLRA; a prisoner must comply with his prison's grievance procedure to exhaust his administrative remedies. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). An inmate's failure to “properly take each step within the administrative process . . . bars, and does not just postpone, suit under § 1983.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002); see also Johnson v. Ozmint, 567 F.Supp.2d 806, 815-16 (D.S.C. 2008) (granting summary judgment on the plaintiff's § 1983 claims for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to those claims).
In support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants have submitted an affidavit from Felicia McKie, Agency Inmate Grievance Coordinator/Branch Chief within the SCDC Office of General Council. (Dkt. No. 62-25.) In her affidavit, McKie describes the grievance system as a “three-step process.” (Id. at 2.)
First, an inmate must attempt to resolve the issue informally by submitting a Request to Staff Member Form (“RTSM”) or Automated Request to Staff Member (“ARTSM”) using the kiosk system. The Request must be submitted to the appropriate supervisor or staff person within eight (8) working days of the incident. . . . Staff members are allowed forty-five (45) days to respond to RTSMs or ARTSMs.
If no response to the Request is provided within the allotted time frame, or if the inmate is unsatisfied with the response, the inmate can proceed to the second step by filing a Step 1 grievance, which involves completing Inmate Grievance Form 10-5. The Step 1 form requires the inmate to include “supporting documentation and attach [the] answered RTSM or Kiosk reference number” The Step l grievance must be completed and placed in the Grievance Box at the institution within eight (8) working days of the RTSM response.
After it is turned in by the inmate and retrieved by staff, the Step 1 grievance form will be routed to the institution's IGC. If the IGC determines the grievance cannot be processed due to missing information, documentation, or other issues, the IGC
will note this on the Step 1 grievance form and return it to the inmate along with the reasons it cannot be processed and possibly further instructions.
If an inmate's Step 1 grievance is returned as “Processed and Returned,” the inmate can either re-file a new grievance after correcting any deficiencies noted, or the inmate can appeal the processed and returned grievance to me or designated staff personnel within ten (10) working days of the grievance being returned to the inmate.
When the Step 1 grievance is processed and returned to the inmate with a Warden's Decision and Reason, if the inmate is unsatisfied, he must appeal that response by submitting a Step 2 grievance form to the IGC within five (5) working days of receipt of the response to the Step 1 grievance. Submission of a Step 2 grievance is the third and last step in the SCDC grievance process. The response to the Step 2 grievance is considered to be SCDC's final decision on the issue, and it is at this point that an inmate's administrative remedies have been exhausted.(Id. at 2-3.)
The undersigned also takes judicial notice of SCDC Policy GA-01.12, which outlines the grievance process and is consistent with McKie's above summary. See SCDC Policy GA-01.12. (available at https://www.doc.sc.gov/policy/GA-01-12.htm.pdf). See Malik v. Ward, No. 9:08-cv-01886, 2010 WL 936777, at *2 n.4 (D.S.C. Mar. 16, 2010) (holding that “[t]he Court may take judicial notice of the SCDC grievance process, specifically, SCDC Policy GA-01.12”).
McKie attests that she has reviewed “the office grievance records maintained by SCDC for” Plaintiff. (Id. at 1.) She describes four Step 1 grievances filed by Plaintiff concerning his conditions of confinement and medical treatment and asserts that Plaintiff only properly exhausted one of those grievances. The referenced grievances are in the record as well as several Request to Staff Member (“RTSM”) forms.
On September 28, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Step 1 grievance asking about the status of his MRI and complaining of the lack of treatment for his severe lower back pain. (Dkt. No. 62-26 at 1.) The grievance was returned because Plaintiff “failed to attach the required RTSM/KIOSK number regarding your attempt at an informal resolution.” (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff was advised he could re-file a new grievance form within five days of receiving the answered Staff Request but would need to “return a copy of this grievance with your answered RTSM when re-filing (otherwise it will appear to be a duplicate and denied as such).” (Id.)
Plaintiff filed another Step 1 grievance on November 1, 2021 raising the same concerns about his MRI and back pain. In this grievance, Plaintiff claims he “sent out a RTSM over two months ago to Miss Enloe who failed to respond in the allotted time.” (Id. at 9.) This grievance was returned as a “duplicate grievance.” (Id.) Notably, Plaintiff's own submitted records belie his claim that he did not receive a timely response to the underlying RTSM. Specifically, Plaintiff has attached to his Complaint a September 15, 2021 RTSM directed to Defendant Enloe, complaining about the status of Plaintiff's MRI and the lack of treatment for his “back injury.” (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 31.) A staff member responded to this RTSM on October 18, 2021 as follows: “Awaiting schedule date for MRI. Sign up for sick call with further complaints.” (Id.)
Plaintiff also filed a Step 1 grievance on October 20, 2021 complaining about the inability to see and hear the TVs. (Dkt. No. 62-26 at 3.) The grievance was returned because Plaintiff needed to first “send a RTSM to Mr. Smith in maintenance, who is the one to know when the TV's will have sound transmitted to all rooms.” (Id. at 4.) No Step 2 was filed as to any of the above Step 1 grievances.
On October 20, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Step 1 grievance complaining of “the room conditions such as the five-inch slab at the back of the cell that has replaced the beds . . . and causes inmates to sit in the “V” position causing lower back pain and can lead to injury.” (Id. at 5.) After the grievance was denied on December 14, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Step 2 grievance raising the same concerns. (Id. at 6-7.) McKie avers that Plaintiff “properly grieved the height of the concrete slab on which a mattress is placed in his cell in the RHU. No other issue related to the present lawsuit has been carried through the grievance process through the use of a Step 2 grievance.” (Dkt. No. 62-25 at 4.)
In his response in opposition to Defendants' motion, Plaintiff first argues that the PLRA is not applicable because Plaintiff originally filed his claims in state court. (Dkt. No. 95 at 6.) This argument is without merit-section 1997e(a) of the PLRA applies to all claims raised under section 1983 “or any other Federal law.” 42 U.S.C § 1997e(a). Plaintiff next argues that his medical records and grievances gave Defendants sufficient notice about the lack of medical treatment for Plaintiff's back pain, such that his claims arising from those allegations should be considered exhausted. (Id. at 6-7.) He further argues that the evidence shows “the grievance coordinator refused to process” Plaintiff's grievances. (Id. at 7-10.) In support, he cites the RTSM and grievances in the record. (Id.) Finally, Plaintiff concedes that he has failed to exhaust his § 1983 claims arising from the “metal window covering that prevents any view” and the “constant lighting of only four hours depriving Plaintiff of sleep.” (Id. at 9.)
Upon review, the RTSM and grievances in the record do not show that any prison officials improperly interfered in the grievance process or that the grievance process was otherwise unavailable. See Graham v. Gentry, 413 Fed.Appx. 660, 663 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[I]n order to show that a grievance procedure was not ‘available,' a prisoner must adduce facts showing that he was prevented, through no fault of his own, from availing himself of that procedure.”). Rather, the written responses to Plaintiff's various Step 1 grievances are consistent with the grievance process as outlined by McKie.Further, while Plaintiff may have complained about his back pain and lack of medical treatment in various RTSM forms and grievances, he never filed a Step 2 grievance on this issue.
To the extent Plaintiff relies on these allegations to support a § 1983 claim against Defendant Grievance Coordinator D. Lee, this claim should be dismissed because “[i]t is well established that a response to a grievance (or failure to respond to a grievance), without more, does not give rise to a constitutional claim.” Hoehn v. White, No. 7:22-cv-00194, 2023 WL 2541130, at *6 (W.D. Va. Mar. 16, 2023) (quoting Johnson v. Clarke, No. 7:20-cv-717, 2021 WL 1536585, at *2 (W.D. Va. Apr. 19, 2021)) (collecting cases).
Even when construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the evidence shows that Plaintiff only exhausted his complaints about the five-inch concrete beds and the injuries arising from the use of such beds. He did not appeal any of the other Step 1 grievances and therefore did not exhaust any of those claims, including those arising from the alleged lack of medical treatment for his back pain. Based on the foregoing, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to all § 1983 claims except for Plaintiff's conditions of confinement claim arising from the height of the concrete beds. See, e.g., State v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., No. 0:17-cv-3326-MGL-PJG, 2019 WL 3773867, at *8 (D.S.C. Aug. 9, 2019) (finding lack of exhaustion where even assuming the plaintiff timely filed a Step 1 grievance, the plaintiff “did not avail himself of the next step in the grievance procedure and file a Step 2 grievance”), adopted by, 2019 WL 3780141 (D.S.C. Aug. 9, 2019); Williams v. Reynolds, No. 4:12-cv-138-RMG, 2013 WL 4522574 at * 4 (D.S.C. Aug. 27, 2013) (noting that “even if Plaintiff did file a Step 1 grievance that was returned unprocessed, there is no evidence that Plaintiff filed a Step 2 grievance or otherwise appealed the decision not to process the Step 1 grievance”).
If the District Judge agrees with this recommendation, the non-exhausted claims should be dismissed without prejudice. See Purdum v. Johns, Case No. 5:10-CT-3183-D, 2011 WL 5117574, at *2 (E.D. N.C. Oct. 25, 2011) (“A dismissal without prejudice allows the prisoner an opportunity to exhaust the administrative process and then file a new suit, if the prisoner so chooses.”); see also Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 401 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[A]ll dismissals under § 1997e(a) should be without prejudice.”); Johnson v. Cannon, Case No. 4:08-cv-776-PMD, 2010 WL 936706, at *8 (D.S.C. Mar. 15, 2010), aff'd, 390 Fed.Appx. 256 (4th Cir. 2010) (dismissing “without prejudice the remainder of Plaintiff's claims for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies”).
B. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Defendants assert that Plaintiff's § 1983 claims brought against them in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. (Dkt. No. 62-1 at 11-13.) Plaintiff disputes this claim. (Dkt. No. 95 at 10-12.) The Complaint brings the § 1983 claims against Defendants in their individual and official capacities. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 3.)
The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from entertaining an action against a state. See, e.g., Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (per curiam) (citations omitted); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1890). Further, Eleventh Amendment immunity “extends to ‘arm[s] of the State,' including state agencies and state officers acting in their official capacity,” Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1332 (4th Cir. 1996) (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted), because “a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office . . . [and] is no different from a suit against the State itself,” Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (internal citation omitted). Accordingly, “[s]tate officials may only be sued in their individual capacities.” Rhoden v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., No. 4:17-cv-2537-HMH-TER, 2017 WL 9288217, at *3 (D.S.C. Oct. 4, 2017) (finding claims against prison warden in his official capacity should be dismissed because warden is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity), adopted by, 2017 WL 5494126 (D.S.C. Nov. 16, 2017), amended, 2017 WL 6032341 (D.S.C. Dec. 6, 2017); Edwards v. Patell, No. 4:06-cv-0748-HFF-TER, 2007 WL 2428548, at *8 (D.S.C. Aug. 21, 2007) (dismissing claims brought against defendant “employee of SCDC” in his official capacity). “As a state agency, SCDC is an arm of the State of South Carolina.” Abebe v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., No. 0:09-cv-3111-MBS-PJ, 2010 WL 2991595, at *2 (D.S.C. July 2, 2010), adopted in part, 2010 WL 3258595 (D.S.C. Aug. 16, 2010).
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiff's § 1983 claims for monetary damagesbrought against Defendants in their official capacities because they are employees of SCDC.
It is not clear whether Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief under § 1983. While such a claim may not necessarily be barred by the Eleventh Amendment, see Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1908), the undersigned recommends infra section C that Plaintiff has not established any violation of his constitutional rights. Accordingly, any claim for injunctive relief under § 1983 also fails as a matter of law. See Renciu v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., No. 4:19-cv-01773-SAL-MGB, 2021 WL 11506592, at *3 (D.S.C. Jan. 6, 2021) (“[T]he undersigned has recommended that Plaintiff's § 1983 claims based on any alleged constitutional violations fail as a matter of law. Accordingly, there is no “continuing violation of federal law,” and any claim for injunctive relief under § 1983 brought by Plaintiff would therefore be dismissed.”), adopted by, 2021 WL 11506591 (D.S.C. Feb. 17, 2021).
C. § 1983 Claims
The Complaint alleges claims against Defendants under § 1983 for deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's conditions of confinement and for deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's serious medical needs. (Dkt. No. 1-1.)
In Estelle v. Gamble, the Supreme Court held that “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain' proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To prevail on an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim, “a prisoner must prove two elements: (1) that objectively the deprivation of a basic human need was sufficiently serious, and (2) that subjectively the prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Johnson v. Quinones, 145 F.3d 164, 167 (4th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The first element “is satisfied by a serious medical condition,” while the second element “is satisfied by showing deliberate indifference by prison officials.” Id. Similarly, to state a claim that conditions of confinement violate constitutional requirements, “a plaintiff must show both ‘(1) a serious deprivation of a basic human need; and (2) deliberate indifference to prison conditions on the part of prison officials.'” Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1379 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 824 (4th Cir. 1991)).
The subjective prong of a deliberate indifference claim requires the plaintiff to allege facts that indicate a particular defendant actually knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to his or her person. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); see also Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 226 (4th Cir. 2016) (the plaintiff must show “the official's actual subjective knowledge of both the inmate's serious medical condition and the excessive risk posed by [the official's] action or inaction”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “A plaintiff can meet the subjective knowledge requirement through direct evidence of a prison official's actual knowledge or circumstantial evidence tending to establish such knowledge, including evidence that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.” Scinto, 841 F.3d at 226 (internal citations and quotations omitted). A prison official's “failure to respond to an inmate's known medical needs raises an inference of deliberate indifference to those needs.” Id. (internal quotations and alterations omitted).
Before analyzing the merits of Plaintiff's § 1983 claims, the undersigned first summarizes the relevant evidence in the record.
1. Evidence
a. Documentation of transition to cement beds at Perry
Defendants have submitted a memorandum dated January 12, 2018 from Warden Scott Lewis to the Deputy Director of Operations concerning “Changing metal beds to cement beds in RHU compound” at Perry. (Dkt. No. 62-23.) The memorandum states that “[a]fter much thought and deliberation with staff,” Warden Lewis requests that “all metal beds in the RHU compound be replaced with cement beds” because, inter alia: (1): “less metal to be used for weapons”; (2) “safer for forced cell movement teams (I/M hiding under bed”; (3) “inmates are tearing them out of the floors”; (4) “lower beds make it more difficult to reach lights (still within ADA regulations)”; and (5) “Limit likelihood of self-harm.” (Id.) Warden states “the long-term benefits of this change outweigh the initial cost and will be beneficial to the institution.” (Id.) The memorandum shows that the request for cement beds was approved. (Id.)
Relatedly, Defendants have submitted a “Project Request” form for Perry that states
We would like to replace the metal bed in the RHU 2 building with cement beds that would be 8 inches long, and 36 inches wide. This would prevent inmates from destroying and using pieces of the metal beds for contraband or weapons. The cost would cover all 48 rooms.(Dkt. No. 62-24.) The form describes the project as “a safety and renovation project” and indicates it was completed on August 22, 2019. (Id.)
b. Plaintiff's RTSM and grievances
The record includes Plaintiff's RTSM dated September 25, 2021 complaining about the amount of time the lights are left on in the cells and the covered windows. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 29.) Defendant Palmer responded on September 29, 2021 stating, “This is the schedule for all inmates in PCI RHU. Lights in general population operate on the same schedule. Lowers were added to all window covers to allow sunlight into the cells.” (Id.) On October 6, 2021, Plaintiff submitted a RTSM to Defendant Williams complaining about the ventilation system, the five-inch bed slab which “causes back problems, pain, and injuries,” and an obstructed view from his cell. (Id. at 25.) Defendant Palmer responded on October 19, 2021 stating “You are incorrect about all of these issues.” (Id.)
Plaintiff submitted a Step 1 grievance on October 20, 2021, complaining that the five-inch slab that replaced the beds “causes inmates to sit in the V position causing lower back pain and can lead to injury.” (Id. at 27.) The “Warden's Decision and Reason” states the warden denied this grievance because, inter alia,
I have reviewed your concern. In your grievance you stated that the five-inch slab at the rear of the cell is against federal guidelines and causes inmates to sit in a “V position.” You state that the slab is causing back pain and can lead to injury. You are requesting that beds be placed in the cells and to raise the slab to the correct height. Be advised that there is no documentation to support your allegation that the beds located in the Restrictive Housing Unit (RHU) are against federal regulations. Measurements were determined by Maintenance staff prior to installing the beds. You are advised to follow all SCDC rules, policies, and procedures so that you do not have to utilize the beds located in RHU. Please govern yourself accordingly.(Dkt. No. 62-6 at 6.) The response contains the “Warden Signature” and appears to belong to Defendant Warden Williams. (Id.)
Plaintiff filed a Step 2 grievance again complaining of the height of the beds “requiring inmates to sit in a V position which puts all a person's weight on the small of their back causing back pain and injuries if prolonged.” (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 28.) The response to the Step 2 grievance states it is denied because, inter alia:
You were informed by the Warden on December 14, 2021 that you did not provide any evidence/documentation that supports your claim that the beds in the Restrictive Housing Unit (RHU) were made incorrectly. Furthermore, there is no indication within federal guidelines about bed height/condition for normal inmates. Inmates who have medical issues consistent with the American Disabilities Act (ADA) must be placed in wheel-chair accessible rooms with the appropriate bed height accommodations. There was no suggestion in your initial grievance submission that you suffer from ADA related issues and require special cell accommodations. Be advised that maintenance staff made the necessary considerations prior to installing beds in RHU at PCI. You have not shown that SCDC staff has conducted their job duties improperly.(Id.) The signature of the “Responsible Official” who issued this decision does not belong to any of the defendants in this case.
On July 15, 2021, Plaintiff submitted a sick call request stating he had been “waiting over a year for SCDC to approve an MRI” and stating that he has severe lower back pain. (Id. at 30.) On September 15, 2021, Plaintiff submitted a RTSM to Defendant Enloe stating he saw her “over a month and a half ago concerning the back injury I suffered over a year and a half ago and how I was under the impression that I was waiting on SCDC to approve me to have an MRI for over a year. My question is have I been approved for that MRI?” (Id. at 31.) The RTSM indicates that “K. Burgess, RN” responded on October 18, 2021, stating “Awaiting schedule date for MRI. Sign up for sick call with further complaints.” (Id.)
On September 28, 2021, Plaintiff submitted a Step 1 grievance stating he has “had a back injury now for going on two years that occurred when I was in Mississippi.” (Id. at 32.) Plaintiff states that “the doctor in Mississippi said my problem is a pinched nerve or nerve damage but I would need an MRI to determine what's what and South Carolina would have to approve the MRI. While waiting for that approval, I have come back to SCDC for Court.” (Id.) Plaintiff states after arriving at Perry, he met with Defendant Enloe “and she said she was going to get the MRI approved,” but he has not heard anything about the MRI “in over two months.” (Id.) Plaintiff states he “need[s] an MRI to determine what medical course needs to be taken next.” (Id.) Plaintiff filed another Step 1 grievance on November 1, 2021, raising the same issues. (Id. at 33.) On December 31, 2021 Plaintiff submitted a RTSM to Defendant Enloe stating he “recently went for an MRI” and asking “the next course of action toward addressing the issue.” (Id. at 37.) K. Burgess, RN responded on January 4, 2022, stating “You have been referred to ortho clinic.” (Id.)
On September 18, 2022, months after Plaintiff filed this action in state court, Plaintiff submitted a RTSM directed to “Mr. Williams, Warden,” stating,
Sir, as you are aware I spent a month on CI due to Joel Anderson denying me an assessment at CSU. I have not been properly assessed and it seems the counselors assigned to me keep quitting and/or being dismissed so I'm looking to be assessed by an outside doctor concerning my mental health and the symptoms I'm having. As well, I want to know what steps I need to take to be assessed concerning the two pinched nerves I have in my back as it seems medical here is set on letting me
endure my pain and suffering and D-dorm conditions are making my pain and suffering worse.(Dkt. No. 95-2 at 13.) The response to this request is dated September 21, 2022 and states, “Per Warden Williams, your request has been forwarded to medical and mental health.”
In addition to his own RTSM and grievances, Plaintiff has attached four RTSM forms submitted to “medical sick call” by another inmate, Inmate X,in June and July of 2022. (Dkt. No. 95-2 at 9-12.) In these RTSM forms, Inmate X complains of back pain caused by the “concrete slab” in the D-Dorm of the RHU housing at Perry. (Id.) The records indicate Defendant Enloe received a June 23, 2022 RTSM from Inmate X, complaining of back pain from the concrete slab. (Id. at 11.) There is no evidence any of the other Defendants were aware of Inmate X's complaints to “medical sick call.”
For privacy reasons, the undersigned will refer to this inmate as Inmate X.
c. Plaintiff's Medical Records
Both parties have submitted portions of Plaintiff's medical record pertaining to his physical and mental health.
1. Physical Health
With respect to Plaintiff's physical health, the records document the following: Plaintiff's July 9, 2021 medical screening indicates Plaintiff arrived at Perry with back pain, stating “back pain with xray report in file.” (Dkt. No. 95-2 at 15.) On July 15, 2021, Plaintiff was seen complaining of “lower back pain.” (Dkt. No. 62-6 at 1.) Plaintiff stated that “when he stands for longer than an hour pain radiates down his L leg causing numbness and tingling that extends to the tips of his toes in the L foot....[T]he pain dissipates when he lays flat on his back, but worsens when he lays on either of his sides.” (Id.) He stated he was injured playing basketball 18 months previously while in Mississippi. (Id.) Plaintiff claimed he was waiting for an MRI to be approved by SCDC. (Id.) The records from this visit were electronically signed by Defendant Enloe on July 19, 2023. (Id. at 2.)
Plaintiff saw Defendant Enloe on July 20, 2021, again complaining of back pain originating from his basketball injury. (Dkt. No. 62-7.) Notes from this visit state that his previous x-ray was completed “with normal results” and Plaintiff was not in acute distress. (Id.) Enloe prescribed Plaintiff pain medicationand she initiated the process for Plaintiff to have an MRI performed. (Id.) On October 25, 2021, Plaintiff's MRI appointment was scheduled for December 10, 2021 at Anderson Radiology. (Dkt. No. 62-10.) Notes from a December 10, 2021 provider visit state that Plaintiff received an “abnormal MRI with mild to moderate canal stenosis and foraminal stenosis.” (Dkt. No. 62-12.) The notes here state that Plaintiff “injured back about 2 years ago and pain progressively gotten worse.” (Id.)
Plaintiff was prescribed meloxicam, which is “a nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug (NSAID) used to relieve the symptoms of arthritis (juvenile rheumatoid arthritis, osteoarthritis, and rheumatoid arthritis), such as inflammation, swelling, stiffness, and joint pain.” Meloxicam, Mayo Clinic, https://www.mayoclinic.org/drugs-supplements/meloxicam-oral-route/description/drg-20066928 (last visited June 28, 2023).
Defendant Enloe referred Plaintiff to the orthopedic clinic at Kirkland Correctional Institution on December 15, 2021. (Id.) Plaintiff was scheduled to visit the Kirkland orthopedic clinic on February 7, 2022. (Dkt. No. 62-13.) The appointment was cancelled, however, “due to unforeseen circumstances” at Kirkland. (Dkt. No. 62-14.) The appointment was immediately rescheduled for March 7, 2022. (Dkt. No. 62-15.) At the visit to the orthopedic clinic, Plaintiff was provided with physical therapy and the dosage of his anti-inflammatory medication was increased. (Dkt. No. 62-16.) Plaintiff was given an exercise program to perform twice a week on his own for an hour, and he was referred to Prisma Health for an epidural steroid injection. (Dkt. Nos. 62-16; 62-17.) This procedure took place at Prisma Health on May 4, 2022. (Dkt. No. 62-18.) Plaintiff had a follow up appointment at the Kirkland orthopedic clinic scheduled for May 9, 2022, but it was cancelled because the follow up was “scheduled too soon.” (Dkt. No. 62-19.) The appointment was immediately rescheduled for the first available date of August 22, 2022. (Dkt. No. 62-20.)
2. Mental Health
With respect to Plaintiff's mental health, the records document the following: Notes from an August 10, 2021 “Sick Call Follow Up” state that Plaintiff will be placed on crisis intervention because Plaintiff reported being suicidal. (Dkt. No. 108-1 at 1.) The next day, Plaintiff underwent a “Crisis Visit Initial observation” where it was noted Plaintiff “would not speci[fy] what his triggers were or what situations lead to his SI.” (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff denied “any issues with appetite, sleep.” (Id.) On August 12, 2021, Defendant Qualified Mental Health Professional (“QMHP”) Harper performed a “Crisis Visit” at Plaintiff's cell door. Plaintiff denied “issues with appetite or sleep.” (Id. at 3.)
Notes from an August 29, 2021 “Crisis Visit” note that Plaintiff's “Risk Treatment Plan” included a suicide resistant mattress and blanket. (Dkt. No. 95-2 at 56.) On September 1, 2021, Plaintiff had an onsite visit with a Dr. Jimmy Pacheco at the psychiatric clinic where he was “seen and evaluated.” (Dkt. No. 108-1 at 6-7.) Dr. Pacheco discussed with Plaintiff taking medication “for his temper, dosing, indications and side effects.” (Id.) Medication was prescribed and Dr. Pacheco noted that Plaintiff did not need a full mental status exam. (Id.)
On September 2, 2021, Defendant QMHP Martin performed a “Crisis Visit Daily Assessment” and met with Plaintiff “in one of the visitation rooms.” (Id. at 8.) Martin performed a mental status exam, a Columbia-Suicide Severity Rating Scale assessment, and a Jail Suicide Assessment Tool screening. He noted Plaintiff's mental status was “unremarkable.” (Id. at 8-10.) Plaintiff asked to be taken off crisis intervention, and Martin “recommend[ed] he be assessed by Dr. Pacheco for possible removal from CI status.” (Id.)
Dr. Pacheco evaluated Plaintiff at the psychiatric clinic on September 3, 2021. He found Plaintiff “is no longer a suicidal risk” and does not “require a full Mental Status Exam.” (Id. at 11.) Dr. Pacheco saw Plaintiff twice more in September. (Id. at 13-16.) He adjusted Plaintiffs medication and found that Plaintiff “shows good insight and judgment.” (Id. at 15.)
On October 8, 2021, Defendant QMHP Martin performed a “comprehensive assessment.” (Id. at 17-18.) In this assessment, he noted that Plaintiff's
conception of his problem includes reporting he was in the Lee County prison riot and says, “I have anger issues and a lot of anxiety. I have bad dreams from seeing a lot of people killed around me.” The inmate reports having flashbacks from the riot and believes he was also traumatized. He requested information on anger management and PTSD.(Id. at 17.) Martin noted that on the mental status exam, Plaintiff's “appearance, behavior, speech, thought processes, thought content, perceptions, and cognitive level were all within normal limits during the time of this assessment.” (Id. at 18.)
On November 23, 2021, Plaintiff had a telemedicine visit with a nurse practitioner (“NP”) at the psychiatric clinic where he complained of “hearing things and seeing things, mood swings.” (Id. at 19.) The NP noted that Plaintiff was “generally normal” and recommended a full mental status exam. (Id. at 20.) The NP also ordered lab tests. In an “addendum” on December 7, 2021, she noted that Plaintiff's vitamin D levels were “low.” The NP forwarded those lab results to medical. (Id. at 23.) Plaintiff had another telemedicine visit with the NP at the psychiatric clinic on January 4, 2022. (Id. at 25-29.) Plaintiff complained that his medication “increased stiffness” and he was stressed about “new charges of murder.” (Id. at 25.) He reported “stiffness of shoulders arms legs.” (Id.) The NP recorded Plaintiff's various medications and adjusted the amount of certain medications. (Id. at 27-28.) She appeared to provide a mental status exam and also noted that a full mental status exam was required. (Id.)
On March 8, 2022, Plaintiff had another telemedicine visit with the NP at the psychiatric clinic. (Id. at 31-34.) The NP noted Plaintiffs “meds are excellent” and continued Plaintiffs medication regimen without change. (Id.) She appeared to provide a mental status exam and also noted that a full mental status exam was required. (Id.) Plaintiff had another telemedicine visit with the NP at the psychiatric clinic on May 17, 2022. (Id. at 36-39.) The note indicates Plaintiff stated things were “going OK since March. Still in RHU.” (Id. at 36.) He reported “doing well with rest at night.” (Id.) The NP continued Plaintiff's medication regimen without change. (Id. at 36-39.) She appeared to provide a mental status exam and also noted that a full mental status exam was required. (Id.)
On July 19, 2022 Plaintiff had another telemedicine visit at the psychiatric clinic where he reported “doing OK.”(Dkt. No. 95-2 at 61.) On August 9, 2022, Defendant QMHP Boyd conducted a “QMHP session” and performed a mental status exam. (Id. at 53-54.) Boyd noted that Plaintiff should continue the “QMHP sessions as needed and per policy.” (Id.)
The records from this visit do not include a signature page so it is unclear if this visit was with the same NP.
2. Analysis of § 1983 Conditions of Confinement Claim
The majority of Plaintiff's § 1983 claims contest his conditions of confinement. Namely, Plaintiff alleges that since his arrival at Perry, he has been subject to the following conditions: no “desk/sitting/writing area,” a five-inch concrete slab for a bed, a cell window completely covered by a metal plate that blocks a view of “the natural surroundings,” bright lights that are left on for 20 hours a day, and no TV that Plaintiff is able to hear. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 6-7, 23.) Plaintiff claims that these conditions caused him physical and psychological harm. (Id. at 11.) The record shows that Plaintiff arrived at Perry on July 9, 2021 and was transferred to Broad River Correctional Institution on January 4, 2023, where he remains housed. (Dkt. No. 62-2.) See also SCDC, Inmate Search Detail Report: Stephen Green, https://public.doc.state.sc.us/scdc-public/ (last visited June 28, 2023).Thus, construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the conditions Plaintiff experienced at Perry lasted approximately 18 months.
A federal court may take judicial notice of factual information located in postings on governmental websites in the United States. United States v. Garcia, 855 F.3d 615, 621 (4th Cir. 2017) (“This court and numerous others routinely take judicial notice of information contained on state and federal government websites.”); Mitchell v. Newsom, No. 3:11-cv-0869-CMC-PJG, 2011 WL 2162723, at *3 n.1 (D.S.C. May 10, 2011) (collecting cases), adopted by, 2011 WL 2162184 (D.S.C. June 1, 2011).
As discussed above, the undersigned has recommended all of these claims except those arising from the height of the concrete bed should be dismissed based on exhaustion. Regardless, even if the Court were to disagree with the exhaustion analysis, those same claims fail to establish an Eighth Amendment violation. See, e.g., Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 166 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298) (noting that the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, and only deprivations which deny the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities are sufficiently grave to provide the basis of a § 1983 claim); Banner v. Anderson, No. 6:21-cv-03738-JD-KFM, 2022 WL 2068866, at *4 (D.S.C. Feb. 15, 2022) (“[P]laintiff's allegations - that his cell window isn't to the outside so he can see the sun . . . fail to rise to the level of a constitutional violation”) adopted by, 2022 WL 1537320 (D.S.C. May 16, 2022); McCoy v. Budz, No. 8:19-cv-01421-TLW-JDA, 2019 WL 8807862, at *4 (D.S.C. June 28, 2019) (claim that “lights are kept on in the rooms 24 hours a day, seven days a week” does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation), adopted by, 2020 WL 2541950 (D.S.C. May 19, 2020); Wright v. Lassiter, No. 1:18-cv-90-FDW, 2018 WL 4186418, at *4 (W.D. N.C. Aug. 30, 2018) (allegations that “Plaintiff is unable to view outside his window due to a metal plate” and “There is no desk or chair to write or draw” are “inadequately severe to deny the minimal civilized measures of life's necessities”); Conn v. Stolle, No. 1:11-cv-758-CMH-TCB, 2011 WL 3321136, at *3 (E.D. Va. July 29, 2011), aff'd, 460 Fed.Appx. 276 (4th Cir. 2012) (“loss of [inmate's] television” while in lockdown status does not “warrant constitutional protection”).
Although the claim in Conn was presented as a due process challenge rather than one under the Eighth Amendment, if conditions are not so atypical or burdensome as to trigger due process protections, such conditions could not be so inhumane as to violate the Eighth Amendment.
Accordingly, the focus here is on Plaintiff's claim that Defendants demonstrated deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of harm concerning the height of Plaintiff's concrete bed and Plaintiff's resulting injuries. When construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the evidence establishes a genuine dispute of material fact as to the objective prong of this conditions of confinement claim. The record shows that Plaintiff's alleged back pain originated from a “back injury . . . that occurred when [he] was in Mississippi,” nearly two years before his arrival at Perry. (Dkt. No. 62-26 at 1.) Plaintiff's medical records, coupled with the allegations in his verified Complaint, sufficiently establish that the height of the concrete bed exacerbated his preexisting back injury, requiring referrals to specialists for treatment. (Dkt. Nos. 1-1 at 10-11; 95-2 at 17.)
While Plaintiff also alleges psychological harm as a result of the conditions of his confinement, the evidence does not support this allegation. Other than his conclusory allegations in his verified Complaint, the evidence, including his extensive mental health records, does not include any detail or facts to connect his symptoms to the conditions of confinement in the RHU. The undersigned does not find that Plaintiff's vague allegations of psychological harm are sufficient to satisfy the objective element of Plaintiff's conditions of confinement claim. See Mason v. Talley, No. 1:21-cv-1118 (LMB/JFA), 2023 WL 2619160, at *11 (E.D. Va. Mar. 22, 2023) (plaintiff did not satisfy objective element of conditions of confinement claim based on “vague description of psychological injury . . . [that] fail[ed] to include any detail or facts to connect his symptoms to the conditions of his confinement in the RHU”).
Although Plaintiff may be able to satisfy the objective prong of this Eighth Amendment claim, he cannot show that any Defendants acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind under the subjective prong. While Plaintiff complained to Defendants Palmer and Williams about the height of the concrete beds in RHU, his grievances did not connect this condition to his preexisting back pain. Rather, in his October 19, 2021 grievance to Defendant Palmer, Plaintiff briefly stated that the height of the concrete beds generally causes “inmates . . . back problems, pain, and injuries.” (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 25.) Similarly, in his December 2021 grievance to Defendant Williams, Plaintiff briefly stated that the height of the concrete beds “causes . . . lower back pain and can lead to injury.” (Dkt. No. 62-26 at 7.) In these grievances, Plaintiff did not mention that his own back pain was severe and exacerbated by his preexisting back injury. On September 18, 2022 RTSM, months after Plaintiff filed this action in state court, Plaintiff complained to Defendant Williams about the lack of medical treatment for his “two pinched nerves . . . in [his] back,” and the “D-Dorm conditions . . . making [his] pain and suffering worse.” (Dkt. No. 95-2 at 13.) The record indicates Williams forwarded Plaintiff's complaints “to medical and mental health” on September 21, 2022. (Id.) Approximately three months later, on January 4, 2023, Plaintiff was transferred to a different institution. (Dkt. No. 62-2 at 4.)
In his verified Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that when Defendant Mental Health Coordinator Ms. Wyant “did a walk through” of his cell in February 2022, Plaintiff “inform[ed] her of the back problems, and severe pain he was experiencing due to the five (5) inch slab that replaced the bed.” (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 13.) According to Plaintiff, Ms. Wyant “shrugged off” Plaintiff's complaint. (Id.) There is no evidence or allegation that Ms. Wyant knew of Plaintiff's preexisting back injury, however. And there is no other evidence in the record indicating any other Defendants were aware of Plaintiff's complaints about the height of the beds in RHU.
Here, the undersigned recognizes that the record indicates Defendant Grievance Coordinator D. Lee also had notice of Plaintiff's grievances. The Complaint limits its allegations against D. Lee to his involvement in the grievance process (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 19), and there is no evidence D. Lee was responsible for any of the conditions of confinement at Perry. Accordingly, the undersigned does not construe the Complaint as bringing any § 1983 deliberate indifference claims against D. Lee.
In his brief, Plaintiff argues that Defendants knew of a substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff based on the number of inmate grievances submitted concerning conditions of confinement at Perry. (Dkt. No. 95 at 15.) In support, he points to a discovery response from Defendants stating that 30 grievances were filed between July 2021 and April 2022 at Perry “coded as Institutional Conditions/Institution Security.” (Dkt. No. 95-2 at 21.) However, the mere fact that other inmates grieved generally about conditions of confinement at Perry, without more, does not support finding the risk of harm to Plaintiff was obvious. Cf. Burkey v. Baltimore Cnty., No. GJH-20-cv-2006, 2021 WL 3857814, at *8 (D. Md. Aug. 30, 2021) (finding plaintiff satisfied subjective component of conditions of confinement claim “because the failure to allow Plaintiff exercise for several months and the associated risks would have been obvious to correctional officials, who record exercise on walk logs”).
Further, the Fourth Circuit has held that the “existence of some valid penological purpose . . . could negate any presumption that prison officials were acting with malicious or sadistic intent in subjecting a prisoner to a particular condition.” Mason, 2023 WL 2619160, at *11 (citing Porter v. Clarke, 923 F.3d 348, 362-63 (4th Cir. 2019) (“[A] legitimate penological justification can support prolonged detention of an inmate in segregated or solitary confinement . . . even though such conditions create an objective risk of serious emotional and psychological harm.”); see also Thorpe v. Clarke, 37 F.4th 926, 941 (4th Cir. 2022) (“Absence of penological purpose plays a part in [conditions of confinement inquiry], as it helps establish that corrections officers acted with culpable mental state rather than for justifiable reasons”); Lopez v. Robinson, 914 F.2d 486, 490 (4th Cir. 1990) (looking to “ institutional competence” and penological objectives to decide whether “prison administrators' conduct constitutes deliberate indifference”).
Here, Defendants have produced evidence that the beds in RHU at Perry were changed from metal to cement in 2019 for specific policy reasons including, inter alia, “less metal to be used for weapons; safer for forced cell movement teams (I/M hiding under bed); . . . fewer hiding places for contraband; . . . lower beds make it more difficult to reach lights (still within ADA regulations); . . . limit likelihood of self-harm.” (Dkt. No. 62-23.) The transition from metal beds to cement beds at a lower height was justified as a “safety” project. (Dkt. No. 62-24.) This clear penological justification for the condition of confinement at issue further indicates that Defendants lacked the subjective deliberate indifference required to establish an Eighth Amendment violation.
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned cannot find that any Defendants in this case had actual knowledge of a substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff based on the height of the concrete beds and disregarded that substantial risk. See Keith v. Degeorgis, No. 1:14-cv-36-RMG, 2015 WL 1958277, at *4 (D.S.C. May 1, 2015) (granting summary judgment on conditions of confinement claim based on metal bed exacerbating plaintiff's “back problems/scoliosis” because, inter alia, “Plaintiff has provided no evidence showing that Defendants had knowledge of Plaintiff's alleged condition from any medical authority and knew that a metal bed would exacerbate his conditions.”). And, assuming arguendo, that the September 2022 RTSM provided notice to Defendant Williams of Plaintiff's worsening back pain due to the height of the concrete bed, Plaintiff's transfer to a different institution shortly thereafter and the legitimate penological justification for the beds establish Defendant Williams was not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's constitutional rights under § 1983. See Lopez, 914 F.2d at 490 (looking to “ institutional competence” and penological objectives to decide whether “prison administrators' conduct constitutes deliberate indifference”).
The undersigned therefore recommends Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's § 1983 claim for deliberate indifference to conditions of confinement.
3. Analysis of § 1983 Claim for Deliberate Indifference to a Serious Medical Need
In his remaining § 1983 claim, Plaintiff alleges Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. While the undersigned has recommended this claim be dismissed based on exhaustion, the undersigned addresses its merits in an abundance of caution. In his brief, Plaintiff clarifies that this § 1983 claim is based on: (1) the alleged ineffective and delayed treatment Plaintiff received for his back pain; and (2) the failure “to adhere to the doctor's prescribed treatment” for Plaintiff's mental health. (Dkt. No. 95 at 18-26.)
Upon careful review, there is insufficient evidence to support any deliberate indifference claim. As an initial matter, for the non-medical prison personnel, there is no evidence Defendants Stirling, Williams, Palmer, and D. Lee were personally involved with a denial of treatment, deliberately interfered with prison doctors' treatment, or tacitly authorized or were indifferent to the prison physicians' misconduct. See Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 854 (4th Cir. 1990) (To bring a denial of medical treatment claim against non-medical prison personnel, an inmate must show that such officials were personally involved with a denial of treatment, deliberately interfered with prison doctors' treatment, or tacitly authorized or were indifferent to the prison physicians' misconduct.); Mallett v. Johnson, No. 8:08-cv-863-PMD, 2008 WL 5351618, at *7 (D.S.C. Dec. 22, 2008) (“A medical indifference claim is not appropriate against a superintendent/supervisor absent an allegation that he was personally connected to the treatment received.”).
While the record indicates Williams reviewed Plaintiff's September 18, 2022 RTSM asking for a medical assessment of his “two pinched nerves . . . in [his] back” (Dkt. No. 95-2 at 13), “[m]ere knowledge is not sufficient to establish personal participation” under § 1983. Coleman v. Stevenson, No. 0:09-cv-872-HMH, 2010 WL 2990737, at *4 (D.S.C. June 22, 2010), adopted by, 2010 WL 2990740 (D.S.C. July 26, 2010), aff'd, 407 Fed.Appx. 709 (4th Cir. 2011). Further the RTSM response indicates that Williams took appropriate action by forwarding Plaintiff's complaints “to medical and mental health.” (Dkt. No. 95-2 at 13.) Such facts do not support a deliberate indifference claim against Williams.
Likewise, there is no evidence any medical prison personnel were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's serious medical needs. Based on the submitted records and the allegations in the verified Complaint, Nurse Practitioner Amy Enloe and Mental Health Coordinator Ms. Wyannt are the only medical personnel Defendants who knew of Plaintiff's alleged back pain. Specific to these Defendants, the record shows that Defendant Enloe entered a referral to Anderson Radiology concerning Plaintiff's back pain on July 20, 2021, approximately two weeks after he arrived at Perry. (Dkt. No. 62-7.) That same day, she prescribed Plaintiff pain medication and initiated the process for Plaintiff to have an MRI. (Id.) After Plaintiff received an MRI on December 10, 2021, Defendant Enloe referred him to the Kirkland orthopedic clinic. (Dkt. No. 62-12.)
The verified Complaint alleges that Defendant Ms. Wyant “did a walk through” of Plaintiff's cell in February 2022, wherein Plaintiff “inform[ed] her of the back problems, and severe pain he was experiencing due to the five (5) inch slab that replaced the bed.” (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 13.) According to Plaintiff, Ms. Wyant “shrugged off” Plaintiff's complaint. (Id.) The record shows Plaintiff visited Kirkland orthopedic clinic on March 7, 2022, where he was provided with physical therapy and the dosage of his anti-inflammatory medication was increased. (Dkt. No. 6216.) On May 4, 2022, Plaintiff received an epidural steroid injection at Prisma Health. (Dkt. No. 62-17.) Plaintiff had a follow up appointment at the Kirkland orthopedic clinic scheduled for August 22, 2022. (Dkt. No. 62-20.)
Based on the foregoing, the record shows that Plaintiff received regular treatment for his back pain at Perry throughout the time period at issue. He received an MRI, pain medication, physical therapy and treatment at an orthopedic clinic, and an epidural steroid injection. While Plaintiff may believe he should have received different medical treatment, “[a] disagreement as to the proper treatment to be received does not in and of itself state a constitutional violation.” Mickell v. Ozmint, No. 3:08-cv-2973-RBH, 2009 WL 1361873, at *4 (D.S.C. May 11, 2009) (granting summary judgment on § 1983 deliberate indifference claim where “plaintiff disagrees with the treatment he has been offered”); see also Krug v. Loranth, No. 1:13-cv-01409-DCN, 2014 WL 4955365, at *4 (D.S.C. Sept. 29, 2014) (“The fact that a prisoner believed he had a more serious injury or that he required better treatment does not establish a constitutional violation.”), aff'd, 599 Fed.Appx. 512 (4th Cir. 2015).
Additionally, while Plaintiff blames Defendant Enloe for his delay in receiving an MRI, the record shows that she initiated the process for Plaintiff to receive an MRI less than two weeks after he arrived at Perry. (Dkt. No. 62-7.) There is no evidence the four-month wait for Plaintiff to obtain the MRI was due to Enloe's conduct. More importantly, there is no evidence Plaintiff was substantially harmed by any delay in receiving the MRI. See Webb v. Hamidullah, 281 Fed.Appx. 159, 166 (4th Cir. 2008) (“An Eighth Amendment violation only occurs, however, if the delay results in some substantial harm to the patient.”). As for Plaintiff's alleged interaction with Defendant Wyant, there is no evidence his medical issues were ignored. Rather, the record shows Plaintiff received significant treatment for his back pain after this interaction, including physical therapy and an epidural steroid injection.
Plaintiff likewise has failed to establish any deliberate indifference to his mental health needs. Based on the submitted records and the allegations in the verified Complaint, the following medical personnel Defendants knew of Plaintiff's mental health issues: Nurse Practitioner Amy Enloe, Mental Health Coordinator Ms. Wyannt, and Qualified Mental Health Professionals Natasha Harper, Mr. Martin, and Ms. Boyd. According to Plaintiff, Defendants failed “to adhere to the doctor's prescribed treatment” for Plaintiff's mental health. (Dkt. No. 95 at 25.) Plaintiff appears to base this claim on his interpretation of entries in his medical record indicating that Plaintiff requires a “full Mental Status Exam.” (Dkt. No. 95-2 at 63, 66, 69, 73.) Plaintiff claims “Defendants still have not followed these recommendations.” (Dkt. No. 95 at 25.)
Upon review, the medical records cited by Plaintiff span from November 2021 through May 2022. They document Plaintiff's telemedicine visits at the Psychiatric Clinic and are all signed by third party Nurse Practitioner (“NP”) Amy Duppstadt-Delambo. (Dkt. No. 95-2 at 63, 66, 69, 73.) In her notes from each of these visits, NP Duppstadt-Delambo evaluates Plaintiff and records her observations from Plaintiff's “Mental Status Exam.” Under her observations in each of these entries, her typed notes state: “Does the individual require a full Mental Status Exam? Yes.” (Dkt. No. 95-2 at 63, 66, 69, 73.) It is unclear if the NP's recorded observations constitute the full Mental Status Exam referenced within. Regardless, there is no evidence that any failure to perform this “full Mental Status Exam” can be attributed to any of the Defendants at issue.
Further, the record shows that Plaintiff received extensive care for his mental health as soon as he complained of psychological harm, including psychiatric evaluations and medication adjustments. See, e.g., Williams v. Branker, 462 Fed.Appx. 348, 354 (4th Cir. 2012) (rejecting an inmate's claim that “the lack of effective mental health treatment,” without evidence he was denied treatment “to a considerable extent,” could support a deliberate indifference claim); Scruggs v. Stirling, No. 0:19-cv-921-PJG, 2021 WL 6061721, at *12 (D.S.C. Dec. 20, 2021) (Dr. Poiletman regularly evaluated Scruggs, made diagnoses, prescribed treatment, and attended treatment team meetings in which he gave input in crafting Scruggs's treatment plan. Even if Scruggs was not provided the level and quality of psychiatric treatment Dr. Husted would provide, the record does not support a reasonable conclusion that Dr. Poiletman consciously disregarded a serious risk to Scruggs's mental health.”). Again, while Plaintiff may believe he should have received different medical treatment, “[a] disagreement as to the proper treatment to be received does not in and of itself state a constitutional violation.” Mickell, 2009 WL 1361873, at *4 (granting summary judgment on § 1983 deliberate indifference claim where “plaintiff disagrees with the treatment he has been offered”); see also Krug, 2014 WL 4955365, at *4 (“The fact that a prisoner believed he had a more serious injury or that he required better treatment does not establish a constitutional violation.”), aff'd, 599 Fed.Appx. 512 (4th Cir. 2015).
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's § 1983 claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.
Because the undersigned finds no questions of fact as to whether Defendants violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights, the undersigned does not address Defendants' qualified immunity argument. See Hill v. Crum, 727 F.3d 312, 321 (4th Cir. 2013) (“Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
D. State Law Claims
Having recommended the dismissal of all federal claims, only Plaintiff's state-law claims for gross negligence against the individual Defendants remain. Because there are no federal claims remaining, the undersigned recommends the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state-law claims. As noted by the Fourth Circuit, “once a district court has dismissed the federal claims in an action, it maintains ‘wide discretion' to dismiss the supplemental state law claims over which it properly has supplemental jurisdiction.” Yashenko v. Harrah's NC Casino Co., 446 F.3d 541, 553 n. 4 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 353-54 (1988)). A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) if . . . (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C § 1367(c)(3)-(4). When determining whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims, a district court must consider “convenience and fairness to the parties, the existence of any underlying issues of federal policy, comity, and considerations of judicial economy.” Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 110 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Cohill, 484 U.S. at 350 n.7).
Here, the undersigned is unable to find that the parties would be inconvenienced or unfairly prejudiced by declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims, nor does the undersigned find there to be any underlying issues of federal policy involved in Plaintiff's state law claims. The comity factor and considerations of judicial economy weigh in favor of declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. For these reasons, the Court should decline to retain jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law causes of action. See, e,g., Missouri v. Spivey, Case No. 4:13-cv-01326-RMG, 2014 WL 4349151, at *4 (D.S.C. Aug. 29, 2014) (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims where summary judgment was granted on the plaintiff's federal claims); Johnson v. Ozmint, No. 9:08-cv-0431-PMD-BM, 2009 WL 252152, at *6 (D.S.C. Feb. 2, 2009) (dismissing federal claims and noting, “With respect to these remaining state law causes of action, when federal claims presented in a case which has been removed to federal court from state court are dismissed, the case should be remanded to state court for resolution of any remaining state law claims ....”). Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff's state-law claims be remanded to Greenville County.
Given that these recommendations are dispositive of the case, the undersigned does not address the parties' remaining arguments, including whether Defendants Enloe, Harper, Boyd, Martin, Wyant, and Lee were served with process.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 62) be GRANTED IN PART. Specifically, the undersigned recommends that summary judgment should be granted as to Plaintiff's federal claims and those claims should be dismissed. The undersigned further recommends the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state-law claims and remand those claims to Greenville County.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court Post Office Box 835 Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).