Opinion
C/A : 1:22-2029-JD-SVH
09-28-2022
Antwan Dominique Grayson, Plaintiff, v. SCDOC Lieutenant Rodney Williams and Officer Mr. Peterson, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER
Shiva V. Hodges United States Magistrate Judge
An inmate brings claims against two correctional officers with the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”), claiming he was not kept safe from other inmates, leading to a May i4, 20i9 assault. The correctional officers seek dismissal of Plaintiff's claims, primarily asserting statute of limitations and immunity defenses.
Antwan Dominique Grayson (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed this case on June 27, 2022, on claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § i983 against correctional officers Rodney Williams (“Williams”) and Mr. Peterson (“Peterson”) (collectively “Defendants”).
This matter is before the court on Defendants' motion to dismiss. [ECF No. 27]. Having been fully briefed [ECF No. 39], the motion is ripe for disposition. Also before the court are Plaintiff's motions to amend his complaint. [ECF Nos. 36, 37, 38].
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), this matter has been referred to the undersigned for all pretrial proceedings. Having carefully considered the record, the undersigned denies Plaintiff's motions and recommends the district judge deny in part and grant in part Defendants' motion.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff has been incarcerated within SCDC and is currently housed at Kirkland Correctional Institution. ECF No. 1 at 14-15.
In his verified complaint, Plaintiff alleges that following a gang riot on April 15, 2018, at Lee Correctional Institution where he was then-housed, Plaintiff was transferred to Broad River Correctional Institution. Id. at 16. Plaintiff alleges he was subsequently cleared of any involvement in the riot and released into the general prison population. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that when he received his bed assignment in the Wateree Dorm where multiple members of a rival gang were housed, he “immediately informed the Lieutenant Mr. Rodney Williams, Mental Health Counselor Dr. Torrez and Classification Case Manager Ms. Shiver that Wateree Unit would put his life in danger.” Id. Plaintiff alleges he was on a “hit list” due to his gang affiliation, “SCDC knew about the ‘hit list,'” and, notwithstanding, placed him in Wateree Dorm. Id. at 17, 19. Plaintiff alleges Williams told him “Grayson, you'll be fine I promise you,” but that “Dr. Torrez informed [Plaintiff] that she spoke with classification Ms. Shiver to have [him] rehoused,” but he was not rehoused. Id. at 17. Petitioner alleges he repeatedly filed requests to staff members over the course of the next six weeks, “attempting to reach a resolution for his safety.” Id.
Plaintiff alleges he has gang affiliations and, following the riot, “tension between gang rivals were still extreme and required heavy scrutiny and monitoring.” [ECF No. 1 at 17].
Plaintiff alleges he was ambushed on May 14, 2019, by “approximately 20-25 masked inmates with malicious intent to kill him” and was stabbed seven times. Id. Plaintiff further alleges that while this occurred, Peterson “panicked and lost all of his training and confidence,” resulting in Peterson running away and locking Plaintiff in with his attackers. Id.
Plaintiff has filed a supplement to his complaint, including his medical records for May 14, 2019, indicating that he was stabbed multiple times that day. [See ECF No. 11]. Courts generally do not consider matters outside the pleadings when ruling on a motion to dismiss. Am. Chiropractic Ass'n v. Trigon Healthcare, Inc., 367 F.3d 212, 234 (4th Cir. 2004). However, a court may consider documents outside the pleadings without converting a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment if those documents are “integral to and explicitly relied on in the complaint” and their authenticity is unchallenged. Copeland v. Bieber, 789 F.3d 484, 490 (4th Cir. 2015). Defendant has not challenged the authenticity of any documents Plaintiff submitted, including his medical records and documentation evidencing his efforts to exhaust his administrative remedies, discussed more above.
Plaintiff filed a step 1 grievance concerning the incident the following day, May 15, 2019. [ECF No. 1-1 at 1]. The grievance was “forwarded to Broad River for processing” and denied. [ECF No. 1-1 at 1, see also ECF No. 39-1 at 3]. Plaintiff filed a step 2 grievance dated October 28, 2021 that was denied on December 15, 2021. [ECF No. 1-1 at 2]. Plaintiff appealed these denials with the South Carolina Administrative Law Court on January 26, 2022. Id. at 3. Plaintiff's appeal was dismissed on June 3, 2022. Id. at 5-7.
Plaintiff alleges that as he pursued the above administrative remedies, he was transferred to a Mississippi penitentiary and “post-transfer interstate compact prison officials closed [his] grievance,” but when he returned to SCDC on July 10, 2021, for pre-trial legal matters, his grievance was reopened after he contacted the grievance coordinator. [ECF No. 1 at 18, see also ECF No. 39-1 at 2]. He filed this action on June 27, 2022. [ECF No. 1].
Plaintiff's complaint was placed in the SCDC mailing system on June 23, 2022. [ECF No. 1-2].
II. Discussion
A. Standard on Motion to Dismiss
To survive a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The court is “not required to accept as true the legal conclusions set forth in a plaintiff's complaint.” Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999). Indeed, “[t]he presence of a few conclusory legal terms does not insulate a complaint from dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) when the facts alleged in the complaint cannot support” the legal conclusion. Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 577 (4th Cir. 2001). Furthermore, in analyzing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court may consider “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs. Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). When a federal court is evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of N.Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dept of Soc Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990).
B. Analysis
1. Statute of Limitations
There is no federal statute of limitation for actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, so the analogous state law statute of limitations for personal injury applies. See Owens v Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1989) (“Because § 1983 claims are best characterized as personal injury actions, . . . a State's personal injury statute of limitations should be applied to all § 1983 claims.”). “A state's limitations and tolling rules are to be followed unless doing so defeat[s] either § 1983's chief goals of compensation and deterrence or its subsidiary goals of uniformity and federalism.” Battle v. Ledford, 912 F.3d 708, 713 (4th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted).
“In South Carolina, the general or residual statute of limitations for personal injury claims is codified at S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-530(5), which provides that the statute of limitations is three years for ‘an action for assault, battery, or any injury to the person or rights of another, not arising on contract and not enumerated by law ....'” Williams v. City of Sumter Police Dep't, C/A No. 3:09-2486, 2011 WL 723148, at *3 (D.S.C. Feb. 23, 2011).
Plaintiff's causes of action accrued no later than May 14, 2019, the date of the alleged incident; therefore, the applicable limitations period expired no later than May 14, 2022. Plaintiff filed the instant case in June 2022, outside the applicable statute of limitations.
Plaintiff concedes that he filed the instant suit beyond the applicable statute of limitations, but argues the statute of limitations should be tolled while he exhausted his administrative remedies. [See ECF No. 39 at 1]. The undersigned agrees.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), which applies to suits by prisoners, provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). As stated by the Fourth Circuit, “because the PLRA requires administrative exhaustion, application of federal equitable tolling principles is appropriate to account for the time prisoners spend exhausting their administrative remedies.” Fauconier v. Clarke, 966 F.3d 265, 275 (4th Cir. 2020) (citing Battle, 912 F.3d at 718-20)).
As further the Fourth Circuit further explained:
Such equitable tolling applies, however, only when the prisoner shows “(1) that he ha[d] been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” [Battle, 912 F.3d] at 718 (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 161 L.Ed.2d 669 (2005)). In Battle, we found equitable tolling appropriate because the plaintiff had in fact diligently pursued his § 1983 claim through the prison
administrative process and, in view of the exhaustion requirement, he “face[d] a complete and absolute barrier to litigation of any § 1983 claim” during those administrative proceedings. Id. at 719. Explaining the logical necessity for such a conclusion, we stated that “refusal to toll limitations during the PLRA's mandatory exhaustion period would trap prisoners in a ‘catch-22': one who files suit prior to exhausting administrative remedies risks dismissal based upon § 1997e [of the PLRA]; whereas the prisoner who waits to exhaust his administrative remedies risks dismissal based upon untimeliness.” Id. at 718 (cleaned up).Fauconier, 966 F.3d at 275; see also, e.g., Simmons v. Robinson, C/A No. 0:21-458-RMG-PJG, 2022 WL 2068828, at *2 (D.S.C. Apr. 27, 2022) (“The three-year statute of limitations may be tolled where an inmate files a grievance within the prison concerning the incident at issue in the § 1983 claim.”), report and recommendation adopted, C/A No. 0:21-0458-RMG, 2022 WL 1638763 (D.S.C. May 24, 2022).
Plaintiff immediately began the grievance process, filing his first grievance the day after the incident, on May 15, 2019, and the final dismissal of his appeal did not occur until after the statute of limitations period had already run, on June 3, 2022. Plaintiff then filed this action within the same month. Defendants do not dispute this timeline, do not address the above case law, nor offer any argument why equitable tolling should not apply.
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends the district judge deny Defendants' motion to dismiss based on untimeliness.
2. Fourteenth Amendment Claim
Plaintiff states in his complaint that he is bringing claims for violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and “my right to be free from assault by other prisoners.” [See ECF No. 1 at 4]. Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claim, arguing he has failed to allege any facts in support of such a claim and that “Plaintiff's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims are disguised Eighth Amendment claims of cruel and unusual punishment.” [ECF No. 27 at 8].
Although Defendants appear to argue that Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim is also deficient, they do not seek dismissal of this claim. [See ECF No. 27 at 8].
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that the deprivation of a constitutionally-protected interest in life, liberty, or property may only be done through due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits “governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike.” Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted)).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff “has failed to allege any violation of due process rights” or “show any violation of rights to equal protection.” [ECF No. 27 at 8]. Plaintiff does not address this argument [ECF No. 39], and a review of the complaint shows Plaintiff, an inmate in SCDC custody, has failed to state a claim for violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. See also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (holding the Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on prison officials “to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners”) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Haggwood v. Magill, C/A No. 5:15-3271-RMG, 2016 WL 4149986, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 3, 2016) (“A pretrial detainee's § 1983 claims are evaluated under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment, which is used to evaluate conditions of confinement for those convicted of crimes.”) (citing City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983)).
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claim.
3. Qualified Immunity
Defendants assert they are entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiff's claims asserted against them in their individual capacities, with the dismissal being with prejudice. [ECF No. 27 at 7]. Defendants do not address the merits of any such claims, arguing only that they cannot be brought. Defendants include a boilerplate recitation of a qualified immunity defense, concluding that Plaintiff has failed to establish that Defendants' conduct violated clearly-established constitutional rights, but provide no analysis specific to the facts of this case.
Qualified immunity “shields government officials from civil liability ‘insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'” Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Here, Defendants have not addressed their specific conduct vis-a-vis Plaintiff's constitutional rights, and as such, the undersigned declines to recommend dismissal of Plaintiff's claims on this basis.
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends the district judge deny Defendants' motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity.
Defendants also argue that they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity for claims brought against them in their official capacities. [See ECF No. 27 at 5-7]. The undersigned recommends the district judge grant Defendants' motion to dismiss as to these claims where Plaintiff concedes that the Eleventh Amendment bars his claims against Defendants in their official capacities and where Plaintiff has stated that he is suing Defendants solely in their individual capacities. [See ECF No. 36, see also ECF No. 39 at 4].
4. Plaintiff's Motions to Amend
On September 12, 2022, Plaintiff filed three motions seeking to amend, correct, or supplement his complaint. [See ECF No. 36, 37, 38]. Although Plaintiff claims to have submitted to the court an attached supplemental complaint, no attachment was submitted with his motion. [See ECF No. 38]. Additionally, although Plaintiff indicates he wishes to add additional facts and an additional party, in that “since the filing of the complaint the plaintiff has determined that Ms. Shiver is responsible also for deliberate indifference,” Plaintiff does not indicate facts supporting his allegation. [ECF No. 37, see also ECF No. 38].
To the extent Plaintiff seeks to amend his complaint to assert claims against Defendants solely in their individual capacities [ECF No. 36], the court has addressed this issue above.
Although leave to amend shall be freely given when justice so requires, here, Plaintiff has failed to submit a proposed amended complaint, and the court cannot discern the amendments he is seeking sufficient to grant his motions. See, e.g., Mena v. Lack's Beach Serv., Inc., C/A No. 4:06-2536-TLW-TER, 2007 WL 9753156, at *7 n.7 (D.S.C. June 11, 2007) (“Plaintiff failed to submit with its motion a copy of the proposed amended complaint. This alone is grounds for denial of the motion.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff's motions to amend are denied without prejudice.
Plaintiff is reminded an amended complaint replaces the original complaint and should be complete in itself. See Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 572 (4th Cir. 2001) (“As a general rule, an amended pleading ordinarily supersedes the original and renders it of no legal effect.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned denies Plaintiff's motions to amend [ECF Nos. 36, 37, 38] and recommends the district judge deny in part and grant in part Defendant's motion to dismiss, dismissing Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claim and claims asserted against Defendants in their official capacities. [ECF No. 27].
IT IS SO ORDERED AND RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).