Opinion
No. CV 02-0080322
May 20, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE (106) AND OBJECTION TO MOTION TO STRIKE (109)
This is an action brought in five counts arising out of an automobile accident in which it is alleged that the car operated by the Plaintiff was struck from behind by a car operated by the Defendant, Georges El-Achkar, and owned by the Defendant, Joseph Harb. The Defendants have moved to strike the Fifth Count of the complaint as well as the accompanying demand for relief in which the Plaintiff seeks double or treble damages pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295 against the Defendant Harb. The Defendants claim that there is no vicarious liability for multiple damages against the owner.
General Statutes § 14-295 provides: "In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property, the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14-218a, 14-219, 14-222, 14-227a, 14-230, 14-234, 14-237, 14-239 or 14-240a, and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury, death or damage to property."
"`The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 580, 693 A.2d 293 (1997); see Practice Book § 10-39. `A motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading, and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court . . . We take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint . . . and we construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency . . . Thus, [i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied.' (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Vacco v. Microsoft Corp., 260 Conn. 59, 64-65, 793 A.2d 1048 (2002). `A motion to strike is properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged.' Novametrix Medical Systems, Inc. v. BOC Group, Inc., 224 Conn. 210, 215, 618 A.2d 25 (1992)." Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498 (2003).
The Fifth Count of the complaint alleges that Harb owned the motor vehicle that was operated by El-Achkar at the time of the collision, that Harb maintained the motor vehicle and gave permission to El-Achkar to operate the vehicle at that time, and that as a result, Harb is liable for the statutory recklessness of El-Achkar as referred to in General Statutes § 52-183. That statute provides that: "In any civil action brought against the owner of a motor vehicle to recover damages for the negligent or reckless operation of the motor vehicle, the operator, if he is other than the owner of the motor vehicle, shall be presumed to be the agent and servant of the owner of the motor vehicle and operating it in the course of his employment." In his prayer for relief the Plaintiff claims as to the Fifth Count, "double or treble damages in accordance with C.G.S. § 14-240."
The reference to General Statutes § 14-240 appears to be in error and all parties have proceeded on the basis that the claim for multiple damages is brought pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295.
The parties note that there is a split of authority in the trial courts as to whether such a claim will be allowed. Some of the more recent cases which support a claim for multiple damages against an owner are Batchelor v. Veliz, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 01-0185583 (March 31, 2003); Thompson v. Arsenault, Superior Court, judicial district of New London at New London, Docket No. 124579 (March 20, 2003) ( 34 Conn.L.Rptr. 346); and Welcome v. Ouellette-McGregor, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford at Hartford, Docket No. CV 01-0811-39 (November 21, 2002) ( 33 Conn.L.Rptr. 454). In Welcome v. Ouellette-McGregor the court notes that, "Moreover, `[t]he language in General Statutes Section 52-183 clearly establishes an agency relationship between the owner and operator of a motor vehicle for the purposes of recovering damages in a civil action brought for negligent or reckless operation of a motor vehicle. Section 14-295 clearly provides for multiple damages for violations of certain motor vehicle statutes. It is neither necessary nor warranted for this court to attempt to read beyond the plain language of the statutes.' . . . Bostick v. Dvornek, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. CV 01 0383575 (December 13, 2001, Gallagher, J.)." In Thompson v. Arsenault the court quotes its earlier decision in Johnson v. Campo, Superior Court, judicial district of New London at New London, Docket No. 0553378 (July 25, 2000) ( 27 Conn.L.Rptr. 598), where it stated: "The separate mention of negligence and recklessness in General Statutes § 52-183 supports an inference that the legislature anticipated employer liability for recklessness damages in addition to ordinary negligence damages. `When it enacted the statute the legislature must be presumed to have been aware of the well established principle announced in Maisenbacker v. Society Concordia, 71 Conn. 369, 379 [ 42 A. 67] (1899), . . . that there was no vicarious liability for reckless misconduct at common law . . . Thus for the legislature to have set up an evidentiary presumption in two distinct categories of cases, i.e., negligence and recklessness, without that constituting recognition of a cause of action for vicarious recklessness would be attributing to the legislature a useless act." In Batchelor v. Veliz the court, quoting, Santillo v. Arredono, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. 442323 (March 21, 2001) stated: "The legislative reference to damages for recklessness in § 52-183 can reasonablely read as encompassing double or treble damages imposed under § 14-295."
In a recent decision denying exemplary or punitive damages against an owner or employer under General Statutes § 52-183, Washburn v. Potter, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain at New Britain, Docket No. CV02-051531S (January 6, 2003) ( 33 Conn.L.Rptr. 662), the court based its decision on its determination that the statute did not clearly and unambiguously create a cause of action for double or treble damages against a non-operator owner sufficient to overcome the common law rule that a person who is vicariously liable for the acts of another is not liable for punitive or exemplary damages. This is consistent with earlier decisions which support this same view. E.g., Coman v. Mannix, Superior Court, judicial district of Windham at Putnam, Docket No. 065645 (April 11, 2002) ( 31 Conn.L.Rptr. 680).
Recently the Supreme Court rejected the plain meaning rule of statutory construction and held that "`The process of statutory interpretation involves a reasoned search for the intention of the legislature . . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. In seeking to determine that meaning, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter . . . Thus, this process requires us to consider all relevant sources of the meaning of the language at issue, without having to cross any threshold or thresholds of ambiguity. Thus, we do not follow the plain meaning rule. In performing this task, we begin with a searching examination of the language of the statute, because that is the most important factor to be considered. In doing so, we attempt to determine its range of plausible meanings and, if possible, narrow that range to those that appear most plausible. We do not, however, end with the language. We recognize, further, that the purpose or purposes of the legislation, and the context of the language, broadly understood, are directly relevant to the meaning of the language of the statute. This does not mean, however, that we will not, in a given case, follow what may be regarded as the plain meaning of the language, namely, the meaning that, when the language is considered without reference to any extra textual sources of its meaning, appears to be the meaning and that appears to preclude any other likely meaning. In such a case, the more strongly the bare text supports such a meaning, the more persuasive the extra textual sources of meaning will have to be in order to yield a different meaning.' (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Courchesne, 262 Conn. 537, 577-78 (2003)." Bhinder v. Sun Co., 263 Conn. 358, 367-68 (2003).
A review of the legislative history of General Statutes § 52-183 reveals that it was enacted in substantially its present form in 1935, 1935 Sup. § 1661c. Even at that time, there had long been a provision, such as General Statutes § 14-295, providing for the imposition of double or treble damages. "In unbroken precedents dating back to 1913, judicial discretion to impose multiple damages under 14-295 or its precursors has been held to be limited to cases where the record demonstrates more than ordinary negligence. Although its statutory designation has changed over time, 14-295 has remained essentially unchanged since 1909. See Public Acts 1909, c. 268 . . . The statute thus incorporates standards that have long been recognized at common law. See, e.g., Kowal v. Hofher, 181 Conn. 355, 361-62, 436 A.2d 1 (1980). . ." Bishop v. Kelly, 206 Conn. 608, 613-14 (1988).
Similarly, the liability of an employer for the damages caused by his employee while using the employer's motor vehicle in the course of his employment was recognized by the courts even prior to 1935 when the precursor to General Statutes § 52-183 was enacted. Mastrilli v. Herz, 100 Conn. 702 (1924); McKierson v. Lehmaier, 85 Conn. 111 (1911). In Mastrilli the Court noted: "The fact that an automobile is a dangerous instrumentality and that the permitting an employee to use it for his own purposes is in the nature of a use for family purposes, has influenced the courts for reasons of public policy to construe strictly the extent of the license involved in such permissive use of an automobile by an employee." In Levick v. Norton, 51 Conn. 461 (1883), the court recognized that by statute for over three quarters of a century, a master was liable for treble damages for the injury caused by a negligent or malicious servant who operated a vehicle for the conveyance of persons. The statute relied upon by the Court in Levick was subsequently amended in 1905 and then repealed in 1921. The replacement statute, enacted in 1925, although referring to the liability of a person renting or leasing a motor vehicle, made no reference to the liability of an owner or employer. Gionfriddo v. Rent a Car Systems, Inc., 192 Conn. 280, 287 fn. 3 (1984). Yet despite this void, the court in Mastrilli in 1924 continued to recognize the liability of an employer for the injuries caused by the use of his motor vehicle by his employee.
Thus, at the time General Statutes § 52-183 was adopted, the concept of double or treble damages for reckless use of a motor vehicle was well established. Similarly recognized was the responsibility of an employer for the damages caused by an employee in the operation of the employer's motor vehicle in the course of his employment. The choice to use the words "negligent or reckless operation of the motor vehicle" the legislature made in enacting General Statutes § 52-183 appropriately codified these long held legal tenants.
The fact that the common law, as cited in Washburn v. Potter, was reluctant to impose liability for punitive or exemplary damages on one who is vicariously liable for the acts of another, is not relevant. As the Court stated in Gionfriddo v. Rent a Car Systems, Inc., 192 Conn. 280, 288-89 (1984), when discussing the applicability of General Statutes § 14-154a regarding the liability of a rental car company for double and treble damages resulting from an accident caused by a driver to whom they had leased a car: "It is not relevant, in the light of an operative statute, that the common law was reluctant to impose liability upon employers for punitive damages assessed against employees; Maisenbacker v. Society Concordia, 71 Conn. 369, 379, 42 A. 67 (1899). . . Our statute is different, and it governs. Its broad reference to `any damage to any person or property' must be construed, in view of the statutory purpose of protecting the public from unsafe drivers, to include responsibility for any damages to person or property for which the offending driver is properly held liable. As in other branches of the law where strict liability is imposed, the legislature is free to conclude that costs associated with rentals to unsafe drivers should be borne by the enterprise that affords such drivers access to the highways, without requiring the injured party to show the negligence of the enterprise itself. See Garthwait v. Burgio, 153 Conn. 284, 289-90, 216 A.2d 189 (1965), and General Statutes 52-572m et seq." (Footnotes omitted.) It should be noted that Masisenbacker, the case most often cited for the common law principle that an employer is not liable for punitive damages accessed against its employee, involved a claim for personal injuries arising out of an assault and not injuries from a motor vehicle. The legislature has, because of the dangerousness of a motor vehicle, treated vicarious liability different in that context than in the usual employer-employee situation. It can be gleaned from the statutes as well as the judicial decisions in this area that this is in recognition of the fact that one who entrusts a dangerous instrumentality to another should be held liable for any injuries caused thereby. Like the Court recognized in Gionfriddo the legislature is free to conclude that the costs associated with the provision by employers of motor vehicles to unsafe drivers should be borne by the employers who afford such drivers access to the highways.
Lastly, where the legislature has sought to preclude an employer from liability for the reckless conduct of his employees the legislature has done so. General Statutes § 4-165 (state not liable for reckless conduct of its employees); General Statutes § 5-141d (state not liable to indemnify its employees where their conduct has been reckless); General Statutes § 10-235 (boards of education not liable to indemnify its employees where their conduct has been reckless); General Statutes § 29-8a (state not liable to indemnify state police where their conduct has been reckless). Similarly, where the legislature has sought to impose liability on an entity for only the negligent, and not reckless, use of its motor vehicles by others, such as the state, where no such liability would exist otherwise, it has done so. General Statutes § 52-556 provides: "Any person injured in person or property through the negligence of any state official or employee when operating a motor vehicle owned and insured by the state against personal injuries or property damage shall have a right of action against the state to recover damages for such injury."
Therefore this court agrees with those decisions which hold that General Statutes § 52-183 permits an owner or employer to be held liable for double or treble damages pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295.
The Motion to Strike is denied and the Objection is sustained.
Jane S. Scholl, J.