Opinion
2:21-cv-03399-SAL-MGB
10-11-2022
Julius Grant, Petitioner, v. Director, Al Cannon Detention Center, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Julius Grant (“Petitioner”), a pretrial detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review all pretrial matters in this case and submit findings and recommendations to the assigned United States District Judge. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that the petition be summarily dismissed without prejudice and without requiring Respondent to file a return.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is currently being detained at the Al Cannon Detention Center on a drug charge, among others, pending before the Charleston County Court of General Session. (See Indictment No. 2021-GS-10-03893.) In filing this petition for habeas relief, Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of his arrest and subsequent detention, claiming that he was subject to an illegal traffic stop based on “false accusations” by officers who claimed to have observed Petitioner “throwing a white powder substance out of the window.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 6.) Petitioner claims that while he consented to the search of his vehicle and “nothing was found in [his] possession,” he was ultimately arrested for drugs that did not belong to him. (Id. at 2, 6.) Petitioner therefore claims that the pending drug charge has “no merit” and asks that this Court “dismiss the false indictment imposed” on him. (Id. at 7.) Petitioner also requests a “reasonable bond modification.” (Id.)
The undersigned takes judicial notice of the records filed in Petitioner's underlying state criminal proceedings. See https://jcmsweb.charlestoncounty.org/PublicIndex/ (last visited October 9, 2022); see also Aloe Creme Labs., Inc. v. Francine Co., 425 F.2d 1295, 1296 (5th Cir. 1970) (explaining that a federal court may take judicial notice of the contents of its own records, as well as those records of other courts); Tisdale v. South Carolina Highway Patrol, No. 0:09-cv-1009-HFF-PJG, 2009 WL 1491409, at *1 n.1 (D.S.C. May 27, 2009), aff'd, 347 Fed.Appx. 965 (4th Cir. Aug. 27, 2009) (noting that the court may also take judicial notice of factual information located in postings on government websites).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under the established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of Petitioner's pro se petition pursuant to the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts;the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996; and the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983); and Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147 (4th Cir. 1978).
See Rule 1(b), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases (allowing district courts to apply any or all of these rules to § 2241 petitions).
The narrow question before the Court is whether it “plainly appears” that Petitioner is not entitled to any relief. Rule 4, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. If so, his petition must be dismissed; if not, the Respondent must respond to Petitioner's claims. Id. Because Petitioner is a pro se litigant, his petition is accorded liberal construction. See, e.g., Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Gordon, 574 F.2d at 1151. Even under this less stringent standard, however, the Court cannot ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990). Such is the case here.
DISCUSSION
Under certain circumstances, a pretrial detainee may bring a petition for habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, “which applies to persons in custody regardless of whether final judgment has been rendered and regardless of the present status of the case pending against him.” See United States v. Tootle, 65 F.3d 381, 383 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Dickerson v. Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220, 224 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 956 (1987)). However, “[i]t is well settled that in the absence of exceptional circumstances in criminal cases[,] the regular judicial procedure should be followed and habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of trial.” Jones v. Perkins, 245 U.S. 390, 391-92 (1918). Consequently, a detainee's “attempt to dismiss an indictment or otherwise prevent a prosecution” is generally not attainable through federal habeas corpus and must be addressed as part of the ongoing criminal proceedings. See Miller v. Cannon, No. 2:17-cv-2752-TMC-MGB, 2017 WL 6731503, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 23, 2017), adopted, 2018 WL 516438 (D.S.C. Jan. 22, 2018).
The United States Supreme Court emphasized this principle in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), finding that a federal court should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances. 401 U.S. at 43-44; see also Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996). Specifically, the Younger Court noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44. From Younger and its progeny, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: “(1) there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings.” Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).
In the instant case, the first criterion is met because Petitioner is plainly involved in ongoing state criminal proceedings. See Boyd v. South Carolina, No. 1:11-cv-2981-TMC-SVH, 2012 WL 786341, at *2 (D.S.C. Feb. 10, 2012) (noting that the first prong of the abstention test is satisfied where the petitioner “is currently awaiting trial in an ongoing state criminal proceeding”), adopted, 2012 WL 786356 (D.S.C. Mar. 9, 2012). The second criterion is also met, as the Supreme Court has explained that “States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief.” Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). And finally, the third criterion is satisfied because Petitioner can address his claims in his pending criminal proceedings. Gilliam, 75 F.3d at 904 (noting that “ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights”) (referencing Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975)); see also Sparks v. Mitchell Cty., No. 1:21-cv-50-MR, 2021 WL 781508, at *2 (W.D. N.C. Mar. 1, 2021) (“Under the third prong, the scheme for federal habeas review is designed ‘to give the State an initial opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights.”) (citing Picardv. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971)). Because Petitioner's case meets all three criteria for abstention under Younger, federal habeas relief is available under § 2241 only if “special circumstances” justify the provision of federal review. Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 224-26 .
Petitioner has not shown the type of extreme misconduct or extraordinary circumstances that would warrant federal interference in a pending state criminal case. While “special circumstances” lacks any precise, technical meaning, courts have essentially looked to whether procedures exist which would protect a petitioner's constitutional rights without pretrial intervention; thus, where a threat to the petitioner's rights may be remedied by an assertion of an appropriate defense in state court, no special circumstance is shown. See Askins v. Dir. of Florence Cty. Det. Ctr., No. 9:20-cv-2846-DCC-MHC, 2020 WL 7001015, at *2 (D.S.C. Sept. 3, 2020) (referencing Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 449 (3d Cir. 1975)), adopted, 2020 WL 6110960 (D.S.C. Oct. 16, 2020). Further, where the right may be adequately preserved by orderly post-trial relief, special circumstances are likewise nonexistent. Id.; see also Victoria v. Bodiford, No. 8:21-cv-01836-JMC, 2021 WL 3726707, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 20, 2021) (“If Petitioner has the opportunity to raise his constitutional arguments within the state court proceedings and appeal adverse determinations within the state court system, this court is bound by Younger to abstain from granting Petitioner the relief he requests.”).
Petitioner is plainly able to raise his claims regarding the constitutionality of his traffic stop and subsequent arrest in his underlying criminal case, both during trial and on direct appeal if necessary. See, e.g., Lark v. Boniford, No. 9:13-cv-2869-MGL, 2013 WL 6710338, at *4 (D.S.C. Dec. 18, 2013) (finding no special circumstances where petitioner could raise claims of unlawful arrest and insufficient evidence during trial and post-trial proceedings); Lucas v. Francis, No. 2:15-cv-626, 2015 WL 9899362, at *4 (S.D. W.Va. Dec. 28, 2015) (explaining that petitioner could address the integrity of the investigation and evidence against her during her criminal proceedings). Because Petitioner can pursue his claims in state court, he cannot demonstrate “special circumstances,” or show that he has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied his requested relief. The undersigned therefore finds that Petitioner is precluded from federal habeas relief at this time.
CONCLUSION
Based on the above, the undersigned finds that Petitioner cannot cure the deficiencies in his petition by amendment and therefore RECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISS the petition without prejudice and without requiring Respondent to file a return.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties' attention is directed to the Important Notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court Post Office Box 835 Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).