ORDER AND REASONS

SARAH S. VANCE, United States District Judge

On November 6, 2002 at 10:00 a.m., the Court held a nonjury trial, severed from plaintiff's other claims, on plaintiff's claim for maintenance and cure against defendant Ensco. Plaintiff also sought punitive damages, attorney's fees, and costs. After hearing live testimony and reviewing all the evidence, the Court rules as follows.

I. Background

This action arises out an accident that occurred on June 9, 2000 on Ensco 64, a jack-up drilling vessel owned and operated by defendant. Plaintiff, Charles "Bubba" Gorum, then a thirty-four year old seaman and member of the vessel crew, was injured while descending a derrick ladder on Ensco 64. ( See Pl.'s Findings of Fact ¶ 4.) Plaintiff's right knee popped as he descended. ( See id.) Plaintiff's knee and leg quickly became swollen. ( See Id.)

For the next few days, plaintiff treated his leg with ice and continued to work on Ensco 64. ( See Id. ¶ 5.) The workload during those few days was light. ( See Id.) When he resumed heavy work, plaintiff experienced increased pain and swelling and had limited movement in his knee. (See Id. ¶ 6.) On June 14, 2000, Ensco sent plaintiff to one of its doctors, Dr. Charles W. Hebert, who diagnosed epicondylitis and placed plaintiff on light duty. ( See Jt. Ex. 1 at 7.) Plaintiff returned to Ensco 64 and engaged in light work until June 22, 2000. On June 22, 2000, Ensco began paying plaintiff maintenance and advances and medical care expenses. ( See Def.'s Findings of Fact ¶ 16, Stipulation of Counsel.)

On June 26, 2000, plaintiff consulted Dr. Mark Dodson, an orthopaedic surgeon at Mid-State Orthopaedic and Sports Medicine, Inc., in Alexandria, Louisiana. Observing the swelling in plaintiff's knee, which Dr. Dodson believed to be reflex sympathetic dystrophy, Dr. Dodson placed plaintiff in a knee brace, gave him crutches, and sent him to physical therapy. ( See Jt. Ex. 2 at 2; Jt. Ex. 7 at 34-35; Jt. Ex. 6 at 2.) At plaintiff's follow-up visit on July 3, 2000, Dr. Dodson found that plaintiff's swelling and pain had increased. ( See Jt. Ex. 2 at 5.) From July 3, 2000 until February 2, 2001, at Dr. Dodson's recommendation, plaintiff regularly underwent physical therapy. ( See Jt. Ex. 7 at 35-96.)

In the early months of physical therapy, plaintiff's physical therapist, Kevin Mayo, repeatedly noted on plaintiff's chart that plaintiff's swelling and pain was increasing despite the therapy and for an unknown reason. On July 19, 2000, Mayo wrote, "[S]welling increased enormously — has reduced ability to flex — can achieve full extension. Unsure why swelling increased so much." ( Id. at 48.) On August 7, 2000, Mayo wrote, "[P]atient had MRI — very swollen today — to See Dr. Dodson tomorrow; isn't progressing well at all." ( Id. at 34-35.) On September 8, 2000, Mayo wrote, "[P]atient relates has improved level of pain — still particularly swollen; near full mobility at present with flexion." ( Id. at 67.) And on September 22, 2000, Mayo wrote, "[F]elt a pop in right knee yesterday; some increased swelling." ( Id. at 72.)

Concerned that plaintiff was not improving, Dr. Dodson ordered an MRI, which was carried out on August 4, 2000. The MRI technician noted that plaintiff's leg was "extremely swollen" and suggested the extent of the swelling might have compromised the quality of the MRI. ( See Jt. Ex. 4 at 9.) Dr. Dodson interpreted the MRT as negative for knee pathology and continued plaintiff on physical therapy. ( See Jt. Ex. 2 at 7.) On October 19, 2000, Dr. Dodson consulted with a colleague, Dr. Chris Rich, who agreed that physical therapy was the best course. ( See Id. at 11.) Plaintiff's physical therapy now included active lymphedema management consisting of manual lymphatic drainage, intermittent compression, and multi-layer compression bandaging to reduce the swelling. ( See Jt. Ex. 7 at 88.) On November 22, 2000, Patti Berry, an occupational therapist who administered plaintiff's lymphedema management, wrote Dr. Dodson, stating that the therapy seemed to be helping plaintiff's symptoms, but that he must continue the therapy or his swelling would get worse. ( See Id.)

On December 5, 2000, plaintiff received a second opinion from Dr. Vanda Davidson, another orthopaedic surgeon, who found plaintiff to have "a very swollen knee with no signs of a specific lesion in the knee," and noted that "the swelling is enough to cause catching of tissues in the knee." ( See Jt. Ex. 5 at 4-5.) Dr. Davidson said that he was tempted to do a "look-see" operation of plaintiff's knee. ( See Id.) Nevertheless, because he preferred to pursue non-aggressive methods for finding or ruling out any specific injuries, Dr. Davidson recommended that plaintiff continue physical therapy and suggested lumbar sympathetic blocks. ( See Id.)

On December 28, 2000 and January 4, 2001, plaintiff underwent lumbar sympathetic blocks for reflex sympathetic dystrophy under the care of Dr. Stephen Katz, an anesthesiologist and pain specialist at Central Louisiana Anesthesia and Pain Management Center. On January 4, 2001, Dr. Katz noted that the blocks provided plaintiff "significant benefit in terms of decreased swelling around the knee [but] he continues to have swelling from his calf down." (Jt. Ex. 6 at 4.) He continued the lumbar sympathetic blocks. (See id.) At a follow-up visit on January 18, 2001, Dr. Katz noted that the blocks had "alleviated [plaintiff's] pain and swelling for approximately two to three days." ( Id. at 5.) He noted, however, that the symptoms had returned. (See id.) Dr. Katz did not reinitiate the lumbar sympathetic blocks, but recommended "a trial of a spinal cord stimulator." (See id.) Dr. Katz prescribed three medications for plaintiff and noted at a follow-up visit on February 1, 2001 that the medications had helped decrease plaintiff's pain and swelling. ( See id. at 6.) In addition to the spinal cord stimulator, he recommended another lumbar sympathetic block. ( See Id.)

On February 6, 2001, plaintiff informed Dr. Dodson that his knee had popped a few days before and the swelling had increased. ( See Jt. Ex. 2 at 16.) Dr. Dodson recommended that plaintiff continue treatment under Dr. Katz's care and return in one month. ( See Id.) On March 1, 2001, plaintiff returned to Dr. Katz, who noted that plaintiff "continues to have popping and swelling in his right knee." (Jt. Ex. 6 at 7.) Dr. Katz recommended that plaintiff follow up with Dr. Dodson regarding the pain and swelling and observed that the medication regimen seemed to help. Lastly, he recommended plaintiff return in one month to determine whether another lumbar sympathetic block would be appropriate. ( See Id.)

On March 22, 2001, Dr. Dodson saw plaintiff and stated that nothing more could be done for his condition. ( See Jt. Ex. 2 at 19.) Dr. Dodson stated he believed plaintiff had reached maximum medical improvement and ordered a Functional Capacity Evaluation ("FCE"). ( See Id.) Dr. Dodson did not at this time address Dr. Katz's suggestion of another lumbar sympathetic block. On April 2, 2001, Dr. Katz saw plaintiff and stated that he was "doing very well" but observed that plaintiff stated he had a lot of pain when he exerted himself. (Jt. Ex. 6 at 8.) At plaintiff's FCE on May 1, 2001, he gave full effort and was able to conduct heavy lifting. (See Jt. Ex. 7 at 1; Dodson Depo. at 67.) Plaintiff's knee audibly popped, however, while he squatted to lift a heavy item. ( See Id. at 2.) Two days after the FCE, plaintiff's physical therapist observed a "noticeable increase in edema in the right lower extremity." ( Id. at 29.) Based on the FCE results, the FOE evaluator recommended plaintiff "seek employment that does not require greater than a third of the day completing low level work" and that plaintiff should kneel or sit when working at low heights. ( See Id. at 29.) The FCE evaluator also recommended that plaintiff avoid sitting for longer than two hours at a time and avoid activities requiring knee flexion to 90 degrees such as lifting at floor level. ( See Id.)

On May 8, 2001, Dr. Katz saw plaintiff for the last time and stated he was doing "extremely well with the medication he is on" and that plaintiff seemed to be suffering no discomfort. (Jt. Ex. 6 at 9.) On May 21, 2001, Dr. Dodson saw plaintiff for the last time, who reported that plaintiff's swelling had decreased but was still evident. ( See Jt. Ex. 2 at 19.) Dr. Dodson stated he believed plaintiff could return to heavy labor. ( See Id.)

Julie Slocum, Claims Manager for Ensco, received a letter from Dr. Katz on May 28, 2001, stating that plaintiff had reached maximum medical improvement and was being treated only for pain control at that point. ( See Jt. Ex. 6 at 11.) Therefore, on June 6, 2001, Ensco ceased paying plaintiff maintenance and advances and medical expenses. Ensco's payments to plaintiff from June 22, 2000 until June 6, 2001 totaled $13,348.03. ( See Def.'s Findings of Fact ¶ 16, Stipulation of Counsel.)

Plaintiff hired an attorney and then he was seen by a specialist in physical medicine and rehabilitation, Dr. Gerald J. Leglue. On June 13, 2001, Dr. Leglue observed plaintiff's swelling and offered the impression that plaintiff had lymphatic damage with chondromalacia patella and a significantly deconditioned right leg. ( See Jt. Ex. 8 at 19-20.) At Dr. Leglue's recommendation, plaintiff then saw Dr. James P. David, a vascular specialist. On July 17, 2001, Dr. David observed plaintiff's swelling and pain, found no significant vascular or lymphatic problems, advised that the knee brace was aggravating plaintiff's swelling, and suggested elevation and support stockings as "the best management for this problem." (Jt. Ex. 9 at 5.) Plaintiff continued to consult with Dr. David though mid-September 2001. ( See id. at 7-8.)

On November 15, 2001, plaintiff followed up with Dr. Davidson, the orthopaedic surgeon he had seen in December 2000. Dr. Davidson wrote, "The patient has continued knee swelling and popping. I don't know what's going on . . . ." (Jt. Ex. 5 at 5.) Dr. Davidson referred plaintiff to Dr. Robert L. Barrack, Director of Adult Reconstructive Surgery at Tulane University Medical Center. On December 6, 2001, Dr. Barrack saw plaintiff and reported that "clinically he has a miniscal tear" and a possible Baker's cyst causing calf swelling. (Jt. Ex. 10 at 1.) Dr. Barrack noted that this tear should have been observed on plaintiff's August 4, 2000 MRI, but that he did not have access to this MRT. ( See id.) Therefore, on February 18, 2002, plaintiff underwent a second MRI at Dr. Barrack's suggestion, which Dr. Barrack interpreted as revealing irregularities of both the medial miniscus and the lateral miniscus. ( See Id. at 2.) On March 12, 2002, at a follow-up visit, Dr. Barrack recommended arthroscopy and sent a letter to that effect, entitled "To Whom It May Concern," ostensibly to Ensco. ( See Jt. Ex. 10 at 2, 3.)

On July 1, 2002, plaintiff's attorney sent Julie Slocum a letter requesting Ensco pay for plaintiff's arthroscopy and update his maintenance payments. ( See Jt. Ex. 20 at 1.) The letter included Dr. Barrack's medical notes from December 2001 and March 2002 and his recommendation of arthroscopy. ( See id.) Ensco asserts that, until this letter, it had not been contacted regarding plaintiff since he was diagnosed as achieving maximum medical improvement in May 2001. ( See Def.'s Findings of Fact ¶ 21.) Noting that Dr. Barrack's December medical notes reported that he had not seen the August 4, 2000 MRI, Slocum asked Dr. Barrack if he was aware that the August 4, 2000 MRI of plaintiff's leg had revealed no problems with plaintiff's medial and lateral ligaments and that plaintiff had been released to heavy duty labor after his FCE in May 2001. ( See id. at 4.) Slocum sent Dr. Barrack the results of the MRI and requested a response to her questions. ( See id.) Ensco did not receive a reply from Dr. Barrack. (See Def.'s Findings of Fact ¶ 21.)

On July 18, 2002, defendant's attorney asked for copies of all of plaintiff's medical records and current information regarding his medical status. ( See Jt. Ex. 20 at 2.) Defendant also reserved the right to investigate plaintiff's claim for maintenance and cure. ( See id.) On July 22, 2002, defendant's counsel renewed his request for access to plaintiff's medical information. ( See id. at 5.) On August 22, 2002, defendant's counsel again requested access to the relevant information. ( See Id. at 10-11.)

On September 5, 2002, plaintiff's counsel provided medical authorizations for defendant to obtain the records it requested. ( See id. at 12.) On September 20, 2002, plaintiff's counsel provided defendant with a new report made by Dr. Barrack dated September 17, 2002. ( See id. at 17.) In this report, Dr. Barrack and an orthopaedic radiologist confirmed that the August 2000 MRI was not of very good quality, but that it did not reveal pathology in plaintiff's knee. ( See Jt. Ex. 10 at 5.) They also stated that the second MRI likewise did not reveal pathology. ( See id. § ) Dr. Barrack then stated, "In spite of the lack of confirmation of meniscal tear or other intraarticular pathology on MRI, I do not believe that Mr. Gorum has reached maximum medical improvement. In a small percentage of cases there are meniscal tears that are not picked up on MRI." ( Id.) Dr. Barrack concluded, "It is my impression that the dramatic recurrent swelling and popping that he is experiencing indicates that arthroscopy should be seriously considered." ( Id.) Dr. Barrack then referred plaintiff to an orthopaedic specialist at Tulane University Medical Center, Dr. Derek Jones. ( See Id.)

On October 15, 2002, Dr. Jones evaluated plaintiff's condition and medical history and concluded that plaintiff appeared to have chronic meniscus pathology to the medial and lateral aspects of his knee and venous insufficiency, and that he "certainly has not reached maximum medical improvement and should undergo arthroscopic intervention." (Jt. Ex. 12 at 18, 24.) Dr. Jones' conclusion regarding venous insufficiency conflicted with that of Dr. David, who had found no evidence of venous thrombosis. ( See Jt. Ex. 9 at 5.) Defendant only became aware of Dr. Jones' medical conclusions at Dr. Jones' deposition on October 22, 2002. ( See Jones Depo. at 69.)

The day before Dr. Jones' evaluation, on October 14, 2002, Dr. Dodson conducted a medical examination of plaintiff at defendant's request, which included reviewing more recent x-rays and the second MRI. Dr. Dodson concluded that plaintiff was still experiencing swelling of the right leg, although less than when he had previously observed plaintiff. ( See Jt. Ex. 2 at 23.) Dr. Dodson noted that plaintiff had almost complete flexion in the knee and no instability, and the knee did not pop when he asked plaintiff to squat and rise. ( See id.) Dr. Dodson concluded that plaintiff's leg swelling is the cause of most of his problems, not any pathology in the knee. ( See id.) Moreover, Dr. Dodson noted that neither of the MRIs revealed any tears. ( See id.) Dr. Dodson concluded that arthroscopy is unlikely to improve plaintiff's condition and may, in fact, worsen it. ( See id.) Lastly, Dr. Dodson concluded that home exercise and a pressure stocking are the appropriate solutions for plaintiff at this time. (See Dodson Depo. at 60-61.)

II. DISCUSSION

A. Maintenance and Cure

Seamen have a right to maintenance and cure for injuries suffered by them in the course of their duties on a vessel. See O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36, 41-42 (1943); Guevara, 59 F.3d at 1499. Before plaintiff can recover maintenance and cure, he bears the burden of alleging and proving the following facts: (a) his engagement as a seaman, (b) that his illness or injury occurred, was aggravated or manifested itself while in the ship's service, (c) the wages to which he may be entitled, and (d) the expenditures or liability incurred by him for medicines, nursing care, board and lodging. See Foster, III v. Brian's Trans. Serv. et al., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4531, *6, 1993 WL 114528, *2 (E.D. La. 1993) (citing MARTIN NORRIS, 2 THE LAW OF SEAMEN § 26.21 at 53 (Supp. 1992)). A plaintiff need not present any proof of negligence or fault on the part of the employer to establish his entitlement to maintenance and cure. See id.

Seamen injured in the course of their employment are entitled maintenance and cure benefits until they reach the point of maximum medical improvement ("MMI"). See Breese v. AWI, Inc., 823 F.2d 100, 104 (5th Cir. 1987) . MMI is the point at which no further improvement in the seaman's medical condition is reasonably expected. See Lauland v. Hugh Eymard Towing Co., Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6447, *20, 2000 WL 533880, *7 (citing Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511, 518 (1949)). In other words, MMI is the point beyond which it is not reasonably possible that medical treatment will "reduce [the amount of the seaman's] disability," be "curative," "better the seaman's condition," or "improve [his] health." Vella v. Ford Motor Co., 421 U.S. 1 (1974); Gaspard v. Taylor Diving Salvage Co., 649 F.2d 372, 374 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1981); Pelotto v. LN Towing Co., 604 F.2d 396, 400 (5th Cir. 1970). If "future treatment will merely relieve pain and suffering," then MMI has been reached. Felotto, 604 F.2d at 400.

Generally, the obligation to provide maintenance and cure ends when a doctor provides a qualified medical opinion that plaintiff has reached MMI. See Lauland, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6447 (citing Breese, 823 F.2d at 104-05). Conflicting diagnoses and prognoses of various physicians present a question to be determined by the trier of fact as to the entitlement to maintenance and cure benefits and as to whether an employer's termination of maintenance and cure benefits was arbitrary or capricious. See Tullos v. Resource Drilling, Inc., 750 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1985) . As the United States Supreme Court held long ago in Vaughan v. Atkinson, "When there are ambiguities or doubts [as to a seaman's right to receive maintenance and cure], they are resolved in favor of the seaman." Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 532 (1962) (citing Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523 (1951)).

The Vaughan rule must be applied when there is conflicting credible medical testimony as to whether the seaman has reached MMI. In Johnson v. Marlin Drilling Company, 893 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1990), the Fifth Circuit stated:

While it is obviously within a district court's domain to judge the credibility of the evidence presented to it, in cases of maintenance and cure, important considerations must be taken into account. Significantly, it is crucial to ensure that the rule stated in Vaughan, regarding the existence of ambiguities and doubts, is applied correctly . . . . [U]nder the Vaughan rule, the possibility of physical improvement, expressed by [the seaman's second doctor], would require a finding in favor of Johnson.

The Court found both doctors to be highly credible witnesses, and believes that there is simply a difference of opinion regarding whether Plaintiff has reached maximum medical cure, and the possible benefits that could result from a second arthroscopy. . . . In a situation such as the one facing the Court, where there is equally strong evidence presented by both parties as to whether Plaintiff has achieved maximum medical cure, the Supreme Court has clearly instructed the lower courts to resolve those ambiguities in favor of the seaman.

In this case, plaintiff met his burden of alleging and proving the four elements of a maintenance and cure claim. It is undisputed that plaintiff was a seaman whose injury occurred, was aggravated, or manifested itself while in the service of the vessel, Ensco 64. Plaintiff has also alleged and proved the wages to which he may be entitled and the expenses he incurred for medicines, nursing care, board and lodging from June 6, 2001 to date. The only remaining issue at trial was whether defendant owes plaintiff maintenance and cure from June 6, 2001 to date, based on the opinions of Drs. Barrack and Jones that plaintiff has not reached MMI, or whether defendant does not owe plaintiff maintenance and cure after June 6, 2001, based on the opinions of Drs. Dodson and Katz that plaintiff reached MMI.

The Court finds that plaintiff has advanced credible medical testimony as to his condition and potential for medical improvement. Dr. Robert L. Barrack is Director of Adult Reconstructive Surgery at Tulane University Medical Center and Dr. Derek Jones is an orthopaedic specialist at Tulane University Medical Center. ( See Jt. Exs. 10, 12.) Dr. Jones is Board Certified, has published extensively in medical journals, and has held several academic positions. ( See Jt. Ex. 12 at 1-7.) Dr. Barrack is likewise well-qualified. Dr. Barrack reviewed both MRIs of plaintiff's knee and explained his opinion that plaintiff had not reached MMI: "In spite of the lack of confirmation of meniscal tear or other intraarticular pathology on MRI, I do not believe that Mr. Gorum has reached maximum medical improvement. In a small percentage of cases there are meniscal tears that are not picked up on MRI." (Jt. Ex. 10 at 5.) Dr. Barrack concluded, "It is my impression that the dramatic recurrent swelling and popping that he is experiencing indicates that arthroscopy should be seriously considered." ( Id.) On October 15, 2002, after evaluating plaintiff's condition and medical history, Dr. Jones confirmed Dr. Barrack's diagnosis in concluding that plaintiff appeared to have chronic meniscus pathology to the medial and lateral aspects of his knee and venous insufficiency, and that he "certainly has not reached maximum medical improvement and should undergo arthroscopic intervention." (Jt. Ex. 12 at 18, 24.) Although defendant presented contrary evidence from qualified physicians, the Court finds that their testimony simply raises doubts as to plaintiff's entitlement to maintenance and cure, which Vaughan requires the Court to resolve in favor of the seaman. See Johnson, 893 F.2d at 80; Malta, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4769 at *8; In re Sirret, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13408, *15, *16-17; Williams, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14140, *10-11.

Defendant asserts that, even if cure is owed, maintenance from June 7, 2001 to date is not owed because the treatment plaintiff received from various doctors during that time did not improve his condition, but merely attempted to stabilize or maintain his condition. The Court finds no authority for defendant's proposition that each discrete treatment plaintiff receives before reaching MMI must actually improve his condition. Defendant's citation to cases involving relapses in incurable diseases are inapposite. See Muruaga v. United States, 172 F.2d 318, 320-21 (2d Cir. 1949); Vassos v. Soc. Trans-Oceanica Canopus, S.A., 205 F. Supp. 845 (S.B.N.Y. 1959). The Court thus rejects defendant's argument.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that plaintiff has not reached maximum medical improvement. Therefore, plaintiff is entitled to continuing maintenance and cure from the date that defendant discontinued maintenance and cure payments.

B. Punitive Damages and Attorney's Fees

The Fifth Circuit has held that, upon receiving notice of a claim for maintenance and cure, a shipowner may investigate and require corroboration of the claim, and need not immediately provide payment. See Morales v. Garijak, Inc., 829 F.2d 1355, 1358 (5th Cir. 1987) (citing McWilliams v. Texaco, Inc., 781 F.2d 514, 518-20 (5th Cir. 1986)). If the shipowner unreasonably rejects the claim after investigating it, the owner becomes liable for compensatory damages in addition to maintenance and cure, such as aggravation of the seaman's condition. See id. Further, if the owner rejects the claim in an arbitrary and capricious, or willful, callous, and persistent manner, the owner becomes liable for punitive damages and attorney's fees as well as maintenance and cure and compensatory damages. See McWilliams, 781 F.2d at 519; Gaspard, 649 F.2d at 375. The Fifth Circuit has held that when a shipowner terminates maintenance and cure in reliance on the seaman's doctors' opinions that MMI has been attained, the owner has not acted arbitrarily and capriciously in not paying further maintenance and cure when the seaman did not notify the owner of subsequent visits to other doctors. See Harrell v. Dixon Bay Trans. Co., 718 F.2d 123, 129-30 (5th Cir. 1983)

In this case, as in Harrell, there is no evidence that defendant acted arbitrarily and capriciously in handling plaintiff's claim for continuing maintenance and cure. First, defendant received opinions from plaintiff's then-treating physicians that he had reached MMI in May 2001. Defendant acted reasonably in terminating plaintiff's maintenance and cure payments as of June 6, 2001. It was not until July 2002, over a year later, that defendant was notified by plaintiff's attorney that plaintiff had seen other doctors in the interim and that plaintiff sought continuing maintenance and cure based on Dr. Barrack's opinion that plaintiff required arthroscopic surgery and that he had not reached MMI. ( See Jt. Ex. 20 at 1; Def.'s Findings of Fact ¶¶ 21.)

Beginning in July 2002, defendant's attorney made repeated requests for access to all of plaintiff's medical records and current information regarding his medical status so that defendant could conduct its own investigation of the maintenance and cure claim. ( See Jt. Ex. 20 at 2, 5-7.) Defendant received no replies to these letters. ( See Def.'s Findings of Fact ¶ 23.) On August 22, 2002, defendant's counsel renewed its requests. ( See Jt. Ex. 20 at 10-11.)

On September 5, 2002, plaintiff's counsel finally provided medical authorizations for defendant to obtain the records it requested. ( See id. at 12.) On September 20, 2002, plaintiff's counsel provided defendant with a new report made by Dr. Barrack dated September 17, 2002. ( See id. at 17.) In this report, Dr. Barrack and an orthopaedic radiologist confirmed that the August 2000 MRI was not of very good quality, but that it did not reveal pathology in plaintiff's knee. ( See Jt. Ex. 10 at 5.) In this report, Dr. Barrack explained his medical conclusions, which were contrary to Dr. Dodson's, and referred plaintiff to Dr. Jones. ( See id.)

On October 15, 2002, Dr. Jones evaluated plaintiff's condition and medical history and formulated his conclusions in concurrence with Dr. Barrack and in conflict with Dr. Dodson and Dr. David. ( See Jt. Ex. 12 at 18, 24; Jt. Ex. 9 at 5.) Defendant asserts that it only became aware of Dr. Jones's medical conclusions at Dr. Jones' deposition on October 22, 2002. ( See Def.'s Findings of Fact ¶ 26.) The day before Dr. Jones' evaluation, on October 14, 2002, at defendant's request, Dr. Dodson conducted a medical examination of plaintiff which included reviewing more recent x-rays and the second MRI. ( See Jt. Ex. 2 at 23.) Stating that neither of the MRIs revealed any tears, Dr. Dodson confirmed his earlier medical conclusions and disagreed with Drs. Barrack and Jones regarding the need for arthroscopy. ( See id.)

This sequence of events demonstrates that defendant promptly, dingently, and reasonably conducted an investigation into plaintiff's claim. Because Dr. Dodson's conclusion conflicted with Dr. Barrack's and Dr. Jones' conclusions, defendant was unwilling to pay continuing maintenance and cure pending the Court's resolution of the matter. There is simply no evidence that defendant acted in an arbitrary and capricious, or willful, callous, and persistent manner, which would give rise to punitive damages and attorney's fees. Nor is there even evidence that defendant acted unreasonably, which would give rise to compensatory damages.

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's claim for punitive damages and attorney's fees is DENIED.

C. Prejudgment Interest and Prepayment

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1961, the Court may award prejudgment interest on any money judgment in a civil case recovered in a district court. In admiralty cases generally, prejudgment interest should be awarded. See Inland Oil and Transport Co. v. Ark-White Towing Co., 696 F.2d 321, 327 (5th Cir. 1983). The purpose of prejudgment interest is to compensate, not penalize. See Transorient Navigators Co., S.A. v. M/S SOUTHWIND, 788 F.2d 288, 294 (5th Cir. 1986). "Discretion to deny prejudgment interest is created only when there are 'peculiar circumstances' that would make it inequitable for the losing party to be forced to pay prejudgment interest." Noritake Co. v. M/V HELLENIC CHAMPION, 627 F.2d 724, 728 (5th Cir. 1980)

Defendant argues that peculiar circumstances exist precluding the Court from awarding prejudgment interest, namely, that plaintiff improperly delayed bringing the lawsuit and resolving the action. The cases which defendant cites for this proposition involve admiralty generally, not maintenance and cure specifically. The Court does not find peculiar circumstances to warrant departure from the rule that prejudgment interest is recoverable.

Defendant also argues that it should not be required to prepay the cost of plaintiff's arthroscopic surgery. Defendant cites Dominguez v. Maritime Transport Management Company, in which the court stated that it "IS unable to find a single precedent requiring that the maritime employer must guarantee to pay for tests prior to such tests being done." 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11215, *5 (E.D. La. 1992) (citing NORRIS, THE LAW OF SEAMEN § 26.18 at 41 (4th ed. 1985). In Guevara v. Maritime Overseas Corporation, however, which involved a shipowner's arbitrary delay in making cure payments, the Fifth Circuit suggested that the cure obligation can extend beyond simply reimbursing medical expenses:

This obligation to pay maintenance and cure "embraces not only the obligation to pay a subsistence allowance and to reimburse the seaman for medical expenses he incurs; the employer must also take all reasonable steps to insure that the seaman who is injured or ill receives proper care and treatment.'

III. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff Charles "Bubba" Gorum is entitled to maintenance and cure as follows, to be paid before plaintiff undergoes surgery:

(1) maintenance in the amount of $20/day for 518 days since June 6, 2001, totaling $10,360;

(2) prejudgment interest on the maintenance award at an annual rate of 6.375%, or $1.80/day for 518 days, totaling $932.40;

(3) cure for the cost of arthrosoopic surgery and all associated medical, rehabilitative, and necessary treatment, until the point at which plaintiff reaches MMI;

(3) plaintiff's medical expenses since June 6, 2001, totaling $2,631.50, which consist of the following bills (not including any treatment for back pain):