On appeal from a decree of the court of chancery advised by Vice-Chancellor Bigelow, who filed the following memorandum:

"On bill to restrain prosecution of action at law.

"On complainant's order to show cause and defendant's motion to strike out bill of complaint for want of equity.

"The defendant, Mrs. Hunt, is the owner of a bond and mortgage made in 1925 by the complainants. In 1926 the complainants sold the mortgaged premises subject to the lien of the mortgage. Mrs. Hunt thereafter and before the mortgage matured, entered into an agreement with the new owners whereby she extended the time of payment of the mortgage money for three years and whereby they agreed to pay the same. This agreement was made without the knowledge or consent of complainants. About a year after the original maturity of the mortgage, Mrs. Hunt foreclosed and the premises were sold by the sheriff at a price which failed by a wide margin to pay the amount due. She has instituted in the New Jersey Supreme Court an action on the bond against complainants for the deficiency This is the action which complainants seek to stay.

"The bill of complaint also sets forth that when complainants conveyed the property to the present owners, the agreed purchase price was the full value of the premises and there was credited thereon the amount due on the bond and mortgage. These facts, however, were never brought to the attention of Mrs. Hunt. She had no notice of them. The principles discussed in Woodbury Heights Land Co. v. Loudenslager, 60 N.J. Eq. 403; 45 Atl. Rep. 630, are not involved in this case. So far as Mrs. Hunt is concerned, the complainants remained the only persons personally liable on the bond.

"Complainants contend that the action of Mrs. Hunt in extending the mortgage prejudiced their interest to such an extent as to release them in equity from liability on the bond, and hence they are entitled to an injunction. They rely principally on decisions of the courts of New York. The rule in that state is that the land is the primary fund for the payment of the debt and is liable in exoneration of the bond; that the extension of the mortgage after the premises are sold releases the mortgagor but only to the extent the premises depreciate in value, after the original due date of the mortgage. Murray v. Marshall, 94 N.Y. 611; Metzger v. Nova Realty Co., 214 N.Y. 26; 107 N.E. Rep. 1027.

"The instant case is not within that rule since the bill of complaint does not allege that the land depreciated in value between the original maturity of the mortgage and the time when foreclosure was begun.

"In a large number of states it is held that an extension of the mortgage without the consent of the mortgagor releases him from liability in case the mortgagee has notice of the fact that the grantee has assumed the mortgage debt and thus become the principal debtor. The cases are collected in 41 C.J. 735. In some of the western and southern states this same rule is applied even though the grantee has not become the principal debtor. 41 C.J. 719. To the contrary are Shepherd v. May, 115 U.S. 505; 6 S.C. 119; Chilton v. Brooks, 72 Md. 554; 20 Atl. Rep. 125, and Morganroth v. Pink, 227 Ill. App. 244.

"I think the correct rule applicable to this case is that an extension of a mortgage by agreement between the mortgagee and the grantee of the mortgaged premises does not release the mortgagor from liability on his bond when the mortgagee has no notice that the grantee has become the principal debtor or otherwise equitably liable to the mortgagor. The safety of mortgages should not be whittled away. The mortgagor when he sells his land subject to a mortgage assumes many risks. He takes the chance that the grantee will permit taxes and interest to accumulate, that he may not keep buildings insured, that he may allow them to deteriorate; and he also takes the risk that the term of the mortgage may be extended.

"I will advise that the order to show cause be discharged and that the bill of complaint be dismissed."