Summary
In Jackson v. Sackett (7 Wend. 94), ejectment was brought on a mortgage executed as collateral security for the payment of a sum of money secured to be paid by a note.
Summary of this case from Hulbert v. ClarkOpinion
No. CV02-0174484S
February 18, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
On September 10, 2002, plaintiff Gonzalez was a passenger in a motor vehicle driven by defendant Sackett. Sackett's vehicle was involved in an accident, on Interstate 84 in Cheshire, with a motor vehicle operated by third-party defendant White. Plaintiff Gonzalez' allegations, as set forth in the complaint, are that defendant Sackett suddenly and without warning swerved into the left lane of travel, then swerved back into the right lane of travel, then crashed into a motor vehicle in the right lane operated by White, then defendant Sackett's vehicle traveled over the highway guardrail, struck a light pole and rolled down the highway embankment. The complaint alleges that the defendant Sackett caused the collision through his own negligence and carelessness, and that as a result of the collision, the plaintiff incurred numerous injuries and medical expenses.
Defendant Sackett, on October 9, 2003, filed a third-party complaint against third-party defendant White seeking indemnity from White if he is found to be responsible to the plaintiff, Gonzalez.
On December 5, 2003, third-party defendant White filed a motion to strike the third-party indemnification complaint on the ground that, as a matter of law, no reasonable jury could find that White had exclusive control over the multi-vehicle accident at issue in this case. On January 8, 2004, defendant/third-party plaintiff Sackett filed an objection to the motion to strike on the ground that they sufficiently alleged all four elements for an indemnity action. Oral argument was held on February 9, 2004.
DISCUSSION
"Whenever any party wishes to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any . . . complaint . . . that party may do so by filing a motion to strike the contested pleading or part thereof." Practice Book § 10-39. "The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint. The court must construe the facts in the complaint most favorably to the plaintiff . . . If facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 580, 693 A.2d 293 (1997). "A motion to strike admits all facts well pleaded . . ." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 588.
In support of her motion, third-party defendant White argues that the indemnity claim is legally insufficient because in order to assert an indemnity action, a party must establish that the other defendant had exclusive control over the accident. Specifically, White argues that in the context of a multiple vehicle accident such as the one at issue in this case, where active negligence is alleged against both the defendant and the third-party defendant, a majority of Superior Court judges have held that the element of "exclusive control" necessary to maintain an action in common-law indemnification cannot be satisfied. The defendant/third-party plaintiff, Gonzalez, disagrees and argues "that the particular facts of this case establish that the third-party defendant [White] was in control over the "situation" to the exclusion of the third-party plaintiff [Gonzalez]."
"[I]ndemnity involves a claim for reimbursement in full from one on whom a primary liability is claimed to rest, while contribution involves a claim for reimbursement of a share of a payment necessarily made by the claimant which equitably should have been paid in part by others." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Crotta v. Home Depot, Inc., 249 Conn. 634, 641-42, 732 A.2d 767 (1999). In order to maintain a common-law action for indemnity, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to establish: "(1) that the other tortfeasor was negligent; (2) that [that] negligence, rather than [the third-party plaintiffs'], was the direct, immediate cause of the accident and injuries; (3) that [the other tortfeasor] was in control of the situation to the exclusion of [the third-party plaintiffs]; and (4) that [the third-party plaintiffs] did not know of such negligence, had no reason to anticipate it, and could reasonably rely on the other tortfeasor not to be negligent." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Skuzinski v. Bouchard Fuels, Inc., 240 Conn. 694, 698, 694 A.2d 708 (1997).
"There is a split of authority in the Superior Court concerning whether an allegation in a third-party complaint that a third-party defendant was in `exclusive control of the situation' is legally sufficient to support an indemnity claim arising out of an automobile accident when both parties are alleged to have committed active negligence." Keller v. Irizarry, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford at Milford, Docket No. 067999 (May 8, 2000, Arnold, J.) ( 27 Conn. L. Rptr. 242). Cases that support the conclusion that exclusive control cannot be sufficiently plead in such a situation include: Keller v. Irizarry, supra, 27 Conn. L. Rptr. 242; Simon v. My Bread Baking Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. 165440, 25 Conn. L. Rptr. 473 (October 14, 1999, D'Andrea, J.); Sanclemente v. Wlaz, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. 394430 (May 12, 1992, Aurigemma, J.); Vahey v. Dodson, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. 268414, 3 Conn. L. Rptr. 73 (December 31, 1990, Nigro, J.); and Mahoney v. Gibson, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. 055256 (June 26, 1984, Lewis, J.).
Cases which support the conclusion that exclusive control may be possible in a multiple vehicle accident for an indemnity action include: Pettway v. Gonzalez, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. 345423 (January 12, 1999, Nadeau, J.) ( 23 Conn. L. Rptr. 610); Sivahop v. Harris, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. 351127 (Sept. 11, 1998, Nadeau, J.) ( 22 Conn. L. Rptr. 578); Gladding v. Saren, Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury at Danbury, Docket No. 327219 (November 17, 1997, Stodolink, J.); and Riscitelli v. Metro North Commuter Railroad, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. 326325 (September 5, 1995, Zoarski, J.).
This court is persuaded by the reasoning of the majority of cases which have been reluctant to extend indemnification to accidents involving multiple motor vehicles on a public highway. This court agrees with the third-party defendant that the defendant/third-party plaintiff has failed to state a claim for common-law indemnity against a joint tortfeasor. Accordingly, the motion to strike is granted.
Alvord, J.