OPINION

GEORGE DANIELS, District Judge

Plaintiff Lance Goldenberg brings suit against St. Barnabas Hospital, St. Barnabas Correctional Services, the City of New York and the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation (collectively, "defendants") alleging violations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("1983") that occurred while he was a pre-trial detainee at Rikers Island Correctional Facility ("Rikers Island"). Defendants St. Barnabas Hospital and St. Barnabas Correctional Services moved to dismiss plaintiff's federal claims pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) because plaintiff's claims are barred by the statute of limitations and because plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Plaintiff moved to amend his complaint. Defendant opposed the motion and filed a motion for sanctions pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 11. While the motion was sub judice, plaintiff sought leave to file a second amended complaint. For the reasons stated below, defendant's motion to dismiss is granted. Plaintiff's first motion to amend is denied as moot. Defendant's motion for sanctions is denied. Plaintiff's second motion to amend is denied as futile.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Lance Goldenberg was a pretrial detainee at Rikers Island. He alleges that while being detained, his prescription anti-seizure medication was taken from him. Plaintiff alleges that despite repeated requests for their return and warnings that he would become ill without them, defendant St. Barnabas Correctional Services denied him his medication.

Plaintiff alleges that the denial of his medication caused him to become "visibly ill, breaking out into cold sweats, becoming incontinent, and unable to get up from his bunk." Complaint, ¶ 6. He "lost consciousness, became comatose and was unconscious for a number of days." Id., ¶ 8. Plaintiff alleges that while he was comatose, he was transferred to Bellevue Hospital Center ("Bellevue") and that after he recovered consciousness, he continued to be confined at Bellevue in its jail ward. Id., ¶ 17-18. He also claims that his "jail sentence expired while he was confined by Defendant City of New York and New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation at Bellevue Hospital Center, but [he] was not released from the jail ward for a number of days after the expiration of his sentence." Id., ¶ 19. He contends that defendant City of New York's failure to release him from detention "was due to a systematic failure to monitor the expiration of sentences of inmates detained at Bellevue Hospital Center, and to release them upon the expiration of their sentences." Complaint, ¶ 20. Plaintiff further alleges that "no administrative remedy [was] available to him to redress the violation of his rights." Id., ¶ 14.

Plaintiff filed his original complaint on August 21, 2001 alleging that he was detained at Rikers Island and deprived of his constitutional rights on November 25, 1997. Defendants St. Barnabas Hospital and St. Barnabas Correctional Services moved to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), asserting that plaintiff's claims are barred by the relevant statute of limitations, that plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and that plaintiff failed to allege that defendants possessed final policymaking authority in relation to inmate health services. The statute of limitations for actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in New York is three years. See Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 251, 109 S.Ct. 573, 582, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989); see also Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2002). It is undisputed that plaintiff's initial complaint was filed more than three years past the date of the alleged constitutional violation. Defendants' motion to dismiss is therefore GRANTED and plaintiff's initial complaint is DISMISSED.

Plaintiff moved to amend his complaint on February 13, 2002, alleging that plaintiff was actually detained at Rikers Island on November 25, 1999 ("Amended Complaint"). Then, by letter dated March 7, 2002, plaintiffs' counsel sought to again amend the date plaintiff was detained, requesting that "paragraph 7 of the proposed amended complaint be read as corrected, to propose amending the time of Mr. Goldenberg's incarceration to be on or about November 25, 1998." Plaintiff's counsel attests that he contacted Mr. Eugene Martin of Correctional Health Services, who confirmed that plaintiff was incarcerated in 1998, and not November 25, 1999. Plaintiff's counsel explained that his client "suffers from cognitive impairments, and although I questioned him closely about the dates of his incarceration, his answer was obviously in error."

Upon further investigation by defendants' counsel, however, it was shown that plaintiff was not incarcerated on November 25, 1998. On October 17, 2002, plaintiff requested leave to file his second proposed amended complaint ("Second Amended Complaint") alleging that plaintiff was detained and suffered his injuries on September 27, 1998. Plaintiff's counsel attests that this latest complaint is based on "additional, detailed, discussion with Plaintiff, correlating his recollections with the dates of Plaintiff's arrests and sentencing shown in the records maintained by the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services . . ., and the dates provided by Eugene Martin of the Correctional Health Services to [defendants' attorney] and set out in [defendants' attorney's] "Affirmation in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the Complaint. . . ." Declaration of Aaron David Frishberg, ¶ 5. Given his subsequent request to file a second amended complaint, plaintiff's motion to file his amended complaint is DENIED as moot.

The allegations in plaintiff's second amended complaint sufficiently defeat the statute of limitations bar of his initial complaint. Defendants, however, argue that plaintiff's second motion to amend should be denied as futile because his Second Amended Complaint suffers from the following infirmities: plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies; plaintiff's claims insufficiently allege that St. Barnabas Hospital and St. Barnabas Correctional Services possessed final policymaking authority; plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege that defendant's were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs; and plaintiff's attempt to amend a second time would cause undue delay.

DISCUSSION

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a party to move to dismiss a complaint where the complaint "fail[s] . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]" FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). In reviewing a motion to dismiss, this Court accepts the allegations in the complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Patel v. Searles, 305 F.3d 130, 134-35 (2d Cir. 2002). A motion to dismiss will only be granted if the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of its claim that would entitle it to relief. See Citibank, N.A. v. K-H Corp., 968 F.2d 1489, 1494 (2d Cir. 1992). In considering a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), a district court must limit itself to facts stated in the complaint, or in documents attached to the complaint as exhibits or incorporated in the complaint by reference. See Kramer v. Time Warner, Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 773 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Pani v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, 152 F.3d 67, 71 (2d Cir. 1998) (in evaluating motions to dismiss, a court must limit its review to the allegations contained within the four corner's of the complaint).

A. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint

The Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (" PLRA"), provides: "No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 . . . or any other federal law . . . by a prisoner . . . until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." Complaints filed under § 1983 are to be dismissed if prisoners have failed to exhaust administrative remedies. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 742, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001). Furthermore, "the PLRA's exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong."Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002).

A three-part inquiry is appropriate in cases where a plaintiff challenges defendants' contention that plaintiff failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies pursuant to the PLRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). First, depending on the inmate's explanation for the alleged failure to exhaust, the court must ask whether administrative remedies were in fact "available" to the prisoner. See Abney v. McGinnis, 380 F.3d 663, 2004 WL 1842647 (2d Cir. 2004). The court must then assess whether the defendants may have forfeited the affirmative defense of non-exhaustion by failing to raise or preserve it, see Johnson v. Testman, 380 F.3d 691, 2004 WL 1842669 (2d Cir. 2004), or whether the defendants' own actions inhibiting the inmate's exhaustion of remedies may estop one or more defendants from raising the plaintiff's failure to exhaust as a defense.See Ziemba v. Wezner, 366 F.3d 161, 163 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam). If the court finds that administrative remedies were available to the plaintiff, and that the defendants are permitted to assert a non-exhaustion defense, the court should consider whether "special circumstances" have been plausibly alleged that justify "the prisoner's failure to comply with administrative procedural requirements." Giano v. Goord, 380 F.3d 670, 2004 WL 1842652 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Berry v. Kerik, 366 F.3d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 2003)).

The dispute between the parties concerns whether special circumstances have been plausibly alleged that justify plaintiff's failure to comply with administrative procedural requirements. Plaintiff concedes that had such remedies been available to him and were not utilized by him, his Section 1983 claims would be barred under the PLRA. Plaintiff alleges, however, that he was rendered unconscious and then comatose by the denial of the seizure medication and that upon regaining consciousness, he was in such a physically and mentally debilitated state that he could not make use of these administrative procedures. He claims that he "did not have access to his jail records to ascertain the time his sentence would expire, nor was he in physical or mental condition to file an administrative grievance at any time prior to the expiration of his sentence, and his release from custody, when the grievance process . . . was no longer available to him." Id., ¶ 42. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint alleges he was detained at Rikers Island on September 27, 1998 and released from custody on or about November 17, 1998.

As an initial matter, the record fails to support plaintiff's assertion that he was physically and mentally incapable of filing an administrative claim. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint alleges that he "came to be detained on criminal charges at Rikers Island" on September 27, 1998. After he was allegedly denied his medication, "[o]ver the course of four days, [he] experienced fourteen seizures." Id. ¶ 13. He "lost consciousness, and woke up in the jail infirmary." Id. ¶ 15. While he was in the infirmary, "a nurse accused him of faking, and struck him, at which point he again lost consciousness." Id., ¶ 17. He alleges that "[w]hen [he] woke up, three weeks later, he had been transferred to Bellevue Hospital Center" and learned that while he was unconscious, "he had missed four court appearances." Id. ¶¶ 19-20. He claims that "[a]t the time [he] regained consciousness at Bellevue Hospital Center, he was in such a debilitated mental and physical state that he could not walk, and could not remember his own home telephone number." Id. ¶ 20. "In or about mid-October, 1998, [he] was transferred from Bellevue Hospital Center back to the North Infirmary Command at Rikers Island." Id., ¶ 34. Following this transfer, plaintiff "was brought back to court and was sentenced to a term of ninety days." Id., ¶ 35. According to his New York State Identification ("NYSID") record, plaintiff pled guilty and was sentenced on November 4, 1998. He "remained [at Rikers] through the date of his sentence on a guilty plea to a term of ninety days, and his release from custody on or about November 17, 1998." Id. ¶ 21.

Plaintiff's proposed second amended complaint, however, is devoid of any facts that support his conclusory allegations that he was in no "physical or mental condition to file an administrative grievance at any time prior to the expiration of his sentence, and his release from custody." Id., ¶ 42. Although he was physically unable to file a grievance during the three weeks he claims he was unconscious, plaintiff has provided no facts to explain why he was unable to exhaust once he regained consciousness. Plaintiff was conscious for the first four days he was in custody and after, when he woke up in the Rikers Island infirmary. Moreover, the record clearly shows that plaintiff was conscious from the time he awoke in Bellevue until he was transferred back to Rikers Island in or about mid-October, 1998. He remained conscious through his guilty plea on November 4, 1998 and his release date on November 17, 1998. Indeed, the complaint indicates that plaintiff appeared before the court on his state criminal case, knowingly and voluntarily entered a guilty plea and was sentenced. Under New York law, if he was as debilitated as he claims, he could not have entered a guilty plea or been sentenced. See People v. Alexander, 97 N.Y.2d 482, 485, 743 N.Y.S.2d 45, 47 (2002).

Furthermore, even if plaintiff was debilitated during much of the time he was incarcerated, courts have found a failure to attempt to file any grievance is insufficient to waive the exhaustion requirement. See Parker v. Adjetey, 89 Fed.Appx. 886, 2004 WL 330866, *1 (5th Cir. 2004) (dismissing plaintiff's complaint for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies, despite plaintiff's claim that he was hospitalized and in a coma because when he recovered, he did not attempt to file a grievance, even though the grievance would have been untimely); see also Ferrington v. La. Dep't of Corrs., 315 F.3d 5239, 532 (5th Cir. 2002) (rejecting claim of exhaustion based on plaintiff's alleged blindness). There is no evidence that plaintiff ever attempted to seek any relief through the grievance process. In Giano v. Goord, 380 F.3d 670, which set the "special circumstances" exception, plaintiff made some attempt at redress through the grievance process, but was rebuffed because he failed to follow the specific grievance procedure to the letter. In contrast, plaintiff in the present case has offered no facts, except his own unsupported conclusory allegations, to support his contention that he was unable to follow administrative procedures to exhaust his grievance remedies.

Additionally, plaintiff alleges that he was detained for several days after the expiration of his sentence in violation of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff's NYSID shows that he was arrested on September 26, 1998. He pled guilty on November 4, 1998 to a ninety day sentence. Although plaintiff alleges that his release on November 17, 1998 was days beyond the period he should have served, had plaintiff served sixty days of his ninety day sentence, his release date would not have been before in or around November 25, 1998. Plaintiff's belated claim that he was held longer than he should have been is both insufficient and inherently inconsistent with the record upon which he relies to state a cause of action. Plaintiff's claim is therefore dismissed. Compare Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099 (3d Cir. 1989) (finding in favor of plaintiff who was held beyond the expiration of his prison term where there was evidence of deliberate indifference on the part of senior records clerk and where plaintiff, seeking to correct the mistake, informed prison officials of the mistake).

Plaintiff's motion to file a Second Amended Complaint is DENIED. Plaintiff submitted his original complaint and two proposed amended complaints without any factual allegations which would excuse his failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. The Second Amended Complaint is futile in that it fails to allege that plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies.

B. Rule 11 Sanctions

Defendants have moved for Sanctions pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 based on plaintiff's first motion for leave to amend his complaint. Rule 11(b) provides in relevant part:

By presenting to the court . . . a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances . . . the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law . . . [and that] the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery. Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(b). If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines that the standards set forth in section (b) have been violated, the court may impose sanctions upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(c).

A pleading, motion or other paper violates Rule 11 either when it "has been interposed for any improper purpose, or where, after reasonable inquiry, a competent attorney could not form a reasonable belief that the pleading is well-grounded in fact and warranted by existing law. . . ."W.K. Webster Co. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 32 F.3d 665, 670 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Sanctions should only be imposed "where it is patently clear that a claim has absolutely no chance of success." Healey v. Chelsea Res., Ltd., 947 F.2d 611, 626 (2d Cir. 1991) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

In determining whether a Rule 11 violation has occurred, the court should use an objective standard of reasonableness. See MacDraw, Inc. v. CIT Group Equip. Fin., Inc., 73 F.3d 1253, 1257-58 (2d Cir. 1992) (internal citation omitted). Whether the attorney's conduct was reasonable should be determined without the benefit of hindsight, based on what was objectively reasonable to believe at the time the pleading, motion or other paper was submitted. See Kamen v. AT T, 791 F.2d 1006, 1011-12 (2d Cir. 1986). "Thus, what constitutes a reasonable inquiry may depend on such factors as how much time for investigation was available to the signer; whether he had to rely on a client for information as to the facts underlying the pleading, motion or other paper; whether the pleading, motion or other paper was based on a plausible view of the law; or whether he depended on forwarding counsel or another member of the bar." Id. at 1012. In addition, attorneys are entitled to rely on the objectively reasonable representations of their clients. See Hadges v. Yonkers Racing Corp., 48 F.3d 1320, 1329-30 (2d Cir. 1995). All doubts must be resolved in favor of the signer of the pleading. See Rodick v. City of Schenectady, 1 F.3d 1341, 1350 (2d Cir. 1993) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

The Supreme Court has cautioned that Rule 11 "must be read in light of concerns that it will . . . chill vigorous advocacy." Cooter Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990); see also MacDraw, Inc., 73 F.3d at 1259. "[J]udges should always reflect seriously upon the nuances of the particular case, and the implications the case has on the nature of the legal representation, before imposing sanctions." Thompson v. Duke, 940 F.2d 192, 195 (7th Cir. 1991).

Defendants' Rule 11 motion is denied. The Court finds that there was a reasonable basis for plaintiff's counsel to have believed that Goldenberg's allegations were grounded in fact when he filed the initial complaint as well as the motions to amend.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is ordered that defendants' motion to dismiss is granted and plaintiff's complaint is dismissed. Plaintiff's initial motion to amend his complaint is denied as moot. Defendants' motion for sanctions pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 is denied. Plaintiff's second motion to amend is also denied.

SO ORDERED.