Opinion
2:20-cv-02506-RMG-MGB
08-05-2021
Brian L. Glidden, Plaintiff, v. Ted Smith and Scarlett Wilson, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Brian L. Glidden (“Plaintiff”), a state detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights to due process and a speedy trial, among other things. Under 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review the Complaint and to submit a recommendation to the United States District Judge. For the following reasons, the undersigned recommends that this action be summarily dismissed, without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a detainee at the Al Cannon Detention Center with several criminal charges pending before the Charleston County General Sessions Court. Records indicate that Plaintiff was arrested on or around June 28, 2019, for sexual exploitation of a minor in both the second and third degree. Plaintiff claims that following his arrest, his public defender Ted Smith (“Smith”)
The undersigned takes judicial notice of the records filed in Plaintiff's underlying criminal cases, Case Nos. 2019A1010203409-14. See Charleston County Public Index, https://jcmsweb.charlestoncounty.org/PublicIndex/ (search limited to Plaintiff's name) (last visited August 2, 2021); see also Aloe Creme Labs., Inc. v. Francine Co., 425 F.2d 1295, 1296 (5th Cir. 1970) (explaining that a federal court may take judicial notice of the contents of its own records, as well as those records of other courts); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989); Tisdale v. South Carolina Highway Patrol, No. 0:09-cv-1009-HFF-PJG, 2009 WL 1491409, at *1 n.1 (D.S.C. May 27, 2009), aff'd, 347 Fed.Appx. 965 (4th Cir. Aug. 27, 2009) (noting that the court may also take judicial notice of factual information located in postings on government web sites).
conspired with Solicitor Scarlett Wilson (“Wilson”) (collectively, “Defendants”) to violate his constitutional rights to due process and a speedy trial by failing to promptly indict him as required under S.C. Code § 17-23-90. (See Dkt. No. 1-1 at 2-3, alleging that Smith conspired with the State by allowing Plaintiff's claims to “go un-indicted” and failing to move for dismissal; see also Dkt. No. 12 at 5-6, 14-15.) Based on the above, Plaintiff asks that the Court vacate the criminal charges pending against him and release him from the detention center. (Dkt. No. 1 at 6; Dkt. No. 1-1; Dkt. No. 12 at 6.) As of the date of this Report and Recommendation, it appears Plaintiff has yet to be indicted.
Specifically, SC Code § 17-23-90 provides that,
If any person committed for treason or felony, plainly and specially expressed in the warrant of commitment, upon his prayer or petition in open court the first week of the term to be brought to his trial shall not be indicted some time in the next term after such commitment, the judge of the circuit court shall, upon motion made in open court the last day of the term either by the prisoner or anyone in his behalf, set at liberty the prisoner upon bail, unless it appear to him, upon oath made, that the witnesses for the State could not be produced at the same term. And if any person committed as aforesaid, upon his prayer or petition in open court the first week of the term to be brought to his trial, shall not be indicted and tried the second term after his commitment or upon his trial shall be acquitted, he shall be discharged from his imprisonment.See also State v. Hunsberger, 418 S.C. 335, 341 n.3 (2016) (explaining that § 17-23-90 provides release where the State fails to prosecute the accused within a certain timeframe).
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
After reviewing Plaintiff's Complaint in the instant case (Case No. 2:20-cv-02506), the undersigned issued an order notifying Plaintiff that his pleading was subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim. (Dkt. No. 6.) The undersigned provided Plaintiff an opportunity to cure the deficiencies in his pleading by filing an amended complaint. Around this same time, however, Plaintiff initiated a separate civil action (Case No. 2:20-cv-02973) against Defendants Smith and Wilson alleging claims almost identical to those raised in Case No. 2506. Thus, for purposes of judicial efficiency, the undersigned issued an order consolidating the two actions under Case No. 2506 pursuant to Rule 42(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Dkt. No. 10.) The undersigned then gave Plaintiff an additional opportunity to file an amended complaint and resolve the pleading deficiencies identified in his filings. (Id. at 2.) The order warned Plaintiff that failure to file an amended complaint or cure the pleading deficiencies within twenty-one days would result in summary dismissal. (Id.) To date, Plaintiff has not filed any amended pleading or factual allegations, and the time to comply with the undersigned's order has lapsed.
The undersigned informed Plaintiff that the Court would proceed with his consolidated allegations under Case No. 2506 and instructed the Clerk of Court to add Plaintiff's pleading from Case No. 2973 to the docket so that the two complaints could be considered together. (See Dkt. Nos 1, 12.) The undersigned instructed Plaintiff to submit any future filings under Case No. 2506, and Case No. 2973 was eventually closed by the Clerk of Court.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. This action also falls under the purview of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which allows a detainee like Plaintiff to seek “redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). To protect against possible abuses, these statutes charge the court with dismissing such prisoner complaints, or portions thereof, that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b).
As to failure to state a claim, a complaint filed in federal court must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). In order to satisfy this standard, a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that the court need not accept as true a complaint's legal conclusions). Rather, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” See Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When “it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations, ” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), the complaint fails to state a claim.
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is therefore charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim under Rule 8(a)(2). See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390- 91 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”). Such is the case here.
DISCUSSION
As noted above, Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated his constitutional rights to due process and a speedy trial by failing to promptly indict him as required under S.C. Code § 17-23-90. The Complaint therefore asserts that the Court should dismiss Plaintiff's pending criminal charges and release him from Al Cannon Detention Center. For the reasons set forth below, these allegations fail to state a plausible claim to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
I. Plaintiff's Claims Are Barred by the Younger Abstention Doctrine
In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the United States Supreme Court held that a federal court should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings “except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances.” Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996). Specifically, the Younger Court noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44. From Younger and its progeny, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: “(1) there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings.” Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).
In the instant case, the first criterion is met because Plaintiff is plainly involved in ongoing state criminal proceedings. See Boyd v. South Carolina, No. 1:11-cv-02981-TMC-SVH, 2012 WL 786341, at *2 (D.S.C. Feb. 10, 2012), adopted, 2012 WL 786356 (D.S.C. Mar. 9, 2012) (noting the first prong of the abstention test is satisfied where the plaintiff “is currently awaiting trial in an ongoing state criminal proceeding”). The second criterion is also met, as the Supreme Court has explained that “States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief.” Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). And finally, the third criterion is satisfied because Plaintiff can address his claims in his pending criminal proceedings. Gilliam, 75 F.3d at 904 (referencing Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975)) (noting that “ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights”). Because Plaintiff's case meets all three criteria for abstention under Younger, federal relief is available under § 1983 only if “special circumstances” justify the provision of federal review. Dickerson v. Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220, 224- 26 (5th Cir. 1987).
As the undersigned explained in the proper form orders, Plaintiff has not shown the type of extreme misconduct or extraordinary circumstances that would warrant federal interference in a pending state criminal case. (See Dkt. No. 6 at 2-3; Dkt. No. 10 at 2-3.) While “special circumstances” lacks any precise, technical meaning, courts have essentially looked to whether procedures exist which would protect a plaintiff's constitutional rights without pretrial intervention; thus, where a threat to the plaintiff's rights may be remedied by an assertion of an appropriate defense in state court, no special circumstance is shown. See Askins v. Dir. of Florence Cty. Det. Ctr., No. 9:20-cv-02846-DCC-MHC, 2020 WL 7001015, at *2 (D.S.C. Sept. 3, 2020), adopted, 2020 WL 6110960 (D.S.C. Oct. 16, 2020) (referencing Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 449 (3d Cir. 1975)). Further, where the right may be adequately preserved by orderly post-trial relief, special circumstances are likewise nonexistent. Id. Accordingly, a federal court should generally abstain from considering a speedy trial claim at the pretrial stage because such concerns can be raised at trial and on direct appeal. Id.
Plaintiff's claim is no different here; because he can pursue his claims in state court both during and after trial, he fails to demonstrate any “special circumstances” or irreparable injury if denied his requested relief. See, e.g., id. at *2-3; see also Bennekin v. Baugh, No. 4:14-cv-4004, 2014 WL 6909017, at *3 (D.S.C. Dec. 8, 2014) (finding that plaintiff was not foreclosed from raising delayed indictment claim and having it ruled on “by the state court judge in his on-going state criminal prosecution”); Tyler v. South Carolina, No. 9:12-cv-260-RMG-BM, 2012 WL 988601, at *3 (D.S.C. Feb. 22, 2012), adopted, 2012 WL 988596 (D.S.C. Mar. 22, 2012) (dismissing pro se plaintiff's claims seeking speedy trial under S.C. Code § 17-23-90 based on the Younger abstention doctrine).
II. Release from Custody Is Unavailable Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Next, it is well established that release from jail is not a proper remedy in a civil rights case. Rather, such relief may be sought only in a habeas corpus action. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994) (stating that “habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983”); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487-88 (1973) (explaining a challenge to the duration of confinement is within the core of habeas corpus). Thus, as the undersigned previously warned, Plaintiff's request for immediate release from the Al Cannon Detention Center is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and this action is therefore subject to summary dismissal. (See Dkt. No. 6 at 3; Dkt. No. 10 at 3.) See, e.g., El v. Fornandes, No. 2:19-cv-3045-RMG-MGB, 2019 WL 7900140, at *4 (D.S.C. Nov. 22, 2019), adopted, 2019 WL 6712057 (D.S.C. Dec. 10, 2019) (“Release from pretrial detention is simply not an available remedy in a § 1983 action.”); Hamilton v. Ninth Jud. Cir. Ct. of Charleston Cty., No. 2:17-cv-921-MBS-MGB, 2017 WL 2373217, at *4 (D.S.C. May 3, 2017), adopted, 2017 WL 2362387 (D.S.C. May 31, 2017) (same); Tyler, 2012 WL 988601, at *2-3 (same).
III. Defendants Are Not Liable Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Even if the Court determines that Plaintiff's claims are cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff's allegations against Defendants Smith and Wilson are still subject to summary dismissal for several reasons.
A. Defendant Smith
To state a claim to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege that a right secured by the Constitution was violated “by a person acting under the color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). A public defender, like Defendant Smith, generally “does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.” Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981); see also Hall v. Quillen, 631 F.2d 1154, 1156 (4th Cir. 1980) (concluding a court-appointed attorney was entitled to dismissal of the plaintiff's § 1983 claim against him for want of state action). As an exception to this general rule, however, a public defender may be subject to suit if he engages in “conspiratorial action with state officials.” Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 921 (1984). Although Plaintiff's Complaint does assert that Defendant Smith conspired with the State, he offers very few factual allegations in support thereof. Rather, Plaintiff simply states that Defendants “let the charges go un-indicted” and Defendant Smith “failed to quash the charges in a motion.” (See Dkt. No. 1-1 at 2.) As the undersigned noted in the proper form orders, such bare allegations-without more-are insufficient to trigger the conspiracy exception here. (Dkt. No. 6 at 3; Dkt. No. 10 at 3.) See Howell v. Gustafson, No. 5:17-cv-1297-JFA-TER, 2017 WL 9289375, at *5 (D.S.C. June 27, 2017), adopted, 2017 WL 3887159 (D.S.C. Sept. 6, 2017) (“The naked assertion of a conspiracy without supporting operative facts establishing an agreement between the defense attorney and the prosecutor or some other state actor, and a common plan to put the agreement into effect, is insufficient to implicate § 1983 liability.”); see also Simpson v. Florence Cty. Complex Solicitor's Office, No. 4:19-cv-03095-JMC, 2019 WL 7288801, at *3 n.2 (D.S.C. Dec. 30, 2019) (dismissing pro se complaint where plaintiff's conspiracy allegations were conclusory). Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Smith are therefore subject to summary dismissal.
B. Defendant Wilson
With respect to Solicitor Wilson, a person acting under color of state law can be held liable under § 1983 only if he or she was personally involved in the deprivation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Wilcox v. Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2017). Accordingly, the doctrines of vicarious liability and respondeat superior generally are not applicable in § 1983 actions. See Polk, 454 U.S. at 325 (noting that “Section 1983 will not support a claim based on a respondeat superior theory of liability”); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”). Here, there is no indication that Defendant Wilson was personally involved in Plaintiff's arrest or the subsequent prosecution of his underlying criminal case. (See Dkt. No. 1-1 at 3 referring to Defendant Wilson as the “Head Solicitor.”) Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff is attempting to hold Defendant Wilson liable in her supervisory capacity as the Solicitor of the Ninth Judicial Circuit, any such claims are likely subject to dismissal.
See Charleston County Public Index, https://jcmsweb.charlestoncounty.org/PublicIndex/ (search limited to Plaintiff's name) (last visited August 2, 2021) (listing Jennifer Stevens Wells for the State in Case Nos. 2019A1010203409-14).
Notwithstanding the above, the undersigned further notes that even if Defendant Wilson participated to some extent in Plaintiff's arrest, any involvement would be protected from damages under the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity. Prosecutors, when acting within the scope of their duties, are entitled to absolute immunity from personal liability under § 1983 for alleged civil rights violations committed in the course of “activities intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976); Dababnah v. Keller-Burnside, 208 F.3d 467, 468 (4th Cir. 2000). Any involvement in the decision to charge Plaintiff in the underlying criminal actions was intricately related to the criminal judicial process and is therefore protected from damages under the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity. See, e.g., Safar v. Tingle, 859 F.3d 241, 249 (4th Cir. 2017) (finding that a “prosecutor's decision to seek an arrest warrant is protected by absolute immunity”); Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 340-43 (2009) (noting that absolute immunity applies when a prosecutor prepares to initiate a judicial proceeding); Black v. Hammers, No. 3:19-cv-00582, 2019 WL 4875318, at *3 (S.D. W.Va. Sept. 11, 2019), adopted, 2019 WL 4877369 (S.D. W.Va. Oct. 2, 2019) (applying prosecutorial immunity where plaintiff accused defendants of interfering with his right to a speedy trial).
Although Plaintiff appears to seek injunctive relief only, the undersigned addresses possible monetary damages in an abundance of caution.
IV. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over Plaintiff's Remaining State Law Claims
Although not entirely clear, Plaintiff appears to allege-or at the very least, alludes to-a possible cause of action under S.C. Code § 17-23-90 for Defendants' purported failure to prosecute his criminal charges in a timely manner. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 6; Dkt. No. 1-1 at 3; Dkt. No. 12 at 5, 14.) However, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, meaning they possess only that power authorized by Article III of the United States Constitution and affirmatively granted by federal statute. Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 136-37 (1992); In re Bulldog Trucking, Inc., 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1998). Pursuant to this limited power, there are two primary bases for original federal jurisdiction: (1) “diversity of citizenship, ” under 28 U.S.C. § 1332; and (2) “federal question, ” under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
If a federal district court has original jurisdiction over a civil action, it shall also have supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims that are “so related” to the claims under the court's original jurisdiction “that they form part of the same case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). On the other hand, without original jurisdiction, a federal court generally cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims. See Id. § 1367(c)(3) (stating that the district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims if it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (stating that “if the federal claims are dismissed . . ., the state claims should be dismissed as well”); see also Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 655 (4th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he Constitution does not contemplate the federal judiciary deciding issues of state law among non-diverse litigants.”). As discussed above, Plaintiff's federal claims are subject to summary dismissal. The undersigned therefore finds that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over any remaining state law causes of action and recommends that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the same.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that this action be summarily dismissed in its entirety without prejudice and without issuance and service of process at this time.Moreover, the Court has already provided Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his Complaint and he failed to do so, despite being apprised of the consequences. (Dkt. Nos. 6, 10.) Therefore, the undersigned also RECOMMENDS that the Court dismiss this action without further leave to amend. See Workman v. Morrison Healthcare, 724 Fed.Appx. 280, 281 (4th Cir. June 4, 2018) (explaining that, where the district court has already afforded a plaintiff with the opportunity to amend, the district court, in its discretion, can either afford plaintiff an additional opportunity to file an amended complaint or dismiss the complaint).
A dismissal based on the Younger abstention doctrine should be issued without prejudice. See Brown v. Sumter Cty., No. 1:20-cv-3076-MGL-SVH, 2020 WL 6384639, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 30, 2020); see also Carter v. Norfolk Cmty. Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., 761 F.2d 970, 974 (4th Cir. 1985) (explaining that dismissal for failure to state a claim is presumed to be with prejudice unless the court specifically orders dismissal without prejudice, which is within the district court's discretion).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).