Summary
reversing summary judgment in a defamation action because the defense of truth presents a question of fact to be determined by the jury
Summary of this case from Young v. KopchakOpinion
No. 83-2858.
July 3, 1984. Rehearing Denied September 7, 1984.
Appeal from the Circuit Court, Dade County, Moie Tendrich, J.
Frederick C. Sake, Miami, for appellant.
Paige Catlin and William M. Tuttle, II, Miami, for appellee.
Before HUBBART, NESBITT and BASKIN, JJ.
In a defamation action, the affirmative defenses of truth, good motive and qualified privilege present factual questions for resolution by the jury. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Fraser, 209 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1954); Lewis v. Evans, 406 So.2d 489 (Fla.2d DCA 1981); Drennen v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 328 So.2d 52 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). Because appellant asserted these defenses, we find that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. Holl v. Talcott, 191 So.2d 40 (Fla. 1966).
Reversed and remanded.