Summary
declining to "infer constructive notice of loss of consortium claims from one single Form 95 that facially refers only to the spouse's injury"
Summary of this case from Diawara v. United StatesOpinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-CV-1697
December 16, 2003
MEMORANDUM
Cleofeel Gland, a/k/a Yvonne Gland, ("Plaintiff) brought this action against the United States of America under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq., both on behalf of her deceased husband's estate and on her own behalf. Plaintiff claims that employees at a federal detention center in Philadelphia negligently failed to provide needed and prescribed medical treatment to her late husband, Clarence Gland, while he was incarcerated. Clarence Gland later died, allegedly due to this failure to treat him.
Presently before the Court is the Government's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs claims asserted "in her own right" — i.e., all claims not on behalf of Clarence Gland's estate — for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on Plaintiffs alleged failure to file first an administrative claim with the Federal Bureau of Prisons. For the reasons which follow, the Government's motion is granted.
I. Legal Standard
The Government has moved to dismiss Cleofeel Gland's claims asserted "in her own right" for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defining the pending motion is of importance because on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the plaintiff bears the burden of persuading the Court that subject matter jurisdiction exists. Kehr Packages. Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991). Because her complaint implicates the Federal Tort Claims Act, Cleofeel Gland must demonstrate, in order to establish subject matter jurisdiction, that, prior to filing suit, she first exhausted her administrative remedies as to each claim. E.g., Danowski v. United States, 924 F. Supp. 661, 665 (D.N.J. 1996). It is uncontested that Plaintiff, as the administratrix of Clarence Gland's estate, exhausted the available administrative remedies vis-a-vis the survivor claim on behalf of the estate. The parties dispute whether Plaintiff had exhausted her administrative remedies as to those claims presented "in her own right" before filing her complaint.
The Government also moved in the alternative for partial summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56. Because the parties have neither filed additional affidavits nor engaged in discovery, this Court believes partial summary judgment would be premature. See, e.g., Schwartzman v. Carmen, 995 F. Supp. 574, 575 n. 1 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (choosing not to interpret a similar motion as a motion for summary judgment where the parties sought to resolve a jurisdictional disagreement and not to receive adjudication on the merits). Hence, this Court will regard Defendant's Motion as a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12, and will base its opinion solely on the pleadings and documents attached thereto.
II. Analysis
As a sovereign, the United States is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued. Under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), the United States has consented to be sued for torts committed by its employees acting within the scope of their employment, provided that would-be litigants first satisfy certain procedural preconditions. The FTCA requires that a claimant exhaust her administrative remedies before bringing suit in federal court:
An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States for money damages for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, unless the claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by the agency in writing and sent by certified or registered mail. The failure of any agency to make final disposition of a claim within six months after it is filed shall, at the option of the claimant anytime thereafter, be deemed a final denial of the claim for purposes of this section. . . .28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). Given that the FTCA constitutes a limited waiver of the sovereign immunity of the United States, this Court strictly construes the Act's provisions. Pascale v. United States, 998 F.2d 186, 193 (3d Cir. 1993). No exceptions to the filing requirement are to be implied from the FTCA. Klimaszewski v. United States, No. 96-7093, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4677, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 1997). This exhaustion requirement is a jurisdictional prerequisite that cannot be waived.Bialowas v. United States, 443 F.2d 1047, 1049 (3d Cir. 1971).
In order for this or any federal district court later to have subject matter jurisdiction over an FTCA claim, the claimant must first submit "an independent and separate claim to the appropriate federal agency for review and possible settlement." Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Nat'l Assoc. of Flood Insurers, 520 F.2d 11, 23 (3d Cir. 1975). Before pursuing relief from this Court regarding those claims asserted "in her own right," Plaintiff needed first to attempt settlement negotiations with the Federal Bureau of Prisons, the appropriate administrative agency, via a standardized administrative form ("Form 95"). 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). This Court will dismiss Plaintiff's claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction if it is clear on the face of the pleadings that Plaintiff has not exhausted her administrative remedies via the Form 95. Dugan v. Coastal Indus., Inc., 96 F. Supp.2d 481, 485 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
The wrinkle in the instant case is that while Plaintiff asserts multiple claims, she submitted only one Form 95 to the Federal Bureau of Prisons. Where multiple claims are asserted on a single claim form, the form must give "constructive notice" of each additional claim, or else the extra claims will later be dismissed for failure to exhaust; "constructive notice" is notice sufficient to warrant investigation.Dondero v. United States, 775 F. Supp. 144, 148 (D. Del. 1991). The parties agree that Plaintiff, as the administratrix of Clarence Gland's estate, asserted a proper survivor claim under the FTCA. Notwithstanding, because a survivorship claim is separate and distinct from those claims Plaintiff would assert on her own behalf (e.g., wrongful death and loss of consortium), Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the single claim form submitted to the Federal Bureau of Prisons gave constructive notice of the several causes of action. Frantz v. United States, 791 F. Supp. 445 (D. Del. 1992).
Under Pennsylvania law, death actions taken on behalf of the decedent and wrongful death actions undertaken by his survivors are separate causes of action. See, e.g. Groh v. Phila. Elec. Co., 271 A.2d 265, 269-70 (Pa. 1970). Under Pennsylvania law, a litigant's loss of consortium claim is a claim separate and individual from those claims asserted on behalf of the injured spouse. E.g., Nunamaker v. New Alexandria Bus Co., 88 A.2d 697, 699 (Pa. 1952).
The Government argues that it is clear on the face of the pleadings and exhibits attached thereto that the Form 95 only recounted the facts and injuries pertinent to the claims applicable to Clarence Gland's estate, and that Plaintiff failed to file an independent administrative claim for her personal injuries suffered consequent to her husband's death, e.g., wrongful death and loss of consortium. Therefore, the Government contends that the Federal Bureau of Prisons only had notice regarding the estate's claims, and only those claims have been properly preserved for judicial review via administrative exhaustion. Plaintiff responds that her Form 95 placed the Government on constructive notice that her private claims were simultaneously being submitted along with those claims peculiar to her husband's estate. Plaintiff attached to her complaint the Form 95 processed by the Federal Bureau of Prisons, and it is from this form that this Court must determine whether the Federal Bureau of Prisons had been given constructive notice that Plaintiff intended for her separate, individual claims to be considered alongside those claims of her late husband's estate.
Plaintiffs completed Form 95 is confusing and self-contradictory. The second question asks the name and address of both the claimant and the claimant's personal representative, if any. Instead of writing directly on the form itself, Plaintiffs response was typewritten on a separate sheet of paper, leading this Court to conclude that this response was a deliberate and intentional effort to identify the claimant. Plaintiff identified the claimant as the Estate of Clarence Gland, the claimant's representative as Joseph L. London, Esquire, and the appropriate mailing address as Mr. London's professional office. However, where the thirteenth question asks the "claimant" to sign the form, Plaintiff herself — and not Joseph L. London, Esquire, on behalf of the Estate of Clarence Gland — has clearly signed the document. In disposing of the Government's motion to dismiss, this Court must determine the legal consequences of this internal inconsistency by deciding, for instance: whether the combination constituted constructive notice of multiple claimants; whether only one "claimant" can be gleaned from the form as a whole; or whether the incompatibility negates both claimants from pursuing their respective claims.
This Court notes that Plaintiff signed as "Cleofeel Gland AKA Yvonne Gland." There appears to be more writing that follows her signature, bleeding over into the next box, but it is illegible. This Court can only speculate what Plaintiff wrote and how that additional writing could have influenced its decision regarding "constructive notice." See, e.g. Frantz, 791 F. Supp. at 451 ("This Court also believes that, even without legal training, an individual would understand the limiting effect of `Administratrix of the Estate of James Frantz' behind a signature. . . ."). Though, this Court will forgo this opportunity to speculate and will disregard the unintelligible scrawl, as whatever Plaintiff wrote is illegible on both copies of Form 95 submitted to the Court. See Form 95, Exh. C, Docket No. 1; Form 95, Exh. A, Docket No. 13. Moreover, Plaintiff acknowledges that her response to the thirteenth question was, presumably in its entirety, "Cleofeel Gland a/k/a Yvonne Gland." (PL's Opp'n Mem., Docket No. 13, at 2.)
In completing the Form 95, Plaintiff estimated the monetary worth of her claims; the personal injury claim brought on behalf of the estate was estimated as being worth $1,000,000, while the wrongful death claim brought by Plaintiff individually was estimated as being worth $1,500,000. Plaintiff argues that by stating a figure for her wrongful death claim, in addition to her signature, she provided the Government with sufficient constructive notice of any claim being asserted "in her own right." As any recovery pursuant to a successful wrongful death claim would accrue to a living recipient, Plaintiff contends that the Government should have realized that someone beyond the decedent's estate itself was submitting a claim and that Cleofeel Gland, having signed the form as claimant, would be that corporeal entity.
Most damaging to Plaintiffs efforts to retain her personal claims isFrantz v. United States, supra. While Frantz originates from another district court within the Third Circuit, this Court considers its facts highly similar to the instant case and its rationale persuasive. Frantz is factually different from the instant case in that multiple Forms 95 were submitted in that case whereas Plaintiff filed only one Form 95. Despite this surface disparity, one highly relevant common fact emerges: on every form submitted in Frantz, the decedent's estate was listed as the claimant (in response to the form's second question), even where his widow signed as claimant (in response to the form's thirteenth question). 791 F. Supp. at 451. InFrantz, a widow submitted a Form 95 as the administratrix of her late husband's estate, stating that the decedent suffered a wrongful death, the results of which were the emotional suffering and economic loss of his wife and children. Id. at 449. As is the situation in the instant case, the Form 95 in Frantz sought to recover in excess of $1,000,000 for personal injury and in excess of $1,000,000 for wrongful death. Id.
Like Cleofeel Gland in the instant case, the widow in Frantz argued that stating a figure for her wrongful death claim indisputably provided constructive notice that she was pursuing claims both on behalf of herself and her late husband's estate. In disagreement, the court held, "Mere reference to a related cause of action without more does not provide sufficient notice of multiple claims or claimants addressed on a single form, even when the claims arise from the same factual occurrence." 791 F. Supp. at 452. The tenth question on the form asks the signor to "State nature and extent of each injury or cause of death, which forms the basis of the claim. If other than claimant, state name of injured person or decedent." The claimant in Frantz provided a two-sentence response that described the "nature and extent" of the injury as the decedent's "wrongful death injury" and his survivors' emotional and financial loss. The court in Frantz found the claimant's response inadequate to provide constructive notice of claims being asserted by the decedent's survivors. Refusing to obligate federal agencies to parse every response in order to ferret out hidden claims, especially where the decedent was named as the claimant on the form, the court in Frantz concluded that the response was insufficient to notify the Government of claims asserted independent of the decedent's estate.Id. Nor did mentioning the survivors' anguish constitute constructive notice of their subsequent claims since emotional and financial loss accompanies every death and would not be sufficiently unusual to alert the agency to accompanying claims. Id.
Even if this Court were generously to review Plaintiffs response to the tenth question, the response still would not provide sufficient notice of any claims being asserted on Plaintiffs own behalf in light of Frantz. Plaintiffs response to question ten reads:
The decedent, Clarence Gland, was a federal prisoner who was very ill while in federal detention. He was in dire need of immediate and appropriate medical attention for significant and life threatening illnesses that were systematically ignored by the prison officials and medical personnel. He was in constant need of medication to monitor and control his blood pressure and to be brought immediately back to the hospital for follow-up care. Appropriate and necessary medical attention was never afforded to prisoner. Prison guards prohibited him from obtaining his necessary medication and from seeking the medical help he required. By the time he was eventually permitted to go to anyone, his condition was irreversible. The cause of death is attached hereto in the medical examiner's report.
However liberally this Court interprets this response, Plaintiff cannot explain away the fact that nowhere is she identified as a victim of negligence attributable to the Federal Government. Nowhere is there any reference, either express or implicit, to any injuries suffered personally by Plaintiff. Any injury inflicted by the alleged negligence of federal employees is discussed solely in the context of Clarence Gland himself. It stands to reason that if the widow's clearly mentioned economic and emotional suffering in Frantz did not constitute constructive notice of the spouse's separate claims, then Cleofeel Gland's response, from which Plaintiff is conspicuously absent, surely could not have provided constructive notice of her personal claims.
Nor would Plaintiffs response to the eighth question have provided constructive notice of claims being asserted on her own behalf, as this response identically fails to refer to Cleofeel Gland and her injuries. The eighth question asks, "Basis of Claim (State in detail the known the known [sic] facts and circumstances attending the damage, injury, or death, identifying persons and property involved, the place of occurrence and the cause thereof). . . ." Plaintiff responded as follows:
The decedent, Clarence Gland, was a federal prisoner who was very ill while in federal detention. He was in dire need of immediate and appropriate medical attention for the significant life threatening illnesses he had that needed constant medical monitoring and surgical intervention. He was not given his medication as needed to control his blood pressure and other significant medical problems and not permitted to return to hospital [sic] for surgery. By the time he was given medical care it was too late. He spent over a month in the Medical College of Pennsylvania until he eventually expired on January 1, 2001.
For similar reasons, Plaintiff's loss of consortium claim is jurisdictionally barred due to her failure to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit. See, e.g. Ryan v. United States, 457 F. Supp. 400 (W.D. Pa. 1978). "Loss of consortium is defined as a loss of services, society, and conjugal affection of one's spouse. A loss of consortium claim arises from the marital relationship and is premised on the loss of a spouse's services after injury." Nowosad v. Villanova Univ., No. 97-5881, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14502, at *9-10 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 1999) (citations omitted). Because of the need to enumerate facts and theories peculiar to the related but legally different causes of action, district courts generally have refused to infer constructive notice of loss of consortium claims from one single Form 95 that facially refers only to the spouse's injury. See, e.g. Dugan, supra. Plaintiffs meager efforts to distinguish Dugan from the instant case have not persuaded this Court to diverge from this precedent. Plaintiffs arguments against dismissal of her loss of consortium claim are further weakened by her failure to identify herself as Clarence Gland's widow on the Form 95. See, e.g. Klimaszewski, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4677, at *2-3 (holding that claimant's self-identification as "married" did not constitute constructive notice of his spouse's consequential loss of consortium claim). Review of Plaintiff's Form 95 reveals that Cleofeel Gland signed absent any explanation of her relationship to the decedent; the identical surnames hint of some relationship, but there is nothing conclusive or even indicative of a marital union. It stands to reason that if the claimant's clearly mentioned marital status in Klimaszewski did not constitute constructive notice of the spouse's loss of consortium claim, then Cleofeel Gland's indeterminate marital status surely could not have provided constructive notice.
Plaintiff argues that any self-contradictory information provided by her in Form 95 is justified considering that the "form itself is defective in design and does not specifically ask the appropriate questions." (PL's Opp'n Mem., Docket No. 13, at 3.) That is, even if this Court were to conclude that Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, Plaintiff would have this Court forgive the oversight because of the supposedly confounding standardized form. The plaintiff in Frantz, supra, unsuccessfully contended that her failure to satisfy exhaustion prerequisites was due in part to the defectively inscrutable Form 95. In its memorandum, the court wrote:
[T]he standard claim form is simple, short, and accompanied by clearly written instructions. It repeatedly uses the singular form of the terms `claim' and `claimant' and provides room for only one signature at the bottom of the front page, notifying the signor of the civil and criminal penalties for fraud. The regulations, cited on the reverse side of the form, and the instructions are also worded in the singular and the standard claim form gives every indication that the claim form is tailored for a single claimant.791 F. Supp. at 452. Having also concluded that Form 95 is straightforward and comprehensible, this Court adopts the rationale ofFrantz in its entirety and declines to find fault in Form 95.
In a last-ditch effort to salvage her claims, Plaintiff argues that those causes of action she asserts "in her own right" should survive because "[t]he government can show absolutely no prejudice since they knew who signed the form and they knew she was presenting claims on her behalf and on behalf of the estate by the questions propounded and answered." (Pl's Opp'n Mem., Docket No. 13, at 4.) This argument is unpersuasive.
Although the FTCA was not designed to defeat legitimate claims on the bases of mere technicalities, basic notice of the claim is not an insignificant technicality. The FTCA does not give this Court discretionary power to balance hardship between the parties or to excuse noncompliance with the jurisdictional prerequisites merely because the defendant has not been prejudiced.Frantz, 791 F. Supp. at 454 (citations omitted). Congress has authorized federal agencies to review claims such as those presented by Plaintiff and has chosen to withhold subject matter jurisdiction from those claimants who do not first attempt settlement with the relevant agency. Regardless whether omitting this step prejudices the Government in a subsequent trial, this Court is not empowered to act absent jurisdiction.
Perhaps Plaintiff could have made a more compelling "prejudice" argument had she contended that the "Re: line" in fact indicated that the Government was aware of and had considered the causes of action Plaintiff asserted on her own behalf. To wit, the "Re: line" states, "Administrative Tort Claim No. TRT-NER-2002-09871 On Behalf of Cleofeel Gland for Wrongful Death of Clarence Gland." (Letter from Sadowski to London of 11/14/02, at 1) (emphasis added). However, this argument falters when one considers that the body of the letter reveals that the agency communicated its belief that Cleofeel Gland served as administratrix of Clarence Gland's estate. "The authority you submitted still has not resolved whether your client [i.e., presumably, Cleofeel Gland] is the appropriate claimant on behalf of the estate." (Id.) (emphasis added).
III. Conclusion
"The importance of notice to create subject matter jurisdiction [in FTCA cases] is well-established and providing such notice is easy to do."Frantz, 791 F. Supp. at 455. As is her burden, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that adequate notice was given to the Government of those claims asserted on her own behalf. Therefore, all claims other than those advanced by the decedent's estate are jurisdictionally barred.
An appropriate order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 16th day of December, 2003, upon consideration of the Government's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Claims Asserted "In Her Own Right" or, Alternatively, for Partial Summary Judgment (Docket No. 10), it is hereby ORDERED that the Government's Motion is GRANTED. All claims Plaintiff asserts "in her own right" against the United States are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.