Summary
In Gene Slagle, Inc., v. Pub. Util. Comm., supra, at page 46, it was held that when an order of the commission changing utility rates has been reversed by this court for failing to adequately set forth the reasons prompting the decision, "the increased rates pursuant to such order could no longer be lawfully charged, and those rates in effect prior to the above order were reinstated by operation of law, and continued in effect until further order of the commission."
Summary of this case from Cleveland Elec. Illum. v. P.U.COpinion
No. 74-414
Decided January 29, 1975.
Telephone company — Application for rate increase approved — Supreme Court reversal and remand to set forth reasons — Former rates charged, when.
APPEAL from the Public Utilities Commission.
This matter arises out of a prior decision of this court involving appellees herein, General Telephone Company of Ohio and the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio.
On April 9, 1970, General Telephone filed an application with the commission for authority to increase its rates and charges. On August 17, 1971, the commission issued its opinion and order (case No. 36,476) approving a rate increase, but at a lower percentage than that sought by the company. However, due to federal orders pursuant to the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, the new rates were not effective until November 16, 1971.
Subsequent to the above order of the commission, General Telephone filed an appeal with this court. On June 21, 1972, this court reversed the order of the commission and stated in the syllabus that "* * * if the Public Utilities Commission has not set forth in its order the reasons prompting its decision in sufficient detail to enable the Supreme Court, upon appeal, to determine how the commission reached its decision, the order will be set aside * * *." General Telephone Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1972), 30 Ohio St.2d 271, 285 N.E.2d 34. The cause was therefore remanded to the commission, with instructions to set forth the reasons prompting its decision.
In compliance with that mandate, the commission re-issued its opinion and order on September 29, 1972. This order explained the commission's August 17, 1971, decision in greater detail, and had the effect of incorporating substantially all the findings of that determination. Thus, the commission authorized the same rates which it had previously granted, and which General Telephone had maintained since November 16, 1971.
On September 5, 1973, appellants filed a complaint with the commission, alleging, in part, that this court's decision in General Telephone Co., supra, reversed the commission's opinion and order of August 17, 1971, and therefore, the utility company should have reverted to charging those rates in effect prior to the November 16, 1971, increase. General Telephone's motion to dismiss the complaint was sustained, and appellants then filed an application for rehearing. After denial by the commission, appellants appealed to this court as a matter of right.
Messrs. Muldoon Pemberton and Mr. David L. Pemberton, for appellants.
Mr. William J. Brown, attorney general, Mr. Keith F. Henley and Mr. Marvin I. Resnik, for appellee Public Utilities Commission.
Messrs. Power, Jones Schneider, Mr. John Robert Jones and Mr. Andrew T. Jones, for appellee General Telephone Company of Ohio.
Where a public utility appeals a rate increase as being inadequate, and this court reverses the order which granted the increase and remands the cause to the Public Utilities Commission, with instructions to set forth the reasons prompting its decision, are the increased rates to be charged until compliance by the commission upon remand or must the rates be lowered to what they were before the increase?
R.C. 4903.09 provides, in part, that "[i]n all contested cases heard by the Public Utilities Commission, a complete record of all proceedings shall be made, including * * * findings of fact and written opinions setting forth the reasons prompting the decisions arrived at * * *." In General Telephone Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1972), 30 Ohio St.2d 271, 285 N.E.2d 34, this court agreed with General Telephone that the order in that case should be reversed because the commission had failed to sufficiently set forth the reasons prompting its decision, as mandated by R.C. 4903.09. The order was clearly unlawful. It follows, therefore, that General Telephone should not have continued to collect rates pursuant to an order which was unlawful and which had been reversed by this court.
Appellees contend, however, that even if the public utility could not continue to charge the increased rates established by the order, which was reversed in General Telephone, supra, it would be improper for the rates in effect prior to such order to be reinstated. Their assertion is based primarily upon the decision in Cincinnati Suburban Bell Telephone Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1923), 107 Ohio St. 370, 140 N.E. 86. In an effort to comprehend that case, however, attention must also be directed to Cincinnati v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1922), 105 Ohio St. 181, 137 N.E. 36. In viewing what transpired in those unusual cases, we do not consider them helpful in resolving the issue at hand. Furthermore, the reversal involved in those cases was ordered without any reason being given therefore. In General Telephone Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm., supra, the court specifically withheld consideration of the reasonableness of the rate ordered, placing the reversal upon the sole ground of a failure by the commission to observe the requirements of R.C. 4903.09. Cf. Cincinnati Suburban Bell Telephone Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm., supra.
It is our conclusion that when the order of August 17, 1971, was reversed by this court, the increased rates pursuant to such order could no longer be lawfully charged, and those rates in effect prior to the above order were reinstated by operation of law, and continued in effect until further order of the commission.
The order sustaining the motion to dismiss the complaint is unlawful and must be reversed.
Order reversed.
O'NEILL, C.J., HERBERT, CORRIGAN, STERN, CELEBREZZE and W. BROWN JJ., concur.