REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

CLINTON AVERITTE, Magistrate Judge

Plaintiff MICHAEL E. GEIGER, while a prisoner in the custody of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, filed suit pursuant to Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983 complaining against the above-named defendants and has been granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis. By this cause, plaintiff complains of his treatment by a multitude of prison officials since his transfer to the High Security section of the Clements Unit on July 16, 2000. A hearing was conducted July 9, 2002, in an attempt to determine exactly who plaintiff was attempting to sue and what claim(s) plaintiff was attempting to assert in this lawsuit.

By his original complaint, plaintiff initially requested punitive and compensatory damages of unspecified amounts and unspecified injunctive relief. By his January 28, 2002, amended complaint, plaintiff merely stated he wanted the Court "to enact any all relief and restitution for injuries afforded by law as well as criminal investigation for violation of Tx. Penal Code(s)".

JUDICIAL REVIEW

When a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or from an officer or employee of a governmental entity, the Court must evaluate the complaint and dismiss it without service of process, Ali v. Higgs, 892 F.2d 438, 440 (5th Cir. 1990), if it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The same standards will support dismissal of a suit brought under any federal law by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility, where such suit concerns prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1). A Spears hearing need not be conducted for every pro se complaint. Wilson v. Barrientos, 926 F.2d 480, 483 n. 4 (5th Cir. 1991)

The Magistrate Judge has reviewed plaintiff's pleadings to determine if his claims present grounds for dismissal or should proceed further.

THE LAW AND ANALYSIS

Plaintiff complains that, on July 16, 2000, he arrived at the Clements Unit from the Estelle Unit after being hog-tied for 12 hours nonstop and, upon arrival, was forced by PRICE, RICH, and DUFFY to remain on the bus with other inmates in temperatures in upper 90s for over 1-1/2 hours. Plaintiff says he was then forced to "scamper from the bus to the building hog-tied or be attacked. . . ." Plaintiff says on July 17, 2000, he and others were begging for medical treatment and requesting to see supervisors because they were "not being given medical assistance or allowed to shower to clean up blood and body waste" from the journey. Plaintiff also alleges personal property was withheld from the inmates that day.

Further, on July 17, 2000, when other prisoners refused to allow officers to close the food slot, a chemical agent was applied using what plaintiff described as an industrial outdoor fogger. Plaintiff states he has asthma. He says DUFFY and SHIELDS went from door to door spraying gas inside the cells and nurses BAKER and DUNN watched. Plaintiff further alleges defendants SHIELDS, SANCHEZ, and other officers forced plaintiff to strip, crawl out of his cell on his knees while others stood and laughed.

Title 42, United States Code, 1997e(a), as amended by Section 803 of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, provides that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions . . . by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." At the July 9, 2002, hearing, plaintiff stated he had submitted copies of his grievances to the Court with his original complaint. Review of the grievances submitted by plaintiff with the original complaint does not reveal any Step 2 grievance by plaintiff on these claims. It is clear plaintiff has not exhausted administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court and, thus, claims on these events are barred by Title 42, United States Code, section 1997(e)(a). By choosing to file and pursue suit before meeting the section 1997e exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement, plaintiff has sought relief to which he was not entitled. Underwood v. Wilson, 151 F.3d 292 (5th Cir. 1998). Consequently, these claims lack an arguable basis in law and are frivolous. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989).

Plaintiff further alleges that all sixty-one prisoners were written disciplinary cases on identical charges and demoted to level 3; plaintiff had been level 2. Plaintiff has exhausted a administrative remedies as to this incident; however, at the July 9, 2002 hearing, plaintiff informed the Court he did not lose any goodtime as a result of his disciplinary case. He stated his punishment was fifteen days of commissary and cell restriction and demotion from level 2 to level 3.

A prisoner has a liberty interest only in "freedom[s] from restraint . . . impos[ing] atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life," and these will normally consist of deprivations which clearly impinge on the duration of confinement. Orellana v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 31-32 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2294, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995)) Plaintiff has no federally-protected liberty interest in connection with the imposition of cell or commissary restriction; and the effect on the duration of his sentence that a reduction in class or level had upon his ability to earn goodtime credits is too speculative and too attenuated to invoke the procedural guarantees of the Due Process Clause. Luken v. Scott, 71 F.3d 192, 193 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995)). Consequently, this claim lacks an arguable basis in law and is frivolous. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989).

Plaintiff next alleges defendant DUFFY ordered that he be stripped and that defendant STUBBLEFIELD ordered all plaintiff's toiletries be removed from his cell. He says SHIELDS led a five-man team into his cell to strip him and his cell. He states he was left naked in the air conditioned cell for 3 or 4 days without toiletries or examination and was forced to sleep naked on a cold metal bunk. At the July 9, 2002 hearing, plaintiff was asked if he had exhausted administrative remedies and admitted he had not. It is clear plaintiff has not exhausted administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court and, thus, claims on these events are barred by Title 42, United States Code, section 1997(e)(a). By choosing to file and pursue suit before meeting the section 1997e exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement, plaintiff has sought relief to which he was not entitled. Underwood v. Wilson, 151 F.3d 292 (5th Cir. 1998). Consequently, these claims lack an arguable basis in law and are frivolous. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989).

Plaintiff alleges that, without sufficient evidence, defendant McCoy found him guilty of a disciplinary case for blocking his cell door. Plaintiff suffered commissary and cell restriction as a result. Plaintiff has no federally-protected liberty interest in connection with the imposition of cell or commissary restriction. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995)). Consequently, this claim lacks an arguable basis in law and is frivolous. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989).

During the July 9, 2002, hearing, plaintiff complained of retaliation saying his level was taken because he wanted to take ink pens and that he had an argument with an officer because he wanted to wear a religious ornament. Of course, enforcement by guards of strictures against the wearing of symbolic jewelry and the storage, transport, or use of property by inmates is a legitimate act to maintain security and order. It does not constitute retaliation of any kind. In his complaint, plaintiff alleged, in general terms, that, from August of 2000, he has been in constant and daily terror from guards who incite an inmate response so they can use chemical force. By his step 2 grievance on this issue, plaintiff makes clear that guards utilized chemical force on an entire cell block in response to noise created by some of the inmates and then placed the inmates on strip cell for four days, giving out disciplinary cases which resulted in another demotion for plaintiff. The instant case is similar to the claims asserted in Baldwin v. Stalder, 137 F.3d 836 (59 Cir. 1998), in which the Fifth Circuit found no violation of the Eighth Amendment when chemical force was used on a bus loaded with inmates, even though only one or two of the inmates was being disruptive and even though the inmates were then denied the ability to wash off the pepper spray. To the extent plaintiff is attempting to allege he received a false disciplinary case, he has not shown favorable termination of such case. Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1165 n. 16 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Ordaz v. Martin, 5 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 1993) (unpublished)). The Constitution guarantees due process, not error-free decision making. McCrae v. Hankins, 720 F.2d 863, 868 (5th Cir. 1983). Thus, plaintiff's claim(s) based on this incident lacks an arguable basis in law and is frivolous. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989).

Plaintiff next alleges he has been denied recreation and meals by various officers. Review of plaintiff s Step 2 grievance no. 2001124155 reveals plaintiff was not complying with security procedures concerning property storage because he felt officers were using the regulation as a way to avoid the work involved in taking him to recreation and because he interpreted the regulation in a way different from the interpretation of the guards. Plaintiff has alleged no harm he suffered as a result of the alleged denials. Further, he has alleged no fact to support his feeling of wrongful motivation by the guards. Regulations for the storage of property by prisoners in High Security before meals and before opening a cell door for transport to recreation have a firm basis in security and the need to maintain order. Guards are not required to interpret a regulation in the way most amenable to the inmate with whom they are dealing. Plaintiff's disagreement with prison regulations is not a valid basis for a 1983 lawsuit. Plaintiff's claim lacks an arguable basis in law and is, therefore, frivolous. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989).

Plaintiff alleges he was traumatized daily by these practices to the degree that he went on a food strike to get the administration's attention to various abuses in High Security, was chained out for a court appearance, and then returned in September 2000 at which time he was forced to undergo a strip search in the presence of recruits who were touring the facility at that time. When plaintiff protested, he was placed in a visitation cell for about one and one-half hours and subjected to threats and verbal abuse. It is clearly established that mere allegations of verbal abuse do not present an actionable section 1983 claim. Bender v. Brumley, 1 F.3d 271, 274 (5th Cir. 1993). Further, mere threatening language and gestures of a custodial officer do not amount to a constitutional violation. McFadden v. Lucas, 713 F.2d 143, 146 (5th Cir.); cert. denied, 464 U.S. 998, 104 S.Ct. 499, 78 L.Ed.2d 691 (1983) (quoting Coyle v. Hughs, 436 F. Supp. 591, 593 (W.D.Okla. 1977)). Moreover, plaintiff does not allege his strip search was conducted for any reason other than the standard security search before his admission back to High Security and he alleges no way his one and one-half hour confinement in a visitation cell constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Based on the foregoing, plaintiff has failed to state a claim against prison officials relating to this incident.

Plaintiff further alleges that, after going on a hunger strike, he refused to answer the questions put to him by Nurse Prior who then recommended his evaluation by the Psychology Department. Plaintiff alleges that, from May 17, 2001 to May 19, 2001 he was subjected to three days of "horror" when he was stripped naked and placed in cold cell, sleeping on metal bunk, with little food and threats from the guards, all during his psychological evaluation. Plaintiff feels he was wrongfully placed in 12 Bldg. for such evaluation. Plaintiff's own account of the incident shows he flatly refused to talk to the psychiatric nurse, Mrs. PRIOR. Although plaintiff states he answered questions earlier posed to him by another nurse from the clinic infirmary who was checking on his physical health, this does not mean he did not need to respond to PRIOR's questions to enable her to determine whether he was still able to make a rational choice concerning his ongoing hunger strike. Plaintiff alleges no fact to show that his referral for psychological evaluation was improper or that the conditions he endured during such evaluation were inappropriate in light of the fact that it was suspected that he presented a danger to himself. Plaintiff states that, after being evaluated by a psychologist, he was returned to High Security. Plaintiff's disagreement with the need for mental evaluation and the conditions in which he was confined during the mental evaluation amount simply to a disagreement over his mental health care. Not every claim of inadequate or improper medical treatment is a violation of the Constitution, Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105, 97 S.Ct. 285, 291, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976); nor does a disagreement over the method and result of medical treatment require a finding of deliberate indifference. Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985). Consequently, plaintiff's claim lacks an arguable basis in law and is frivolous. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989).

Plaintiff alleges harassment and intimidation from guards continues and, at the July 9, 2002 hearing, he argued that all the events in his complaint are "an accrued process" because he utilized the grievance procedure when he first arrived. To view plaintiff's complaint in the light he casts it would require the Court to accept, without any supporting allegation of material fact, that all of the defendants are engaged in a vast and ongoing conspiracy to retaliate against plaintiff merely for his utilization of the grievance process when he first arrived at the Clements Unit. Moreover, plaintiff has not identified the specific grievance he feels caused all these defendants to retaliate and has alleged no fact supporting the claimed retaliatory intent. He has, instead, alleged facts which demonstrate prison officials had valid, nonretaliatory reasons for the alleged denials of food and recreation, disciplinary cases, and referral of plaintiff for psychiatric evaluation. Conclusory allegations lacking reference to material facts are not sufficient to state a claim of conspiracy under section 1983, McAfee v. 5th Circuit Judges, 884 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1083, 110 S.Ct. 1141, 107 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1990); to support claims of malice, Al-Ra'id v. Ingle, 69 F.3d 28 (5th Cir. 1995); or to allege retaliation, Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1166 (5th Cir. 1995). By his conclusory allegations, plaintiff has failed to state a claim of conspiracy or retaliation on which relief can be granted.

Lastly, to the extent plaintiff is attempting to sue any of the defendants based on a failure to properly investigate or resolve his grievances or letters of complaint, inasmuch as the results of grievances or complaint letters have no bearing on the duration of plaintiff's confinement, the plaintiff cannot show the existence of a state-created liberty interest in an inmate grievance procedure and, therefore, cannot show any violation of federally-protected constitutional rights. See, Orellana v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 31-32 (5th Cir. 1995). Therefore, any claim in this respect lacks an arguable basis in law and is frivolous. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989).

CONCLUSION

Pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, sections 1915A and 1915(e)(2), as well as Title 42, United States Code, section 1997e(c)(1), it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge to the United States District Judge that the Civil Rights Complaint filed pursuant to Title 42, United States Code, section 1983, by plaintiff MICHAEL E. GEIGER BE DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE AS FRIVOLOUS AND FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM ON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED.

The United States District Clerk shall mail a copy of this Report and Recommendation to plaintiff and to each attorney of record by certified mail, return receipt requested. Any party may object to the proposed findings and to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order. Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and Rule 4(a)(1) of Miscellaneous Order No. 6, as authorized by Local Rule 3.1, Local Rules of the United States District Courts for the Northern District of Texas. Any such objections shall be in writing and shall specifically identify the portions of the findings, recommendation, or report to which objection is made, and set out fully the basis for each objection. Objecting parties shall file the written objections with the Clerk of the Court and serve a copy of such objections on the Magistrate Judge and on all other parties. The failure to timely file written objections to the proposed factual findings, legal conclusions, and the recommendation contained in this report shall bar an aggrieved party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the District Court. Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) ( en banc).

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.