RUSSELL LEACH, Judge.

On August 1, 1989, this matter came to trial before a referee of this court, Kevin P. Byers. On October 4, 1989, the referee issued a report wherein he found plaintiff's complaint lacked merit and thus recommended the cause be dismissed.

Civ.R. 53 states that "[a] party may, within fourteen days of the filing of the report, serve and file written objections to the referee's report." Plaintiff did not file an objection to said report.

Upon review of the record, and the referee's report, it is the court's finding that the referee was correct in his analysis of the issues and application of the law. Accordingly, this court adopts the referee's report and recommendation as its own. See Appendix.

The July 28, 1989 order awarding a $25 sanction against plaintiff is hereby VACATED.

Accordingly, the plaintiff's complaint is hereby DISMISSED. Costs shall be absorbed by the court.

Complaint dismissed.

RUSSELL LEACH, J., retired, of the Franklin County Municipal Court, sitting by assignment.

APPENDIX Referee's Report Issued October 4, 1989

KEVIN P. BYERS, Referee.

Plaintiff's original complaint was filed on December 5, 1985, and was voluntarily dismissed pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a) on October 13, 1987. On October 12, 1988, plaintiff refiled the complaint as allowed by R.C. 2305.19. The gravamen of plaintiff's complaint is the alleged failure by defendant to provide a "minimally safe environment" in which prison inmates may shower. Defendant timely answered with a general denial as well as an assertion of the affirmative defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, and the statute of limitations. This matter came on for trial before the duly appointed referee sitting at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility at Lucasville, Ohio. Counsel for the parties notified the court at trial that defendant's July 11, 1989 motion to compel was moot. Thus, the referee recommends that the July 28, 1989 order awarding a $25 sanction against plaintiff be vacated. At the conclusion of trial plaintiff's counsel conceded the lack of evidence regarding the claims for medical expenses and future work loss; thus, the sole claim for determination is for pain and suffering. The following findings and conclusions are rendered after thorough consideration of the admitted evidence, the presentations by counsel and the court file.

Findings of Fact

1. On December 11, 1983, plaintiff, Antonio Gatewood, was an inmate at the Columbus Correctional Facility ("CCF") under the custody and care of defendant pursuant to R.C. 5120.16.

2. On December 11, 1983, and for all times relevant to this suit, defendant knew that plaintiff claimed to suffer from epilepsy and furthermore knew of his extensive history of seizure complaints.

3. Defendant also knew, and its own records reflect, that plaintiff is of borderline intellect and has been categorized as "mentally retarded."

4. On December 11, 1983, plaintiff went to the shower in CCF dorm 4E and undressed to take a shower. At this time a sheet or towel was hanging across the shower entrance in order to hold the steam in the shower bay. This sheet or towel was hung by unknown inmates and was in violation of CCF rules.

5. Plaintiff entered the shower bay and immediately suffered a seizure which caused him to collapse under a shower head which was spraying hot water.

6. As a result of the seizure, plaintiff suffered first and second degree burns over twenty percent of his body and ultimately was hospitalized on two occasions for a total of sixty-four days.

7. One corrections officer ("CO") was on duty in dorms 3E and 4E when plaintiff was injured on December 11, 1983. There were approximately one hundred and eighty residents in these dorms.

8. The shower where plaintiff was injured was glass enclosed on three sides. This allows the CO on duty to observe activities in the shower bay.

9. When the CO on duty is in the 3E dorm he cannot view the 4E showers and vice versa.

Conclusions of Law

Initially, it must be decided what genre of claim is presented by plaintiff's complaint. Defendant asserts that it is a medical negligence claim and plaintiff must thus prove the defendant's negligence by expert testimony. Bruni v. Tatsumi (1975), 46 Ohio St.2d 127, 75 O.O.2d 184, 346 N.E.2d 673. Defendant points to plaintiff's allegations regarding negligent supervision over epileptic inmates as the point where the claim is converted to one sounding in medical negligence requiring the concomitant expert testimony. However, a fair and impartial review of the complaint reveals that the essence of plaintiff's complaint is the allegedly negligent administration of CCF. Plaintiff specifically avers that defendant failed to provide a safe environment and also failed to adequately supervise plaintiff. Thus, defendant's motion pursuant to Civ.R. 41(B)(2), to the extent that it was premised upon plaintiff's lack of expert medical testimony, should be denied.

In order to recover in Ohio on a negligence claim, plaintiff must prove "the existence of a duty, the breach of the duty, and injury resulting proximately therefrom." Strother v. Hutchinson (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 282, 285, 21 O.O.3d 177, 179, 423 N.E.2d 467, 469. The duty imposed upon defendant is the common-law duty of ordinary care. Jenkins v. Krieger (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 314, 21 O.O.3d 198, 423 N.E.2d 856. Ordinary care is analogous to reasonable care, and reasonable care is that which would be utilized by an ordinarily prudent person. Smith v. United Properties, Inc. (1965), 2 Ohio St.2d 310, 31 O.O.2d 573, 209 N.E.2d 142. The state is not an insurer of inmate safety and ordinary care is owed only to inmates who are foreseeably at risk. McAfee v. Overberg (1977), 51 Ohio Misc. 86, 5 O.O.3d 345, 367 N.E.2d 942.

In the case at bar, plaintiff would have this court find that defendant's duty to plaintiff is heightened due to his known seizure disorder. Plaintiff suggests that his medical history and diagnoses should be provided to all COs who will come in contact with him. This is clearly an unrealistic proposal when viewed within the context of a correctional system which currently houses nearly thirty thousand inmates. Furthermore, even if CO Matthews had actually known of plaintiff's particular physical impairments does not necessarily mean that his course of supervision over plaintiff would have been measurably different. Defendant attempts to place the genuineness of plaintiff's seizure history at issue; however, the fact that plaintiff routinely receives Dilantin and phenobarbital from defendant's own medical staff militates against a skeptical view of the presence of a seizure disorder. Nevertheless, even had a CO been standing next to plaintiff in the shower, it is sheer speculation as to the preventative impact of this presence.

A second aspect of plaintiff's deficient supervision claim is the defendant's failure to segregate epileptic (seizure-prone) inmates from non-epileptic inmates. Yet, plaintiff fails to explain how supervision over a group of epileptics would be undertaken, why special supervision is appropriate, and how such supervision would have prevented plaintiff's injury. As noted through the testimony of Dr. Turkson, epileptics commonly engage in activities routine to the daily existence of non-epileptics and generally do so without traumatic results. Classification of prisoners is one of the administrative functions of government, which is due great deference. Bell v. Wolfish (1979), 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447. In the exercise of administrative discretion defendant chose not to segregate inmates prone to seizures from those without such malady. This decision is one involving "the making of a basic policy decision which is characterized by the exercise of a high degree of official judgment or discretion" and is thus immune from attack. Reynolds v. State (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 68, 70, 14 OBR 506, 507, 471 N.E.2d 776, 778.

A duty of ordinary care in the supervision of prison inmates is owed only to inmates who are foreseeably at risk. McAfee, supra. It was not foreseeable that plaintiff would suffer a seizure while in the proximity of scalding hot water. The evidence indicates that plaintiff was regularly ingesting his prescribed anti-seizure medications and defendant was without forewarning of the December 11, 1983 seizure. Plaintiff testified that he has no warning prior to the onset of a seizure; thus, a duty imposed upon defendant to guard against all harm to plaintiff during a seizure would essentially require defendant to place plaintiff in an empty padded room with constant monitoring. This is an unrealistic expectation and ignores the plaintiff's duty to reasonably safeguard his own well-being. Plaintiff's mental disability does not operate to excuse the exercise of ordinary care nor does the disability enhance the defendant's duty. 70 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d (1986) 186-187, Negligence, Section 92. Plaintiff was bound to exercise that amount of judgment and care for his safety as would any reasonably prudent person with similar mental incapacity. Id. Plaintiff's testimony clearly illustrated his comprehension of the significance of his episodic seizures as well as the necessity to guard against undue risks. Plaintiff had a number of options available to him on December 11, 1983 when he consciously chose to enter the shower bay cognizant of the ongoing "steam bath": plaintiff could have simply postponed taking a shower until later, he could have informed CO Matthews that a rule violation was ongoing in the 4E shower, or he could have asked a friend to accompany him to guard against injuries should a seizure occur in the shower area.

Plaintiff's failure to guard against known risks and dangers does not excuse the defendant's failure to appropriately staff CCF to ensure rule compliance by inmates. CO Matthews was the sole CCF employee in charge of two dormitories on December 11, 1983. Usually two COs worked these adjoining dorms, but Matthews' co-worker was apparently on sick leave and defendant provided no substitute guard. The regulation prohibiting "steam showers" was aimed at preventing sexual activity under the blanket of steam, not at the prevention of personal injury. Any supervision negligence attributable to defendant is de minimis and was not a causative factor.

In summary, the only theory under which plaintiff has a colorable claim is via the assertion that defendant's failure to prevent a "steam shower" on December 11, 1983, was the proximate cause of injury to plaintiff. While it is certainly arguable whether or not defendant was negligent by the understaffed dorms 3E and 4E on December 11, 1983, there can be little dispute but that plaintiff was an unforeseeable victim. Defendant cannot be reasonably held to a duty which requires prevention of all accidents within the facility. While defendant was clearly on notice of plaintiff's physical and mental infirmities it owed no duty specifically to plaintiff to prevent "steam showers." In this regard the recent decision of Sawicki v. Ottawa Hills (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 222, 525 N.E.2d 468, is instructive. The defendant's failure to enforce its own regulation prohibiting "steam showers" does not independently create a special duty owed to plaintiff. The law from Sawicki, supra, at paragraph four of the syllabus, requires the satisfaction of four criteria before a special duty may be imposed upon a government entity. Under the Sawicki test, plaintiff fails on three of the elements and proved, at most, only that there was direct contact between defendant and plaintiff.

Plaintiff was simply an unforeseeable plaintiff who could not have been reasonably anticipated to suffer injury in the fashion presented by the case at bar. Plaintiff produced no testimony regarding the water temperature or standards controlling same; thus, the referee expresses no opinion on this issue. The referee recommends dismissal of the complaint for plaintiff's failure to prove his claims against defendant by the greater weight of the evidence.