Summary
In Gaston, the site of the accident clearly was not an interior stair, and in Maksuti, the layout of the restaurant is not fully described, but the decision implies that the "trap door" servicing the stairs where plaintiff fell was not the only way in and out of the basement, so the subject stair was not a "required exit".
Summary of this case from Remes v. 513 West 26th RealtyOpinion
September 9, 1999
Defendant appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, New York County (Louis York, J.).
Brian J. Isaac, of counsel (Jeffrey S. Kimmel and Julie T. Mark, on the brief, Pollack, Pollack, Isaac DeCicco and Salenger Sack, attorneys) for plaintiff-respondent.
Herbert Rubin, of counsel, (David B. Hamm, Linda M. Brown, on the brief, Herzfeld Rubin, P.C., attorneys), for defendant-appellant.
BETTY WEINBERG ELLERIN, P.J., PETER TOM, RICHARD W. WALLACH, DAVID FRIEDMAN, JJ.
The issue presented by this appeal is whether a staircase located outside of a building is, for purposes of the Administrative Code of the City of New York (Code), treated as an interior staircase. While the applicable Code provisions present a complex web, careful scrutiny reveals that they do not require the staircase in issue to comply with the provisions governing interior staircases.
On January 17, 1994, plaintiff slipped and fell on ice while ascending the outside staircase of the Martin Luther King Towers at 21 West 112th Street in Manhattan. The staircase, as reflected in several photographs, consists of three steps leading from a path to a platform. The platform begins as a fourth step of the staircase, and ends at a door which leads into the building. At one side of the staircase is a handrail while the other side of the staircase is framed by a fence. The building was owned and operated by defendant New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA), and plaintiff commenced this action against it.
Various theories to justify a recovery were asserted by plaintiff, but the only one to survive to trial and be submitted to the jury was her claim that defendant was negligent in failing to provide an intermediate handrail for the staircase on which she fell. According to plaintiff, although these steps were outside of the building, they were nevertheless required to comply with the requirements of the Code regarding interior staircases, which under certain circumstances, require a center handrail.
Plaintiff's claim is dependent upon the juxtaposition of sections 27-232, 27-375(f) (1) and 27-376 of the Code. Section 27-232 of the Code defines the pertinent terms. That section defines an interior stair as "[a] stair within a building, that services [sic] as a required exit." An exit, in turn, is defined as "[a] means of egress from the interior of a building to an open exterior space which is provided by . . . interior stairs, [or] exterior stairs . . ." Finally, exterior stair is defined as "[a] stair open to the outdoor air, that serves as a required exit."
With this definitional backdrop, we turn to the Code provisions that are at the heart of plaintiff's claim. Section 27-375 (f)(1) discusses interior stairs and requires that, when an interior staircase is more than eighty-eight inches wide, it must have an intermediate handrail dividing the stairway. Section 27-376 provides that "[e]xterior stairs may be used as exits in lieu of interior stairs" provided they comply, inter alia, with all of the requirements for interior stairs except that such stairs need not be enclosed.
It is uncontroverted that this case does not involve a section 27-375 interior staircase. It is for that reason that plaintiff points to section 27-376. She maintains that the staircase on which she fell is a section 27-376 staircase, that is, an exterior staircase being used as an exit in lieu of interior stairs. As already indicated, the Code requires such stairs to comply with all the requirements for interior stairs and hence, from plaintiff's perspective, the staircase needed the intermediate handrail called for by section 27-375.
At the trial of this action, plaintiff, in seeking to establish this point, called Howard Edelson, a self-employed safety consultant. He testified over objection that the stairway on which plaintiff fell was an "exterior stairway." Thereafter, in the course of the court's charge on this issue the jury was told that,
A substantial factor in causing this incident, contends plaintiff, was the defendant landlord's failure to comply with the . . . Code in that the main entrance stairway was in excess of 88 inches wide and did not have an intermediate center handrail . . . Now, plaintiff claims that the failure of the defendant . . . to provide an intermediate handrail in the middle of what she alleges was an exterior stairway was the cause of plaintiff's accident. Defendant denies that the area in which plaintiff fell was an exterior stairway.
Supreme Court then continued by telling the jury that their first order of business would be to determine whether the area where plaintiff fell was an exterior stairway. In fact, the first two interrogatories presented to the jury were "[i]s the area where plaintiff fell an exterior stairway" and "[w]as the exterior stairway more than 88 inches wide, thereby requiring an intermediate handrail."
The jury answered these questions affirmatively, returning a verdict in favor of plaintiff. In our view, Supreme Court erred in asking the jury to decide whether the staircase at bar was one defined by the Code as exterior.
Contrary to plaintiff's contention, our review of the record indicates that defendant adequately preserved this error for our review, which, in any event, is fundamental in nature (see, Breitung v. Canzano, 238 A.D.2d 901, 902).
Initially, it is true that there are circumstances where stairs outside of the four walls of a building may serve the function of interior stairs. Thus, as previously noted, section 27-376 of the Code explicitly provides that "[e]xterior stairs may be used as exits in lieu of interior stairs provided they comply with all of the requirements for interior stairs . . . However, where exterior stairs are used in lieu of interior stairs they must comply with certain additional requirements. Examination of these additional requirements provides insight into the precise type of staircase contemplated by the Code.
Significantly, where exterior stairs are to be used in lieu of interior stairs they must have a roof (§ 27-376 [c]). They must not exceed seventy-five feet or six stories in height (§ 27-376 [b]). In a building "four stories or fifty feet in height or more, there shall be no openings in the building walls adjoining" the stairs unless such openings are protected by self-closing fire-rated doors (§ 27-376[d]). The stairs must further comply with section 27-369(f) (see, § 27-376[c]), which provides that such stairs "be protected along their outer side by guards or. parapets at least three feet six inches high . . ."
When these requirements are considered together, a common example of the type of staircase contemplated by the Code becomes readily apparent, namely, the metal staircases that are frequently connected to, and run along, the exterior walls of many theaters and serve as emergency exits from the upper portions of the theater. Viewed in light of such an example it becomes self-evident why the Code speaks in terms of a height restriction on such staircases, a prohibition against non-fire rated door openings in the walls adjoining such staircases, and a requirement that the outer side of the staircase be protected by a parapet or guard of a certain height. What becomes equally evident is that section 27-376 has no applicability to the stairs at issue here (cf., Taylor v. City of New York, 150 Misc.2d 528).
This conclusion is further supported by the definition of exit contained in section 27-232 of the Code. It should be remembered that the significance of the definition of the word exit flows from section 27-376, which speaks of stairs being used as exits in lieu of interior stairs. As earlier set forth, an exit is "[a] means of egress from the interior of a building to an open exterior space." Here, the subject staircase, which was outside the parameters of the building, did not provide a means of egress from the interior of the building to an open exterior space. Considered otherwise, the front door of the building served as the exit to the open exterior space, namely, the platform in front of the door. Obviously, if the stairs are not an exit, by definition they do not fall within the ambit of section 27-376.
It is also of interest to note that, prior to trial, defendant moved for summary judgment presenting the issue raised by this appeal. In support of that motion defendant submitted an affidavit from Leonard J. Hopper, Chief of the Landscape Architecture Section of defendant's Landscape Architecture Design Department. He averred that the Building Department of the City of New York does not consider the instant staircase to be governed by the Code requirements for interior stairs. In this regard, the Building Department waived the requirement that it certify the conformance of these steps with the Code. In so doing, it permitted landscape projects to be certified by the NYCHA. This indicates that the Building Department viewed these stairs as part of the landscape architecture, not an exterior staircase being used in lieu of an interior staircase.
Stripped to the essentials of the issue, since there was no factual dispute regarding the configuration and location of the stairs, whether the Code required the subject staircase to have a center handrail presented a question of law, not fact (cf., Robbins v. County of Broome, 87 N.Y.2d 831, 834; compare, Goncalves v. Regent Intl. Hotels, 58 N.Y.2d 206, 218). Hence, Supreme Court erred in submitting the issue to the jury and in failing to determine, as a matter of law, that the staircase was not required to comply with section 27-376 of the Code (see, Sparrock v. City of New York, 219 A.D.2d 705 [stairway in question was outside building and clearly not an exit nor an interior staircase]; Wirth v. DeVito, 74 A.D.2d 827 [court improperly instructed the jury that it could decide whether handrails were required under Yonkers Building Code]; see also, Miller v. Coye, 254 A.D.2d 800 lv denied 92 N.Y.2d 818; Union Bank Trust Co. v. Hattie Carnegie, Inc., 1 A.D.2d 199; Erlicht v. Boser, 259 AD 269, 271).
In sum, it is apparent that in common parlance the staircase at the Martin Luther King Towers was certainly an exterior one. Resolution of this action, however, is not dependent upon common parlance but whether, under the Code, defendant was negligent in failing to provide an intermediate handrail. Since the Code provisions on which plaintiff relied are inapplicable, defendant cannot be liable for an alleged violation of such provisions. Moreover, since liability in this action was predicated solely upon an alleged violation of inapplicable Code provisions, it follows that there is no choice but to set aside the judgment and dismiss the complaint.
Supreme Court dismissed, without objection, plaintiff's alternative claims, namely, that defendant negligently removed snow and that the staircase was defectively designed. Hence, there is no basis upon which to order a new trial.
Accordingly, the judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Louis York, J.), entered April 20, 1998, awarding plaintiff damages, should be reversed, on the law, without costs, the judgment vacated and the complaint dismissed.
All concur.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.