Opinion
20-P-1373
04-04-2022
TONY B. GASKINS & others [1] v. MICHAEL RODRIGUES.[2]
Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass.App.Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass.App.Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass.App.Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The plaintiffs, inmates at MCI-Cedar Junction, appeal from the award of summary judgment in favor of the defendant concerning the constitutionality of certain prison conditions in "10-Block," a restrictive housing unit at MCI-Cedar Junction. On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that, where the publication restrictions and the provision of powdered milk and coffee as substitutes for regular milk and hot coffee violated both the inmates' constitutional rights and the regulations of the Department of Corrections (DOC), the award of summary judgment was improper. We affirm.
The plaintiffs also challenge the judge's denial of their own motion for summary judgment. However, such motion failed to set forth the requisite statement of material facts as to which the plaintiffs contend there was no genuine issue to be tried. Such failure alone was proper grounds for denial of the motion. See Rule 9A (b) (5) (i) of the Rules of the Superior Court (2017) .
Discussion.
1. Publication restrictions.
The plaintiffs argue that the publication restrictions in 10-Block violate DOC regulations, as well as the plaintiffs' constitutional rights, such that the award of summary judgment in favor of the defendant was erroneous. We disagree.
According to the DOC's regulations, inmates of different security levels may possess different types of property. See 103 Code Mass. Regs. § 403.10 (2001). In particular, transient inmates may retain only religious books, newspapers, and magazines, while non-transient inmates may possess up to ten books, newspapers, and magazines, none of which need be religious in nature. See 103 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 403.10(4), (7)(d). In their brief, the plaintiffs argue that they were not properly subjected to these regulations because they were not transient inmates. Because each plaintiff was housed at MCI-Cedar Junction for more than a mere brief period of time, the plaintiffs argue that subjecting them to the publication restrictions is not authorized by DOC regulations. However, the plaintiffs misstate the definition of a transient inmate. A transient inmate is a technical term within the DOC that includes "any inmate whose security classification has yet to be determined or who has not been assigned to a permanent housing location." 103 Code Mass. Regs. § 403.06 (2001). Inmates housed in 10-Block are by definition transient inmates, as their placement has yet to be determined for a variety of reasons.
We cite to the 2001 version of the 103 Code Mass. Regs. § 403.10 because this was the version in effect both at the time the plaintiffs were inmates at MCI-Cedar Junction, and at the time the plaintiffs filed their complaint.
Both transient inmates and non-transient inmates may also retain books for temporary use in authorized educational programs. See 103 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 403.10(4), (7)(d).
Inmates may also be housed in 10-Block for disciplinary and non-disciplinary reasons.
Here, each plaintiff was housed in 10-Block because their classifications and placements had not yet been determined. Some of the plaintiffs were the subject of disciplinary investigations, while others awaited transfer to other in-State and out-of-State facilities. Thus, the defendant properly classified the plaintiffs as transient inmates, and contrary to the plaintiffs' argument, subjecting each of them to the publication restrictions of 103 Code Mass. Regs. § 403.10(4) was not against DOC regulations.
The plaintiffs also argue that the publication restrictions violated 103 Code Mass. Regs. § 423.09(2)(g) (2007), as well as 103 Code Mass. Regs. § 481.15(3)(a) (2002). However, 103 Code Mass. Regs. § 423.09(2)(g) is inapplicable here because the plaintiffs' reading materials were not restricted as a direct result of any disciplinary detention status. Furthermore, where the publication restrictions imposed on the plaintiffs were not content-based restrictions, 103 Code Mass. Regs. § 481.15(3) (a) is also inapplicable.
The plaintiffs nevertheless maintain that such publication restrictions still violate their constitutional rights under the First and Fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as their rights under arts. 12 and 16 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. We disagree.
"Although 'prison inmates retain certain constitutional rights,' those rights are necessarily limited by '[t]he fact of confinement as well as the legitimate goals and policies of the penal institution.'" Commonwealth v. Ecker, 92 Mass.App. 216, 220 (2017), quoting Cacicio v. Secretary of Pub. Safety, 422 Mass. 764, 770 n.10 (1996). Where a regulation "impinges on an inmate's constitutional rights," it may still be valid so long as "'it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.'" Cacicio, 422 Mass. at 770, quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
In making this assessment, we examine the following four factors: (1) whether there is a "valid, rational connection between the regulation and the [legitimate, neutral] governmental interest put forward to justify it"; (2) whether "alternative means of exercising the challenged right remain open to inmates"; (3) whether "accommodating the challenged right [will] have a significant 'ripple effect' on guards, other inmates, and the allocation of prison resources in general"; and (4) whether "an alternative to the regulation exist[s] which would fully accommodate the inmates' rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests." Cacicio, 422 Mass. at 770, citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-91.
Here, the restrictions on publications and other reading materials served the legitimate and neutral government interest of maintaining safety and security within MCI-Cedar Junction. See Commonwealth v. Jessup, 471 Mass. 121, 131-132 (2015)(prohibition of "inmate-to-inmate correspondence in the absence of a family relationship" valid to ensure "safety and security within the prison"). Were the plaintiffs to be permitted to possess more reading materials in 10-Block than other transient inmates housed in MCI-Cedar Junction, there existed the possibility of disrupting the climate of the prison, such that the change in policy would have had a potentially significant ripple effect on other inmates, guards, or prison resources. See id.
No alternative solutions were suggested to accommodate the plaintiffs at a de minimis cost to MCI-Cedar Junction's penological goals. See Cacicio, 422 Mass. at 771.
In addition to the defendant's legitimate penological goals, the plaintiffs also retained alternative means of accessing information while in 10-Block, including access to the radio, legal materials, the telephone, and books from the prison library. These alternative means of accessing information support the constitutionality of MCI-Cedar Junction's publication restrictions for transient inmates in 10-Block. See Cacicio, 422 Mass. at 771 (monitoring of inmate telephone calls constitutional where inmates retained alternative means of communication to exercise their rights).
At bottom, we accord the defendant "wide-ranging deference" in the crafting of policies and practices that seek to preserve internal order and institutional security within the prison. Champagne v. Commissioner of Correction, 395 Mass. 382, 387 (1985). Thus, where the publication restrictions were properly authorized by DOC regulations, and where such restrictions are undoubtedly reasonably related to the defendant's legitimate penological interests, we discern no error in the award of summary judgment in favor of the defendant.
2. Milk and coffee.
Like their claim concerning the publication restrictions within 10-Block, the plaintiffs argue that the award of summary judgment was improper where the providing of powdered milk and coffee, as opposed to regular milk and hot coffee, violates both the plaintiffs' constitutional rights and DOC regulations. We disagree.
Pursuant to G. L. c. 127, § 32, "[t]he superintendents of the institutions under the supervision of the [DOC] shall treat the prisoners with the kindness which their obedience, industry and good conduct merit." This so-called kindness statute requires "equal treatment, as far as may reasonably be, for prisoners who are not being disciplined" (quotation and citation omitted). Hastings v. Commissioner of Correction, 424 Mass. 46, 53 (1997). The plaintiffs argue that where the defendant provided them with powdered milk and coffee, as opposed to the regular milk and hot coffee provided to general population inmates in MCI-Cedar Junction, the defendant has violated the kindness statute. We disagree.
Here, the provision of powdered milk and coffee does not implicate a fundamental right. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-721 (1997) (to qualify as fundamental right, asserted right must be "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition," such that it is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" [citations omitted]). As such, we review the plaintiffs' claim of a violation of the kindness statute through the lens of rational basis review. See Hastings, 424 Mass. at 53. Where refrigeration issues caused issues with the taste of the regular milk previously provided to transient inmates in 10-Block, the cost-effective and safer alternative of providing powdered milk and coffee to inmates in 10-Block survives rational basis review. See Doe v. Secretary of Educ, 479 Mass. 375, 393 (2018)(policy need only be rationally related to legitimate government interest to survive rational basis review).
The plaintiffs also argue in the alternative that the provision of powdered milk and coffee violates the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. To establish an unconstitutional condition of confinement, an inmate must show: (1) his or her living conditions amount to a serious deprivation of human needs, and (2) the prison officials acted, or failed to act, with deliberate indifference. See Foster v. Commissioner of Correction, 484 Mass. 698, 717 (2020) . Here, the plaintiffs have not met their burden of demonstrating that the provision of powdered milk and coffee constitutes a serious deprivation of human needs, particularly where the powdered milk was said to have equal nutritional value as regular milk. See Butler v. Turco, 93 Mass.App.Ct. 80, 87-89 (2018)(inmate failed to demonstrate denial of "minimal civilized measure of life's necessities" where transfer from single to double cell presented no danger to inmate's health or safety).
Finally, the plaintiffs argue that the provision of powdered milk and coffee to 10-Block inmates violated DOC regulations. We disagree.
All inmates are to "receive the same meals as those served to the general population unless being placed on alternative feeding." 103 Code Mass. Regs. § 423.09(1)(c) (2007). By being provided powdered milk and coffee, the plaintiffs argue they have not received the same meals as those served to general population inmates. The defendant counters by claiming that the particular form or composition of the meal is not determinative; rather, DOC regulations only require inmates to receive the nutritional equivalent to what is being provided to general population inmates.
The plaintiffs possess a formidable burden to demonstrate that the defendant's interpretation of its own regulations is irrational. See Dexter v. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst., Concord, 88 Mass.App.Ct. 325, 327 (2015). Where ambiguities in the regulation exist, we "show deference to the experience, technical competence, specialized knowledge, and discretionary authority conferred upon the regulatory agency." Shelales v. Director of the Office of Medicaid, 7 5 Mass.App.Ct. 636, 640 (2009). Here, the defendant's interpretation that 103 Code Mass. Regs. § 423.09(1) (c) requires only a nutritionally equivalent meal, rather than a meal of the same form of composition, is not an interpretation that is "patently wrong, unreasonable, arbitrary, whimsical, or capricious" (citation omitted). Shelales, supra. As such, we discern no error in the judge granting the defendant summary judgment on this issue.
Judgment affirmed.
The panelists are listed in order of seniority.