KLEIN, Justice.

Ricky Dale Garringer appeals from the circuit court's order denying his Haw. Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 40 petition for post-conviction relief. For the following reasons, we vacate the circuit court's order and remand for further proceedings.

I.

Garringer conceded at trial that he and a minor accomplice (Minor) planned to commit theft at a Jack-in-the-Box restaurant in Waipi`o Gentry. Garringer accompanied the Minor to the restaurant's drive-through window, where the Minor threatened Robert Pointer with a shotgun and demanded money. The Minor pounded the shotgun on the counter and it went off, killing Pointer. Garringer then grabbed the money from the cash register and the two men fled in a car stolen by Garringer prior to the robbery.

Garringer was convicted, inter alia, of multiple counts relevant to the instant appeal: Robbery in the First Degree pursuant to Haw. Revised Statutes (HRS) § 708-840(1)(b)(ii) (1993) (Count I); Possession of Prohibited Firearm pursuant to HRS § 134-8(a) (Count IV) (Supp. 1994); Possession of Firearm by a Person Convicted of Certain Crimes pursuant to HRS §§ 134-7(b) and (h) (Supp. 1994) (Count V); and Place to Keep Loaded Firearm pursuant to HRS §§ 134-6(a) and (d) (Supp. 1994) (Count VI). He was sentenced to the following terms of incarceration, "to be served concurrently with all other terms presently being served": life imprisonment with the possibility of parole and a mandatory minimum term of six years and eight months on Count I; five years in prison with a mandatory minimum term of one year and eight months on both Counts IV and VI; and ten years in prison with a mandatory minimum of three years and four months on Count V.

In an earlier appeal, in connection with which Garringer was represented by substitute counsel, we affirmed the sentences imposed by the circuit court despite Garringer's claim that the court abused its discretion in sentencing him to an extended life term of imprisonment under HRS § 706-662(4). State v. Garringer, 73 Haw. 624, 827 P.2d 1148 (1992) (Table). Garringer subsequently filed a pro se HRPP Rule 40 petition for post-conviction relief on August 3, 1993. The circuit court denied his petition without a hearing.

II. A.

Garringer argues that: 1) the indictment did not fairly notify him that he could face sentencing enhancement under HRS § 706-660.1 (1993) based upon the aggravating circumstance of using a firearm in the commission of a felony; and 2) there was insufficient evidence that he used a firearm in the commission of a felony — i.e., enhanced sentencing under HRS § 706-660.1 may not be premised upon a finding of accomplice liability.

1.

In State v. Schroeder, 76 Haw. 517, 880 P.2d 192 (1994), we stated that "an indictment must be read in a common-sensical fashion in order to ascertain whether the material aggravating circumstance has been sufficiently alleged therein to support the imposition of enhanced sentencing." Id. at 530, 880 P.2d at 205. Respectively, Counts I, IV, V, and VI of the indictment in the instant case alleged that on or about December 30, 1989: "[Garringer] and [his co-defendant], while in the course of committing theft, and while armed with a dangerous instrument, did threaten the imminent use of force against [Pointer], a person who was present, with the intent to compel acquiescence to the taking of or escaping with the property" (emphasis added); "[Garringer] did possess, transfer, or acquire a shotgun with a barrel length less than eighteen inches" (emphasis added); "[Garringer] did own, possess, or control a firearm"; and, finally, "[Garringer] did carry or possess a loaded firearm and did fail to confine said firearm[.]"

Although Counts IV through VI do not allege that Garringer either used or threatened to use a firearm, mere possession thereof is sufficient for the purposes of HRS § 706-660.1. See supra note 7. To the extent that a firearm was employed in the robbery, the circuit court correctly held that Garringer "was on notice that the charges against him included the use of a firearm." (Emphasis added). In any event, the court did not impose mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment for these counts under HRS § 706-660.1. See supra note 6. Furthermore, we are convinced that a plain reading of the robbery count must result in the conclusion that the possession of a shotgun — i.e., the relevant aggravating circumstance supporting the imposition of enhanced sentencing — was being charged. See Schroeder, 76 Haw. at 530, 880 P.2d at 205. Thus, we hold that Garringer was on notice that the charges against him included the possession of a firearm.

2.

Garringer next argues that there was insufficient evidence in the record to support enhanced sentencing with respect to Count I because he never actually possessed the shotgun during the robbery. The prosecution responds that Garringer's liability as an accomplice justified the imposition of an enhanced sentence.

The sentencing court, which also presided over the trial in the instant case, found that the evidence:

clearly show[ed] that [Garringer] did aid and abet [the Minor] on December 30, 1990, in the commission of the felony at the Jack in the box [sic]. At the time [the Minor] was in possession of a shotgun which was used to cause the death of Pointer.

And it must have been clear to [Garringer] as his course of conduct as an accomplice did result in the use of that shotgun and his accomplice liability did not terminate prior to the time of his use by [the Minor] on the record made at the time of the trial.

I have been provided and shall find that beyond a reasonable doubt as a matter of fact that [Garringer] while engaged in the commission of that Class A felony did have it in his possession and used and threatened the use of a shotgun, a firearm, within the meaning of HRS [§] 706-660.1 beyond a reasonable doubt.

(Emphasis added.)

The sentencing court appears to have held Garringer legally responsible under HRS § 706-660.1 by imputing possession of the shotgun to him based on the actual possession and "use by [the minor]" during the robbery, as opposed to any actual or constructive possession by Garringer during the crime or while fleeing from the crime scene. The following exchange took place after the court made its findings:

[Defense]: Your Honor, if I may and this is with all due respect to what the Court has just stated as its findings. The legislature did not state specifically in this statute that an accomplice liability person who is considered an accomplice should, in fact, fall under this statute.

THE COURT: That is true.

[Defense]: And this statute is designed to presume from the Court its discretion. And all of these statutes which remove from the Court's discretion are specific as to whether they should be applied.

And I would argue to the Court that when a person is considered an accomplice and really the evidence shows that Mr. Garringer only knew of the weapon at the time when [the Minor] pulled it out with his hands. So he had no ability to at that point to be an accomplice to the Robbery.

The plan as he stated on the record for them to commit a theft — a robbery accomplice after the fact when the gun was brought out. So with that I would argue to the Court I can't see where the Court can find that he had it in his possession, threatened its use.

THE COURT: I think that as I — as I had indicated and that I agree with you that the language of 706-660.1 does not possess a cover in a [sic] commission of such felony with a firearm, but I think it must, the accomplice liability in 706-660.1 that that section maybe applicable to an accomplice on the general scheme of the penal legislation as it embraces in our [Haw.] Penal Code [sic] it has to be so if one can be punished as an accomplice then he can be punished as an accomplice in the course of the commission of the felony which in the — while in the possession of a firearm it has to be that way because none of the other laws with respect to accomplice liability carries out a sentence in 706-660.1 to witness [sic] accomplice.

[Defense]: Your Honor, just to be clear then the Court is making its findings and basing its findings of beyond a reasonable doubt as to the elements of 706-660.1 in the fact that Mr. Garringer was convicted as an accomplice to [the Minor], but not that [he personally had] any physical control of the weapon or threatened its use.

THE COURT: No, to the extent that he is convicted as an accomplice and to the extent that he acted as an accomplice in possession of [the shotgun] as well as [the Minor, he] was in deed [sic] in possession of [the shotgun]. Garringer was be [sic, presumably `by'] operation of law.

[Defense]: Your Honor, therefore, as to the amount of time, I believe that it is — it could be discretionary with the Court as to the amount of mandatory time, I would request the Court for the maximum which is ten years. And the fact that, one, he was, as the Court has said, sentenced as an accomplice to [the Minor].

The State chose to trade away their ability to seek 15 years of mandatory time for this specific statute from [the Minor] in exchange for his testimony and his plea bargain. He was charged with Murder in this case.

. . . .

I would ask the Court not to give him the ten years, but to make it perhaps five years.

THE COURT: Argument against?

[Prosecution]: Yes, the State based on the facts in this case and Mr. Garringer's role in the commission of the Robbery which resulted in the death of Robert Pointer feels that we didn't trade anything away for [the Minor's] . . . participation and testimony in this trial.

The State's position is that Mr. Garringer being the adult is much more culpable for his role in the planning and commission of the Robbery, therefore, we feel he, if anybody, deserves a greater sentence than a juvenile, that's why we feel that it's justified for asking the full ten years in this case.

When you consider that fact that Mr. Garringer was on probation and had been given two chances already on probation and has committed another pending crime for which he is here today for the sentence of the [Unauthorized Control of a Propelled Vehicle]. You consider all of the circumstances in this case, the mandatory sentence of ten year jail is appropriate and necessary in this case. Thank you.

THE COURT: I'm going to take it under advisement until I've heard all matters and that shall be ruled upon this morning.

(Emphases added.)

The imposition of a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment pursuant to a conviction premised on accomplice liability is neither explicitly permitted nor prohibited by the language of HRS § 706-660.1(1). Neither does the legislative history of this statute provide us with clear guidance. Faced with similar circumstances in State v. Kumukau, 71 Haw. 218, 787 P.2d 682 (1990), we gave a broad interpretation to HRS § 706-660.1, thereby permitting imposition of consecutive mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment notwithstanding the absence of explicit authority for such action under the statute. See id. at 223-26, 787 P.2d at 686-87. However, we relied heavily upon HRS § 706-668.5 (Supp. 1992), which clearly permits the discretionary imposition of consecutive terms of imprisonment. Id. at 224, 787 P.2d at 686. In the instant case, the prosecution does not cite, nor are we aware of, any provision in the Haw. Penal Code that explicitly permits the imposition of an enhanced sentence — as opposed to a finding of guilt, see supra note 8 — based upon principles of accomplice liability.

There is no doubt that the theory of accomplice liability applies where the use or possession of a firearm is an element of the offense or a separate offense even though the defendant did not engage in the requisite conduct. The question that we must consider in this case is whether the law of accomplice liability renders Garringer liable for the mandatory penalties within the scope of HRS § 706-660.1.

The Alaska Court of Appeals addressed a similar query in Dailey v. State, 675 P.2d 657 (Alaska App. 1984). After a jury trial, Dailey and a co-defendant were convicted, inter alia, of armed robbery, which is a class A felony under Alaskan law; they were both sentenced to six year presumptive terms of imprisonment for that crime. At trial, the victim testified that the codefendant held him at gunpoint in the living room of a friend's house while Dailey stole several items from other parts of the house. Dailey contended on appeal that the trial court erred in sentencing him to the six year presumptive term because the victim testified that he never saw Dailey with a gun in his possession. At the time, Alaska's relevant enhanced sentencing statute provided in pertinent part that:

[a] defendant convicted of a class A felony may be sentenced to a definite term of imprisonment of not more than 20 years, and shall be sentenced to the following presumptive terms . . . if the offense is a first felony conviction, other than for manslaughter, and the defendant possessed or used a firearm or caused serious physical injury during the commission of the offense, six years.

Id. at 658-59 (citation omitted) (emphasis added in original).

After distinguishing the prosecution's citation to an opinion by the Alaska Supreme Court, and observing that the decisions of courts in other jurisdictions provided "no clear cut answer[,]" see id. at 659-61, the Court of Appeals concluded that the statute:

should be construed to apply only to a defendant who personally uses or possesses a firearm during the commission of an offense. That certainly is the plain language of the statute and the statute could have been easily written to apply to an accomplice. . . . We believe that the legislature could rationally have intended this result. The defendant who personally possesses or uses a firearm or personally causes serious physical injury would normally be fully responsible for those actions. His accomplice could very well have a lesser level of responsibility. For instance the accomplice might not know that his partner planned to use a gun. Therefore, for sentencing purposes, there might be a reason to treat a defendant more severely who personally uses a gun or personally causes serious physical injury. The revised criminal code is flexible enough to allow an accomplice who did not personally possess or use a firearm to receive the same sentence as a co-defendant who personally possessed or used a firearm if the same sentence is justified.

Id. at 661 (emphasis added).

Applying the court's rationale in Dailey to the instant case, we hold that HRS § 706-660.1(1) must be interpreted, absent definitive legislative history to the contrary, to preclude the imposition of enhanced sentencing with respect to Garringer's conviction of robbery where he did not personally possess, threaten to use, or use a firearm while engaged in the commission of that felony. Contra Battle v. United States, 515 A.2d 1120 (D.C.App. 1986). Therefore, even if Garringer is unable to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel on remand, see infra section II.B., he is entitled to be resentenced with respect to his conviction of robbery as charged in Count I.

On remand, the sentencing court is not empowered to make the necessary finding that Garringer actually or constructively possessed the shotgun during the robbery. See Schroeder, 76 Haw. at 528, 880 P.2d at 203 (distinguishing the court's power to make findings concerning "historical facts" under State v. Huelsman, 60 Haw. 71, 588 P.2d 394 (1978), reh'g denied, 60 Haw. 308, 588 P.2d at 407 (1979), from the rule under State v. Estrada, 69 Haw. 204, 738 P.2d 812 (1987), that where the aggravating circumstances required under an enhanced sentencing statute are intrinsic to the commission of the crime charged, they must be determined by the trier of fact). Therefore, following the procedure used by the court in United States v. Garcia, 37 F.3d 1359, 1370-71 (9th Cir. 1994), we withhold judgment on Garringer's conviction of Count I for thirty days. If the prosecution within that time consents to resentencing without a mandatory minimum under HRS § 706-660.1, we will affirm the conviction on that count and remand for resentencing. If, on the other hand, the government does not consent, we will vacate Garringer's conviction on Count I and remand for a new trial. In order to avoid this problem in future cases, the circuit court should instruct the jury, by special verdict interrogatories, to make any and all findings relevant to the imposition of enhanced sentences where the requisite aggravating circumstances are intrinsic to the commission of the crime charged.

B.

Based on our resolution of the issues discussed in sections II.A.1. and 2., supra, we need not address Garringer's claim that both his trial and appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance with respect to the issue of sentencing. However, Garringer also contends, inter alia, that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance with respect to his defense of temporary insanity and that the circuit court should have permitted him to amend his pleadings to demonstrate trial counsel's ineffectiveness.

Without holding a hearing, the circuit court determined that Garringer did not demonstrate actual prejudice to support his claim of ineffective assistance. However, HRPP Rule 40(e) (1994) provides:

Amendment or withdrawal of petition. The court may grant leave to amend or withdraw the petition at any time. Amendment shall be freely allowed in order to achieve substantial justice. No petition shall be dismissed for want of particularity unless the petitioner is first given an opportunity to clarify the petition.

(Emphasis added.) In Stanley v. State, 76 Haw. 446, 879 P.2d 551 (1994), we observed that:

[a]lthough Appellant was pro se when he filed his petition and "should not suffer for his inability to articulate his claims[,]" Appellant, as a pro se petitioner, still must alert the court to the general issue that is the basis of his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Bryant v. State, 6 Haw. App. 331, 335, 720 P.2d 1015, 1019 (1986) ( disapproved on other grounds in Briones v. State, 74 Haw. 442, 460-461 n. 11, 848 P.2d 966, 975-76 n. 11 (1992)). In Bryant, although the petitioner failed to "specify as a ground for relief the precise factual basis" upon which his appeal was based in his original petition, he subsequently amended his petition and clearly raised the factual issue that served as the substance of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Id.

Stanley, 76 Haw. at 449-50, 879 P.2d at 555. In the instant case, Garringer alerted the court that one of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims concerned the "insanity" defense. See, e.g., HRS § 704-400 (1993); HRS § 702-230 (1993) ("pathological intoxication" exception). Therefore, under HRPP Rule 40(e), Garringer should have been given the opportunity to clarify his petition by amending it to include specific factual allegations relevant to his claim.

Specifically, Garringer must establish "that (1) his appellate counsel omitted an appealable issue, and (2) in light of the entire record, the status of the law, and the space and time limitations inherent in the appellate process, a reasonably competent attorney would not have omitted that issue." Domingo v. State, 76 Haw. 237, 242, 873 P.2d 775, 780 (1994). See also State v. Tyrrell, 60 Haw. 17, 31, 586 P.2d 1028, 1036 (1978) (indicating that defense counsel's decision not to subject client to the rigors of a mental examination is not unreasonable on its face). "Because appellate courts do not ordinarily consider evidence outside the record, a post-conviction proceeding is the most appropriate forum in which to resolve ineffective assistance claims." Raines v. State, 79 Haw. 219, 223, 900 P.2d 1286, 1290 (1995); see also State v. Silva, 75 Haw. 419, 439, 864 P.2d 583, 592 (1993) (acknowledging "that not every trial record is sufficiently developed to determine whether there has been ineffective assistance of counsel"). Therefore, if the prosecution chooses not to retry Garringer on Count I and accepts the imposition of a sentence without a mandatory minimum under HRS § 706-660.1, we remand this case to the circuit court for an HRPP Rule 40 hearing to determine the merits of Garringer's remaining ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See supra note 14.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part and vacate in part the circuit court's order denying Garringer's HRPP Rule 40 motion and remand, at the option of the prosecution, for retrial (in which case Garringer's Rule 40 petition becomes moot) or for resentencing on his conviction of robbery and for an HRPP Rule 40 hearing on the question whether Garringer's counsel provided ineffective assistance with respect to his defense of temporary insanity.