Decision and Order

GARY L. SHARPE, United States Magistrate Judge

I. Introduction

Pro se plaintiff, Anthony M. Garraway, has filed multiple civil actions in the Northern District of New York, some of which are currently pending and at different stages in the litigation process. His in forma pauperis applications have been granted in each pending case. Although now incarcerated, Garraway's complaints were filed before he was imprisoned and have nothing to do with prison conditions. Therefore, his cases are not governed by Local Rule 72.3(c) which operates as an automatic referral of prisoner civil rights cases to magistrate judges for decision and order on non-dispositive matters, and for report and recommendation on dispositive matters. See 28 U.S.C. § 636. Instead, these cases are governed by Local Rules 40.1, 72.2(a)(d)(5) and 72.3(a) which authorize magistrate judges to manage civil cases by conducting conferences, entering scheduling orders, controlling discovery, and resolving non-dispositive motions.

Although Garraway was at liberty when he filed his suits, the court learned on December 5, 2002, that he was then incarcerated in the Broome County Jail and subject to an impending state prison sentence. At the time, Garraway had filed, or attempted to file, numerous requests related to his various suits, most of which failed to comply with the Local and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Furthermore, it was abundantly clear that Garraway lacked a fundamental understanding of the rules and procedures governing his litigation despite his possession of this district's Pro Se Handbook and Critical Notice and despite a prior conversation with this court during a Rule 16 personal appearance (see Fed.R.Civ.P. 16). Since Garraway was incarcerated and his personal situation in transition, the court exercised its authority to manage litigation, and issued a stay of his cases. Embodied in a minute order, the court's stay stated:

All further progress in all Garraway cases is stayed pending further order of this court . . . Except in 9:99-CV-1913 in which Garraway must respond to the motion by December 12, 2002, as previously ordered.

See 1117 at Dkt. No. 9.

Since Garraway has now reached his final destination, the court issues this decision in order to: clarify and vacate the December 5, 2002, stay; clarify the status of Garraway's pending litigation; resolve outstanding management and scheduling issues; resolve a Garraway recusal motion; and, apprize Garraway of some of his responsibilities under the Local and Federal Rules, especially in light of his repeated failure to abide by those rules and court orders.

II. Clarification and Dissolution of the December 5, 2002, Stay

The court begins with clarification of its prior stay because the specific language referred to "all Garraway cases." In retrospect, that choice of language was unfortunate since the court was unaware that Garraway was a plaintiff in two additional Northern District cases, Garraway v. Mollen, 3:02-CV-613, and Garraway v. Edwards, 3:00-CV-1710.

First of all, it should have been crystal clear that Mollen (613) was unaffected by the stay since it was previously dismissed on May 20, 2002, by decision and order of Thomas J. McAvoy, District Court Judge. See 613, Dkt. No. 3. Furthermore, the stay was not meant to effect Edwards (1710), and it is clear that it did not. In Edwards, judgment was entered for Garraway on July 19, 2002, following a jury verdict in his favor. On July 31, his standby trial counsel, Remy Perot, Esq., filed a motion for attorney fees. 1710, Dkt. No. 51. On August 8 and August 22, 2002, Edwards and Garraway filed appeals with the Second Circuit. 1710, Dkt. Nos. 52, 55. On September 27, Judge McAvoy took the motion for attorney fees on submit, and issued a decision and order on February 21, 2003. 1710, Dkt. Nos. 65, 68. Garraway's appeal is now pending before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. See 1710, Min. Entry, Apr. 15, 2003. Thus, Edwards has progressed as it should have.

This court's December 5 stay was never designed to impact either of these cases, and it is obvious that it did not. Furthermore, Garraway has now reached his final destination, and there is now no reason to continue the stay. Accordingly, the court vacates it, effective as of the date of the filing of this decision and order.

III. The Status of Garraway Litigation in Cases Now Pending Before This Court

A. Garraway v. Morabito (9:99-CV-1913)

This civil rights action was filed by Garraway and Kenneth D. Harvey on November 4, 1999, in Binghamton, was given a Binghamton filing division number ("3"), and jointly assigned, as are all civil cases in the district, to a District Court Judge (Hon. Lawrence E. Kahn) and a magistrate judge (this court).

After numerous delays caused by plaintiffs' defective complaint and failures to notify the court of address changes, issue was finally joined almost one year later when Morabito answered on October 26, 2000. See Morabito, 1913, Dkt. Nos. 4-5, 7-9. Consistent with this court's practice of scheduling in person Rule 16 conferences in pro se litigation, the court conducted that conference on March 19, 2001, and issued a Uniform Pretrial Scheduling Order (UPSO), setting deadlines for various stages of the litigation, including a motion filing deadline. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 16; see also, Morabito, 1913, Dkt. Nos. 16-17. During that conference, the court personally explained the practices, procedures and rules governing the progress of civil litigation in this district to Garraway and Harvey. Id. at Dkt. No. 16.

On November 13, 2001, Morabito filed a timely motion for summary judgment Id. at Dkt. No. 18. On November 14, the Clerk's Office issued this district's standard summary judgment notice to plaintiffs advising them of their obligations in responding to Morabito's motion. Id. at Dkt. No. 23. Garraway responded on December 7, 2001, and Judge Kahn then notified the parties that the motion would be taken on submit and adjourned the scheduled trial without date. Id. at Dkt. Nos. 25, 27-28. Thereafter, and by order of the Hon. Frederick J. Scullin, Jr., C.J., the case was reassigned from Judge Kahn to Judge Munson on March 27, 2002. Id. at Dkt. No. 30. On August 1, 2002, Garraway wrote the District Court requesting a trial date. Id. at Dkt. No. 32.

According to the Clerk's electronic filing system, on August 5, 2002, a Deputy Clerk requested that the actual file in this case be transferred from Albany to Syracuse. Then, on August 6, apparently presuming her authority to do so, she improperly changed the case designation from a "3" non-prisoner case to a "9" prisoner case, and referred the summary judgment motion then pending before the District Court to this court. See Morabito, 1913, Aug. 21, 2002, Min. Entry. This court subsequently discussed the procedural history with Judge Munson who then referred the motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). See Fn. 2. After the referral, this court determined that plaintiffs had never substantively responded to the motion nor fully complied with Local Rule 7.1 governing summary judgment motion practice. Accordingly, the court issued a September 9, 2002, order affording them an additional thirty (30) days to respond to Morabito's earlier summary judgment motion and warning them of the possible adverse consequences if they failed to do so. Morabito, 1913, Dkt. No. 33. After the court's order was twice returned as undeliverable because both plaintiffs had failed to comply with L.R. 10.1(b)(2) (notification of address change), the court twice reissued the order, and ultimately reset plaintiffs' response date to December 12, 2002. Id. at Dkt. Nos. 34-37. Because of this procedural history, the court exempted plaintiffs' required response from the December 5, 2002, stay.

On April 9, 2003, Garraway finally responded, submitted no further opposition to the motion, and stated that he intended to rely on his December 5, 2001, response. Id. at Dkt. No. 42. Therefore, the court will issue its report and recommendation to the District Court and the parties.

B. Garraway v. De Posi (3:02-CV-766)

This civil rights action was originally filed in Binghamton on June 10, 2002, and co-assigned to Judge McAvoy and this court. On June 28, Judge McAvoy issued a conditional dismissal order advising Garraway that his complaint was defective, and directed that he file an amended complaint correcting the defects. De Posi, 766, Dkt. No. 3. After Garraway twice amended his complaint, a summons was finally issued on August 20, 2002, and this court reset the date for an in person Rule 16 Conference for November 18. Id. at Dkt. Nos. 4-9. On October 25, De Posi answered through David Bagley, Esq. Id. at Dkt. No. 13.

On October 11 and November 1, 2002, Garraway and De Posi submitted separate Civil Case Management Plans in anticipation of the Rule 16 conference. Id. at Dkt. Nos. 10, 16. On November 7, both a Garraway address change and a Rule 16 conference adjournment notice were filed. Id. at Dkt. Nos. 17-18. The court adjourned the in person conference to February 10, 2003, and Garraway advised that he was then incarcerated in the Broome County Jail. In Garraway's letter, he requested that the court issue a "transport order," requiring someone, presumably the Broome County Sheriff since he was in the Sheriff's custody, to transport him to what he believed was the impending November 18 Rule 16 Conference. Id. at Dkt. No. 17. The adjournment notice and Garraway's change of address obviously crossed in the mail, and it is likely that Garraway did not receive the adjournment notice. Id. at Dkt. No. 18. Unaware of the adjournment, Garraway wrote the District Court on November 13, requesting that the district court issue a "transport order" for the November 18 conference. Id. at Dkt. No. 19. Judge McAvoy rejected his letter-request because he had not served a copy on Bagley, De Posi's attorney, as required by L.R. 5.1(a), and ordered that the request be returned. Id. Naturally, neither this court nor the District Court has the authority to order the Broome County Sheriff's Department to "transport" Garraway to a federal civil conference without Garraway's full compliance with the Sheriff's rules and regulations in that regard.

On November 22, 2002, Garraway sought to file a letter bearing a written notation, "Motion for Injunction," seeking to have the District Court issue an order to the Broome County Sheriff's Department preventing Garraway's transfer to some other facility "during the life" of his cases. Because the letter-motion ignored L.R. 5.1(a) and Judge McAvoy's earlier order and because it failed to comply with L.R. 7.1 governing motion practice, this court directed that the Clerk return it. Id. at Dkt. No. 21.

On November 26, 2002, this court issued an order in this case and in Julian (3:02-CV-848) and Newcomb (3:02-CV-1117), all of which were co-assigned to Judge McAvoy and this court. Id. at Dkt. No. 22. In the order, the court noted that Garraway was unable to attend scheduled Rule 16 conferences because of his incarceration, adjourned the conferences without date pending service of process and the filing of answers, and directed Garraway to notify the court, in writing, once his permanent address had been established. The court also formally denied his request for a transport order. Id. Despite that order, Garraway again wrote the court requesting issuance of a transport order for some unspecified "court appointment," which the court rejected as having been addressed in the November 26 order. Id. at Dkt. No. 23.

On December 5, 2002, Garraway filed a three-page letter with attachments, self-styled as a "motion for emergency injunction." Id. at Dkt. No. 25. Naturally, his letter did not comply with the Local Rules' motion requirements, but the court denied the motion in any event since it had then stayed further proceedings. See Newcomb, 1117 at Dkt. No. 9.

Apparently unhappy with this court's earlier orders rejecting his motions and his request for transport orders, Garraway sought to renew the requests with Judge McAvoy. Id. at Dkt. No. 26. Citing this court's stay, Judge McAvoy denied the requests, and further instructed Garraway:

The Court has directed that your correspondence dated December 8, 2002 be rejected and returned to you on the basis that it failed to meet the proof of service requirements.

Finally, the Court is directing that you refrain from combining several cases in one general correspondence when seeking various relief in different suits. Once the Court has lifted the stay, all further submissions shall be subject to filing in the specific action that it relates to, shall concisely state the relief being sought, and, need comply with the filing and service requirements set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the local rules of this district. Failure to comply with this directive may result in the document(s) being rejected by the Court and returned for non-compliance. (sic.)

Id. at Dkt. No. 26.

On March 13, 2003, Garraway wrote the court, stated that all parties had been served, provided his permanent address and requested that a "scheduled hearing be held." Id. at Dkt. No. 27. The defendant has now answered, and the case is ripe for a scheduling order.

C. Garraway v. Julian (3:02-CV-848)

On June 27, 2002, Garraway filed this civil rights complaint which proceeded substantially in the same fashion as did De Posi. Judge McAvoy issued a conditional order of dismissal because Garraway's complaint was defective, Garraway amended, and Judge McAvoy accepted the amendment and ordered that a summons and complaint be forwarded to the U.S. Marshal for service. Julian, 848 at Dkt. Nos. 1-5. Because of the delays occasioned by Garraway's defective complaint, this court adjourned the Rule 16 conference to November 18, 2002. Id. at Dkt. No. 6. Once again, there were delays caused by Garraway's failure to notify the court of his address change. Id. at Dkt. Nos. 8-9.

On October 31, 2002, the Marshals returned the summons unexecuted. Id. at Dkt. No. 10. On November 5, the court again adjourned the Rule 16 conference because Julian had not been served, and reminded Garraway of that fact. Id. at Dkt. No. 12. On December 2, Garraway wrote the court, and acknowledged that the Marshals had not perfected service and that he understood that Fed.R.Civ.P. 4 governed service. Id. at Dkt. No. 18. On December 2, the Clerk responded, and reminded Garraway not to combine cases in single correspondence, provided a new USM-285 with directions that Garraway contact the Marshals concerning service of process and reminded him that service had not been perfected in Newcomb (1117). Id. at Dkt. No. 19.

Despite all prior warnings from Judge McAvoy and this court, despite repeated reminders concerning the obligation to serve his adversaries with copies of communications to the court, despite repeated reminders that "motions" and other requests for relief had to comply with the Local and Federal rules, and despite the December 5 stay, Garraway continued to improperly communicate with the court between November 13, 2002, and March 17, 2003. See Julian, 848, Dkt. Nos. 14-16, 20-24, 29, 31-33.

According to a docket entry, the Marshal did perfect service on February 5, 2003, by leaving the summons and complaint with Beverly Bmaine, "a person of suitable age and discretion then residing in . . . [Ms. Julian's] . . . usual place of abode." Id. at Dkt. No. 25; see also, Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(e)(2). However, the court has scrutinized the return and checked the Marshal's records, and service was not perfected at Ms. Julian's residence. Rather, the summons and complaint were left at the BC Humane Society. Accordingly, there is a substantial issue regarding whether Ms. Julian has ever been properly served. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(e).

Nothing in the docket reflects that the defendant has answered, but proceedings in the case were stayed on December 5, 2002. Accordingly, Garraway's subsequent efforts to enter default were vacated and denied by both Judge McAvoy and this court. Id. at Dkt. Nos. 31-33.

Since the court now vacates the stay, the case may proceed, but proper service must still be effectuated. Accordingly, the court directs the Clerk of Court to forward another copy of the summons, amended complaint and Mr. Garraway's prior USM-285 to the Marshal for personal service in compliance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(e). Subsequent to service, the defendant or her counsel must then file a formal response to the complaint as required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

D. Garraway v. Newcomb (3:02-CV-01117)

On August 28, 2002, Garraway filed this civil rights complaint and, as in the preceding cases, service and Rule 16 conferences were delayed. See Newcomb, 1117, Min. Entry Sept. 5, 2002, and Dkt. No. 6. Again, and as with the other cases, a number of Garraway's submissions were rejected for failure to comply with judicial orders and the federal and local rules. Id. at Dkt. Nos. 7-10, 15. Furthermore, there were delays caused by Garraway's failure to notify the court of his address change. Id. at Dkt. Nos. 8-9.

After a second attempt, the Marshal served Newcomb on February 14, 2003, and she answered on February 26, 2003. Id. at Dkt. Nos. 16, 18. The case is now ready for a Rule 16 scheduling conference since the December 5 stay is now vacated.

IV. Management and Scheduling

A. Garraway v. Morabito (9:99-CV-1913)

All pretrial deadlines have expired, and the court will issue the report and recommendation requested by the Honorable Howard G. Munson, Sr., District Court Judge. The parties must comply with the requirements of the report and recommendation, and timely file any objections. All further proceedings will then be scheduled by Judge Munson.

B. Garraway v. De Posi (3:02-CV-766)

This case is now ready for the court to issue a Uniform Pretrial Scheduling Order setting dates that will control the progress of this action. Because of Garraway's incarceration, the court will not hold an in person conference. Instead, the court directs that the Clerk transmit to each of the parties a Civil Case Management Plan. The parties are directed to separately complete the plan, serve a copy on their adversary by mail, and file the original with the Clerk on or before June 30, 2003. In addition to those areas specifically addressed in the Plan, the parties should address, to the extent to which they apply, those subjects recited in Local Rule 16.1(d). Additionally, the parties should specifically address the authorized discovery they will seek, and how they intend to engage in such discovery. After receipt of the Plans, the court will issue a Uniform Pretrial Scheduling Order.

C. Garraway v. Julian (3:02-CV-848)

As previously articulated, this case is not ready to proceed because the Marshal has not perfected proper service. The court directs the Clerk to re-issue the summons, complaint and USM-285, and schedule further proceedings after issue has been joined. The Marshal is directed to effect legal service pursuant to Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. If the defendant fails to timely answer following proper service, Mr. Garraway may file a motion for default judgment.

C. Garraway v. Newcomb (3:02-CV-01117)

This case is now ready for the court to issue a Uniform Pretrial Scheduling Order setting dates that will control the progress of this action. Because of Garraway's incarceration, the court will not hold an in person conference. Instead, the court directs that the Clerk transmit to each of the parties a Civil Case Management Plan. The parties are directed to separately complete the plan, serve a copy on their adversary by mail, and file the original with the Clerk on or before June 30, 2003. In addition to those areas specifically addressed in the Plan, the parties should address, to the extent to which they apply, those subjects recited in Local Rule 16.1(d). Additionally, the parties should specifically address the authorized discovery they will seek, and how they intend to engage in such discovery. After receipt of the Plans, the court will issue a Uniform Pretrial Scheduling Order.

V. Litigation Responsibilities

During Garraway's personal appearance on March 19, 2001, in Morabito, the court specifically advised him that while he had an absolute right to represent himself, nothing in that entitlement absolved him from having to comply with the Local and Federal Rules. As the court also explained, it cannot serve as his legal advisor. Garraway has been supplied several copies of this District's Pro Se Handbook and Critical Notice, the contents of which should help him through the litigation process. Furthermore, all State Penal Institutions have copies of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in their law libraries. Mr. Garraway must comply with those rules. The failure to do so when filing correspondence or documents with the court will result in orders rejecting the filings.

While the court cannot draft a treatise summarizing all of Garraway's responsibilities under the Rules, it does recite several given Garraway's repeated violations during prior submissions.

1. As Judge McAvoy has ordered several times, you may not file a single document addressing multiple cases. Each document must pertain to a single case, must identify the case by filing number, and must succinctly state the relief you are seeking.

2. If you are filing a motion, you must comply with all motion rules, including those in Local Rule 7.1.

3. You may not engage in ex parte (private) communication with the court. Therefore, anything you seek to file with the court must contain a certificate of service demonstrating that you have filed a copy with your adversary's attorney.

4. Although you have been granted in forma pauperis status, that only relates to the original filing fee. You are responsible for all costs of litigation, including photocopying fees and other costs of discovery.

The court will not photocopy documents for you as you have previously requested.

5. The court will not pay expenses associated with any required court hearings or appearances, nor expenses associated with discovery such as costs of depositions. The court will not issue orders, "transport" or otherwise, directing prison officials to transport you in connection with your personal civil litigation. You are fully responsible for complying with any and all New York State Prison Regulations, including costs, applicable to your needs in order to prosecute your civil suits. Furthermore, you are responsible for prosecuting your suits, and your failure to do so may render your suit subject to dismissal. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b).

VI. Recusal

Lastly, the court addresses several recent letters from Garraway seeking recusal of the court. See Undocketed and Unserved Ap. 7, 2003, Ltr. to Chief Judge Scullin; Undocketed and Unserved Ap. 17. 2003, Ltr. to Pro Se Unit; Undocketed, Undated and Unserved Ltr. to Judge Sharpe Marked Rec'd Ap. 21, 2003; Undocketed and Unserved Ltr. to Judge McAvoy Marked Rec'd and Ret'd Ap. 22, 2003; Undocketed and Unserved Ap. 28, 2003, Ltr. to Pro Se Staff Attorney.

According to Garraway, he is serving a New York State prison sentence as a result of a felony conviction in Broome County Court. His case was prosecuted by an Assistant Broome County District Attorney, Robert Sharpe. Garraway alleges that Sharpe is my son and is influencing this court's various decisions concerning his cases. He alleges no facts to support his bald conclusion, and offers nothing to suggest any connection whatsoever between his state court criminal action and his unrelated federal civil actions.

It is true that my eldest son, Robert, was employed by the Broome County District Attorney's Office in 2002 although he no longer works there. It is also true that my son is a thirty-four year old adult, and has never consulted with me about any federal case pending before me. It is also true that virtually all of Garraway's complaints about case processing demonstrate a fundamental misunderstanding on his part concerning rules and procedures that govern federal litigation. That misunderstanding is unwarranted in light of the repeated information supplied Garraway in handbooks, hand-outs, at conferences and in numerous orders rejecting his submissions wherein the purpose of the rejection was explained.

Recusal is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 455. The court has carefully reviewed the statute, and none of the factors would warrant recusal here. This court has no dispositive jurisdiction over Garraway's suits since all such matters must be resolved by the co-assigned District Court Judges. This court's principal role is to manage the litigation through its preliminary stages in anticipation of referral to the District Court at the dispositive motion and trial stage. While this court would like nothing better than to shift responsibility to another magistrate judge, it would be a dereliction of duty to do so. Accordingly, Garraway's recusal motion is unsupported by the facts, has no legal merit, and is denied.

VII. Conclusion

Based upon the foregoing, and for the reasons stated, it is hereby ORDERED:

1. This court's prior stay (3:02-CV-1117, Docket No. 9) is HEREBY VACATED AS OF THE DATE OF THIS ORDER;

2. The motion by pro se plaintiff, Anthony M. Garraway, for this court to enter an order of recusal (see Undocketed and Unserved Ap. 7, 2003, Ltr. to Chief Judge Scullin; Undocketed and Unserved Ap. 17. 2003, Ltr. to Pro Se Unit; Undocketed, Undated and Unserved Ltr. to Judge Sharpe Marked Rec'd Ap. 21, 2003; Undocketed and Unserved Ltr. to Judge McAvoy Marked Rec'd and Ret'd Ap. 22, 2003; Undocketed and Unserved Ap. 28, 2003, Ltr. to Pro Se Staff Attorney) is HEREBY DENIED;

3. The Clerk is HEREBY DIRECTED to file the submissions listed in the preceding decretal paragraph (#2) in Garraway v. De Posi, 3:02-CV — 766, and add a minute entry to the dockets of Garraway v. Morabito, 9:99-CV-1913, Garraway v. Julian, 3:02-CV-848 and Garraway v. Newcomb, 3:02-CV-1117, indicating the original docketing in De Posi;

4. As to Civil Action 9:99-CV-1913, pro se plaintiff, Anthony M. Garraway, and the defendant, Paul Morabito, through counsel, Earl D. Butler, Esq., must comply with all time requirements for filing objections to a report and recommendation as recited in the report and recommendation to be filed by this court under separate cover;

5. As to Civil Action Nos. 3:02-CV-766 (Garraway v. De Posi) and 3:02-CV-1117 (Garraway v. Newcomb):

a. The Clerk of Court is HEREBY DIRECTED to mail copies of Proposed Civil Case Management Plans together with the copy of this decision and order, one (1) to each of the defendants and two (2) to pro se plaintiff, the latter to be separately completed by pro se plaintiff as to each case;

b. Pro se plaintiff, Anthony M. Garraway, and the defendant, Cheryl De Posi, through counsel, David A. Bagley, Esq., and the defendant, Kathleen Newcomb, through counsel, Robert G. Behnke, Esq., SHALL:

(1) Independently and without the necessity of consultation, complete the plan, including information, as pertinent, concerning the subjects recited in Local Rule 16.1(d), and including the authorized discovery they will seek under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and how they intend to engage in such discovery; and,

(2) SHALL SERVE A COPY OF THEIR PLAN ON THEIR ADVERSARY BY MAIL, AND FILE THE ORIGINAL WITH THE CLERK ON OR BEFORE JUNE 30, 2003;

6. As to Civil Action No. 3:02-CV-848 (Garraway v. Julian), the Clerk is HEREBY DIRECTED TO RE-ISSUE THE SUMMONS, COMPLAINT AND A COPY OF ANTHONY M. GARRAWAY'S USM-285 TO THE UNITED STATES MARSHAL WHO SHALL THEN ATTEMPT TO EFFECT LEGAL SERVICE OF PROCESS PURSUANT TO RULE 4 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE ON OR BEFORE JUNE 20, 2003;

7. As to CIVIL ACTION NOS. 3:02-CV-766 (Garraway v. De Posi), 3:02-CV-848 (Garraway v. Julian) and 3:02-CV-1117, the Clerk SHALL HEREAFTER forward all correspondence and other filings submitted by pro se plaintiff, Anthony M. Garraway, to this court for review for compliance with the Local and Federal Rules and this Order, subject to the sua sponte issuance of an order rejecting such correspondence and filings for failure to comply with such rules or this order;

8. The Clerk SHALL serve a copy of the Pro Se Handbook, Supplement to the Handbook, and this District's Critical Notice to Anthony M. Garraway together with a copy of this decision and order by regular mail; and,

9. The Clerk SHALL serve a copy of this decision and order on all other parties and the United States Marshal by regular mail.

SO ORDERED.