ORDER

VAUGHN R WALKER, United States District Judge

Metropolitan Life (MetLife) denied plaintiff's claim for benefits under a long-term disability policy administered by MetLife. Plaintiff filed an action in San Francisco superior court to recover benefits under the civil enforcement provision of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), as well as compensatory and punitive damages for MetLife's alleged breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing (bad faith). Compl (Doc #1, Exh A), ¶¶ 14-24. Plaintiff moves to remand the case to state court. Docs #7 and 9. For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff's motion to remand is GRANTED.

During the period relevant to this action, plaintiff was a human resources manager and consultant at Genentech, Inc. Compl (Doc #1, Exh A), ¶ 5. As an employee of Genentech, plaintiff was enrolled in the disability plan offered by MetLife, which was intended to provide benefits for plaintiff in the event that she became totally disabled from her occupation. Id, ¶ 5, 6. In 1999, plaintiff was diagnosed as disabled; she thus applied for disability benefits under MetLife's disability plan. Id, ¶ 9. According to plaintiff, MetLife denied plaintiff's claim on November 10, 1999, without conducting a reasonable investigation or other necessary procedures. Id, ¶¶ 18, 23. Plaintiff appealed the denial and exhausted her administrative remedies under the plan, but MetLife affirmed its denial of plaintiff's claim on August 10, 2000. Id, ¶ 18.

Plaintiff filed the present action in state court on December 8, 2000. Notice of Removal (Doc #1). On January 8, 2001, MetLife filed a petition to remove the matter to federal court. Id.

II

In plaintiff's motion to remand, she argues that MetLife's notice of removal is defective because all defendants did not properly join in the petition. Plaintiff also argues that MetLife failed to explain affirmatively the absence of a co-defendant in its notice of removal. MetLife contends that no other defendants needed to join in its petition because MetLife was the only properly served defendant in this matter.

Any civil action brought in state court may be removed to federal court by a defendant when federal courts have original jurisdiction over the matter. 28 U.S.C. § 1441. In the Ninth Circuit, however, it is well established that section 1441 is to be construed strictly against such removal jurisdiction. Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co, 592 F.2d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir 1979). A plaintiff may seek to remand the matter to state court under 28 U.S.C. § 1447 for a lack of federal jurisdiction or if the notice of removal is procedurally defective. In response to such a motion, the party that invoked federal jurisdiction has the burden of establishing that removal was proper. Gaus v. Miles, Inc, 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir 1992). The court finds that MetLife has not satisfied this burden.

Plaintiff asserts that the notice of removal violates 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) because each defendant did not join in the petition. As the Ninth Circuit has made clear, all defendants must join in a notice of removal. Parrino v. FHP, Inc, 146 F.3d 699, 703 (9th Cir 1998). Aside from nominal defendants, plaintiff's complaint names MetLife and "Genentech, Inc. Long Term Disability Plan" (the Plan) as defendants. See Compl (Doc #1, Exh A). The court, however, need not address this contention because plaintiff's alternative argument, that MetLife failed to explain the absence of the Plan in its notice of removal, is dispositive.

"Where fewer than all the defendants have joined in a removal action, the removing party has the burden under section 1446(a) to explain affirmatively the absence of any co-defendants in the notice for removal." Prize Frize, Inc v. Matrix (US) Inc, 167 F.3d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir 1999). Specifically, "the notice of removal should expressly indicate why one or more defendants have not joined in the removal notice." Id (quoting 16 James Wm Moore et al, Moore's Federal Practice § 107.11(d) (Matthew Bender 3d ed 1997)). MetLife's notice of removal contains no explanation of the Plan's failure to join. Certainly, as MetLife argues in great detail in its opposition to plaintiff's motion to remand, serious questions exist regarding whether plaintiff properly effectuated service on the Plan. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d)(1). All MetLife had to do was include this argument in its original removal notice. Without such an explanation in the original notice or a cure within the 30 day time period under section 1446(b), however, the court is bound by the law of this circuit to remand the matter to state court. Prize Frize, 167 F.3d at 1266.

III

Accordingly, plaintiff's motion to remand (Doc #7) is GRANTED. MetLife's motion to dismiss is thus DENIED as moot. The clerk is directed to close the file and terminate all pending motions. The clerk is directed to transfer the file to the Superior Court in and for the county of San Francisco.