Summary
In Foster v. Powers, No. 3:08-25-PMD (D.S.C.), Plaintiff brought claims, including for false arrest and improper search pertaining to the 2008 conviction for manufacturing and distributing crack cocaine, against some of the Defendants listed in this case (Defendants Powers, Fisher, Hall, Swad, and James).
Summary of this case from Foster v. PowellOpinion
C.A. No.: 3:08-0025-PMD-JRM.
February 10, 2009
ORDER
This matter is before the court upon the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge to dismiss the Plaintiff's above-captioned case without prejudice and without issuance and service of process. The record contains a Report and Recommendation ("R R") of United States Magistrate Judge Joseph R. McCrorey, which was made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). A dissatisfied party may object, in writing, to an R R within ten days after being served with a copy of that report. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Plaintiff filed timely objections in response to the R R. Plaintiff has also filed a "Supplemental Claim," which this Court construes as a Motion to Amend his Complaint pursuant to Rule 15. For the reasons set forth herein, Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment are granted, and Plaintiff's Motion to Amend is denied.
Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, § 636(b)(1), and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e), D.S.C., the Magistrate Judge is authorized to review all pretrial proceedings involving litigation by individuals proceeding pro se, and submit findings and recommendations to this Court.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Robert Lee Foster ("Plaintiff" or "Foster") is currently an inmate serving a 20 year sentence at Lee Correctional Institution ("LCI") on a conviction for manufacturing and distributing crack cocaine. Plaintiff asserts that his constitutional rights were violated during the arrest, pretrial detention, and trial, and asserts a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his Complaint, Plaintiff makes multiple allegations: (1) that Defendant Officers J.L. Hall ("Hall") and Brad James ("James") of the Spartanburg Police Department arrested him without probable cause, violating his constitutional rights; (2) that Defendant K.D. Swad ("Swad") conducted an unconstitutional search of his person while processing him when he was first brought to the Spartanburg County Detention Facility ("SCDF"); (3) that SCDF was overcrowded; and (4) that Hall defamed him in statements made at a preliminary hearing. Plaintiff also asserts that Defendants Powers and Fisher should be responsible for the actions of their inferiors.Plaintiff filed his Complaint in this matter on January 4, 2008. Defendants James, Fisher, and Hall filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on May 30. Defendant Powers filed a separate Motion for Summary Judgment on June 2. Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to these Motions on June 26. The Magistrate Judge filed an R R on October 7, recommending that this Court dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint without prejudice and without issuance and service of process. Plaintiff filed timely Objections to the Magistrate Judge's R R on October 28.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
I. Magistrate Judge's Report Recommendation
Magistrate Judges are empowered by statute to preside over pretrial matters on appointment by a district judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72. Where, as here, a Magistrate Judge is "assigned without consent of the parties to hear a pretrial matter dispositive of a claim or defense of a party or a prisoner petition challenging the conditions of confinement . . . [t]he magistrate judge shall enter into the record a recommendation for disposition of the matter." Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). The recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility for making a final determination remains with the court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 269 (1976).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), a District Court evaluating a Magistrate Judge's recommendation is permitted to adopt those portions of the recommendation to which no "specific, written objection" is made, as long as those sections are not clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985). However, where a party makes a specific, written objection within ten days of being served with a copy of the report, the district court is required to make a de novo determination regarding those parts of the report, and the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, or recommit the matter with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The court has reviewed the entire record, the R R, and Plaintiff's Objections. The Magistrate Judge fairly and accurately summarized the facts in this case and this Court incorporates the R R's recitation of the facts by specific reference.
II. Summary Judgment
To grant a party's motion for summary judgment, the Court must find that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The Court is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine if there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). All evidence should be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 123-24 (4th Cir. 1990). "[W]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, disposition by summary judgment is appropriate." Teamsters Joint Council No. 83 v. Centra, Inc., 947 F.2d 115, 119 (4th Cir. 1991). "[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The "obligation of the nonmoving party is `particularly strong when the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof.'" Hughes v. Bedsole, 48 F.3d 1376, 1381 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Pachaly v. City of Lynchburg, 897 F.2d 723, 725 (4th Cir. 1990)). Summary judgment is not "a disfavored procedural shortcut" but an important mechanism for weeding out "claims and defenses [that] have no factual bases." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327.
ANALYSIS
I. Plaintiff's Claim that He Was Arrested Without Probable Cause
Plaintiff seeks damages from Powers, James, and Hall because he alleges that James and Hall had no probable cause to arrest him. Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation to this Court that this claim be dismissed. Plaintiff's objection essentially consists of reiterating his original grounds for relief in his Complaint. Plaintiff claims that he was arrested solely because he had been in trouble with the law before, and that he had just been walking down the street when Officer Hall pulled over in his patrol car and placed Plaintiff under arrest. Since he was not doing anything wrong or even mildly suspicious, Plaintiff asserts that his arrest was unconstitutional.
Plaintiff's essential claim, then, is that he never should have been arrested, and thus never should have been convicted, sentenced, and imprisoned. However, the Supreme Court of the United States has held that in order to recover damages for imprisonment in violation of the constitution, the imprisonment must first successfully be challenged. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (holding that a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.). A prisoner's damages claim that would "necessarily require [him] to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement" cannot be brought under § 1983. Id. Because a claim for damages that does not bear a relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983, Plaintiff may not recover monetary damages until the imprisonment is first successfully challenged.
Most importantly, the Supreme Court held in Heck that "when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff(s) would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff(s) can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated." 512 U.S. at 487. In this case, Plaintiff is asserting that he was arrested without probable cause, and thus any evidence seized from him should have been subject to the exclusionary and that his subsequent trial and conviction were invalid. The appropriate method for asserting such a claim is to directly appeal his conviction in state court, not to bring a § 1983 action in federal court.
If Plaintiff's direct appeal is unsuccessful, he still has the opportunity to file an application for post-conviction relief ("PCR"). See S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-10 et seq. (1976). Furthermore, if Plaintiff's application for PCR is denied or dismissed, he can then file an "appeal" (petition for writ of certiorari) in that PCR case. See S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-100 (1976). If Plaintiff seeks habeas relief in federal court, he must file an action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Heck, 512 U.S. at 481 ("[H]abeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release.") Accordingly, Plaintiff's claim should be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Heck.
In his Objections, Plaintiff also seems to raise a host of new claims which he has never raised before and which were not before the Magistrate Judge. While all claims are unsupported by facts and some of them border on the incoherent, he seems to want to bring claims against Defendants for improper chain of custody with regard to some of the evidence against him, prosecutorial withholding of exculpatory evidence, violation of his right to confront witnesses against him under the Confrontation Clause, Double Jeopardy, and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. However, all of these claims seek to undermine the validity of his trial, conviction, and sentence, and Heck quite clearly provides that any such claim is inappropriate under a § 1983 action. For this reason, these claims fail as a matter of law and the Court need not and does not address the specific merits of each proposed claim.
Furthermore, even if Plaintiff's claim that his constitutional rights were violated because he was arrested without probable cause was not barred by Heck, his claim would fail because he has failed to establish an issue of material fact on the claim. Plaintiff's claims are not supported by anything in the record, and he has produced nothing more than his own vague, self-supporting, conclusory claims in support of his cause of action. The record shows that while James and Hall were familiar with Plaintiff's extensive history of selling drugs in the Spartanburg area, this was not the sole reason for Plaintiff's arrest.
James and Hall were patrolling Norris Street, one of Spartanburg's highest-crime areas, with the goal of preventing violence and drug activities, both of which were common in the area. At 8:30 p.m., the officers noticed Plaintiff and another known drug dealer standing on the sidewalk in front of a vacant house at 321 Norris Street, an area where police had received numerous resident complaints regarding narcotic distribution. James warned the individuals that they needed to leave the area, as they were in violation of Spartanburg's anti-loitering provision. Plaintiff and the other individual were allowed to leave the scene at this time. However, upon returning to the area on patrol again approximately half an hour later, James and Hall spotted Plaintiff and the same individual again standing in front of the vacant house at 321 Norris Street. They were again warned that they were illegally loitering and needed to leave, and again they left. After another half an hour, James and Hall once more spotted Plaintiff and his counterpart standing in front of the vacant house at 321 Norris Street. At this point, James and Hall placed the two men under arrest. Before Plaintiff was placed under arrest, he removed a metal crack pipe from his pocket and dropped it underneath the patrol car in an apparent attempt to prevent Officers James and Hall from taking it into evidence when they searched his person.
"Probable cause is determined from the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of the arrest. For probable cause to exist, there need only be enough evidence to warrant the belief of a reasonable officer that an offense has been or is being committed; evidence sufficient to convict is not required." Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 367 (4th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). Here, the police officers in question had not only probable cause, but certainty that a violation had occurred, as they clearly saw Plaintiff and his counterpart violating the municipal loitering ordinance multiple times. Furthermore, the officers were aware that Plaintiff was known as a drug dealer, and that he was repeatedly standing in front of a vacant house in a neighborhood known for drug dealing, in a specific location about which they had received numerous reports from residents complaining that drugs were being sold. Based on the totality of circumstances known to Officers James and Hall at the time, any reasonable officer would believe that an offense was being committed, and thus they had probable cause to make the arrest.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's claim that he was arrested without probable cause is without merit, and this claim therefore fails as a matter of law.
II. Plaintiff's Claim that He Was Unconstitutionally Searched at the Detention Center
The Court next turns to Plaintiff's claim that after being arrested and taken to the Spartanburg County Detention Facility ("SCDF"), he was unconstitutionally subjected to a search of his person. Plaintiff asserts that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy upon arriving at SCDF, and it was therefore unconstitutional for Defendant Swad to conduct a search of his person.
Defendants Swad and Powers assert that they have a compelling interest in making sure detainees are not bringing drugs or weapons into SCDF, and the only reliable way to ensure this is to subject a detainee who was suspected of drug distribution and who had drug paraphernalia on his person at the time of his arrest to a thorough search upon being admitted to the facility. When he was first brought to SCDF, Plaintiff was subject to a strip search by Swad, and the search did indeed uncover a sizeable rock of crack cocaine, which Plaintiff attempted to hide in his mouth and then throw away in a nearby trashcan upon Swad's initiation of the search.
The Fourth Circuit has held:
Strip searches of detainees are constitutionally constrained by due process requirements of reasonableness under the circumstances. "In each case it requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted."Logan v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007, 1013 (4th Cir. 1981) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979)). Here, the record clearly shows that the search procedure was supported by a legitimate and important interest (maintaining order in the facility and protecting the safety of other detainees). There is no evidence in the record that the search was motivated by any sort of cruelty or desire to punish Plaintiff. Every reasonable accommodation of Plaintiff's privacy and dignity was made by Defendants — Plaintiff was searched by a single officer in a private, segregated room, and there was no evidence Swad did anything to demean or degrade Plaintiff while conducting the search.
Accordingly, Defendants' search of Plaintiff upon his arrival at SCDF was motivated by a reasonable suspicion that Plaintiff may have drugs or weapons on his person and was conducted in a reasonable manner. Therefore, Plaintiff's claim that the search violated his constitutional rights fails as a matter of law.
III. Plaintiff's Claim that SCDF was Overcrowded, and His Claim against Hall for Defamation
Plaintiff also claims that his rights were violated because when he arrived, SCDF was overcrowded. However, the Magistrate Judge recommended to this Court that this claim be dismissed, because Plaintiff was able to provide nothing more than the vague, conclusory, self-serving statement that SCDF was overcrowded. He provided no explanation for how overcrowded it was or what injurious effect it had on him. In his Objections to the Magistrate Judge's R R, Plaintiff made no Objection to this recommendation. Since there was no specific objection to this recommendation, this Court is bound only to review that specific portion of the R R to ensure that it is not clearly erroneous or contrary to law. This Court has reviewed that portion of the Magistrate Judge's recommendation, and is satisfied that it was a correct application of the law to the facts of Plaintiff's case. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claim that his constitutional rights were violated by SCDF being overcrowded fails as a matter of law.
Similarly, Plaintiff alleged that Hall defamed him at the preliminary hearing, when Hall informed the Magistrate that Plaintiff had been arrested before for selling drugs, that Norris Street was known as a place where narcotics were often sold, and that Plaintiff threw a crackpipe underneath the squad car when he was placed under arrest. The Magistrate Judge recommended that this Court dismiss this state law claim, because, since all of Plaintiffs' other claims should also be dismissed, there was no longer any basis for this Court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claim. In his Objections to the Magistrate Judge's R R, Plaintiff made no Objection to this recommendation. Since there was no specific objection to this recommendation, this Court is bound only to review that specific portion of the R R to ensure that it is not clearly erroneous or contrary to law. This Court has reviewed that portion of the Magistrate Judge's recommendation, and is satisfied that it was a correct application of the law to the facts of Plaintiff's case. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claim that he was defamed by Hall at the preliminary hearing is hereby dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
IV. Supervisor Liability
The Magistrate Judge further recommended that this Court hold that Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Powers and Fisher be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to make any factual allegations against them, and seeks to hold them liable solely on the theory of respondeat superior. Generally speaking, there is no respondeat superior liability in § 1983 suits unless the employee's actions were due to an official policy set forth by a supervisor. Monell v. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). A supervisor may also be held responsible for the actions of subordinates if the supervisor is aware of the risk of a statutory harm or constitutional violation and fails to take preventive action. Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368 (4th Cir. 1984).
Since Plaintiff fails to make any allegations that Defendants Powers and Fisher played any role in the alleged constitutional violations themselves, and this Court has determined that none of the Defendants' actions violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights, there is no possible grounds for supervisor liability. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Powers and Fisher fail as a matter of law.
V. Qualified Immunity
Furthermore, the Magistrate Judge also recommended, correctly, that Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment be granted because all Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. The doctrine of qualified immunity offers some protection to a government employee being sued in his or her individual capacity. The Supreme Court has held that "[g]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
Since all Defendants are government officials being sued in their individual capacities for actions taken while they were acting in an official capacity, the only remaining question as to qualified immunity for Defendants is whether or not Defendants violated "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." As the Court has previously explained, Plaintiff has failed to establish an issue of material fact on any of his allegations of constitutional violations. Since none of Defendants violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights, Defendants are also shielded from liability by qualified immunity.
VI. Plaintiff's "Supplemental Claim"
Finally, this Court addresses Plaintiff's "Supplemental Claim," a document Plaintiff filed along with his Objections to the Magistrate Judge's R R on October 20, 2008. Plaintiff appears to be attempting to amend his Complaint with this document.
Motions to amend a pleading are governed by Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 15(a) provides that leave to amend "shall be freely given when justice so requires." Upholding the letter and the spirit of this rule, "leave to amend a pleading should be denied only when the amendment would be prejudicial to the opposing party, there has been bad faith on the part of the moving party, or the amendment would be futile." Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 242 (4th Cir. 1999) (emphasis in original); see also Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techn., AG, 304 F. Supp. 2d 812, 819 (E.D. Va. 2004) ("Courts generally favor the `resolution of cases on their merits' . . . [t]hus the substantive merits of a proposed claim [or defense] are typically best left for later resolution, e.g., motions to dismiss or for summary judgment, . . ., or for resolution at trial.") (quoting Davis v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 615 F.2d 606, 613 (4th Cir. 1980)). A delay in bringing a proposed amendment is generally insufficient reason to deny a party leave to amend. Edwards, 178 F.3d at 242.
For a motion to amend to be denied for futility, the amendment must be "clearly insufficient or frivolous on its face." Johnson v. Oroweat Foods Co., 785 F.2d 503, 509 (4th Cir. 1986). Such is the case here. It is impossible to decipher exactly what Plaintiff is seeking in his Supplemental Claim. The pleading merely consists of a recitation of the exact same allegations Plaintiff has previously made in his Complaint and his Objections to the Magistrate Judge's R R. He makes no new factual allegations, and makes no new claims against Defendants who were not previously named in this action. Since this would add no new claims or parties to the action, this Motion is quite obviously futile in that it does not actually seek to materially alter the proceeding in any way. Furthermore, in this Order, this Court has already determined that all of these claims are legally devoid of merit, so allowing Plaintiff leave to continue to litigate these claims would be futile.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's Supplemental Claim, which this Court construes as a Motion to Amend, would be futile and is therefore denied.
CONCLUSION
It is, therefore ORDERED, for the foregoing reasons that Plaintiff's action for civil rights relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 be DISMISSED without prejudice and without issuance and service of process. It is further ORDERED, for the foregoing reasons, that Plaintiff's Motion to Amend be DENIED.