Opinion
F084192
08-24-2023
FOSTER DAIRY FARMS, et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. STANISLAUS CONSOLIDATED FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT, Defendant and Appellant.
Best Best & Krieger, Megan K. Garabaldi and Patrick D. Skahan, for Defendant and Appellant. Greenberg Traurig, Cris K. O'Neall, Tyler R. Andrews and Rowena Santos, for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County, No. CV-20-002107 John R. Mayne, Judge.
Best Best & Krieger, Megan K. Garabaldi and Patrick D. Skahan, for Defendant and Appellant.
Greenberg Traurig, Cris K. O'Neall, Tyler R. Andrews and Rowena Santos, for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
OPINION
SNAUFFER, J.
Four taxpayers jointly filed a tax-refund complaint against Stanislaus County and Stanislaus Consolidated Fire Protection District. The complaint alleged certain fire suppression assessments "were ... illegal and erroneous" because they were based on misclassifying properties "as 'industrial,' when in fact they were 'agricultural.'" These property types-industrial and agricultural-were contained in a District resolution which in turn was based on an engineer's report and a regional vote originally enacting the assessments pursuant to Article XIII D of California's Constitution. Importantly, the taxpayers did not, and have not, challenged the assessments on constitutional grounds- the taxpayers concede the assessments are valid and constitutional.
In the trial court, the government - Stanislaus County and Stanislaus Consolidated Fire Protection District ("District") - argued the taxpayers' refund requests were barred by various statutes of limitations because, in most instances, the taxes were paid several years prior to taxpayers filing the complaint. Alternatively, the government asserted the properties were correctly classified.
The complaint proceeded to trial and the taxpayers prevailed. The trial judge held the complaint was filed timely and the government misclassified each property as industrial rather than agricultural.
On appeal, the parties essentially repeat the arguments presented in the trial court. We conclude the complaint was filed timely; however, taxpayers' properties were not unreasonably classified as industrial. As explained below, the trial court failed to properly consider the District's resolution within the entire assessment scheme and failed to show appropriate deference to the District's role in classifying property to fund fire suppression. Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment.
Our factual summary is relatively lengthy because the procedural history underpinning the District's fire suppression assessment is less than ideal. The District could have acted much more clearly and explicitly, but it did not. Nonetheless, as discussed post, the District's property classifications were reasonable when considered within proper context, which this summary attempts to provide.
In late 2004, District voters were "asked to vote on a proposed increase in Fire Suppression Assessments" "to bring the District back to financial solvency and to preserve fire suppression services to all property owners within the District." The District explained to voters its "proposed new Assessments were determined by a recent Assessment Engineering Study _."
Ballot
The ballot itself called for a simple up or down vote. A document accompanying the ballot informed each voter "[t]he proposed maximum annual assessment against your property is shown on the attached ballot." The document set forth various, undefined property classifications and assessment rates. It concluded by stating "[a] more detailed description of the assessment methodology and benefit calculation is contained in the Engineer's Report for the assessment, which is available for public inspection" at the District Clerk's Office.
The record is unclear whether an individual owning multiple parcels within the District was mailed a singular ballot listing all parcels or one ballot per parcel.
Engineer's Report
The Engineer's Report "present[ed] the benefit analysis for the imposition of the assessment known as[] the Stanislaus Consolidated Fire Protection District Fire Suppression Assessment." In describing factors relevant to the analysis, the report provided:
"Government Code Section 50078 et. seq. requires that a fire suppression assessment be based upon the type of use of property and the risk classification of the structures or other improvements on, or the use of, the property. The risk classification may include, but need not be limited to, the amount of water required for fire suppression on that property, the structure size, type of construction, structure use, and other factors relating to potential fire and panic hazards and the costs of providing the fire suppression by the District to that property."
The report explained the analysis used "the property classifications used in [a National Fire Protection Association] document" entitled" 'Fire Loss in the United States During 2002.'" Each classification was then referenced "to the land use descriptions of the District parcels as provided by the County of Stanislaus," and each parcel was assigned an "NFPA property class."
"[L]and use descriptions . . . provided by the County of Stanislaus" means Stanislaus County Property Use Codes. The relevance of those references is not clear. "NFPA" is an acronym for National Fire Protection Association.
The property classification assignments were subsequently tabulated into the following relevant groups: "Industry," "Agricultural," and "Vacant Land[.]" Notably, neither agricultural nor vacant land are specified in the NFPA document but were "included as [they comprised] a significant part of the District['s] acres[.]"
After identifying factors relevant to resource demand, the report "applied a weight to each factor." "Building [s]quare [f]ootage" was weighted at "80 percent" because "it was considered to be the most significant factor in determining demand on District fire response resources. [¶] In addition, ... District call data [was used] to determine how many fire suppression calls were related to structure fires and how many were related to unimproved parcel fires." The report "also considered District staff's analysis of the amount of resources used to respond to calls to structure fires compared to grass fires."
Property types were then segregated into "Structured Property," including "Industry," and "Unimproved Property," including "Agricultural / Vacant Land[.]" Structured property was estimated to require "98%" of the District's resources.
Finally, the report published three tables based on varying staffing levels and projected an "Annual Assessment Rate" per property type. These tables include "Industry" and "Agricultural / Vacant Land" property types but do not mention structures or improvements. The report did not define any property type.
Under Stanislaus County Property Use Codes, Vacant Land means "parcels where existing improvement have little or no value contribution" and chicken and turkey ranches are categorized as agricultural without regard to improvements.
Resolutions
After the vote passed, the District's Board of Directors passed several resolutions. In the first, the Board acknowledged it "carefully examined and reviewed" the Engineer's Report "and [was] satisfied with each and all of the items and documents ... set forth therein . . .." The Board "approved" the report and "ordered [it] to be filed in the Office of the Clerk as a permanent record and to remain open to public inspection."
In the second resolution, the District Board stated its proposed fire suppression assessments "comply with all applicable provisions of the California State Constitution Article XIIID." The Board concluded, "[b]ased upon its review .. . of the [Engineer's] Report," "that:
"a) The land within the District service area will receive special benefit by the operation, maintenance and servicing of fire suppression services and appurtenant equipment within the boundaries of the District service area.
"b) The net amount to be assessed upon the lands within the District service area is in accordance and apportioned by a formula and method which fairly distributes the net amount among all eligible parcels in proportion to the special benefit to be received by each parcel . . .."
The second resolution ended by noting "this Resolution constitutes the Fire Suppression Assessment levy" for the coming fiscal year, and directed the clerk "to file the levy with the County Auditor . . .." It further directed the "County Auditor" to enter the assessment "on the County Assessment Roll" and collect the "levies . . . at the same time and in the same manner as the County taxes are collected . . .."
In the last resolution, the District Board restated compliance with California's Constitution, acknowledged voters approved the assessments, and stated the "District has set forth a new process of assessment for the levying charges [sic] or assessments for the purpose of fire protection. ... Levies henceforth will be solely by way of the methodology as described in 'Exhibit A'. Each and every rate set forth in 'Exhibit A' corresponds to rates authorized by the [approved] ballot vote . . .."
Later resolutions renewed the assessment annually.
Exhibit A appears as follows:
Property Type
Assessment Rate
Public Assembly / Educational / Institutional
$413.00 per parcel
Residential (1 and 2 family dwellings)
$213.00 per parcel
Residential (3 or more living units)
$173.00 per unit
Stores and Offices
$0.078 per SF
Industry
$0.062 per SF
Agricultural / Vacant Land
$50.00 per parcel
Neither the exhibit nor the resolution itself defined property types.
Based on the record, it appears in 2018 the District published a document entitled "Parcel Assessment Review Program." It defines "[a]gricultural/vacant land . . . as land that is unimproved property. Unimproved property is property that is not tilled, built on, or otherwise improved for use." We do not rely on this document to resolve this dispute.
We note that the District's appellate appendix contains representative photographs of each of the properties in question, including those contained within the taxpayers' complaint.
Foster Farms, LLC, Foster Dairy Number Two, Foster Dairy Farms, and Frantz Properties Family Limited Partnership each own parcels within the Stanislaus Consolidated Fire Protection District. Each entity operated its business on its land.
Foster Farms, LLC operated six parcels in Stanislaus County. For fiscal years 2012 through 2018, its parcels were classified as industrial and it paid $1,126,133.78 in District fire suppression assessments.
The parties stipulated Foster Farms, LLC's parcels were "devoted primarily to agricultural or livestock uses and being used for the commercial production of agricultural or livestock products." In total, these parcels were improved with buildings covering more than 2,300,000 square feet.
Foster Dairy Number Two operated one parcel in Stanislaus County. For fiscal years 2015 through 2018, its parcel was classified as industrial and it paid $33,379.42 in District fire suppression assessments.
The parties stipulated Foster Dairy Number Two's parcel was "devoted primarily to agricultural or livestock uses and being used for the commercial production of agricultural or livestock products." In total, the parcel was improved with buildings covering more than 100,000 square feet.
Foster Dairy Farms operated two parcels in Stanislaus County. For fiscal years 2015 through 2018, its parcels were classified as industrial and it paid $32,539.52 in District fire suppression assessments.
The parties stipulated Foster Dairy Farms' parcels were "devoted primarily to agricultural or livestock uses and being used for the commercial production of agricultural or livestock products." In total, the parcels were improved with buildings covering more than 540,000 square feet.
Frantz Properties Family Limited Partnership operated one parcel in Stanislaus County. For fiscal year 2018, its parcel was classified as industrial and it paid $10,416.24 in District fire suppression assessments.
The parties stipulated Frantz Properties Family Limited Partnership's parcel was "devoted primarily to agricultural uses and being used for the commercial production of agricultural products." In total, the parcel was improved with buildings covering more than 125,000 square feet.
Administrative Remedies
In April 2016, Foster Farms, LLC "submitted to the District a Petition for Parcel Review and Claim for Refund" for fiscal years 2012-2016. "The District completed a site review of each parcel and ... determined that based upon that review and the Engineer's Report . . ., the classification of each of the parcels as industrial [was] appropriate." The review explained "any parcel with a significant improvement value (usually meaning over $10,000) was considered to be a developed parcel rather than an undeveloped or vacant parcel."
Foster Farms, LLC also sought a refund for fiscal year 2011. But the parties agree any refund related to fiscal year 2011 is time-barred.
Whether the District abused its discretion in denying reclassification based on $10,000-significant-improvement value is not at issue.
Later in 2016, Foster Farms, LLC mailed a tax-refund claim to the Stanislaus County Board of Supervisors and the Stanislaus Consolidated Fire District. The claim, "brought pursuant to Revenue &Taxation Code section 5096 et seq.," alleged the fire suppression "[a]ssessments were erroneously and/or illegally collected, assessed, or levied . . .." Foster Farms, LLC did not receive a response.
In August 2019, all four taxpayers submitted nearly identical tax-refund claims to the Stanislaus County Board of Supervisors. These claims were "brought pursuant to Revenue &Taxation Code section 5096 et seq." and alleged the "[a]ssessments were erroneously and/or illegally collected, assessed, or levied . . .." Again, no taxpayer received a response.
The taxpayers were each represented by the same counsel.
Trial Court
The four taxpayers, in April 2020, filed a "verified complaint" in the superior court "for refund of taxes paid," reiterating their belief the paid fire suppression assessments were "illegal and erroneous . . .." The taxpayers brought suit "pursuant to Revenue and Taxation Code Sections 5096, 5097, and 5140," but did "not seek to invalidate the Stanislaus Consolidated Fire Protection District's [] resolutions or other proceedings that levy charges or assessments for the purpose of fire protection . _."
The District answered the complaint by essentially opposing all relief. It raised several defenses, best summarized as follows: compliance with the law, statute of limitations, waiver, laches, unclean hands, and failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Stanislaus County likewise opposed relief in its answer, similarly asserted the complaint was "barred by one or more statute[s] of limitations," and alleged it was "immune from liability" under the Government Code.
The case proceeded to a bench trial. Several witnesses testified, including the property owners and a witness for the government.
Michael Frantz, on behalf of Frantz Properties Family Limited Partnership, testified its property included "three acres combined of greenhouses and 85 acres of total land[.]" The property was "used exclusively to grow . . . plants for [its] family nursery business."
Deborah Byrne, on behalf of Foster Farms, testified its properties were used to raise chickens and turkeys with no other use or production except for unspecified crops on one parcel. The properties contained numerous chicken and turkey "shelters."
Dennis Lund, on behalf of Foster Dairy Farms, testified its properties were "dedicated to growing cows from calf to heifer to ... milking . . .., as well as growing crops on the land which ends up as feed for the cows." These properties included "three long white structures . . . called free stall barns ... where the cows are kept during the day" and a "milking barn ... where the cows go to be milked."
Lund testified on behalf of both Foster Dairy Farms and Foster Dairy Number Two.
Brian Jewett, a person familiar with the Engineer's Report, testified for the government. He testified the report was "the basis of the assessment methodology, the data, and the assumptions utilized for the analysis. It also demonstrates what the findings are of the analysis, which would include the assessment rates by property type."
Jewett "oversaw and supervised the preparation of the [E]ngineer's [R]eport as well as all the contents, including the assessment methodology."
Jewett explained Table 8 in the Engineer's Report informs the "classification of commercial improvements on ag[ricultural] property[.]" He asserted "the resources to respond for agricultural property with improvements is similar to other nonresidential and commercial properties with improvements; and therefore ag[ricultural] properties with improvements would be treated fairly under this assessment program." He reiterated the fact the report" 'assign[s] the greatest weight to building square footage as it was considered to be the most significant factor in determining the fire response.' "
The court summarized Jewett's testimony as presenting an "opinion ... that improved agricultural properties should be classified as industry." Jewett continued to explain agricultural land with improvements constituted structured property and were properly classified as industry under the report methodology.
Finally, Jewett conceded the District's resolution implementing the assessment did not include the phrases" 'structured property'" or" 'unimproved property,'" but noted the resolution did "reference the [E]ngineer's [R]eport, which does include those terms." He also recognized neither the report nor the NFPA document contain property-type definitions and, although the County does define property types, "they have those descriptions for their own purposes . . .." In Jewett's opinion, the terms "agriculture" and "vacant land" were redundant and were he to rewrite the report he would simply delete the agricultural classification. i.e., a vacant land classification would suffice.
The parties stipulated" 'Agricultural/Vacant Land' . . . is intended to identify separate but related property type classifications that are related, but not the same[.]"
Decision
In the trial court's final statement of decision, it summarized the District's property classification "is given deference if it is a reasonable reading of the code section, but the reading is facially unreasonable." It characterized the "threshold question [as] not whether [the District] could have passed a taxation scheme that would tax agricultural land with structures differently than agricultural land without such structures, but whether [it] actually did."
It is unclear to what "code section" the court referred.
The court held "[t]he [s]tatute of [l]imitations arguments ultimately fail, as the County was the appropriate agency to serve, and the County's failure to respond meant the clock did not start." It then adopted a deferential standard of review and noted the District's resolutions "remove[d] entirely the subsets of structured and unimproved property . . .." It concluded the "removal ... before sending the matter to the voters was plainly deliberate" and "that removal . . . substantially changes what a reasonable interpretation should be."
Utilizing "[p]lain-language analysis," the court found the taxpayers' "land was agricultural" because "there [was] simply no viable path to an alternate reading." The court believed "plain language virtually always controls when it is not reasonably susceptible to alternate interpretations." It "supported" its conclusion by referencing the "plain language of the statute," "Stanislaus County Property Use Codes," the "lack of any qualifying language on the actual resolution (as opposed to the engineer's report)," the terms "[a]gricultural and vacant properties" appearing "in the notice of public hearing" preceding the vote, and "Government code sections and dictionary definitions of" 'agricultural ....' "
Finally, the court speculated "[t]he change in language from Table 8 in the engineer's report to the actual measure may have been designed to get more votes in these agricultural areas. No reasonable person would conclude from this language that agricultural properties would pay a different rate than $50 per parcel."
Judgment
The court awarded monetary refunds to each taxpayer. It also awarded prejudgment interest based on "Revenue and Taxation Code section 5151."
DISCUSSION
The parties discuss first whether the court erred in its ruling against the government. They discuss second the applicable statute of limitations. We take the opposite approach and first discuss the statute of limitations and, because we find it satisfied, then turn to the merits.
We ultimately conclude the trial court erred in finding the District misclassified each taxpayer's property. Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment.
I. The Applicable Statute of Limitations
The District argues "this case presents a clear Proposition 218 challenge. ... Such a challenge is subject to a 60-day statute of limitations period." It concludes this "lawsuit is thus barred because, in actuality, it is a reverse validation action."
Stanislaus County did not file an appellate brief.
"Proposition 218, approved by voters in 1996, is one of a series of voter initiatives restricting the ability of state and local governments to impose taxes and fees." (Plantier v. Ramona Municipal Water Dist. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 372, 380.) It is "known as the 'Right to Vote on Taxes Act,' which added articles XIII C and XIII D to the California Constitution." (Id. at p. 381.) "Article XIII D imposes distinct procedural and substantive limitations" on agencies attempting to enact a special assessment. (Ibid.)
Alternatively, the District asserts taxpayers' administrative "claims should have been presented one year after they accrued, and a lawsuit filed within six months of the District's rejection of their claim," citing Government Code sections 911.2, subdivision (a) and 945.6, subdivision (a)(1). In essence, the District argues "the [Government] Claims Act governs."
The taxpayers resist these arguments, contending instead "the [t]rial [c]ourt correctly ruled the statute of limitations on [their] claims for refund is governed by Revenue and Taxation Code §§ 5097(a)(2), 5141." They also claim the strict "limitation periods set forth in Code of Civil Procedure §§ 860, 863 (60-days) and Government Code § 50078.17 (90-days) are inapplicable because this is not a validation action." We agree with the taxpayers.
A. Validation Statutes Are Inapplicable
"An action under the validation statutes permits a public agency to obtain a judgment upholding its handling of an agency matter. (Code Civ. Proc., § 860.)" (Davis v. Fresno Unified School District (2023) 14 Cal.5th 671, 684 (Davis).) But "[t]he validation statutes do not apply just because a claim or action seeks to challenge-and thereby, in the colloquial sense, to 'invalidate'-an agency's action." (Santa Clarita Organization for Planning &the Environment v. Abercrombie (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 300, 308 (Santa Clarita).) "[I]f no statute authorizes use of the validation statutes to test a particular type of agency matter, then the validation statutes do not apply." (Davis, supra, at p. 685.)
Here, no statute authorizes the validation statutes to test the District's assessment implementation. It is true Government Code section 50078.17 states the validation statutes apply "to any judicial action proceeding to validate, attack, review, set aside, void, or annul an ordinance or resolution levying [a fire suppression] assessment ...." But the taxpayers here are not challenging an ordinance or resolution.
"In assessing whether a claim or action falls within the boundaries of a particular legislative declaration that the validation statutes apply, we assess whether' "[t]he gravamen of a complaint and the nature of the right sued upon, rather than the form of the action or relief demanded ..."' falls within the language of the declaration." (Santa Clarita, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 308.) The instant taxpayers are not challenging the assessment's validity but rather the assessment's specific application to their properties.
"[T]axpayers ... remain free to present claims for refunds not based on the validity of [assessments] themselves, such as claims based on errors in implementation of the [assessments] or based on other matters specified in Revenue and Taxation Code section 5096." (Golden Gate Hill Development Co., Inc. v. County of Alameda (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 760, 771.) There is no reason to believe the validation statutes are applicable in this case.
B. Government Claims Act Not Applicable
The Government Claims Act "requires the presentation of 'all claims for money or damages against local public entities'" to occur "within six months" of accrual if related to "personal injury or property damage . . .." (City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 737-738.) "[A]ll other claims must be presented within a year." (Id. at p. 738.)
"Claims under the Revenue and Taxation Code" are specifically exempted from the Government Claims Act. (Gov. Code, § 905, subd. (a).) Although Health and Safety Code section 13903, subdivision (a) states "[a]ll claims for money or damages against a [fire suppression] district are governed by" the Government Claims Act, it does not alter the fact tax-refund claims are exempted. (See Mendocino Redwood Co., LLC v. County of Mendocino (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 896, 902-903 [tax-refund claims governed by Revenue and Taxation Code when validation not at issue].)
The Government Claims Act would cover other claims against a fire suppression district, for example a claim for damages due to negligence.
C. Revenue and Taxation Code
"Our Supreme Court has explicitly held that 'the sole legal avenue for resolving tax disputes is a postpayment refund action. A taxpayer may not go into court and obtain adjudication of the validity of a tax which is due but not yet paid.'" (Flying Dutchman Park, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1135.) "' "[T]he power of the state to provide such suit as the exclusive remedy is unquestioned." '" (Fisher v. County of Orange (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 39, 51.)
Article XIII, section 32 of California's Constitution "requires that tax refund actions be brought solely according to procedures established by the Legislature." (Loeffler v. Target Corp. (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1081, 1102.) The Constitution "precludes this court from expanding the methods for seeking tax refunds expressly provided by the Legislature." (Woosley v. State of California (1992) 3 Cal.4th 758, 792 (Woosley).)
Prior to resorting to court, Revenue and Taxation Code section 5142, subdivision (a) demands a taxpayer "first ... file[]" "a claim for refund ... pursuant to Article 1 (commencing with section 5096)." Section 5096, subdivision (b) permits a refund if taxes were "[e]rroneously or illegally collected."
Undesignated statutory references are to the Revenue and Taxation Code.
Section 5097, subdivision (a)(2), in turn, mandates taxpayers to file refund claims "within four years after making the payment sought to be refunded . . .." Section 5141, subdivision (a) requires a tax refund "action" to "commence[] within six months from and after the date that the board of supervisors or city council rejects a claim for refund in whole or in part."
It is clear section 5141's reference to board of supervisors means the county board of supervisors. (See § 5140 [vesting jurisdiction over tax-refund claims in the "superior court" and "against a county or a city to recover a tax which the board of supervisors of the county or the city council of the city has refused to refund"], emphasis added.)
"Subdivision (b) of [section 5141] establishes a different six-month period, providing that 'if the board of supervisors or city council fails to mail notice of its action on a claim for refund within six months after the claim is filed, the claimant may, prior to mailing of notice by the board of supervisors or city council of its action on the claim, consider the claim rejected and bring an action under this article.' [Citation.] The statute thus permits, but does not require, a claimant to deem its claim denied if the county or city fails to give notice of its action within six months of the filing of the claim." (Geneva Towers Ltd. Partnership v. City of San Francisco (2003) 29 Cal.4th 769, 773 (Geneva).) "Unless the claimant chooses to consider the claim rejected and files suit, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the public entity denies the claim for refund." (Id. at p. 774.)
i. Summary
Taken together, a taxpayer must first seek a refund from the county board of supervisors, or city council, within four years of payment. (§§ 5097, 5140, &5141.) If the board of supervisors or city council denies a refund, the taxpayer then has six months to file a lawsuit "in the superior court ... against [the] county or city to recover a tax which the board of supervisors of the county or the city council of the city has refused to refund ...." (§ 5140.)
If the board of supervisors or city council fails to act, the taxpayer may file suit at any time after six months has elapsed. "The Legislature has placed no time limits on when the public entity must act on the claim or when the claimant may deem the claim rejected." (Geneva, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 782.)
ii. Analysis
The taxpayers in this case complied with mandatory tax-refund-claim procedure. Each taxpayer presented refund claims to the Stanislaus County Board of Supervisors within four years of payment. The Board never took action. Accordingly, the six month "statute of limitations [did] not begin to run" and the claims are timely. (Geneva, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 774; Georgiev v. County of Santa Clara (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1428, 1435 (Georgiev).)
The District also argues this "Court should reverse the [j]udgment, and clarify that the District is the appropriate entity for a claim to determine refunds of the assessment." We disagree. The Revenue and Taxation Code permits a person to file a claim in the superior court only after the county board of supervisors or city council has denied, or failed to act on, a refund. (§ 5140.) This Court cannot expand the law to include claims presented to another entity. (See Woosley, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 792; cf. William Jefferson & Co., Inc. v. Orange County Assessment Appeals Bd. No. 2 (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1, 11 ["A tax refund action must be brought against the county or city that collected the tax."].) The county here collected the assessments on the District's behalf. (See, generally, § 5099 ["The refund ordered by the board of supervisors may include county taxes and taxes collected by county officers for a city or revenue district."]; Gov. Code, § 50078.16 [fire suppression district "may provide for" county to collect assessment].) It makes little sense to demand taxpayers present refund claims to districts for monies districts did not collect.
II. The District Properly Classified Each Taxpayer's Property
The District contends "the trial court ... erred as a matter of law by not deferring to the District's substantial evidence . . . in support of its reasonable interpretation that the 'Industry' or 'Utility' categories appl[y] to [the taxpayers'] properties." Taxpayers essentially argue "the District's interpretation is not only 'facially unreasonable' as determined by the [t]rial [c]ourt . . . but erroneous."
We conclude the trial court erred in its conclusion. Properly construed, substantial evidence supports the District's property classifications.
A. Standard of Review
"' "The appropriate degree of judicial scrutiny in any particular case is perhaps not susceptible of precise formulation, but lies somewhere along a continuum with nonreviewability at one end and independent judgment at the other." [Citation.] Quasilegislative administrative decisions are properly placed at that point of the continuum at which judicial review is more deferential; ministerial and informal actions do not merit such deference, and therefore lie toward the opposite end of the continuum.'" (Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1, 7.)
"When a taxpayer challenges an assessment on the ground that a 'valid method' has been 'erroneously applied,' the trial court .. . may only overturn" an agency's decision "if the . . . decision was not supported by substantial evidence." (Georgiev, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 1437; Elk Hills Power, LLC v. Board of Equalization (2013) 57 Cal.4th 593, 606.) The standard of review is the same on appeal. (Georgiev, at p. 1437.)
Reviewing courts "give appropriate respect to a government entity's interpretation of its own laws. [Citation.] ... We may defer especially to interpretations which the government entity has consistently maintained over time. [Citation.] Deference may also be appropriate where the entity has' "expertise and technical knowledge, especially where the legal text to be interpreted is technical, obscure, complex, open-ended, or entwined with issues of fact, policy, and discretion."' " (J. Arthur Properties, II, LLC v. City of San Jose (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 480, 486 (J. Arthur).)
Arguably, a more deferential reviewing standard might apply." 'Because agencies granted [] substantive rulemaking power are truly "making law," their quasilegislative rules have the dignity of statutes. When a court assesses the validity of such rules, the scope of its review is narrow. If satisfied that the rule in question lay within the lawmaking authority delegated by [the electorate], and that it is reasonably necessary to implement the purpose of [the law], judicial review is at an end.'" (Perry v. City of San Diego (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 172, 184-185.) There is little doubt the instant assessment is quasi-legislative. The parties do not, however, brief the issue and we need not resolve it because we conclude the District prevails under a less-deferential standard.
When interpreting law," 'we keep in mind that "the meaning of the enactment may not be determined from a single word or sentence; the words must be construed in context .." '" (Rossa v. D.L. Falk Construction, Inc. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 387, 397 (Rossa).)"' "[W]e do not construe [laws] in isolation, but rather read every [enactment] 'with reference to the entire scheme of law of which it is part so that the whole may be harmonized and retain effectiveness.'"' " (Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 87.)
"Local government laws are interpreted consistent with the general rules of statutory interpretation." (J. Arthur, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 486.)
" '[O]ur task is to select the construction that comports most closely with the [enacting agency's] apparent intent, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the ... general purpose, and to avoid a construction that would lead to unreasonable, impractical, or arbitrary results.'" (Poole v. Orange County Fire Authority (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1378, 1385.)"' "[W]here uncertainty exists[,] consideration should be given to the consequences that will flow from a particular interpretation." '" (Klein v. United States of America (2010) 50 Cal.4th 68, 77.)
B. Analysis
We find the trial court erred in this case for two reasons. First, the court misunderstood the procedure underlying the assessment's enactment. Second, the court erred in interpreting the final resolution implementing the assessment schedule.
Contrary to the trial court's decision, the District did not remove "[s]tructured [p]roperty and [u]nimproved [p]roperty" "before sending the matter to the voters ...." Those terms were included in the Engineer's Report and the voters approved the assessment based on the same report. After the vote passed, the District adopted three resolutions.
The first resolution essentially solemnized the Engineer's Report. The second resolution memorialized the fact voters approved the assessments as described in the Engineer's Report. The third resolution again acknowledges the vote and concludes by publishing the assessment rates.
It is unclear what purpose is served by solemnizing the Engineer's Report after voters already approved the assessment.
Annual resolutions continued to publish the assessment rate, occasionally increasing the rate as approved in the initial ballot. But only these three resolutions are material to this opinion.
These resolutions altered neither the Engineer's Report nor the vote. It is clear all resolutions were adopted after the report was written and after the voters approved the report-based assessment.
More importantly, both the trial court and the taxpayers fail to appreciate the context within which the third resolution exists. It is not a solitary document. Its origin begins with the District moving to adopt a new fire suppression assessment to fund a specific firefighting purpose.
In our view, simply reading the word agricultural on a table is meaningless. The word depends on its context and we do not doubt the term intends "a special or technical meaning," i.e., a meaning related to fire suppression. (See Sacramento County Alliance of Law Enforcement v. County of Sacramento (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1012, 1017 [" 'Unless there is reason to believe that a special or technical meaning was intended, courts give the words of the statute their usual, ordinary meaning.' "]; J. Arthur, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 486 [deference appropriate where language"' "entwined with issues of fact, policy, and discretion."' "].)
Indeed, the law requires the District's "resolution [to] establish uniform schedules and rates based upon the type of use of property and the risk classification of the structures or other improvements on, or the use of, the property." (Gov. Code, § 50078.2, subd. (a).) It does not, however, define classification types, constrain an agency's discretion in establishing classification types, or demand resolutions define each classification.
Clear definitions are, of course, preferable.
There is no doubt the District has expertise in fire suppression. "We are inclined to defer to [the District's] interpretation of its own [enactment]' "since [it] is ... intimately familiar with [language] it authored and sensitive to the practical implications of one interpretation over another." '" (J. Arthur, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 486.) "Such deference makes sense where a local agency must weigh and balance competing interests in applying policies that require broad discretion." (California Renters Legal Advocacy &Education Fund v. City of San Mateo (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 820, 844.)
There is no reason to believe the District did not, for several years, consistently classify agricultural land with structures as industrial before the first taxpayer sought a refund. When first called upon to review a property classification, the District confirmed its classifications were proper. Consistent," 'long-standing'" interpretation is entitled to greater deference. (State Farm General Insurance Company v. Lara (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 148, 184-185.) Courts are not positioned to question the District's reasonable conclusion that structures, whether or not related to agriculture, demand intense fire suppression resources.
Nearly 10 years passed before the first taxpayer challenged the District's property classification. There is no evidence suggesting the District altered its views on classification after the assessment's inception.
The record contains no evidence of any earlier challenge by any taxpayer. In other words, this litigation is the first instance in which a taxpayer challenged a Districtindustrial classification.
The Engineer's Report makes clear building square footage "was considered to be the most significant factor in determining demand on District fire response resources." Testimony in the trial court explained, based on the Engineer's Report, agricultural properties with commercial improvements and structures are properly classified as industrial for the District's fire suppression purpose. That testimony is reasonable and constitutes substantial evidence to uphold the District's classifications in this case.
For clarity, the Engineer's Report-because it was written before the vote, and the vote was anchored to it-is the primary basis for finding substantial evidence to support the District's classifications.
i. Taxpayers' Additional Arguments
Taxpayers make repeated reference to Government Code section 50078.2. Specifically, they argue "[s]ubsection (b) of Government Code § 50078.2 ... governs the establishment of benefit assessment levies on agricultural use parcels. ... [It] strongly indicates that commercial production on the land does not exempt the land from its agricultural use nor change its land use from agricultural." Their reliance is misplaced for three reasons.
First, the section does not define any property type. Second, the argument ignores the fact the District's classification types serve a specific purpose, i.e., funding fire suppression services based on relative risk. Three, the section explicitly requires the District to consider all "factors which reflect the benefit to the land resulting from the fire suppression service provided." Building square footage is a necessary consideration in classifying property.
Government Code section 50078.2, subdivision (b), states in full: "(b) The benefit assessment levies on land devoted primarily to agricultural, timber, or livestock uses, and being used for the commercial production of agricultural, timber, or livestock products, shall be related to the relative risk to the land and its products. The amount of the assessment shall recognize normal husbandry practices that serve to mitigate risk, onsite or proximate water availability, response time, capability of the fire suppression service, and any other factors which reflect the benefit to the land resulting from the fire suppression service provided. A benefit assessment shall not be levied for wildland or watershed fire suppression on land located in a state responsibility area as defined in Section 4102 of the Public Resources Code. This subdivision is not applicable to any benefit assessment levied prior to January 1, 1984, on land devoted primarily to agricultural, timber, or livestock uses."
Taxpayers also suggest the voting materials do not "mention that agricultural use parcel could be classified as either industry or agricultural depending on the presence of structures or improvements. [Citation.] Had the District intended that parcels with an agricultural use be assessed at different rates depending on whether the parcel is 'Structured' or 'Unimproved,' the District would have been required to advise the voters of the same pursuant to Proposition 218. This it did not do .. .." We disagree.
The District proposed its assessment based on the Engineer's Report which discusses the importance of structures on property relative to classifying land. The Engineer's Report was part of the voting materials and made available for public inspection. The time to challenge the assessment's validity has long since passed. (See, Code Civ. Proc., §§ 860 &863.)
Taxpayers suggest "it is unreasonable to assume or presume that voters somehow discerned that agricultural use parcels with structures or improvements were exempted from Property Type 'Agricultural' or, conversely, that the land use classification 'Industry' would include agricultural use parcels." This argument assumes the Engineer's Report either does not exist or was not made available to the public prior to the vote.
Finally, taxpayers champion dictionary definitions and other Government Code statutes to bolster their interpretation. Again, these arguments presuppose the District intended to adopt those definitions. Most importantly, "general-purpose dictionary definitions are not always the most reliable guide ...; sometimes context suggests that the [agency] may have been using a term in a more technical or specialized way." (National Lawyers Guild, San Francisco Bay Area Chapter v. City of Hayward (2020) 9 Cal.5th 488, 499.)
See Government Code sections 51040.3, 51201, and 56016.
The District's reference to agricultural land here serves its specific firefighting purpose and no other purpose. Taxpayers' arguments ignore that indispensable context. (See Rossa, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 397 ["' "the meaning of the enactment may not be determined from a single word or sentence; the words must be construed in context ..."' "]; People v. Brown (2023) 14 Cal.5th 530, 536 [courts "do not examine ... language in isolation, but in the context of the statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its scope and purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the enactment."].)
Taxpayers also claim" 'land use' classification," as used in the "Notice of Public Hearing," "is generally understood and commonly used to refer to the Stanislaus County Property Use Codes." As noted, under the County's Use Codes the taxpayer parcels at issue here are generally classified as agricultural. But there is no basis to claim the District adopted, or intended to adopt, the County's Use Codes. Put simply, the District did not adopt the County's Use Codes. In any event, Jewett testified the County's "land use descriptions"-defining chicken and turkey ranches as agricultural-serve "their own purposes .." Again, we do not doubt the District's definitions serve a different purpose: fighting fire; the County's Use Codes do not constrain the District.
ii. Conclusion
We acknowledge the District's resolutions, the Engineer's Report, and the voting materials, are not perfect. Nonetheless, the District's classification interpretations are unquestionably reasonable when viewed in proper context. Courts are loathe to second-guess an agency's expertise. (Boling v. Public Employment Relations Board (2018) 5 Cal.5th 898, 911 [" 'greater'" deference" 'appropriate when an agency has a" 'comparative interpretive advantage over the courts'"' "].) The trial court failed to heed that caution in this case. In sum, the District's classifications are reasonable and entitled to deference.
The prejudgment-interest and the District's evidentiary-error claims are moot.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. The trial court is directed to enter a new judgment consistent with this opinion. Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)
I CONCUR: DESANTOS, J.
POOCHIGIAN, Acting P.J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur in the majority's conclusion that the Respondents' suit was timely. I respectfully dissent from the majority's conclusion that appellant Stanislaus Consolidated Fire Protection District ("the District") has correctly classified Respondents' property as "industry" for purposes of the District's special fire suppression assessment.
Legal Requirements for Special Property Assessments
There is no dispute that the District has the ability to levy special assessments against land parcels within its jurisdiction. However, California law places substantive and procedural limitations on the District's ability to levy such assessments. The District is required to comply with the provisions of Government Code section 50078 et seq., which provides a specific statutory scheme for fire suppression assessments. (See Davis v. Mariposa County Bd. of Supervisors (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1048, 1051.) The District is also required to comply with California Constitution, article XIII D ("Article XIII D"), which imposes strict procedures and requirements for agencies to levy assessments. (Silicon Valley Taxpayers' Assn., Inc. v. Santa Clara County Open Space Authority (2008) 44 Cal.4th 431, 438, 443 (Silicon Valley).) Although the parties have stipulated to the validity of the assessment itself, as opposed to the application of the assessment, it is useful to review the relevant requirements of Article XIII D and section 50078.
Unless otherwise noted, all further "section" references refer to the Government Code.
As pertinent to this case, section 50078.2 is entitled "Uniform schedules and rates; Risk classifications; Lands devoted to agricultural, timber, or livestock uses." Section 50078.2 contains two subdivisions, (a) and (b). Subdivision (a) reads:
"The ordinance or resolution shall establish uniform schedules and rates based upon the type of use of property and the risk classification of the structures or other improvements on, or the use of, the property. The risk classification may include, but need not be limited to, the amount of water required for fire suppression on that property, the structure size, type of
construction, structure use, and other factors relating to potential fire and panic hazards and the costs of providing the fire suppression by the district to that property. The assessment shall be related to the benefits to the property assessed." (§ 50078.2, subd. (a).)
Unlike subdivision (a)'s general application, subdivision (b) provides specific considerations that must be evaluated for property used primarily for agriculture, timber, or livestock. Subdivision (b) reads in relevant part:
"The benefit assessment levies on land devoted primarily to agricultural, timber, or livestock uses, and being used for the commercial production of agricultural, timber, or livestock products, shall be related to the relative risk to the land and its products. The amount of the assessment shall recognize normal husbandry practices that serve to mitigate risk, onsite or proximate water availability, response time, capability of the fire suppression service, and any other factors which reflect the benefit to the land resulting from the fire suppression service provided...." (§ 50078.2, subd. (b).)
With respect to Article XIII D, in relevant part section 4 requires that an agency: determine the proportionate special benefit to be derived by each parcel subject to the assessment; support the assessment with an engineer's report; give written notice to each parcel owner of the amount of the proposed assessment and the basis of the calculation; and provide each owner with a ballot to vote in favor of or against the proposed assessment. (See Cal. Const., art. XIII D, § 4, subds. (a)-(d); Jacks v. City of Santa Barbara (2017) 3 Cal.5th 248, 259 (Jacks); see also Hill RHF Housing Partners, L.P. v. City of Los Angeles (2021) 12 Cal.5th 458, 474 (Hill RHF).) Section 4 also "requires the agency to hold a public hearing, and bars imposition of the assessment if a majority of parcel owners within the assessment area submit ballots in opposition to the assessment, with each ballot weighted based on the proposed financial obligation of the affected parcel." (Jacks, at p. 259; see Cal. Const., art. XIII D, § 4, subd. (e); see also Hill RHF, at p. 474.) If a majority of the weighted ballots is against the assessment, then the proposed assessment fails and cannot be enacted. (Cal. Const., art. XIII D, § 4, subd. (e); Hill RHF, at p. 475; Jacks, at p. 259.)
Article XIII D was added to the California Constitution by Proposition 218 in 1996. (Hill RHF, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 473; Silicon Valley, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 443.) The provisions of Proposition 218 are to be" 'liberally construed to effectuate its purpose of limiting local government revenue and enhancing taxpayer consent.'" (Jacks, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 267; Silicon Valley, at p. 448.) Proposition 218 was designed among other things to: constrain local governments' ability to impose assessments, place extensive requirements on local governments charging assessments, make it easier for taxpayers to win lawsuits, and limit the methods by which local governments exact revenue from taxpayers without their consent. (Hill RHF, at p. 473; Silicon Valley, at p. 448.)
Passage of the District's Special Assessment
Engineer's Report
As part of its efforts to meet the requirements Article XIII D, the District obtained an Engineer's Report (hereinafter "ER"). The ER identified all parcels within the District, categorized each parcel, attempted to determine the special benefit to each parcel, and then proposed three possible assessment plans with the amount of each assessment to be levied on a per residence, per building square footage, or per parcel basis. The ER expressly recognized the considerations identified by section 50078.2, subdivision (a), and identified nine separate and distinct land use categories for every parcel within the District.
To classify each parcel, the ER identified seven land use categories from the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), as well as two land use categories that were not used by the NFPA. Each parcel was then categorized through a comparison of the NFPA classifications and the County of Stanislaus land use descriptions. As a result, Table 1 of the ER shows that each parcel was classified either as "Public Assembly/Educational/Institutional," "Residential (1 and 2 family dwellings)," "Residential (3 or more living units)," "Stores and Offices," "Industry," "Agricultural," and "Vacant Land." The ER noted that "Agricultural and Vacant Land is not specified by NFPA but included as it is a significant part of the District acres." The ER did not provide a definition for any of the nine property types.
After Table 1 and over the next six sections and tables (Tables 2-7), the ER took data from the NFPA and the District and determined the resources needed to respond to fires within each NFPA property use category. The analyses of Tables 2 through 7 are driven mainly by information from the NFPA and thus, are limited to the seven undefined land use categories of the NFPA; there was no discussion of the land use categories "agricultural" and "vacant land."
Table 8 of the ER then set the "Fire Assessment Factor Share." Table 8 assigned a 10 percent weight factor to "Property Loss by Land Use," a 10 percent weight factor to "Responses to Structure Fires by Land Use," and an 80 percent weight factor to "Building Square Footage." Part of the explanatory section of Table 8 stated the ER used call data regarding structure fires and fires on unimproved parcels, considered the resources to respond to structure fires and grass fires, and allocated resources between structure fires and unimproved parcel fires. Table 8 itself contains a section entitled "Property Type," which has two categories: Structured Property and Unimproved Property. The "Structured Property" category contains seven subcategories, which are the seven land use classifications of the NFPA, including "industry." The "Unimproved Property" category contains the two non-NFPA subcategories of "Agricultural/Vacant Land." Table 8 notes that "Agricultural/Vacant Land determined to require additional fire suppression resources as approximately 98% of acreage is irrigated." Table 8 allocated 98 percent of the "Resource Requirement" to the "Structured Property" category and 2 percent of the "Resource Requirement" to the "Unimproved Property" category. Table 8 did not define any of the property types listed, did not define "Unimproved Property" or "Structured Property," and did not list "Agricultural" as a subcategory of "Structured Property."
Finally, after providing possible budgetary scenarios in Tables 9 and 10, the ER provided three possible assessment plans in Tables 11a, 11b, and 11c. The District chose to present the substance of Table 11b to the voters. Table 11b consists of sections for "Property Type," "Allocation Amounts," Number of Parcels/Units," "Allocation Basis," and "Annual Assessment Rate." The "Property Type" section lists the nine land use categories that were previously identified in Table 1. Of note, "Industry" is a distinct category, and "Agricultural/Vacant Land" is a distinct category. Table 11b does not contain the terms "structured property" or "unimproved property." Further, the "Number of Parcels/Units" section of Table 11b uses essentially the same figures for each land use category as Table 1. The only difference is that Table 1 had separate figures for "Agricultural" and "Vacant Land," whereas Table 11b lists "Agricultural/Vacant Land" land together and identifies a combined figure of 2,113 parcels.
Materials Mailed to the Voters/Landowners
Once it obtained the ER and chose which budgetary option and assessment plan to pursue, the District mailed a "Notice of Public Hearing and Proposed Assessment" ("the Notice"), a ballot, and a letter supporting the proposed assessment by the Fire Chief. There is no indication that the District mailed a copy of the ER to the voters.
With respect to the Notice, under a section entitled "THE METHODOLOGY," the voters were informed as follows:
"What is the amount of the proposed maximum assessment?
"The proposed maximum annual assessment against your property is shown on the attached ballot. The future amount of the maximum assessment against your parcel may be increased from the amount shown by the annual CPI up to 3% per year, although in any fiscal year [the District] may choose to levy the assessment at below the maximum rate. 1 and 2 family unit parcels would pay $213.00 per unit; 3 or more family unit parcels would pay $173.00 per unit; hotels, schools, nursing homes and other public assemblies would pay $413.00 per parcel; stores and offices would pay $0.078 per building square foot; industry and utility properties would pay $0.062 per building square foot; and agricultural and vacant properties would pay $50.00 per parcel. The total assessment for all parcels is projected to be $4,903,321 in [fiscal year] 2005/06.
"How as the assessment calculated?
"Only parcels that receive special benefits from fire suppression services are subject to the assessment. The projected fire suppression expenses were allocated among the benefited parcels in the District based upon each parcel's land use classification. Parcels with land uses that are statistically more likely to experience a fire or are more likely to suffer extensive property damage should a fire occur are determined to receive greater special benefit from fire suppression services than other parcels. Consequently, these parcels were allocated a greater share of the fire suppression expenses. Each parcel within a land use was allocated a proportionate share of that land use categories [sic] fire suppression expenses using an appropriate cost sharing methodology (i.e. per unit, per building square feet, or per parcel).
"A more detailed description of the assessment methodology and benefit calculation is contained in the Engineer's Report for the assessment which is available for public inspection during business hours at the Office of the District Clerk, located at, 3705 Oakdale Road, Modesto, California."
The Notice contained no definitions for the terms "industry" or "agricultural," nor did the Notice contain the terms "structured property" or "unimproved property."
With respect to the ballots, each ballot was linked to a particular parcel within the District. The ballot identified the parcel number, the proposed maximum assessment for that parcel, the proposed fiscal year 2005/2006 total assessment for all parcels in the District, instructions for voting, and a voting choice between "Yes, I support the proposed assessment on my parcel . . ." or "No, I oppose the proposed assessment on my parcel ._" No land use classifications, descriptions, or definitions appear on the ballot.
Finally, the fire chief's letter of support explained the need for additional funds and a discussion of the repercussions for either the assessment passing or failing. Like the ballot, the fire chief's letter of support contained no land use classifications, descriptions, or definitions.
District Resolution Setting the Assessment
After the voters approved the District's proposed special assessment, the District passed three resolutions, as faithfully described by the majority. Exhibit A to Resolution 05-11 ("Exhibit A") set the methodology for levying the special assessment. Exhibit A corresponds to Table 11b of the Engineer's Report, as well as the property types and rates identified in the Notice. Exhibit A reflects assessments based on property type and a per parcel, per square footage, or per unit rate. Resolution 05-11 and its Exhibit A did not define any property types.
District's Levied Assessments
The record contains no information regarding the District's actual implementation of Exhibit A prior to fiscal year 2011/2012. With respect to the individual respondents, however, in the fiscal year 2011/2012 period, the District classified six parcels owned by Respondent Foster Farms, LLC, as "industry." The District also classified two parcels owned by Respondent Foster Dairy Farms and one parcel owned by Respondent Foster Dairy Number Two as "industry" from 2015 through 2018. The assessments levied on these "Foster related" parcels were done on a per building square foot basis. While the vast majority of the acreage on the "Foster related" parcels had no buildings or structures, the parcels did have substantial building square footage on them from structures such as chicken shelters, turkey shelters, houses, pole barns, free-stall barns, sheds, and a milking barn.
The majority notes that the three "Foster related" respondents had 2.64 million square feet of structures on them. This square footage spans nine parcels, and the parcels total approximately 1,543.8 acres. Thus, the structures account for approximately 3.9 percent of the parcels' total acreage.
Further, in fiscal year 2018/2019, the District reclassified an 85-acre parcel owned by respondent Michael Frantz (and his brother) from "agricultural" to "industry" and levied an assessment based on a building square foot basis. Frantz's parcel was used to grow plants for his nursery business. The parcel contained two greenhouses on three acres. Each greenhouse was constructed of five metal arches, with plastic spanning around the arches. The greenhouses were used to grow and protect plants, particularly during the colder months. For 10 months of the year, the plastic walls of the greenhouses are raised up. The entirety of the 85-acre parcel, including the interior of the greenhouses, are irrigated with sprinklers. The greenhouses had been on the 85-acre parcel for between 15 and 20 years. At the time the Frantz parcel was reclassified from "agricultural" to "industry," no changes to the parcel had been made and no new structures had been added. Frantz understood that his property was reclassified because of the greenhouses.
Standard for Reviewing the Trial Court's Order
Ultimately, the resolution of this appeal depends on the meaning of the terms "industry" and "agricultural" in Exhibit A, the actual method and rates of assessment imposed by the District. Determining the meaning of these terms is an exercise of statutory construction, which entails a pure question of law that is subject to de novo review. (People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 432.)
I believe that the majority errs by ascertaining the District's intent. Exhibit A is not a typical legislative or regulatory enactment. It is an assessment that was required to meet the procedures and requirements of Proposition 218/Article XIII D before it could be enacted and imposed. As discussed above, Proposition 218 was intended to place a number of limitations on governmental entities' ability to impose assessments, charges, and fees without voters' express consent. To obtain voter consent, a governmental entity must provide to each voter a detailed notice that explains the amount of the proposed assessment, the need for the proposed assessment, and the method of calculating the proposed assessment. (Paland v. Brooktrails Township Community Services Dist. Bd. of Directors (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1365-1366 (Paland); see also Greene v. Marin County Flood Control &Water Conservation Dist. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 277, 285 (Greene) [recognizing that voters must receive a "detailed notice"]; Crawley v. Alameda County Waste Management Authority (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 396, 411 (Crawley).) After receiving the notice and a proposed ballot, the voters are given the authority to approve or disapprove of the assessment. If a majority of the voters disapprove, the assessment fails and cannot be enacted by the governmental entity. (Hill RHF, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 473; Jacks, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 259.) While it is the District that proposed the assessment and provided the required notice to the voters, the voters needed to interpret the notice and voting materials provided to them in order to determine whether they should consent to the new assessment. Considering the purposes behind Proposition 218 and the liberal implementation of those purposes, and considering the dispositive role that voter consent is constitutionally required to play before a new assessment can be levied, I believe that the pertinent question is to what assessment did the voters consent? Therefore, it is the voter's intent in approving the assessment that should be determined, not the District's intent in passing Exhibit A, which means that the applicable framework for review is that of a voter approved measure or initiative.
" 'It is a general rule of statutory construction that ... courts will interpret a measure adopted by vote of the people in such manner as to give effect to the intent of the voters adopting it.'" (Kaiser v. Hopkins (1936) 6 Cal.2d 537, 538; see Aiu Ins. Co. v. Gillespie (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1155, 1159; Diamond International Corp. v. Boas (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 1015, 1033-1034; see also People v. Henderson (2022) 14 Cal.5th 34, 50 [" 'Where a law is adopted by the voters, "their intent governs"' "].) In determining the voters' intent, courts begin with the language of the measure, giving the words their ordinary meaning. (People v. Henderson, at p. 50.) Courts will consider that voters judged the measure they were adopting by the meaning apparent on its face according to the general use of the words used. (Kaiser v. Hopkins, at p. 538; Keller v. Chowchilla Water Dist. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1010-1011; see also Steinhart v. County of Los Angeles (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1298, 1319; Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. County of Orange (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1375, 1381 (Howard Jarvis).) "If the language is not ambiguous, we presume the voters intended the meaning apparent from that language, and we may not add to the statute or rewrite it to conform to some assumed intent not apparent from that language." (People v. Superior Court (Pearson) (2010) 48 Cal.4th 564, 571 (Pearson).) In the absence of a sufficiently strong indication to the contrary, a measure's words are not to be given a technical or specialized meaning. (See Steinhart v. County of Los Angeles, at p. 1319; Howard Jarvis, at p. 1381; Keller v. Chowchilla Water Dist., at p. 1011; Aiu Ins. Co. v. Gillespie, at p. 1159; Diamond International Corp. v. Boas, at p. 1034.) "When attempting to ascertain the ordinary, usual meaning of a word, courts appropriately refer to the dictionary definition of that word." (Wasatch Property Management v. Degrate (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1111, 1121-1122.) Statutory language should be interpreted within its context, and in light of its structure, analogous provisions, and any other appropriate indicia of its purpose. (FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133, 144.)
The District's Application of Exhibit A Is Contrary To Voter Intent
Exhibit A contains no definitions of any kind. It simply identifies property types and either an assessment rate (for residences and parcels) or a formula for determining the assessment rate (square footage multiplied by a dollar percentage). Of course, Exhibit A itself, as well as Resolution 05-11, were never submitted to the voters for approval. What was submitted was the Notice, a ballot, and a letter from the fire chief. The Notice was consistent with the language of Exhibit A. Therefore, because Exhibit A was never submitted to the voters for approval, in order to determine what the voters intended to consent to, it is necessary to examine the materials actually sent to the voters, particularly the Notice.
As quoted above, the Notice identifies several property types. The Notice explains that the fire suppression expenses were allocated based on "land use classification." There is no explanation about how the "land use classifications" were derived. Moreover, the Notice never uses the terms "structured," "improved," or "unimproved," or suggests that there may be "sub-categories" or "crossovers" of land use classifications based on whether a parcel contains a "structure." There is simply nothing in the Notice to suggest that the "land use classifications" in general would have a meaning that is unique to the District.
With respect to the two specific property classifications at issue, the classification "industry" is grouped together with the classification "utility properties." The term "agricultural" is grouped together with the classification "vacant properties." There are no further explanations, caveats, limitations, or definitions of any kind with respect to the "industry" and "agricultural" classifications. In particular, there is nothing in the Notice that states the term "industry" includes all parcels that are used for an apparent agricultural purpose if the parcel has a structure on it. Instead, the notice reads that there are distinct and separate property types/land use classifications for "industry" and "agricultural."
Because "industry" and "agricultural" are not defined in the Notice, it is appropriate to attempt to ascertain the common understanding of these terms. (Wasatch Property Management, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 1121-1122.) Merriam Webster defines the term "industry" as "a department or branch of a craft, art, business, or manufacture especially: one that employs a large personnel and capital especially in manufacturing." (https://www.merriam-webster.com/ dictionary/industry.) Similarly, the Oxford English Dictionary defines "industry" in relevant part as "productive work, trade, or manufacture. In later use esp.: manufacturing and production carried out on a commercial basis, typically organized on a large scale and requiring the investment of capital." (https://www.oed.com/dictionary/industry_n?tab=meaning_and_use#540690.) Merriam Webster defines the term "agriculture" as "the science, art, or practice of cultivating soil, producing crops, and raising livestock and in varying degrees the preparation and marketing of the resulting products." (https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ agriculture.) Similarly, the Oxford English Dictionary defines "agriculture" in relevant part as "the practice of growing crops, rearing livestock, and producing animal products (as milk and eggs), regarded as a single sphere of activity." (https://www.oed.com/dictionary/agriculture_ n?tab=meaning_and _use#8188759.)
Surely, the voters would have understood the distinct land use classification of "agricultural" to refer to land that is used primarily to produce crops, raise livestock, and/or collect milk or eggs from livestock kept on site, and would have understood the distinct land use classification of "industry" to refer to land that is used to produce and manufacture commercial goods. I do not detect any ambiguities with these terms.
If the District intended the terms "agricultural" or "industry" to have a special, broader, or technical meaning that is unique to the District's own purposes or to the fire suppression field in general, then it was incumbent upon the District to clearly disclose that specialized meaning to the voters in the Notice. The words of a measure approved by the voters" 'must be understood, not as the words of the civil service commission, or the city council, or the mayor, or the city attorney, [or the District,] but as the words of the voters who adopted the amendment. They are to be understood in the common popular way, and, in the absence of some strong and convincing reason to the contrary, not found here, they are not entitled to be considered in a technical sense inconsistent with their popular meaning.'" (Burger v. Employees' Retirement System (1951) 101 Cal.App.2d 700, 702-703 (Burger); see Aiu Ins. v. Gillespie, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 1159; Creighton v. City of Santa Monica (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 1011, 1018; Diamond International Corp. v. Boas, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at p. 1034; see also Howard Jarvis, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 1381.) Based on the ordinary meanings of "industry" and "agriculture," voters would have understood that the special assessment against a parcel that is used primarily to produce crops, raise livestock, and/or collect milk or eggs from livestock kept on site would be $50, while the assessment against a parcel that is used to produce and manufacture commercial goods would be $0.062 multiplied by the building square footage on the parcel. Further, because "industry" and "agricultural" are separate land use classification that are to be assessed under different methodologies (per parcel versus per building square feet), and because nothing in the materials sent by the District to the voters disclosed a specialized or technical meaning for the land use classifications, voters would not have understood that a parcel that is used primarily to produce crops, raise livestock, and/or collect milk or eggs from livestock kept on site would actually be considered a parcel that is used to produce and manufacture commercial goods simply because there is a "structure" (of some kind) on the parcel.
There is nothing in the record that shows "agricultural" and "industry" have technical meanings in the field of fire suppression. In fact, the evidence is to the contrary. The NFPA materials cited by the ER did not define any land use classifications and did not have a category for "agricultural."
Alternatively, voters may have considered the term "land use" in the Notice to refer to the land use codes of the Stanislaus County Assessor (Assessor). Each parcel within the District is subject to being taxed by the Assessor in part based on the land use codes assigned to the parcel by the Assessor. Thus, the owners of every parcel in the District would be aware that their parcel is taxed by a governmental entity based on a land use code or category. As relevant to this case, the Assessor assigned codes 60 through 69 for "Industrial Property" and codes 70 through 89 for "Rural, Farm, &Agricultural Primary Use Codes." Significantly, none of the ten "Industrial Property" codes relate to farming or agricultural pursuits, and several of the "Rural, Farm, and Agricultural" codes indicate that a parcel may have residential or other buildings on them yet would still be considered "agricultural." For example, Code 73 for "Dry Open Land Farming" explains that the parcel "[m]ay have residential or other buildings, etc. but open land farming is the dominant value characteristic," and Code 76 for "Vineyard" explains that the parcel "[m]ay or may not have buildings or other uses, but vineyard is dominant value." A voter comparing the Notice to the Assessor's use codes would understand that "industry" and "agricultural" are separate and distinct categories, and that a parcel that has an "agricultural" use code is considered "agricultural" irrespective of the presence or absence of any buildings or structures.
Use Code 60 does capture parcels that sell agricultural or livestock related machinery, but Use Code 60 has nothing to do with a parcel that raises or produces livestock or crops.
It may be argued that the voters could not have thought a $50 assessment for agricultural parcels would be sufficient to provide services to properties that contain large or extensive farming or livestock structures. It is true, as quoted above, that section 50078.2, subdivision (a), states that fire assessment schedules and rates are to consider the risk classification of structures and improvements, as well as structure use, construction, and size. Nevertheless, section 50078.2, subdivision (b), sets the criteria for making benefit assessments on lands devoted primarily to agricultural, timber, and livestock uses, including the commercial production thereof. Section 50078.2, subdivision (b), recognizes that "agricultural" and "livestock" lands are different from other land uses and that it is appropriate to identify factors that are unique to these types of lands. The specific factors listed by section 50078.2, subdivision (b), are not exclusive and permit consideration of "any other factors" which might reflect the fire assessment's benefit to the land. In other words, special fire risk and benefit assessments related to agricultural properties by law are to account for numerous unique factors, not simply whether there is some form of "structure" on the agricultural parcel. Included among the listed of special factors in 50078.2, subdivision (b), are any normal husbandry practices that could mitigate risk and any onsite or proximate water availability. In relation to this case, Respondent Foster Dairy Farms uses metallic free-stall barns (barns which do not have walls) to house cattle. The use of unwalled, noncombustible, metallic free-stall barns to house cows could be viewed as a typical husbandry practice that reduces fire risk and, correspondingly, the cost of service and the benefit of a special fire assessment. Also, interior and exterior irrigation or fire sprinklers, such as the irrigation on the entirety of the Frantz parcel (including within the greenhouses), could also reduce both fire risk and the benefit of a special fire assessment. Voters could look to such examples, and the language of section 50078.2, subdivision (b), which they are presumed to know (People v. Henderson, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 50), and would not be compelled to conclude that a $50 assessment for all parcels classified as "agricultural" is unreasonable or absurd.
The three reasons identified by the majority for discounting section 50078.2, subdivision (b), are not persuasive. First, the subdivision expressly recognizes that land used primarily for "agricultural" and "livestock" purposes, including commercial production, is to receive special consideration when determining the benefit and cost of a special fire assessment. The majority's observation (that because the subdivision does not expressly define "agricultural") would mean that the subdivision would almost never get applied, even in a case like this where the parties stipulated that the Respondents' parcels are primarily used for agricultural or livestock purposes. Second, 50078.2, subdivision (b), is completely consistent with the purposes of the District. Indeed, section 50078.2, subdivision (b), is part of a statutory scheme that is devoted to assessments levied for fire suppression. As a matter of law, the District must consider and apply section 50078.2, subdivision (b), for purposes of any special assessment. Finally, it is certainly true that building square footage can be a relevant consideration, depending on the type of building or "structure" involved. However, for purposes of subdivision (b), that is a single unidentified factor. Other expressly listed factors must be considered. Making "building square footage," which is a consideration encompassed by section 50078.2, subdivision (a), the only relevant consideration for imposing an assessed rate has the effect of minimizing or nullifying subdivision (b).
To the extent that the District, or perhaps later the voters as a result of the District's advocacy, determine that a $50 assessment for agricultural parcels is inadequate and fails to reflect the special benefit conferred, the remedy is for the District to amend or pass a new assessment in conformity with California statutory and constitutional law. The remedy is not for the courts to rewrite or redefine the voter approved assessment. (Pearson, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 571.)
Relatedly, the fire chief's letter in support of the proposed assessment stated that the money generated from the assessment would permit the District to provide an appropriate level of fire protection. The fire chief's letter, as well as the ballot and the Notice, did not explain that agricultural parcels with "structures" would be considered "industry." Therefore, the voters could have reasonably reviewed the materials sent to them to conclude that assessing all "agricultural" parcels, irrespective of structures on those parcels, at $50 a parcel was still sufficient to maintain an appropriate level of funding for the District's fire suppression activities.
In sum, the materials sent to the voters simply identify separate land use classifications for "agricultural" parcels and "industry" parcels. No definitions, limitations, or clarifications were provided for the terms "agricultural" and "industry," and the materials do not state that "agricultural" and "industry" were being used in either a technical or specialized way. The materials do not explain how a parcel was determined to fit within the land use classifications, and nothing in the materials sent to the voters even hints that the presence of some undefined "structure" could cause an otherwise "agricultural" parcel to be classified (or reclassified) as an "industry" parcel. Thus, voters would have read and understood "agricultural" and "industry" in the common and ordinary sense of those terms. (Pearson, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 571; Burger, supra, 101 Cal.App.2d at pp. 702-703.) Given the terms' ordinary meaning, and considering the provisions of section 50078.2, subdivision (b), it is apparent that, consistent with the Notice, the voters understood and intended to approve: (1) classifying parcels as "industry" if they are primarily used to produce or manufacture commercial goods: (2) classifying parcels as "agricultural" if the parcels are used to produce crops, raise livestock, and/or collect milk or eggs from livestock kept on site, and irrespective of the presence of "structures"; and (3) assess all "agricultural" parcels at a rate of $50 per parcel, irrespective of the presence of a "structure" on the parcel. Since the stipulations of the parties show that each of Respondents' respective parcels are "agricultural" as that term was understood by the voters, the trial court properly concluded that the District misclassified Respondents' parcels as "industry" under Exhibit A.
The parties stipulated that all of Respondents' respective parcels were and are used primarily for agricultural or livestock purposes.
The District clearly performs a valuable service to the community, and it is appropriate for the District to have and seek adequate funding to meet its mission. Nevertheless, it is not for us to speculate how the voters would have voted had they known that the District had special definitions for "agricultural" and "industry," or that the District may (or may not) have budgeted with these special definitions in mind. (Cf. Pearson, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 571 ["[W]e may not add to the statute or rewrite it to conform to some assumed intent not apparent from [the initiative's] language"].) It was incumbent upon the District to provide a level of specificity, transparency, and clarity with respect to the assessment and specific land use classifications so that the voters could make an informed decision. Because the District's Notice did not dispel the notion that the terms "agricultural" and "industry" were used in their ordinary meanings, it is those ordinary meanings, not the District's undisclosed special meaning, that must govern. (Ibid.; Diamond International Corp. v. Boas, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at p. 1034; Burger, supra, 101 Cal.App.2d at pp. 702-703; see also Howard Jarvis, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 1381.)
The Engineer's Report Does Not Support the District's Classification
The District and the majority rely on the ER to support their conclusion that the Respondents' parcels are properly classified as "industry" and not "agricultural" because there are "structures" on Respondents' parcels. Because the ER would not cause a reasonable voter to believe that "agricultural" and "industry" were used by the District in a sense that was different from those terms' ordinary meanings, I do not agree that the ER is sufficient to support the District's position.
First, the ER was never sent to the voters; only the Notice, the ballot, and the Fire Chief's letter were sent to the voters by the District. True, the Report was made available for public inspection at the District Clerk's Office in Modesto, California, and Article XIII D, section 4 does not require the Report to be mailed to the voters. Nevertheless, what Article XIII D, section 4 does require is that a detailed notice be mailed and that the notice itself explain the need for the assessment, amount of the assessment, and the calculation methodology. (Paland, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1365-1366; see also Greene, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 285; Crawley, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at p. 411.) Thus, Article XIII D, section 4 envisions that the voters will be given a notice that is sufficiently self-contained so that they will know the basis and methodology of the calculation without the need to necessarily examine an engineer's report. (Paland, at pp. 1365-1366; Crawley, at p. 411.) The Notice gives the impression that it properly and adequately described the assessment and methodology of the ER such that the voters can intelligently complete their ballots, but that if further details were desired, then a voter would need to go to the Clerk's Office and examine the ER there. The Notice provided no additional excerpts from the ER. The Notice did not state that the ER would define land use classifications in a way that was contrary to the ordinary meaning of the terms "agricultural" and "industry," nor did the Notice state that the land use classifications would be significantly different from the Assessor's familiar classifications. There is simply no indication in the Notice that the ER would materially change the common understanding of the terms "agricultural" and "industry" or that voters would need to take the time to visit the district clerk's office to study and attempt to understand what exactly the land use classifications were or how they were defined. If key and critical information was only revealed in the ER, i.e., that "agricultural" and "industry" were intended to have specialized meanings that were different from their ordinary meanings, then it was incumbent upon the District to ensure that this critical information from the ER was either clearly and expressly stated within the Notice or somehow actually provided to the voters. It is inappropriate to rely on a report that was merely made available for inspection to make up for what would be a material deficiency in the Notice.
The proposed assessment needs to be supported by an engineer's report, but Article XIII D section 4 does not require that the report be mailed to the voters. (Cal. Const., art. XIII D, § 4, subds. (b), (c).)
Second, it is not clear that the ER as a whole would lead a reasonable voter to believe that "agricultural" parcels are parcels without structures. The first part of the
ER's analysis and the resulting Table 1 classified all parcels within the District by using NFPA and Assessor's codes classifications. Table 1 did not state that any parcel with an Assessor's agricultural code was categorized as anything other than "agricultural" under the Report. Importantly, Table 1 also did not state that classification or reclassification would occur if it was determined that there were structures on an "agricultural" parcel. Therefore, voters could reasonably conclude that properties with an Assessor's agricultural code were categorized as "agricultural" in Table 1, irrespective of the presence of structures on the parcel. Further, in Table 11b, whose substance was the proposal submitted to the voters, the number of "agricultural" and "vacant land" parcels are the sum of the "agricultural" and "vacant land" parcels identified in Table 1. Thus, Table 11b indicates that there were no reclassifications of the number of parcels identified in Table 1. The consistency of Table 1 with Table 11b could suggest to a reasonable voter that the analyses of Table 2 through 8 did not affect how a parcel was classified. In other words, the first and last steps/tables of the ER do not indicate that an "agricultural" parcel would be different from either the Assessor's use code or the ordinary understanding of "agricultural," or that the presence of a structure would cause an otherwise "agricultural" parcel to be classified as "industry."
Tables 9 and 10 involved proposals for staffing and budgetary matters.
The District and majority rely heavily on the ER's Table 8. Table 8 is the only table in the ER that clearly has categories for "structured" and "unimproved" parcels. However, even if voters received the ER, or had been aware of Table 8, Table 8 is not so clear that voters would understand that an apparent "agricultural" parcel that has an undefined "structure" on it would actually be considered an "industry" parcel.
Table 8 clearly places significant importance on building square footage in terms of assessing fire risk and benefit. This is consistent with section 50078, subdivision (a). Table 8 also indicates that it considered structure fires versus grass fires and fires on unimproved parcels. However, Table 8 does not state that a parcel would not or could not be considered "agricultural" if there were any "structures" on the parcel. "Agricultural" parcels are simply placed under the "unimproved" category without a clear explanation or an attempt to expressly define that classification. To accept the District's reliance on Table 8 would require a reasonable voter to disregard the ordinary understanding of "agricultural" and "industry" and instead infer that, because there is a significant discussion about the importance of building square footage for purposes of setting the assessment rate, and because "agricultural" was placed in the unimproved category for reasons not expressly discussed, the classification "agricultural" must be limited to structureless parcels and the classification "industry" must silently absorb all "agricultural" parcels that have some form of "structure" on them (because "industry" is the only other land classification where such a parcel could logically go). In my opinion, the absence of clear explanatory language regarding the "agricultural" and "industry" classifications makes it unlikely that a reasonable voter would make this inference.
A reasonable voter could also view Table 8 in light of Table 1. As discussed above, there is nothing in Table 1 to suggest that parcels placed in the "agricultural" classification were different from the parcels that were assigned agricultural codes by the Assessor, or that the parcels placed in the "agricultural" classification contained no "structures." A reasonable voter could conclude that Table 8's "structured" property category was composed only of NFPA classifications because those were the only classifications for which NFPA provided data. That is, because NFPA did not even recognize the land classification "agricultural," a reasonable voter could conclude that NFPA had no data concerning fires, damage, and property loss on any "agricultural" parcels, be they "structured" or "structureless." In the absence of data, but to assign an assessment rate, a reasonable voter could conclude that "agricultural" and "vacant land" would be considered "unimproved."
Finally, although Table 8 does differentiate between "structured" and "unimproved" land classifications, Table 8 does not define or explain what these terms are intended to mean. Respondents' brief questions whether the presence of a shed on an agricultural parcel with irrigated crops would cause the parcel to be classified as "industry." The District's response appears to be "yes." The District's answer would presumably be surprising to voters. It is not evident from Table 8 that the presence of a single shed would result in an otherwise agricultural parcel being classified as "industry." The absence of clearer criteria for determining whether a parcel is considered "structured" supports the conclusion that Table 8 may not adequately inform voters about the breadth of the land classifications or the basis for classifying a parcel as either "agricultural" or "industry."
Deference to the District's Interpretation of "Agricultural" and "Industry"
The majority gives substantial deference to the District's interpretation of "agricultural" as including only parcels without "structures," and its interpretation of "industry" as including parcels used for agricultural purposes that have "structures" on them. I do not believe that the degree of deference afforded by the majority is warranted in this case.
The assessment is not a typical regulation or enactment by a governmental entity. Through operation of Article XIII D, section 4, voter approval was an absolute condition precedent to enactment. Because of the necessity of voter approval, it is imperative to determine what the voters understood and intended to approve. Therefore, in the context of an assessment passed in accordance with Article XIII D, it is appropriate to consider the District's position as to the meaning of "agricultural" or "industry" that it intended to convey to the voters, or believes that it actually did convey to the voters, because it was the District who proposed the assessment to the voters. (Cf. Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. Of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1, 7-8 [noting that an agency's interpretation of the meaning and effect of a statute is entitled to consideration and respect, but that the binding power of an agency's interpretation of a statute or regulation is contextual].) However, there is nothing in any of the materials that were sent to the voters that suggests that the terms "agricultural" or "industry" were used in the District's particular sense. Given the entirety of the materials sent to the voters (the Notice, ballot, and letter), as well as the ordinary meaning of "industry" and "agricultural," these terms are not ambiguous. As a result, the District's interpretation of "industry" and "agricultural" is contrary to their plain meaning, and deference to that interpretation is unwarranted. (Bonnell v. Medical Board (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1255, 1265.)
The majority also notes that the District's interpretation of "agricultural" and "industry" is longstanding. I am not so sure. The District's classification and assessment practices are not clearly spelled out in the record. What can be said is that the District classified the "Foster related" parcels as "industry" as early as 2011 for some parcels and 2015 for others, and reclassified the Frantz Parcel as "industry" in 2018. The Frantz parcel is particularly noteworthy. Prior to 2018, this parcel had been classified by the District as "agricultural." Frantz's trial testimony strongly suggests that his parcel had the greenhouses on it either prior to voter approval of the assessment or shortly thereafter. In any event, it is clear that Frantz's parcel was classified and assessed as "agricultural" for many years prior to 2018, despite the presence of the greenhouses. Given the uncertain classification practices of the District, as well as the ordinary meaning of the terms "agricultural" and "industry," the District's interpretation of "agricultural" and "industry" remains unreasonable, regardless of whether its interpretation may be longstanding. (See Dix v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 442, 460 [an agency's consistent interpretation of a statute will not control if the interpretation is unreasonable or clearly contrary to statutory language].)
CONCLUSION
The importance of adequate funding for firefighting services is without question. Still, the special assessments by fire control districts must follow Article XIII D. Given the policies that support Proposition 218 and Article XIII D, it is necessary to determine what assessment the voters approved, which means that it is necessary to determine what the voters understood and intended when they approved the District's proposed assessment. None of the materials that were actually provided to the voters, and in particular the Notice, indicated that the terms "industry" and "agricultural" were being used in a manner that is contrary to their ordinary meanings (or possibly the meanings that could be gleaned from the Assessor's use codes). The materials do not suggest that a parcel that would commonly be understood to be "agricultural" will be classified and assessed as "industry" if there was a "structure" on the parcel. Thus, the voters were not adequately informed and did not consent to classifying and taxing parcels as either "agricultural" or "industry" depending on the presence of any "structure." If the District wishes to classify and assess parcels as either "industry" or "agricultural" based on definitions that are contrary to those terms' ordinary meanings, then the solution is to propose an amendment to the old assessment or propose a new assessment. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
POOCHIGIAN, Acting P. J.