Opinion
No. PC-2010-7515
03-20-2019
RICHARD FOOTE, as Administrator of the Estate of Colin Foote v. LAURA REALE, THOMAS J. REALE, STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, and SARA R. STRACHAN, Individually and as Administrator of the Division of Motor Vehicles
ATTORNEYS: For Plaintiff: Stephen P. Sheehan, Esq.; Max Wistow, Esq. For Defendant: Gregory A. Carrara, Esq.; Lauren D. Wilkens, Esq.; Marc DeSisto, Esq.; Neil F.X. Kelly, Esq.
DECISION KEOUGH , J. , Before the Court are various motions filed by the parties in this wrongful death/negligence action. Plaintiff Richard Foote, as Administrator of the Estate of Colin Foote (Plaintiff), has filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Cross-Claim Defendant Thomas J. Reale (Mr. Reale) has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and a Motion for Entry of Final Judgment, and Defendant State of Rhode Island (State) has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Jurisdiction is pursuant to Super. R. Civ. P. 56 and 54(b).
The State had also filed a Motion for Protective Order as to Plaintiff's Amended Notices to Take Depositions. The parties agreed to hold that motion in abeyance until the Court ruled on the competing dispositive motions.
I
Facts and Travel
The facts in this case essentially are undisputed. On September 9, 2008, defendant Laura Reale (Ms. Reale) was cited for speeding, bringing to six the number of times she had been convicted for speeding within a three-year period. This qualified her as an "habitual offender" as defined by G.L. 1956 § 31-40-2. Pursuant to § 31-40-3, the Administrator of the Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) is required to "certify three . . . transcripts or abstracts of the conviction record" of any individual who qualifies as an habitual offender to the Rhode Island Department of Attorney General (RIAG). Sec. 31-40-3. Upon receiving such information, the RIAG is directed to "immediately file a complaint against the person named in it in the district court having jurisdiction of criminal offenses . . . ." Sec. 31-40-4. It is undisputed that Ms. Reale's status as an habitual offender was not brought to the attention of the District Court.
On May 16, 2010, at approximately 8:00 p.m., Colin Foote (decedent) was traveling southbound on Route 1 in Charlestown. (MaryAnne Foote Aff. ¶ 2.) He stopped for a red light at the jug handle turn for West Beach Road. Id. ¶ 3. After the light turned green, the decedent proceeded to cross Route 1 when a vehicle operated by Ms. Reale crashed into the left side of his motorcycle. Id. ¶ 4. The decedent was thrown from his motorcycle and suffered severe injuries. Id. ¶ 4-5. He was pronounced dead shortly after arriving at the hospital. Id. ¶ 5.
At the time of the collision, Ms. Reale was operating her father Mr. Reale's vehicle with his permission. (Mr. Reale's Ans. Interrogs. 3, 4.) The Charlestown Police cited Ms. Reale for violating (1) Obedience to Traffic Control Devices, § 31-13-4; (2) Conditions Requiring Reduced Speed, § 31-14-3; and, (3) Operating Motor Vehicle as Habitual Offender, § 31-40-8. The first two citations were referred to the Westerly Municipal Court, while the third citation was referred to District Court. The third citation appears to have been dismissed. Ms. Reale subsequently was arrested and charged with violating § 31-27-1, entitled "Driving so as to endanger, resulting in death." See State v. Reale, W1-2010-0332A. It is undisputed that since first receiving her driver's license nearly ten years before the date of the collision, Ms. Reale had been convicted of fifteen motor vehicle violations, ten of which were for speeding and four of which were for failing to obey a stop sign.
On October 12, 2010, Ms. Reale was found to be in violation of the citations for Obedience to Traffic Control Devices and Conditions Requiring Reduced Speed. (Def. Strachan's Resp. to Pl.'s Second Req. Produc. No. 2, at 1-4.) She was fined $215, and her license was suspended for twenty-four months. Id. On October 26, 2010, the RIAG filed a complaint against Ms. Reale pursuant to chapter 40 of title 31, entitled "Habitual Offenders Act" (the Act). See State's Resp. to Pl.'s Third Req. Produc. No. 1, at 12. Thereafter, on October 29, 2010, the District Court convicted Ms. Reale of being an habitual offender and suspended her license for five years. Id. at 9-10.
On November 19, 2010, Ms. Reale withdrew her not guilty plea to the offense of Driving so as to endanger, resulting in death, electing instead to plead guilty to the crime. See Reale, W1-2010-0332A. On December 17, 2010, the Superior Court sentenced Ms. Reale to serve ten years at the Adult Correctional Institutions, with two of those years being suspended with probation. (State's Resp. to Pl.'s Third Req. Produc. No. 1, at 2-3.) In addition to ordering substance abuse counseling and mental health counseling, the Court suspended Ms. Reale's driver's license for five years upon her release from prison. Id.
On December 23, 2010, Plaintiff filed the instant action against Defendants. In its amended answer, the State filed a cross-claim against Mr. Reale and Ms. Reale for contribution and/or indemnification. Meanwhile, at some point during this litigation, Plaintiff issued a general release to Mr. Reale and Ms. Reale for the insurance policy limits.
The Court is now faced with various motions filed by the parties. The State has filed a motion for summary judgment against Plaintiff, and Plaintiff has filed a motion for partial summary judgment against the State. In addition, Mr. Reale has filed a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the State's cross-claim.
II
Standard of Review
Our Supreme Court has declared that '"[s]ummary judgment is 'a drastic remedy,' and a motion for summary judgment should be dealt with cautiously."' Jackson v. Quincy Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 159 A.3d 610, 612 (R.I. 2017) (quoting Estate of Giuliano v. Giuliano, 949 A.2d 386, 390 (R.I. 2008)). Before deciding any such motion, "[i]t is important to bear in mind that the 'purpose of the summary judgment procedure is issue finding, not issue determination.'" Jackson, 159 A.3d at 612-13 (quoting Estate of Giuliano, 949 A.2d at 391); see also O'Connor v. McKanna, 116 R.I. 627, 633, 359 A.2d 350, 353 (1976) ("[I]n passing on a motion for summary judgment, the question for the trial justice is whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact and not how that issue should be determined.").
It is well-settled that '"[i]n passing on a motion for summary judgment, the trial justice must determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, and if not, the trial justice must determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."' Correia v. Bettencourt, 162 A.3d 630, 634-35 (R.I. 2017) (quoting Ferreira v. Strack, 652 A.2d 965, 969 (R.I. 1995)). Furthermore, "[a]lthough the moving party bears the initial burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists for a finder of fact to resolve, it can carry this burden successfully by submitting evidentiary materials, such as interrogatory answers, deposition testimony, admissions, or other specific documents, and/or pointing to the absence of such items in the evidence adduced by the parties." Doe v. Gelineau, 732 A.2d 43, 48 (R.I. 1999) (citing Superior Boiler Works, Inc. v. R.J. Sanders, Inc., 711 A.2d 628, 631-32 (R.I. 1998)).
Once a party seeking summary judgment satisfies this burden, then "the burden shifts to the opponent of the motion to respond with specific facts that would constitute a genuine issue for trial. Such party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials set forth in his pleadings." Nedder v. R.I. Hosp. Tr. Nat'l Bank, 459 A.2d 960, 962 (R.I. 1983). In doing so, "the nonmoving party . . . must identify any evidentiary materials already before the court and/or present its own competent evidence demonstrating that material facts remain in genuine dispute." Doe, 732 A.2d at 48.
It must be remembered that in general '"issues of negligence are ordinarily not susceptible of summary adjudication, but should be resolved by trial in the ordinary manner."' Correia, 162 A.3d at 635 (quoting Newstone Dev., LLC, v. E. Pac., LLC, 140 A.3d 100, 103 (R.I. 2016)). Notwithstanding this generalization, '"summary judgment should enter against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case. . . ."' Correia, 162 A.3d at 635 (quoting Lavoie v. Ne. Knitting, Inc., 918 A.2d 225, 228 (R.I. 2007)).
III
Analysis
A
Mr. Reale's Motion for Summary Judgment against Cross-Claim Plaintiff State
In support of his motion seeking summary judgment relative to the State's cross-claim, Mr. Reale contends that the undisputed facts demonstrate that he was not a joint tortfeasor. As a result, he maintains that he cannot be held liable to the State for contribution and/or indemnification as a matter of law. The State counters that discovery may reveal a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Mr. Reale was aware of Ms. Reale's motor vehicle offenses such that he might be liable under a theory of negligent entrustment of his vehicle. It further counters that a general release to Mr. Reale by Plaintiff does not absolve Mr. Reale from claims of indemnity and contribution by the State, which did not give Mr. Reale a release. Stated otherwise, the State maintains that the only way Mr. Reale could have insulated himself from the State's claim would have been through a joint tortfeasor release from Plaintiff.
It is well-settled law that '"when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings."' Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Dias, 151 A.3d 308, 311 (R.I. 2017) (quoting Whittemore v. Thompson, 139 A.3d 530, 540 (R.I. 2016)). Accordingly, "[i]n matters of statutory interpretation [the Court's] ultimate goal is to give effect to the purpose of the act as intended by the Legislature." Id. at 311.
Section 31-33-6 entitled "Owner's liability for acts of others" states:
"Whenever any motor vehicle shall be used, operated, or caused to be operated upon any public highway of this state with the consent of the owner . . . expressed or implied, the driver of it, if other than the owner . . . shall in the case of an accident be deemed to be the
agent of the owner . . . of the motor vehicle unless the driver shall have furnished proof of financial responsibility in the amount set forth in chapter 32 of this title, prior to the accident." (Emphasis added.)Our Supreme Court has declared that this provision "impos[es] vicarious liability upon the owner of a motor vehicle for the acts—intentional as well as unintentional—of anyone using or operating the vehicle with the consent of the owner." Hough v. McKiernan, 108 A.3d 1030, 1037 (R.I. 2015). However, in the instant matter, the State is not seeking to impose vicarious liability upon Mr. Reale; rather, it is seeking contribution and/or indemnification from him and Ms. Reale under a negligence theory.
The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (UCATA) "recognizes a right of contribution between joint tortfeasors if they are both liable in tort to the original plaintiff and their respective wrongful conduct caused the 'same injury' to the original plaintiff." Wampanoag Grp., LLC v. Iacoi, 68 A.3d 519, 522 (R.I. 2013) (citing Wilson v. Krasnoff, 560 A.2d 335, 339 (R.I. 1989)). Section 10-6-3 provides: "The right of contribution exists among joint tortfeasors . . ." Sec. 10-6-3. For purposes of the UCATA, "the term 'joint tortfeasors' means two (2) or more persons jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property, whether or not judgment has been recovered against all or some of them; provided, however, that a . . . principal and agent shall be considered a single tortfeasor." Sec. 10-6-2. (Emphasis added.)
It is undisputed that Ms. Reale was driving a vehicle owned by Mr. Reale when she collided with the decedent. (Mr. Reale's Ans. Interrogs. ¶¶ 2-4.) It also is undisputed that Mr. Reale had given his daughter permission to operate the vehicle. Id. ¶¶ 3, 4. Accordingly, it is clear from the unambiguous language of § 31-33-6 that the relationship between Mr. Reale and Ms. Reale was that of principal and agent. Considering that the UCATA clearly states that a "principal and agent shall be considered a single tortfeasor[,]" Mr. Reale cannot be held liable as a joint tortfeasor under § 10-6-2 of the UCATA.
Nevertheless, the State maintains that it should be permitted to conduct detailed discovery to find out whether, and to what extent, Mr. Reale was aware of Ms. Reale's poor driving record. The State asserts that if it can show that Mr. Reale was aware of Ms. Reale's numerous convictions for motor vehicle offenses, then he conceivably could be liable for negligently entrusting his vehicle to Ms. Reale on the day of the collision.
In 2005, our Supreme Court reaffirmed its recognition that '"[t]o date, this Court has not recognized negligent entrustment as a basis for liability, and we decline to do so in this case.'" Lucier v. Impact Recreation, Ltd., 864 A.2d 635, 641 (R.I. 2005) (quoting Regan v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 810 A.2d 255, 257 (R.I. 2002)). However, in so doing, the Court acknowledged that while it was not reaching the merits of the negligent entrustment doctrine, it was "an issue that we might be invited to revisit under appropriate circumstances" despite the fact that it may be a decision "best left to the Legislature." Id. at 641 n.5. It is this Court's opinion that the facts of this case present just those "appropriate circumstances" contemplated by our Supreme Court.
Indeed, in the Regan case, our Supreme Court seemed to suggest that the court would consider adopting the theory of negligent entrustment if plaintiff could furnish sufficient evidence to sustain a reasonable inference that defendant knew or should have known that there was a reasonable probability of danger inherent in entrusting his or her vehicle to a third party. 810 A.2d at 257. That particular case arose from a car accident in which defendant's son was driving defendant's leased vehicle with her permission. Specifically, defendant's son was operating her vehicle when it left the roadway and struck a tree, injuring plaintiff who was a passenger in the car. Id. at 256. The plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that defendant was either vicariously liable for the negligence of her son or was negligent in entrusting her vehicle to her son. Id.
After summary judgment was granted in favor of defendant, plaintiff appealed. In so doing, plaintiff recognized that our Supreme Court has not adopted the theory of negligent entrustment yet nevertheless suggested that the court should look at a variety of factors, including the driver's age and previous actions, to "furnish the basis for a reasonable inference that defendant knew or should have known that there was a reasonable probability of danger" inherent in her son's operation of the vehicle. Id. at 257. The court declined the invitation reiterating that it had not recognized negligent entrustment as a basis for liability previously and would not "do so in this case." Id. (Emphasis added.)
In so doing, the Regan Court set forth the elements of a negligent entrustment action as requiring a plaintiff to prove
"that (1) the entrustee was incompetent, inexperienced, or reckless; (2) the entrustor knew, or had reason to know, of the entrustee's condition or propensities; (3) there was an entrustment of chattel; (4) the entrustment created an appreciable risk of harm to others, and a duty on the part of the entrustor; and (5) the entrustor's negligence in entrusting the chattel caused the plaintiff's injury." Id. (citing 57A Am. Jur. 2d Negligence § 332 (1989)).
The court further opined that "given defendant's entrustment of the car to [her son], she would have owed a duty of care if she knew that [her son] was reckless, incompetent, or otherwise unfit to drive." Id. However, the court ultimately concluded that plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that defendant's son was unfit to drive or that he posed a risk of harm, concluding that "[g]iven the absence of evidence that [her son] was a danger or that defendant had knowledge of any danger posed by [her son], no triable issue of fact was presented." Id. at 258.
In the instant matter, it is undisputed that prior to the date of the collision, Ms. Reale had a lengthy history of motor vehicle violations, including ten speeding convictions and four convictions for failing to obey stop signs. There exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Mr. Reale was aware of Ms. Reale's condition or propensity to speed and run stop signs. If he was aware of such, and nevertheless entrusted his vehicle to Ms. Reale, then it is possible that he could be liable under a theory of negligent entrustment.
As a result, the Court denies Mr. Reale's Motion for Summary Judgment. Discovery may proceed on the issue of whether, and to what extent, Mr. Reale was aware of Ms. Reale's poor driving record when he entrusted his vehicle to her.
B
Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment and Partial Summary Judgment filed by the
State and Plaintiff, Respectively
With respect to the Plaintiff's complaint, the State has asked this Court to render summary judgment in its favor, setting forth multiple grounds upon which it would be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. First and foremost, the State contends that Plaintiff has no standing to bring an action against the State because the undisputed facts demonstrate that there is an insufficient nexus between the injury and the State's conduct. The State further contends that Plaintiff's suit is barred by the doctrines of prosecutorial and judicial immunity. In response, Plaintiff asserts that the injury is "fairly traceable" to the State's egregious negligence in failing to take steps to have Ms. Reale's license suspended and that he does have standing to sue because he had a cognizable interest in Ms. Reale's prosecution as an habitual offender. He next claims that prosecutorial immunity only applies to discretionary criminal prosecutions, whereas this case involves civil prosecutions that are mandatory under the Act. Furthermore, Plaintiff maintains that prosecutorial immunity does not shield the State from liability for the acts and omissions of the DMV.
In addition to these objections, Plaintiff filed his own motion for partial summary judgment, asserting that the State, by and through the DMV and the RIAG, had a duty under the Act to identify Ms. Reale as an habitual offender and to take steps to have her license suspended; that the State, by and through the DMV, breached that duty; and as a result, Plaintiff is entitled to a minimum of $100,000 in damages for wrongful death. The State objected to the motion, averring that the decedent's injuries were unforeseeable, that prosecution under the Act is discretionary, and that Plaintiff nevertheless does not have personal entitlement to enforcement. Moreover, it is the State's contention that even assuming the Act actually did impose a mandatory duty on the DMV and the RIAG to perform certain acts relative to an habitual offender, then the Act would be an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers doctrine. The Court will address each argument in the order they were presented and as is necessary.
1
Standing
As an initial matter, the State argues that Plaintiff does not have standing to bring this action due to the fact that there is an insufficient nexus between the injury and the State's conduct. Specifically, it maintains that Plaintiff has constructed a tenuous causal chain that amounts to mere speculation. The Plaintiff disputes this assertion, maintaining that he meets the "fairly traceable" standard for establishing standing.
It is well-settled that '"[s]tanding is a threshold inquiry into whether the party seeking relief is entitled to bring suit."' Cruz v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 108 A.3d 992, 996 (R.I. 2015) (quoting Narragansett Indian Tribe v. State, 81 A.3d 1106, 1110 (R.I. 2014)). Indeed, "[t]he most fundamental characteristic of standing is that it focuses on the party seeking to have a claim entertained 'and not on the issues he [or she] wishes to have adjudicated.'" McKenna v. Williams, 874 A.2d 217, 225 (R.I. 2005) (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968)). Thus, "when standing is at issue, the focal point shifts to the claimant, not the claim, and a court must determine if the plaintiff whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the issue itself is justiciable or, indeed, whether or not it should be litigated." McKenna, 874 A.2d at 226 (internal quotations omitted).
In determining whether a party has standing to sue, the Court:
"begins with the pivotal question of whether the party alleges that the challenged action has caused him or her injury in fact. It is required that the alleged injury in fact be an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized . . . and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." Cruz, 108 A.3d at 996 (internal citations and quotations omitted)."[t]he line is not between a substantial injury and an insubstantial injury. The line is between injury and no injury." McKenna, 874 A.2d at 226. Nevertheless, "there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court." Mruk v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 82 A.3d 527, 535 (R.I. 2013) (internal quotations omitted). Finally, "it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
In Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2013), the Second Circuit Court of the United States Court of Appeals discussed at length the difference between proximate cause and the "fairly traceable" standard required to establish standing. It cogently stated that the causal nexus between a defendant's conduct and an injury:
"is most easily shown if there is a direct relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant with respect to the conduct at issue. However, while the indirectness of an injury may make it substantially more difficult to show the fairly traceable element of . . . standing, i.e., to establish that, in fact, the asserted injury was the consequence of the defendants' actions, indirectness is not necessarily fatal to standing, because the fairly traceable standard is lower than that of proximate cause[.]
"Central to the notion of proximate cause is the idea that a person is not liable to all those who may have been injured by his [or her] conduct, but only to those with respect to whom his acts were a substantial factor in the sequence of responsible causation and whose injury was reasonably foreseeable or anticipated as a natural consequence.
* * *
"The requirement that a complaint allege[ ] an injury that is fairly traceable to defendants' conduct . . . for [purposes of] constitutional standing is a lesser burden than the requirement that it show proximate cause. Thus, the fact that there is an intervening cause of the plaintiff's injury may foreclose a finding of proximate cause but is not necessarily a basis for finding that the injury is not fairly traceable to the acts of the defendant.
* * *
"Accordingly, we, like other courts, have noted that, particularly at the pleading stage, the fairly traceable standard is not equivalent to a requirement of tort causation and that for purposes of satisfying . . . [the] causation requirement, we are concerned with something less than the concept of proximate cause. . . . [E]ven harms that flow indirectly from the action in question can be said to be fairly traceable to that action for standing purposes. . . . Rather, at [the pleading] stage of the litigation, the plaintiffs' burden . . . of alleging that their injury is fairly traceable to the challenged act is relatively modest.
"In sum, the test for whether a complaint shows the fairly traceable element of . . . standing imposes a standard lower than proximate cause." Id. at 91-92 (internal citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis in original).
Even allowing for this lower standard required to establish standing versus proximate cause, the State maintains that Plaintiff is unable to demonstrate a sufficient nexus between the injury and its conduct that would justify judicial intervention. Specifically, the State asserts that Plaintiff would be required to demonstrate that (1) the DMV would have recognized Ms. Reale's habitual offender status after her sixth speeding conviction on September 9, 2008; (2) the DMV would have provided the necessary information to the RIAG; (3) the RIAG would have then filed and prosecuted a complaint against Ms. Reale in court; (4) Ms. Reale would not have challenged the action; (5) the court would have found against Ms. Reale; (6) the court then would have suspended Ms. Reale's driver's license for over nineteen months, despite the fact that pursuant to § 31-40-7, the statutory minimum penalty for such an offense is one year; and, (7) that Ms. Reale would have obeyed the suspension and therefore would not have been driving on the day she struck the decedent. This "totem pole of contingencies," according to the State, is utterly speculative and provides an insufficient nexus between the injury and its conduct.
In light of the record before the Court, it does appear that the causal chain is indeed extremely tenuous. Nevertheless, it is a causal chain. Moreover, as the focal point of any standing analysis is on the claimant, not the claim, the Court may only consider whether the Plaintiff is the proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the "issue itself is justiciable or, indeed, whether or not it should be litigated." McKenna, 874 A.2d at 226. Consequently, and in light of the deferential standard of review afforded to the nonmoving party, the Court is constrained to conclude that the injury is "fairly traceable" to the State's conduct for purposes of establishing Plaintiff's standing to bring the instant action.
The court hastens to add, however, that it has significant concerns about the ability of Plaintiff to establish proximate cause in this matter given the fragile nature of the causal chain. Indeed, the Court struggled considerably with whether Plaintiff could, based upon the credible evidence provided, even meet the "fairly traceable" standard required for standing. See United States v. 434 Main St., Tewksbury, Mass., 862 F. Supp. 2d 24, 33 (D. Mass. 2012) (court is not empowered to redress injuries connected to governmental conduct based on speculative inferences). The causal chain is supported in large part by Plaintiff's conclusions and conjecture such that causation may very well be supported by nothing more than mere speculation. Nevertheless, given that this Court must resolve all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party and given this Court's opinion concerning the application of the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity, discussed infra, the Court will refrain from any further analysis on the issue of standing and/or proximate cause.
2
Judicial Immunity
The State next maintains that Plaintiff's causal chain of events assumes certain actions by the judiciary; namely, that a judge would have used his or her discretion to find Ms. Reale guilty of violating the Act and would have sentenced Ms. Reale to more than the statutory minimum. According to the State, any such judicial decisions are entitled to protection under the doctrine of judicial immunity.
The judicial immunity doctrine was "developed at common law as a shield intended to protect judges from civil suits for damages for actions taken in their judicial capacity." Estate of Sherman v. Almeida, 747 A.2d 470, 473 (R.I. 2000). The core principle underlying this doctrine is "that judicial decision-making 'must be engaged in . . . freely, independently, and untrammeled by the possibilities of personal liability.'" Id. at 474 (citing Calhoun v. City of Providence, 120 R.I. 619, 631, 390 A.2d 350, 356 (1978)). In accordance with this principle, "[c]ourts have consistently held that judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just an immunity from an ultimate assessment of damages." Estate of Sherman, 747 A.2d at 474 (citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991)).
It is this Court's opinion that judicial immunity is not implicated in the instant matter. To begin with, there has been no judicial decision-making in this case that could be the subject of any suit. Indeed, even if there had been judicial decision-making in this case, Plaintiff has not actually brought suit against any judge. Consequently, the judicial immunity doctrine does not apply.
3
Prosecutorial Immunity
In its final argument in support of its motion, the State suggests that the crux of Plaintiff's claim is that the State is liable for damages because it failed to prosecute Ms. Reale as an habitual offender. The State asserts, however, that any such failure to prosecute is protected under the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity. In response, Plaintiff insists that the doctrine only protects prosecutors when they are acting in a discretionary capacity but that in this case, the State's prosecutorial duties were mandatory rather than discretionary. Moreover, Plaintiff contends that the State by and through the DMV, not the RIAG necessarily, is liable to him and therefore, cannot invoke prosecutorial immunity as an absolute shield. The State responds that even assuming the Act imposes a mandatory duty to prosecute, then the Act would be an unconstitutional usurpation by the General Assembly of the RIAG's power and discretion to prosecute crimes, and thus, would be a violation of the Separation of Powers.
At the outset, it is important to note that the parties do not dispute that Ms. Reale qualified as an habitual offender at the time she collided with the decedent's motorcycle. It also is undisputed that Ms. Reale's privilege to operate a motor vehicle had not been suspended prior to the collision.
In enacting the Rhode Island Habitual Offenders Act, the General Assembly:
"declared to be the policy of Rhode Island:
"(1) To provide maximum safety for all persons who travel or otherwise use the public highways of the state;
"(2) To deny the privilege of operating motor vehicles on the highways to persons who, by their conduct and record have demonstrated their indifference for the safety and welfare of others and their disrespect for the laws of the state of Rhode Island, the orders of its courts, and the statutorily required acts of its administrative agencies; and
"(3) To discourage the repetition of criminal acts by individuals against the peace and dignity of the state of Rhode Island and its political subdivisions, and to impose increased and added deprivation of the privilege to operate motor vehicles upon habitual offenders who have been convicted repeatedly of violations of traffic laws." Sec. 31-40-1.
Section 31-40-3 provides:
"The administrator of the division of motor vehicles shall certify three (3) transcripts or abstracts of the conviction record as maintained in the office of the division of motor vehicles of any person whose record brings him or her within the definition of an habitual offender, as defined in § 31-40-2, to the attorney general. The transcript or abstract shall be prima facie evidence that the person named in it was duly convicted or found delinquent or wayward in the case of a juvenile, by the court wherein the conviction or finding was made, of each offense shown by the transcript or abstract. If the person shall deny any of the facts as stated in it, he or she shall have the burden of proving that the fact is untrue." Sec. 31-40-3 (emphasis added).
Thereafter,
"The attorney general upon receiving the habitual offender transcripts or abstracts from the administrator of the division of motor vehicles shall immediately file a complaint against the person named in it in the district court having jurisdiction of criminal offenses in the city or town in which the person resides." Sec. 31-40-4 (emphasis added).Based upon the aforementioned language, Plaintiff maintains that the RIAG had a mandatory statutory duty to prosecute Ms. Reale as an habitual offender under § 31-40-4. In other words, Plaintiff contends that the State, by and through the DMV and RIAG, is required to file a complaint against any and all habitual offenders despite the fact that § 31-40-11 of the Act specifically provides that "[n]othing in this chapter . . . shall be construed to preclude the exercise of the regulatory powers of any division, agency, department, or political subdivision of the state having the statutory power to regulate this operation and licensing." Sec. 31-40-11.
It is well-settled "that prosecutorial discretion is vested solely in the Attorney General." Jefferson v. State, 472 A.2d 1200, 1204-05 (R.I. 1984) ("[t]he Attorney General was validly exercising his prosecutorial discretion in deciding not to investigate further and prosecute . . . alleged perjurers.") It also is well-settled that "the enforcement of the criminal laws by the attorney general, must be engaged in . . . freely, independently, and untrammeled by the possibilities of personal liability." Calhoun, 120 R.I. at 631, 390 A.2d at 356 (citing Suitor v. Nugent, 98 R.I. 56, 58-59, 199 A.2d 722, 723 (1964)).
"As a constitutional officer, the individual who holds the office of Attorney General in this state is in a unique position independent from the other branches of government." In re House of Representatives (Special Prosecutor), 575 A.2d 176, 179 (R.I. 1990). Thus, "the General Assembly may not abrogate the common law powers of the Attorney General . . . having been constitutionally stated as those prescribed by law." Id. (internal quotations omitted). Under common law, "prosecutors [had] absolute immunity from common-law tort actions, say, those underlying a decision to initiate a prosecution." Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 341 (2009) (internal quotations omitted). "[A] prosecutor's absolute immunity reflects 'a balance' of 'evils.'" Id. at 340 (citing Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949). '"[I]t has been thought in the end better' . . . 'to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do their duty to constant dread of retaliation."' Id.
In Van de Kamp, a former prisoner brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against former district attorney and former chief deputy district attorney for failure to implement an information sharing system among deputy district attorneys concerning jailhouse informants, and for failure to adequately train and supervise the sharing of such information. 555 U.S. at 344. The United States Supreme Court acknowledged "that absolute immunity may not apply when a prosecutor is not acting as 'an officer of the court,' but is instead engaged in other tasks, say, investigative or administrative tasks." Id. at 342 (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976). However, it "conclude[d] that prosecutors involved in . . . supervision or training or information-system management enjoy absolute immunity from the kind of legal claims at issue here [because] [t]hose claims focus upon a certain kind of administrative obligation—a kind that itself is directly connected with the conduct of a trial." Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at 344.
Citing to WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 181 F. Supp. 3d 651 (D. Ariz. 2015), Plaintiff contends that prosecutorial immunity does not apply because the RIAG's policy was so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibility to prosecute habitual offenders. See WildEarth Guardians, 181 F. Supp. 3d at 665 ("Prosecutorial discretion does not encompass discretion to not follow a law imposing a mandate or prohibition on the Executive Branch.") However, that case is readily distinguishable from the case at bar.
In WildEarth Guardians, the Department of Justice (DOJ) formally expressed a policy not to use the mens rea knowledge instruction approved in United States v. McKittrick, 142 F.3d 1170, 1177 (9th Cir. 1998) when prosecuting under the statute at issue in that case. WildEarth Guardians, 181 F. Supp. 3d at 657. Thus, although the McKittrick policy was still good law, the DOJ nevertheless instructed prosecutors to request a specific intent instruction rather than a general intent instruction. In making its ruling, the Appeals Court observed that before a plaintiff may obtain review, he or she first must identify a concrete statement of a general non-enforcement policy. WildEarth Guardians, 181 F. Supp. 3d at 665 (citing People for Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, 60 F. Supp. 3d 14, 17-18 (D.D.C. 2014)). More specifically,
"[A]n agency's statement of a general enforcement policy may be reviewable for legal sufficiency where the agency has expressed the policy as a formal regulation . . . or has otherwise articulated it in some form of universal policy statement, which might conceivably include more informal documents, such as one 'announcing a particular non-enforcement decision [that] . . . actually lay[s] out a general policy." People for Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d at 19 (citing Crowley Caribbean Transp., Inc. v. Pena, 37 F.3d 671, 676-77 (D.D.C. Cir. 1994)).
In the instant matter, Plaintiff has not identified any regulation, concrete statement, or document showing that the RIAG had adopted a policy of non-enforcement of the Habitual Offenders Act. Consequently, Plaintiff is not entitled to rebut the presumption of non-reviewability of the RIAG's actions or inactions. Furthermore, this Court finds the reasoning in Van de Kamp to be applicable to the facts of this case; namely, the RIAG's failure to implement a policy with respect to habitual offenders is entitled to absolute immunity because it is an administrative obligation that "is directly connected with the conduct of a trial." 555 U.S. at 344. Accordingly, the RIAG is protected from this action under the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity.
Nevertheless, Plaintiff insists that it is the State collectively that is the named Defendant in this case and not the RIAG singularly. The Plaintiff maintains that it is the inaction of DMV representatives specifically not identifying Ms. Reale as an habitual offender and then certifying her record of conviction for motor vehicle offenses to the RIAG for prosecution, which serves as the first step in establishing the State's liability. The Plaintiff insists that registry officials are not covered by the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity.
"Although a qualified immunity from damages liability should be the general rule for executive officials charged with constitutional violations," our Supreme Court has recognized that there are some officials whose functions require "a full exemption from liability." Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508 (1978) (citations omitted). In those cases, courts have been instructed to undertake an "inquiry into the immunity historically accorded the relevant official at common law and the interests behind it." Id. As discussed supra, it is widely accepted that prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity when functioning in their official capacities. See Butz, 438 U.S. at 508-10; Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31 n.33; Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991). This immunity is grounded in their role "as advocates for the State," and functions "which are closely associated with the judicial process such as initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution." Knowlton v. Shaw, 704 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2013).
Absolute immunity may also extend to non-prosecutor officials of government agencies who are "'performing certain functions analogous to those of a prosecutor.'" Id. (quoting Butz, 438 U.S. at 515). "Functions likely to be granted absolute immunity are those 'integrally related to the judicial process.'" Storck v. Suffolk Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 62 F. Supp. 2d 927, 943 (1990), (citing Sykes v. James, 13 F.3d 515, 519 (2d Cir. 1993)). Absolute immunity, however, is not available to either prosecutors or agency officials whose actions are primarily administrative or investigative in nature and unrelated to their functions as advocates in preparing for the initiation of a prosecution or for judicial proceedings. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993). See Knowlton, 704 F.3d at 6 (state agency official's decision to initiate administrative proceedings aimed at legal sanctions is entitled to absolute immunity); Cook v. Houston Post, 616 F.2d 791, 793 (5th Cir. 1980) (immunity extends to activities initiating, investigating and pursuing criminal prosecution); Vosburg v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 884 F.2d 133, 135 (4th Cir. 1989) (state social workers immune from liability resulting from their decision to file removal petition); But see Burns, 500 U.S. at 495 (no absolute immunity for prosecutor providing legal advice to police regarding interrogation practices).
In the instant case, Plaintiff maintains that the DMV failed to comply with the dictates of § 31-40-3 which required it to certify three (3) transcripts or abstracts of the conviction record of any person who could be characterized as an habitual offender, as defined in § 31-40-2, to the attorney general for purposes of filing a complaint. The primary purpose of filing the complaint pursuant to the Act would be to "deny the privilege of operating [a] motor vehicle[] . . . to persons who, by their conduct and record have demonstrated their indifference for the safety and welfare of others and their disrespect for the laws of the state of Rhode Island." Sec. 31-40-1(2). The initiation of judicial proceedings aimed at revoking or suspending an individual's driving privileges are analogous to those of a prosecutor and therefore, fall squarely into the category of those entitled to absolute immunity. Accordingly, the DMV as well as the RIAG are entitled to invoke the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity and thus the State as a whole is immune from suit in the instant action such that summary judgment should be granted in its favor.
4
Duty to Identify Ms. Reale and have her License Suspended
In his request for judgment in his favor, Plaintiff contends that compliance with the mandatory provisions of the Act sets the legal process in motion for the suspension of an habitual offender's license, but that the State, by and through the egregious negligence of the DMV and the RIAG, failed in their duty to identify Ms. Reale as an habitual offender and to take the necessary steps to ensure suspension of her driver's license. Consequently, Plaintiff asserts that the State, by and through the DMV and the RIAG, breached its statutorily imposed duties. The Plaintiff further asserts that he is entitled to summary judgment, declaring that the minimum recoverable amount for proven liability against the State is $100,000. Considering that the Court already has concluded that the State is protected from suit under the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity, the Court denies Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment.
IV
Conclusion
In light of the foregoing, the Court concludes: (1) Mr. Reale's motion for summary judgment and motion for entry of final judgment are denied; (2) the Plaintiff has standing to bring this suit and judicial immunity does not apply; however, the State's motion for summary judgment pursuant to the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity is granted; and, (3) Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment is denied.
Counsel shall submit an appropriate Order consistent with this Decision.
ATTORNEYS:
For Plaintiff: Stephen P. Sheehan, Esq.; Max Wistow, Esq. For Defendant: Gregory A. Carrara, Esq.; Lauren D. Wilkens, Esq.; Marc DeSisto, Esq.; Neil F.X. Kelly, Esq.