Opinion
24A-CT-1131
10-04-2024
Appellant Pro Se Alice Marie Flowers Anderson, Indiana Attorneys for Appellees Judge Norrick and Deputy Prosecutor Kane Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana Abigail R. Recker Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana Attorneys for Appellee Tyler Lee Jugg Alex Emerson Laura Parks Coots, Henke & Wheeler, P.C. Carmel, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Madison Circuit Court The Honorable Brian McLane, Special Judge Trial Court Cause No. 48C04-2402-CT-13
Appellant Pro Se Alice Marie Flowers Anderson, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellees Judge Norrick and Deputy Prosecutor Kane Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana Abigail R. Recker Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee Tyler Lee Jugg Alex Emerson Laura Parks Coots, Henke & Wheeler, P.C. Carmel, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
MAY, JUDGE.
[¶1] Alice Marie Flowers, who purports to be a sovereign citizen, appeals the dismissal of her claim against Tyler Lee Jugg, the Jail Commander at the Madison County Jail; Judge Scott A. Norrick; and Deputy Prosecutor Kristin N. Kane ("Defendants"). Flowers provides several arguments in support of her contention that the trial court erred when it granted Defendants' motion to dismiss. However, as Flowers's multiple violations of the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure render her purported arguments impossible to address, we affirm.
At the beginning of her brief, Flowers indicates she is:
Alice Marie Flowers (hereinafter Aggrieved party), Sui Juris, Secured Party (U.C.C. § 9-105), NON-PERSON (U .C.C. §1-201 (27)), NON-CITIZEN, NON-RESIDENT, NON-DEBTOR (28 U.S.C. §3002 (4)), NON-CORPORATED, NON-FICTION, NON-SUBJECT, NON-PARTICIPANT in any government programs, a Living flesh and blood Man standing on the ground, SPC, under Special Appearance (Rule 8(E)) no Generally, NON_DEFENDANT (U.C.C. §1-201 (14)), Holder-In-Due - Course (U.C.C. §3-302 (A) (2)) of all documentation (U.C.C. § 5-102 (6)) of the "Entity" Cestui Que Vie trust Alice Marie Flowers ©TM, representing the Corporate Fiction ALICE MARIE FLOWERS ©TM. Under no circumstances is the Petitioner "Pro Se" as this Complaint is filed under the Holder-In-Due-Couse; Alice Marie Flowers of the "Cestui Que Vie trust" of ALICE MARIE FLOWERS©TM.(Br. of Appellant at 6) (errors and formatting in original). It is clear from the language in Flowers's brief that she is an acolyte of the "sovereign citizen" movement, "a loosely-formed group of citizens who believe that they are sovereign individuals" beyond the reach of the courts. Lewis v. Texas, 532 S.W.3d 423, 430 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2016). However, we and our sister courts have repeatedly rejected such arguments as baseless. See, e.g., Taylor-Bey v. State, 53 N.E.3d 1230, 1231-32 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016) (holding trial court possessed personal and subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant and rejecting his sovereign citizen argument); and see Holland v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 171 N.E.3d 684, 690 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021) (holding litigant who repeatedly filed frivolous motions advancing sovereign citizen argument should be sanctioned), reh'g denied, trans. denied; see also U.S. v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753, 767 (7th Cir. 2011) ("Regardless of an individual's claimed status of descent, be it as a 'sovereign citizen,' a 'secured-party creditor,' or a 'flesh-and-blood human being,' that person is not beyond the jurisdiction of the courts. These theories should be rejected summarily, however they are presented."), reh'g denied, reh'g en banc denied, cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 1612 (2012).
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] During a criminal proceeding involving Flowers's son, Flowers became disruptive and ultimately was removed from the courtroom. Under cause number 48C05-2203-MC-628, Judge Norrick found Flowers guilty of criminal contempt and sentenced her to 72 hours in jail. On February 5, 2024, Flowers filed a complaint against Defendants alleging that, during the criminal contempt matter, they violated her constitutional rights and various federal statutes. On April 9, 2024, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss alleging Flowers failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6). On May 9, 2024, the trial court dismissed Flowers's action against Defendants.
Discussion and Decision
[¶3] Initially, we note that Flowers proceeds pro se on appeal. We hold pro se litigants to the same standard as trained attorneys and afford them no inherent leniency because of their self-represented status. Zavodinik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014). A litigant's choice to proceed pro se "does not relieve them of their duty to comply with all the rules of appellate procedure," Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 986 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016), reh'g denied, "and they must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so." Id. at 984. "One of the risks that a [litigant] takes when he decides to proceed pro se is that he will not know how to accomplish all of the things that an attorney would know how to accomplish." Smith v. Donahue, 907 N.E.2d 553, 555 (Ind.Ct.App. 2009), trans. denied, cert. denied 558 U.S. 1074 (2009). We will not become an "advocate for a party, or address arguments that are inappropriate or too poorly developed or expressed to be understood." Perry v. Anonymous Physician 1, 25 N.E.3d 103, 105 n.1 (Ind.Ct.App. 2014), trans. denied, cert. denied 577 U.S. 873 (2015).
[¶4] Here, Flowers failed to comply with several of our Rules of Appellate Procedure. Her brief is replete with violations of Appellate Rule 46. From an organizational standpoint, she does not have a Statement of Issues as required by Rule 46(A)(4), a Statement of the Case as required by Rule 46(A)(5), or a Statement of Facts as required by Rule 46(A)(6). Flowers's omission of a Statement of Facts severely impeded our review, as her brief gives us little context for the circumstances that led to the appealed judgment.
[¶5] Regarding the substance of her brief, Flowers repeatedly reasserts her fictitious status as a sovereign citizen while making arguments irrelevant to the legal validity of the appealed judgment. For example, she asserts "STATUES ARE NO LAW TO CONVICTED UNDER A STATUTE YOU MUST GIVE YOUR CONSENT[.]" (Br. of Appellant at 7) (formatting and errors in original). She also discusses her view of the distinction between the rights of an individual and a corporation, specifically as related to the actions a governmental entity can take against her as an alleged corporate entity. (Id. at 20.) None of her arguments are cogent, and she often rambles about matters that are not before us. While she cites several cases, she does not make logical connections between those cases and the facts before us. She also does not cite the record because she did not file an appendix. Thus, Flowers's brief also violates Rule 46(A)(8)(a), which requires contentions on appeal to be supported by cogent reasoning and include citations to relevant portions of the record as well as supporting precedent and statutes, and Rule 49, which requires an appellant to file an appendix.
[¶6] While we prefer to decide cases on their merits, alleged errors are waived when an appellant's noncompliance with the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure is so substantial it impedes our consideration of the errors alleged. Perry, 25 N.E.3d at 105 n.1. Here, we are unable to determine whether any of Flowers's arguments have merit because they are unintelligible. Moreover, none of her assertions on appeal seem to address the viability of the complaint dismissed by the trial court. Therefore, her egregious violations of the Indiana Appellate Rules substantially impede our review of any issues she attempts to raise and, thus, she waived the issues she purports to present. See, e.g., Martin v. Hunt, 130 N.E.3d 135, 138 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019) (issue waived for violations of Indiana Appellate Rules to the extent that we were unable to ascertain Martin's argument). As she raised no cogent argument for reversal, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
Conclusion
[¶7] Flowers's numerous violations of the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure render her issues waived. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's grant of Defendants' motion to dismiss.
[¶8] Affirmed.
Bradford, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.