Opinion
1:19-CV-00416 EAW
2021-05-25
Christopher FLINT, Plaintiff, v. Dr. JUN, Dr. Paula Bozer, and Dr. Karl Koenigsmann, (DOCCS Headquarters, Albany, New York), Defendants.
Christopher Flint, Gowanda, NY, Pro Se. David J. Sleight, Office of the Attorney General, Buffalo, NY, for Defendants.
Christopher Flint, Gowanda, NY, Pro Se.
David J. Sleight, Office of the Attorney General, Buffalo, NY, for Defendants.
DECISION AND ORDER
ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD, United States District Judge
Pro se plaintiff Christopher Flint ("Plaintiff"), a prisoner currently confined at the Gowanda Correctional Facility, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that defendants Dr. Jun, Dr. Paula Bozer, and Dr. Karl Koenigsmann (collectively "Defendants") failed to provide him adequate medical care and treatment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Dkt. 1). Presently before the Court is a partial motion to dismiss Plaintiff's amended complaint filed by defendant Bozer (Dkt. 37), and a partial motion to dismiss Plaintiff's amended complaint filed by defendants Jun and Koenigsmann (Dkt. 42). For the following reasons, Defendants’ motions are granted.
BACKGROUND
The Court assumes familiarity with the underlying facts of this litigation, which are described in more detail in the Court's October 22, 2019 Decision and Order. (See Dkt. 28). Plaintiff's claims stem from medical treatment he received for gynecomastia . (Dkt. 1; Dkt. 16). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants denied him adequate and appropriate medical care by denying him surgery and treatment for his gynecomastia. (Id. ).
Gynecomastia is defined as swelling of the breast tissue in males. Mayo Clinic, Enlarged Breasts in men (gynecomastia ) , https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/gynecomastia /symptoms-causes/syc-20351793.
Plaintiff filed his complaint on March 29, 2019. (Dkt. 1). Plaintiff also filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Dkt. 3). On May 21, 2019, the Court issued an order administratively closing the case, but granted Plaintiff leave to reopen upon either (1) payment of the $350.00 filing fee and $50.00 administrative fee, or (2) submission of a new motion to proceed IFP that included a completed and signed prison certification or a certified copy of Plaintiff's inmate account statement that supported his claim of indigency under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) - (b). (Dkt. 12).
In response to the Court's Order, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint (Dkt. 16) and paid the filing and administrative fees ($400.00). The amended complaint sets forth the following claims against Defendants: (1) deliberate indifference; (2) cruel and unusual punishment; (3) medical negligence and medical indifference; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (5) delay and denial of medical treatment. (Id. at 25-26). The Court screened the amended complaint and allowed Plaintiff's claims to proceed to service. (Dkt. 28).
In screening the amended complaint, the Court noted that to the extent Plaintiff's claims could be construed as asserting state law claims, the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over such claims pursuant to New York Correction Law § 24. (Dkt. 28 at 9 n.2). The Court further noted that by allowing Plaintiff's claims to proceed and directing a response to them, the Court expressed no opinion as to whether Plaintiff's claims could withstand a properly filed motion to dismiss. (Id. n.3).
On December 7, 2020, defendant Bozer filed a partial motion to dismiss the amended complaint due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Dkt. 37). Thereafter, on January 4, 2021, defendants Jun and Koenigsmann also filed a partial motion to dismiss the amended complaint due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Dkt. 42). The Court issued scheduling orders for both motions, with any responses by Plaintiff due on or before January 5, 2021 and February 1, 2021, respectively (see Dkt. 38; Dkt. 43), but Plaintiff did not file any response to the motions (Dkt. 44; Dkt. 45).
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Standard
Defendants move to dismiss the third and fourth causes of action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim. (See Dkt. 37; Dkt. 42). However, because Plaintiff's argument is premised on the Court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the motions are more properly evaluated pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).
"A district court properly dismisses an action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction if the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it...." Cortlandt St. Recovery Corp. v. Hellas Telecomms., S.á.r.l , 790 F.3d 411, 416-17 (2d Cir. 2015) (quotation and citation omitted). "A plaintiff asserting subject matter jurisdiction has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it exists." Makarova v. United States , 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). "When considering a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction ... a court must accept as true all material factual allegations in the complaint." Shipping Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Drakos , 140 F.3d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1998) ; see also Tandon v. Captain's Cove Marina of Bridgeport, Inc. , 752 F.3d 239, 243 (2d Cir. 2014) ("In resolving a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), the district court must take all uncontroverted facts in the complaint ... as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party asserting jurisdiction.").
II. Plaintiff's State Law Claims for Medical Malpractice and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress are Dismissed
Defendants contend that Plaintiff's third and fourth causes of action, which assert claims for medical malpractice and intentional infliction of emotional distress, must be dismissed because they are based on New York common law, and the Court lacks jurisdiction over them pursuant to New York Correction Law § 24. (Dkt. 37-1 at 2; Dkt. 42-1 at 2).
" New York Correction Law § 24 provides that New York courts lack jurisdiction over claims for money damages brought against [the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision] and Parole officials in their personal capacities arising from conduct within the scope of their employment." Hassell v. Fischer , 96 F. Supp. 3d 370, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), aff'd , 879 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2018). Specifically, § 24 provides, in pertinent part:
No civil action shall be brought in any court of the state, except by the attorney general on behalf of the state, against any officer or employee of the department, which for purposes of this section shall include members of the state board of parole, in his or her personal capacity, for damages arising out of any act done or the failure to perform any act within the scope of the employment and in the discharge of the duties by such officer or employee.
N.Y. Corr. L. § 24(1). Section 24(2) "requires that state law claims for damages against corrections officers ‘shall be brought ... [as] claim[s] against the state.’ This provision, by its plain terms, precludes the assertion of claims against corrections officers in any court, including the federal courts." Baker v. Coughlin , 77 F.3d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1996).
"It is of no significance that § 24(1) refers only to actions in state courts, because a federal court acts essentially as a state court in addressing pendent state law claims." Baker v. Coughlin , 77 F.3d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1996) ; Ames v. N.Y. Dep't of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision , No. 9:12-cv-01487 (MAD/RFT), 2015 WL 4126326, at *13 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2015) ("It is well settled that when this Court exercises pendent jurisdiction over a state cause of action, it must apply the substantive state law. Section 24 of New York Correction Law governs substantive rights; it is not procedural." (internal citations omitted)); Thomas v. Andrews , No. 97-CV-0267E(SR), 2006 WL 2827682, at *8 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2006) ("While the language of the statute specifies that no action may be brought in state court, this Court acts as a state court when considering a state law claim brought pursuant to the Court's supplemental jurisdiction.").
The Court has reviewed the claims in the amended complaint and concludes that Correction Law § 24 bars Plaintiff's third and fourth causes of action. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were employed by the New York State Department of Corrections (see Dkt. 16 at 2), and his third and fourth causes of action allege state law claims for medical malpractice and intentional infliction of emotional distress. There is nothing in the amended complaint suggesting that Defendants’ actions occurred outside the scope of their employment. Further, as he has not filed a response to Defendants’ motions to dismiss, Plaintiff does not dispute that Correction Law § 24 applies to these causes of action.
As explained above, while " Section 24 does not bar Section 1983 claims against DOCCS employees ... it does mandate that state law claims for damages for acts or omissions committed by DOCCS employees within the scope of their employment be brought exclusively in the New York Court of Claims as claims against New York State." DeMeo v. Koenigsmann , No. 11 Civ. 7099(HBP), 2015 WL 1283660, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2015) (internal citation omitted). Accordingly, to the extent they assert state law claims, Plaintiff's third cause of action for medical malpractice and his fourth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress are dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Correction Law § 24. See Ruffin v. Deperio , 97 F. Supp. 2d 346, 355-56 (W.D.N.Y. 2000) (dismissing plaintiff's medical malpractice and negligence claims as barred by Correction Law § 24 ); see also Cossette v. Downstate Corr. Facility , No. 20-CV-6045 FPG, 2020 WL 8768086, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2020) ("To the extent Plaintiff alleges that the denial of medical care also raises claims of negligence or medical malpractice under state common law ... those claims must be dismissed under New York Correction Law, § 24, because this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to entertain them."); Ficklin v. Rusinko , 351 F. Supp. 3d 436, 444 (W.D.N.Y. 2019) (dismissing plaintiff's state law claims, including those for intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault, and battery, pursuant to Correction Law § 24 ); Tavares v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp. , No. 13-cv-3148(PKC)(MHD), 2015 WL 158863, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2015) ("whatever state-law claims Tavares may have against the DOCCS Defendants must be dismissed, because they may not be brought in federal court").
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ partial motions to dismiss (Dkt. 37; Dkt. 42) are granted. Plaintiff's third cause of action for medical malpractice and his fourth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress are dismissed.
SO ORDERED.