Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof granting that branch of the defendants' motion which was to dismiss the plaintiff's first through fourth causes of action insofar as those causes of action are asserted against the individual defendant Alvin J. Bart and the corporate defendant Alvin J. Bart Sons, Inc., and substituting therefor a provision denying that branch of the motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

The plaintiff's first four causes of action allege quid pro quo and hostile work environment sexual harassment under the New York State Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 290 et seq.) and the New York City Human Rights Law (Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-101 et seq.) against the corporate defendants Alvin J. Bart Sons, Inc., and A.J. Bart, Inc., and the individual defendants Alvin J. Bart and his sons Richard and Ira Bart. The plaintiff's fifth cause of action alleges the intentional infliction of emotional distress against the corporate defendants and the individual defendant Alvin J. Bart,

It is well settled that on a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of?action, the pleading is to be liberally construed, accepting all the facts alleged in the complaint to be true and according the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference ( see, Leon v. Martinez, 84 N.Y.2d 83, 87; Rotanelli v. Madden, 172 A.D.2d 815, 816). The issue is whether the plaintiff has stated a cause of action and not whether he or she may ultimately be successful on the merits ( see, Stukuls v. State of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 272, 275; Detmer v. Acampora, 207 A.D.2d 475; Greenview Trading Co. v. Hershman Leicher, 108 A.D.2d 468, 470).

Applying these principles to the case at bar, the Supreme Court erred when it granted the defendants' motion in its entirety, dismissing the complaint insofar as it was asserted against the corporate defendant Alvin J. Bart Sons, Inc., and the individual defendant Alvin J. Bart ( see, Aronson v. Wiersma, 65 N.Y.2d 592, 594).

We agree, however, that the complaint failed to state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. While some of the conduct alleged is questionable, the plaintiff failed to allege facts warranting the conclusion that it was either so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, or that it was utterly intolerable in a civilized community ( see, Restatement [Second] of Torts, § 46, comment d; Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 303; see also, Howell v. New York Post Co., 81 N.Y.2d 115; Freihofer v. Hearst Corp., 65 N.Y.2d 135).

Miller, J. P., O'Brien, Copertino and McGinity, JJ., concur.