SARAH VANCE, District Judge

ORDER AND REASONS

The Defendant, American River Transportation Company, moves the Court to exclude the testimony of the plaintiff's expert witness, Paul Richard. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion in part and DENIES it in part.

I. BACKGROUND

ARTCO employed David Fenimore as a deckhand aboard the M/V SPARTAN and the M/V MARY ANN. On September 12, 2003, Fenimore injured his back while pulling a wire onshore of the SPARTAN. In February of 2004, Fenimore was working aboard the MARY ANN when it passed through the Harvey Canal. Fenimore injured his back while pulling on a rope aboard barges in tow of the MARY ANN. The rope allegedly got caught on a hatch cover. When Fenimore attempted to free the rope, he experienced a sudden, sharp pain in his lower back and left leg.

On May 27, 2004, Fenimore sued ARTCO under the Jones Act. Fenimore alleges that his injury is a consequence of the negligence of ARTCO and the unseaworthiness of the vessel. Fenimore seeks damages for pain and suffering, loss of wages, impairment of earning capacity, and medical expenses.

Fenimore offers Paul Richard as an expert in marine vessel rigging and safety. Fenimore wishes to use Richard's testimony in connection with his injury aboard the MARY ANN. ARTCO seeks to exclude Richard's testimony on the bases that Richard is not qualified to testify as an expert and that his opinion is not reliable because it is not based on specialized knowledge.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 gives the district court considerable discretion to admit or exclude expert testimony. See General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 138-39 (1997). Rule 702 provides that an expert witness "qualified . . . by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education," may testify when scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. FED. R. EVID. 702. For the testimony to be admissible, Rule 702 requires that (1) the testimony be based on sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony be the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness apply the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. FED. R. EVID. 702.

In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, the Supreme Court held that Rule 702 requires the district court to act as a "gatekeeper" to ensure that "any and all scientific evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable." 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993). See also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (clarifying that Daubert gatekeeping function applies to all forms of expert testimony). The Court's gatekeeping function thus involves a two-part inquiry into reliability and relevance. First, the Court must determine whether the proffered expert testimony is reliable. The party offering the testimony bears the burden of establishing its reliability by a preponderance of the evidence. See Moore v. Ashland Chemical Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 276 (5th Cir. 1998). The reliability inquiry requires the Court to assess whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the expert's testimony is valid. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589. The aim is to exclude expert testimony based merely on subjective belief or unsupported speculation. See id. at 590. Second, the Court must determine whether the expert's reasoning or methodology "fits" the facts of the case and whether it will thereby assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence, in other words, whether it is relevant. See id. at 591.

B. Analysis

(1) Richard's Qualifications

ARTCO argues that Richard is not qualified to testify as an expert in vessel rigging. The Court finds that ARTCO's argument is without merit. This is because Richard has substantial experience in vessel rigging. Specifically, Richard has been teaching vessel rigging for approximately twenty years. (Def.'s Supp. Mem., Ex. 1 at 14-15.) His business, Platform Crane Service, specializes in rigger training and in Basic Safety Awareness. ( Id. at 14.) It has school facilities in Slidell, Louisiana and Lafayette, Louisiana. ( Id.) In addition to its school facilities, Richard's business conducts on-site training. ( Id.) Richard also has experience in vessel rigging inspection and in vessel construction. ( Id. at 11-12.) Furthermore, Richard has a degree in engineering and he is a member of the operation safety committee of the International Association of Drilling Contractors and the American Society of Safety Engineers.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Richard is sufficiently qualified to testify as an expert in the field of vessel rigging and marine safety. As the Fifth Circuit has noted, "[a]s long as some reasonable indication of qualifications is adduced . . . qualifications become an issue for the trier of fact rather than for the court in its gate-keeping capacity." Rushing v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 185 F.3d 496, 507 (5^th Cir. 1990), superceded by statute on other grounds as noted in Mathis v. Exxon Corp., 302 F.3d 448, 459 n. 16 (5^th Cir. 2002).

(2) Reliability

ARTCO also argues that Richard's testimony is unreliable. The Court, however, finds that Richard's expert testimony is largely reliable. In forming his opinion, Richard relied on his experience, discovery documents, several depositions, a physical examination and photographs of the MARY ANN, a physical examination and photographs of a barge similar to the one on which Fenimore was injured, and the Department of Labor's Occupational Safety and Health Administration regulations. Richard's conclusions on the basis of these data are reliable enough to be admissible because they are based on his experience in vessel rigging, his knowledge of safety standards, and his physical observations. See Siegrist v. Kleinpeter, 2003 WL 21276360, at *4 (E.D. La. May 30, 2003) (finding that the expert's opinion was reliable on the basis of his experience in the field).

Additionally, Richard explained the technical basis of his opinions in his deposition with ARTCO. For example, Fenimore injured his back when a hatch in the barge walkway caught the wire Fenimore was pulling. Richard opines that this was partly because the deck of the barge was obstructed. (Expert Report at ¶ 1.) In his deposition, Richard explained that he measured the width of the deck of the barge and he measured the hatches. (Def.'s Supp. Mem., Dep. of Richard at 31-32.) He observed that the hatches extended over and obstructed the work area. ( Id.) Richard also noted that there were several raised hatches in the walkway and that several of the hatch dogs were broken and had sharp edges sticking out. ( Id. at 61.) Richard explained that these edges could catch a worker's leg or foot or tangle a length of rope. ( Id.)

Richard gave an adequate basis for his opinion that the captain of the MARY ANN mispositioned the lock line, which contributed to Fenimore's accident. (Expert Report at ¶ 1.) Richard gave a lengthy explanation as to what the proper positioning is, and how the captain deviated from the proper positioning. (Def.'s Supp. Mem., Dep. of Richard at 63-65.) Specifically, Richard explained that the proper procedure requires the pushboat to pull up alongside the barge and put one line on the barge before going through the locks. ( Id. at 63). The pushboat should then change position and go to the stern of the barge and put the second line off the front of the pushboat. ( Id.) This way, the lines are already in place before the barges actually enter the lock. ( Id.) When the MARY ANN and its tow went through the locks, however, the kevel at the stern of the barge was in the wrong position. ( Id.) Richard noted that the captain of the MARY ANN had experience going through the locks, and he should have been aware of where the rope should have been positioned. ( Id. at 63-64.) This is especially so because the location of the bitts inside the lock wall does not change. ( Id. at 64.)

Moreover, Richard sufficiently supported his opinions that Femimore was not properly trained to perform his duties, and this contributed to his accident. (Expert Report at ¶ 1.) Richard explained in his deposition that he has trained deckhands, and the proper way to move a line of the side of a barge is to coil it and carry it on the shoulder. (Def.'s Supp. Mem., Dep. of Richard at 34, 42.) Fenimore, however, picked up several coils and dragged the line along the side of the barge. ( Id. at 42.) Richard noted that the reason Fenimore carried the line improperly may have been related to the inadequate width of the deck. Specifically, if Fenimore had coiled the line properly, then there would not have been enough space for him to walk on the walkway. ( Id. at 44.)

Finally, Richard gave a reliable basis for his opinion that going through the locks requires a Job Safety Analysis. (Expert Report at ¶ 1.) Richard explained in his deposition that a Job Safety Analysis is necessary because traveling through locks is not a common occurrence, the lock is an extremely confined space, and the barge changes elevation as the water level fluctuates. (Def.'s Supp. Mem., Dep. of Richard at 49.) He noted that there is no room for error when traveling through locks. ( Id.) Therefore, he concluded that the Job Safety Analysis, which has been proven as a reliable tool in the industry, was necessary to inform the crew of the dangers involved with the job. ( Id.)

Ultimately, Richard has supplied ARTCO with evidence as to how he reached his conclusions. Moreover, contrary to ARTCO's argument, Richard does not simply offer factual and legal conclusions that are within the province of the Court and the jury. Instead, Richard offers opinions and information that are beyond a layperson's general understanding, such as proper positioning of vessel lines, proper training for deckhands, proper vessel rigging, and job safety. See Sorcic v. Sea Horse Marine, Inc., 1998 WL 175897, at *2 (E.D. La. Apr. 13, 1998) (permitting the plaintiff's expert to testify because certain vessel procedures were not within an average juror's general knowledge). Furthermore, Richard's conclusion that ARTCO caused Fenimore's accident is not an impermissible legal conclusion, as ARTCO contends, but rather a permissible opinion on causation. Siegrist, 2003 WL 21276360, at *4 (permitting expert testimony on causation).

Despite the reliability of the majority of his opinions, Richard offers one opinion that is not grounded in technical knowledge. Specifically, Richard states that Fenimore did not cause the accident; instead, Fenimore "did his best to follow his supervisor's direction and company policy." (Expert Report ¶ 2.) Whether a person did his best to follow instructions is a fact issue for the jury, not a specialized determination that requires an expert. Therefore, the Court excludes this portion of Richard's testimony.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part ARTCO's motion in limine.