Opinion
HHDCV156056209
04-10-2017
Jacqueline Falero et al. v. Eli Rivera et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO SET ASIDE VERDICT AS TO DAMAGES ONLY AND FOR ADDITUR (#120)
Kevin G. Dubay, J.
The present action arises from a motor vehicle accident between the plaintiffs, Jacqueline Falero and Giovanni Lorenzo, and the defendant Eli Rivera, who was the operator of an automobile that was owned by the codefendant Bejamin Santiago. The plaintiffs filed negligence claims against the defendants, and they were tried to a jury. After the jury was ordered to reconsider its initial verdict, it returned a subsequent verdict, which, in turn, was accepted. Currently before the court is a motion to set aside the verdict as to damages only and for additur that was filed by the plaintiffs. In support of the motion, the plaintiffs claim that (1) the jury's initial verdict was legally inadequate; and (2) the jury's second verdict " was inconsistent, inadequate and was a blatant, disregard for the law and the instruction of the trial court." For the following reasons, the motion is denied.
This memorandum references Jacqueline Falero and Giovanni Lorenzo, collectively, as the plaintiffs, and individually as Falero and Lorenzo where appropriate.
Hereafter, this memorandum references Eli Rivera and Bejamin Santiago, collectively, as the defendants, and individually as Rivera and Santiago where appropriate.
" An additur is a statutory creation that allows the court to increase the award of damages when the verdict is inadequate as a matter of law." Demchak v. New Haven, 93 Conn.App. 309, 311-12, 889 A.2d 266 (2006).
FACTS
On December 19, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a four-count complaint, which is the operative complaint, against the defendants. In the complaint, they allege the following facts. On December 4, 2013, the plaintiffs were traveling together in an automobile that was owned and operated by Falero. Lorenzo was seated in the right front passenger seat. Eventually, they stopped at a red stoplight near an intersection in Windsor. While the plaintiffs were waiting at the intersection, the automobile that Rivera was operating rear-ended the vehicle in which they were traveling. Specifically, in counts one and three of the complaint, the plaintiffs allege that Rivera was negligent, and such negligence proximately caused the collision and, inter alia, the plaintiffs' physical injuries, medical expenses, and physical and emotional pain and suffering. In counts two and four, the plaintiffs allege that Santiago was negligent because he expressly or impliedly authorized Rivera to operate his automobile, and, therefore, is liable for the plaintiffs' losses. Accordingly, the plaintiffs claim damages and costs.
On February 25, 2015, the defendants filed an answer to the complaint. With respect to the plaintiffs' allegations of negligence and damages, the defendants claimed insufficient knowledge and left the plaintiffs to their proof. Before trial, the defendants conceded that Rivera was negligent, and such negligence caused the collision. Ultimately, the matter was tried before a jury on November 15, 16, and 17, 2016.
At the close of evidence, the court charged that jury regarding, inter alia, the jury's duties to follow the law and decide the case on the evidence, the credibility of witnesses, expert witnesses' testimony, the applicable burden and standard of proof, negligence, proximate cause, and damages. During the charge, the court specifically instructed the jury that Rivera had admitted that he was negligent, and his negligence caused the December 2013 accident. Consequently, the court instructed that the jury's function was to determine what injuries, if any, that either or both plaintiffs suffered as a result of Rivera's negligence. The jury received a single verdict form for the plaintiffs, which contained blank spaces where the jury could indicate the amount of economic, noneconomic, and total damages awarded to Falero and Lorenzo, respectively. In turn, the jury retired to deliberate.
" Economic damages are defined as compensation determined by the trier of fact for pecuniary losses . . . Noneconomic damages are defined as compensation determined by the trier of fact for all nonpecuniary losses including, but not limited to, physical pain and suffering and mental and emotional suffering." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) DeVito v. Schwartz, 66 Conn.App. 228, 234, 784 A.2d 376 (2001).
Subsequently, the jury returned with an initial verdict. Falero was awarded approximately $5, 599 in economic damages, which covered a portion of her claimed medical expenses, but was awarded zero noneconomic damages. Additionally, Lorenzo was awarded $1, 539 in economic damages, which also covered only a portion of his medical bills, but, like Falero, was awarded no noneconomic damages. Rather than accepting the first verdict, the court ordered the jury to reconsider the damages award on the ground that--because the jury awarded some economic damages, but no noneconomic damages--the initial verdict could be viewed as inconsistent. After reconsideration, the jury returned a second verdict that awarded zero economic and noneconomic damages. In so doing, the jury crossed out the initial damages figures on the verdict form and drew a circle, bisected by a diagonal line, immediately adjacent to each of the excised calculations. The court accepted the second verdict on November 17, 2016.
On November 28, 2016, the plaintiffs filed the present motion to set aside the verdict as to damages only and for additur pursuant to General Statutes § 52-228b and Practice Book § 16-35. A memorandum of law accompanies the motion. On November 30, 2016, the defendants filed an objection to the present motion, which is also accompanied by a memorandum of law. Oral argument was heard on December 19, 2016. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.
General Statutes § 52-228b provides in relevant part: " No verdict in any civil action involving a claim for money damages may be set aside except on written motion by a party to the action . . . No such verdict may be set aside solely on the ground that the damages are inadequate until the parties have first been given an opportunity to accept an addition to the verdict of such amount as the court deems reasonable."
Practice Book § 16-35 provides in relevant part: " [M]otions to set aside a verdict . . . [and] motions for additur . . . must be filed with the clerk within ten days after the day the verdict is accepted . . . Such motions shall state the specific grounds upon which counsel relies."
DISCUSSION
" In Connecticut, a jury's verdict is normally accorded great deference." Fox v. Colony T.V. & Appliance, Inc., 37 Conn.App. 453, 455, 656 A.2d 705, cert. denied, 233 Conn. 915, 659 A.2d 185 (1995). Nevertheless, our Supreme Court " recognize[s] the right of a court to set aside a jury verdict under proper circumstances . . ." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Seals v. Hickey, 186 Conn. 337, 352, 441 A.2d 604 (1982). In particular, " [t]he trial court possesses inherent power to set aside a jury verdict [that], in the court's opinion, is against the law or the evidence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Auster v. Norwalk United Methodist Church, 286 Conn. 152, 159, 943 A.2d 391 (2008). " Pursuant to this power, the trial court has the right and duty to set aside a verdict as being excessive or inadequate." O'Brien v. Seyer, 183 Conn. 199, 208, 439 A.2d 292 (1981). " When the amount of damages awarded is at issue, the relevant inquiry is whether the verdict falls within the necessarily uncertain limits of fair and reasonable compensation or whether it so shocks the conscience as to compel the conclusion that it was due to partiality, prejudice or mistake." Id.
As a limitation on the discretion of the trial court, " General Statutes § 52-228b provides that before the court can set aside a jury verdict [on the ground that the damages award is inadequate] and order a new trial, it must provide the parties with an opportunity to accept or to reject any court-ordered additur to the jury verdict." Semrau v. Herrick, 72 Conn.App. 327, 330, 805 A.2d 125 (2002). " [T]he sole purpose of the statute was to allow the trial court to order an additur and, if not accepted, to set the verdict aside." Saporoso v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 221 Conn. 356, 372 n.2, 603 A.2d 1160 (1992) (Berdon, J., concurring), overruled on other grounds by Santopietro v. New Haven, 239 Conn. 207, 215, 682 A.2d 106 (1996). Consequently, in practice, the standards that govern motions to set aside a verdict and motions for additur are essentially selfsame. See Hunte v. Amica Mutual Ins. Co., 68 Conn.App. 534, 541, 792 A.2d 132 (2002).
Accord Malerba v. Betkowski, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-14-6051447-S (February 6, 2017, Ecker, J.) [63 Conn.L.Rptr. 868, ] (" The standards for a motion to set aside the verdict and a motion for additur are identical"); DiPalma v. Rapoza, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-14-6045827-S, (August 12, 2016, Wilson, J.) (same); Kempf v. Maurice, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-11-6009382-S, (April 5, 2012, Swienton, J.) (same); Neysmith v. Pagan-Hart, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. 379224 (May 7, 2003, Levin, J.) (34 Conn.L.Rptr. 583, 584, ) (same); Schilkowski v. Agra, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV-02-0086960-S, (November 18, 2003, Brunetti, J.) (same).
The decision to order an additur is within the discretion of the trial court. See Childs v. Bainer, 235 Conn. 107, 112, 663 A.2d 398 (1995). " Our Supreme Court has established the parameters of a trial court's discretion in ruling on a motion for additur. They are: whether (1) the jury award shocks the conscience, (2) the plaintiff, who has proved substantial injuries, is awarded inadequate damages and (3) the verdict is inherently ambiguous." Thames River Recycling, Inc. v. Gallo, 50 Conn.App. 767, 804, 720 A.2d 242 (1998). " When ruling on a motion for additur, the court should not assume that the jury made a mistake, but should suppose that the jury did exactly what it intended to do." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Silva v. Walgreen Co., 120 Conn.App. 544, 556, 992 A.2d 1190 (2010). Additionally, " [t]he evidence offered at trial must be given the most favorable construction to which it is reasonably entitled in support of the verdict . . . " (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Shea v. Paczowski, 11 Conn.App. 232, 233-34, 526 A.2d 558 (1987).
Here, the plaintiffs argue that the court should grant the present motion on that ground that the jury's initial verdict was inadequate as a matter of law. In this regard, the plaintiffs argue that " [b]ased on the jury's initial determination that economic damages were warranted and proven, it was patently unreasonable for the jury to find no pain and suffering." Additionally, the plaintiffs argue that the court should grant the present motion on that ground that the jury's second verdict " was inconsistent, inadequate and was a blatant disregard for the law and the instruction of the trial court." In this vein, the plaintiffs argue that second verdict is the product of partiality, prejudice, or corruption, and it " is so inadequate that it must still 'shock the conscience of the court.'" Consequently, " [t]he plaintiffs ask the court to order a fair and just additur as to economic and non-economic damages. In the event the defendants fail to accept said additur within a time specified by the court, then the plaintiffs move that the jury's verdict be set aside as to damages only and that a new trial be ordered limited to that issue."
In opposition, the defendants argue that the court should deny the motion because, first, the plaintiffs are merely arguing that the verdict " speaks for itself, " rather than affirmatively presenting evidence in support of their position. Second, the defendants argue that " [i]f the initial award of partial economic damages must be considered, the plain intent of the jury appears to have been making a payment of the medical bills incurred on the day of the collision as well as the next day." The defendants also argue that the jury could have reasonably reached its conclusion because there was conflicting evidence pertaining to the issue of damages, which could support the conclusion that the claimed injuries of at least one of the plaintiffs were " embellished or exaggerated." Additionally, the defendants assert that the plaintiffs are not entitled to noneconomic damages on the mere ground that the jury initially awarded economic damages. With respect to this argument, the defendants contend that, in any event, existing case law supports the conclusion that a jury verdict that awards some economic damages, but no noneconomic damages, is not unreasonable. Lastly, the defendants argue, seemingly by viewing the second verdict in isolation, that there is no damages award in the present case, and therefore, the present motion should be denied.
With respect to this point, the defendants argue that the plaintiffs have offered no actual proof in support of their claims. This argument lacks a legal basis. As our Supreme Court has explained, " [a] direct showing of partiality, prejudice, mistake or corruption is not required. [I]f the amount awarded shocks the sense of justice as to what is reasonable, then the inferred conclusion is that the jury was misguided in reaching its decision." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Malmberg v. Lopez, 208 Conn. 675, 680, 546 A.2d 264 (1988).
In this regard, the defendants argue that " it is unknown whether the law of additur even allows making an addition to a jury verdict that fails to award any damages whatsoever." Despite this argument, recent case law reveals that an award of zero damages does not, in and of itself, preclude the court from ordering an additur. See Hall v. Bergman, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Complex Litigation Docket, Docket No. X02-CV-010177551-S (July 6, 2005, Schuman, J.) (39 Conn.L.Rptr. 573, 573-74, ), aff'd, 106 Conn.App. 660, 943 A.2d 515 (2008), aff'd, 296 Conn. 169, 994 A.2d 666 (2010).
I
The plaintiff's first claim is that the initial verdict is legally inadequate. Neverthless, the jury's first verdict is inapposite for purposes of the present motion. " [U]ntil [a jury's] verdict is accepted by the court it is no verdict at all." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Dougherty, 38 Conn.Supp. 400, 406, 450 A.2d 870 (App.Sess. 1982). " Since there is no verdict until it is accepted . . . the jurors, when reconsidering [a] verdict, [are] free to change their minds." (Citation omitted.) Gurland v. D'Adamo, 41 Conn.Supp. 407, 408-09, 579 A.2d 144 (1990). As a corollary, " [i]t is well established that evidence as to the expressions and arguments of the jurors in their deliberations and evidence as to their own motives, beliefs, mistakes and mental operations generally, in arriving at their verdict is excludable in postverdict proceedings as immaterial . . . That rule has been aptly described as applying the parol evidence rule to a jury's verdict, so that [the jurors'] outward verdict as finally and formally made, and not their prior and private intentions, is taken as exclusively constituting the act." Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hall v. Bergman, 296 Conn. 169, 179-80, 994 A.2d 666 (2010). Here, the operative verdict is the second verdict. Accordingly, it would be improper for the court to consider the first verdict, and, by extension, the portions of the verdict form that pertain to the initial verdict. Thus, the court cannot grant the present motion on the basis of the plaintiffs' first claim.
II
Next, the plaintiffs claim that the second verdict is (a) inadequate, (b) inconsistent, and (c) a blatant disregard for the instructions of the trial court and the law. The court will address these grounds in seriatim.
A
First, the plaintiffs claim that the second verdict is inadequate as a matter of law. " In Wichers v. Hatch, 252 Conn. 174, 181-89, 745 A.2d 789 (2000), our Supreme Court set out the standard that governs . . . a trial court's decision that a jury's award of damages is inadequate." Turner v. Pascarelli, 88 Conn.App. 720, 722, 871 A.2d 1044 (2005). " Wichers holds that a case-specific standard should apply to the instance in which a party seeks to have a verdict set aside on the basis that it is legally inadequate." (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 723. In this regard, " [t]he evidential underpinnings of the verdict itself must be examined." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lombardi v. Cobb, 99 Conn.App. 705, 708, 915 A.2d 911 (2007). " Where a claim is made that the damages are inadequate, [the] function [of the court] is to view the evidence . . . in light of the fact that the jury may reasonably accept or reject all, part or none of the evidence presented which they can reasonably conclude is not to be credited." Birgel v. Heintz, 163 Conn. 23, 29, 301 A.2d 249 (1972). " [I]f there is a reasonable basis in the evidence for the jury's verdict, unless there is a mistake in law or some other valid basis for upsetting the result other than a difference of opinion regarding the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence, the trial court should let the jury work [its] will." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lombardi v. Cobb, supra, 708.
In support of this claim, the plaintiffs rely on Hatcher v. Ramada Plaza Hotel & Conference Center, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-01-0807378-S, (January 29, 2003, Stengel, J.), and Verdone v. Moreno-Gonzalez, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-96-0562785-S, (June 25, 2001, Peck, J.). These cases are distinguishable from the present case because, in each case, the jury awarded some damages, while here, the jury awarded no damages at all. To bolster, the court vacated its memorandum of decision in Verdone nearly a month after the decision was issued. See Verdone v. Moreno-Gonzalez, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-96-0562785-S, (July 24, 2001, Peck, J.). Lastly, our Supreme Court has explained that " [i]t serves no useful purpose to compare a verdict in one personal injury case with the verdicts in other personal injury cases." Birgel v. Heintz, 163 Conn. 23, 34, 301 A.2d 249 (1972).
Turning to the present case, the following additional facts and procedural history are relevant to the plaintiffs' claim that the second verdict is legally inadequate. At trial, the plaintiffs testified that the impact between the two vehicles was quite severe. Lorenzo, in particular, testified that the back or trunk of Falero's car was " pushed in" or " indented, " the bumper was " pushed in, " and one of the lights was cracked.
Nevertheless, photos of Falero's vehicle that were taken after the accident failed to reveal any visible damage to the automobile. To bolster, Falero made no claim for damages to her vehicle.
Moreover, Falero testified that her car moved forward only a couple of inches as a consequence of the rear-end collision, while Lorenzo testified to a greater distance. Similarly, Falero testified that her head " jerked" back and forth as a consequence of the impact, while Lorenzo could not recall if his body even moved at all. In addition, before the plaintiffs drove home in Falero's vehicle, waited some period of time, and then sought care at Manchester Memorial Hospital (hospital), the plaintiffs declined the assistance of an ambulance at the scene of the accident because neither of them were in any pain.
According to the plaintiffs' testimony, at the hospital, Falero complained of neck pain, upper back pain, and headaches. In turn, she underwent a computerized tomography (CT) scan--which yielded negative results--and was prescribed naproxen and valium. At the same time, Lorenzo conveyed to the hospital's staff that he was involved in a motor vehicle accident and that he was experiencing lower back pain. Despite this fact, the staff did not physically examine him, and he declined to undergo a CT scan on the ground that he " does not like hospitals." Both of the plaintiffs were discharged from the hospital on the same day with instructions to follow up with their primary care physicians.
After she was discharged from the hospital, Falero waited approximately one week before seeking additional treatment from her primary care physician. She accounted for the delay on the basis that she believed that the pain that she was enduring was going to go away. Lorenzo testified that he called his primary care physician the day after he was discharged from the hospital, but did not state when he was actually examined. Nevertheless, Lorenzo explained that his physician prescribed him vicodin and authorized him to work on light duty restrictions.
The plaintiffs testified that they missed no work following the December 2013 accident. In particular, Lorenzo explained that, after the collision occurred, he started a new job with Amazon as a warehouse worker, and described the work as " physical, " despite his lower back pain. He stated that he took the new position because the entirety of his work history consists of " warehouse positions." Lorenzo added that while he was at work, he would wear a back brace, which was not worn at home. Also, he testified that he did not avoid particular activities outside of work.
During trial, Tomas Sanjurjo, a chiropractor, testified for the plaintiffs. He stated that they received chiropractic treatment at his office following the December 2013 accident. Sanjurjo explained that he did not know how the plaintiffs were referred to his office. During their testimony, however, the plaintiffs explained that they were referred to Sanjurjo's office by a relative.
With respect to Falero, Sanjurjo stated that he met her on December 13, 2013 for an initial consultation regarding chiropractic care. Moreover, he explained that, after he reviewed the medical history that Falero provided and conducted a physical examination, he diagnosed her with a cervical sprain, a thoracic sprain, accompanying muscle spasms, and headaches. Falero underwent a course of care with Sanjurjo--during which time she experienced " flare-ups" of pain--until she was discharged on June 12, 2014. When he discharged Falero, Sanjurjo assessed that, with respect to her neck, she had a 7 percent permanent impairment. He also testified that, in his opinion, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, the December 2013 accident caused Falero's neck injuries.
Nonetheless, Falero testified that she was involved in two, prior motor vehicle accidents. Specifically, in 2008, she was a passenger in an automobile that collided into a guardrail alongside Interstate 95 (2008 accident). As a result, she fractured a part or portions of her lumbar spine, but her physical condition had improved with treatment. Falero explained that she brought a claim for damages against the other driver who was involved in the 2008 accident. Moreover, in 2007, she was the driver of a car that was involved in an accident (2007 accident). Consequently, she sustained neck and upper back injuries with accompanying neck pain, underwent approximately five sessions of treatment, and was assessed with an impairment rating of 10 percent. After this accident, Falero also brought a claim for damages.
During her testimony, Falero admitted that she did not tell Sanjurjo about the 2007 accident and her prior neck and upper back injuries on the ground that she was unsure as to when it actually occurred--she thought the 2007 accident happened in 2005. Moreover, despite the fact that she underwent medical treatment for the neck and upper back injuries that she sustained in the 2007 accident, Falero did not disclose such information in response to an interrogatory of the defendants that inquired as to whether she was under any medical care in the ten years prior to the December 2013 accident. She expressly denied that she attempted to hide or conceal the 2007 accident and her prior neck and upper back injuries. During Sanjurjo's cross examination, he stated that he earned of the 2007 accident only recently from the plaintiffs' attorney, and that it would have been important for him to know of the prior impairment rating while treating Falero.
Sanjurjo also testified that, during the course of Falero's treatment, he referred her to a neurologist, for her headaches, and an orthopedist. First, the neurologist that Falero aw concluded that her headaches were cervicogenic, i.e., they derived from an injury to the neck, as opposed to a trauma to the head. At the same time, excerpts from Falero's deposition testimony were introduced at trial. The excerpts revealed that, during her deposition, Falero testified that her headaches were unrelated to the December 2013 accident. Second, the orthopedist by whom Falero was examined offered her injections that could ease the neck pain that she was experiencing. Falero declined the orthopedist's offer on the grounds that she was concerned about the shots' potential side effects and she fears needles.
Moreover, at trial, Sanjurjo testified that Lorenzo met with a colleague of his on December 13, 2013 for an initial chiropractic consultation, but he, Sanjurjo, oversaw most of Lorenzo's subsequent visits and evaluations. Specifically, Sanjurjo testified that Lorenzo had no lower back issues or complaints prior to the December 2013 accident. Although Sanjurjo sent Lorenzo for lower back X rays--the results of which were normal--he diagnosed Lorenzo with a lumbar sprain and accompanying pain. He also stated that, when he discharged Lorenzo on June 17, 2014, Lorenzo had a 6 percent permanent impairment with respect to his lower back. Much like his opinion regarding Falero, Sanjurjo testified that he believed, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, that the December 2013 accident caused Lorenzo's lower back injury.
Additionally, Sanjurjo testified that when he was treating Lorenzo, he referred him to a physical therapist for additional care. At first, Lorenzo testified that he did not undergo physical therapy because he thought that it would " do the same thing as" the chiropractic treatment that he was receiving. Subsequently, Lorenzo testified that he did, in fact, go to physical therapy, but he only went three times and paid in cash each visit. No records of such treatment existed. Accounting for this absence, Lorenzo explained that he did not feel the need to have merely three physical therapy visits documented on his medical records. Moreover, he testified that he does not intend to see any other medical providers in the future.
Construing the evidence in the manner most favorable to sustaining the second verdict, as the court must do; Shea v. Paczowski, supra, 11 Conn.App. 233-34; the jury could have reasonably determined that the plaintiffs incurred zero economic and noneconomic damages as a result of the December 2013 accident. Specifically, the evidence adduced at trial provided a rational basis for the jury to award no economic damages to the plaintiffs. In this regard, the issue of whether Falero's neck and upper back injuries were proximately caused by the defendants' negligence, on the one hand, or the 2007 accident, on the other, was hotly contested in the present case. " The existence of conflicting evidence . . . curtails the authority of the court to overturn the verdict because the jury is entrusted with deciding which evidence is more credible and what effect it is to be given." Medes v. Geico Corp., 97 Conn.App. 630, 639, 905 A.2d 1249 (2006). Thus, there was some factual basis upon which the jury could conclude that the December 2013 accident was not the proximate cause of Falero's neck and upper back injuries, and, by extension, her related medical expenses.
Regarding Lorenzo's economic damages, there was an evidential basis for the jury to disbelieve that his medical expenses were reasonably necessary or were causally connected to the December 2013 accident. In this regard, there was conflicting evidence with respect to the severity of the collision, and there was evidence that pointed to the following facts: Lorenzo took a new job that was physically rigorous following the accident, he did not miss any work after the accident, he denied medical treatment at the scene of the collision, the hospital's staff discharged him without examining him in any way, he could not recall whether his body moved as a result of the rear-end accident, he might not have sought physical therapy in accordance with Sanjurjo's orders, and the X rays of Lorenzo's back did not reveal any injury. In this light, Sanjurjo's testimony regarding Lorenzo's lower back injuries and their connection to the accident is unavailing. " [The jury] may accept or reject the testimony of any witness . . . and determine the weight to be given the evidence . . . This is true whether the testimony is that of laypersons or experts." (Citations omitted.) Shea v. Paczowski, supra, 11 Conn.App. 234. Thus, with respect to both of the plaintiffs, the jury could have reasonably concluded that they incurred zero economic damages as a consequence of the December 2013 accident.
Moreover, the evidence that was presented during trial provided a rational basis for the jury to award zero noneconomic damages to the plaintiffs. " [G]iven the minimal nature of the incident and the alleged injuries, there can be no amount of monetary award that would be so extremely low as to shock the conscience." Lidman v. Nugent, 59 Conn.App. 43, 46, 755 A.2d 378 (2000) (reversing trial court's decision to set aside verdict as inadequate on substantially similar facts). " The jury was not compelled to accept the plaintiffs' claims as to the severity of their injuries . . . The weight to be accorded to testimony is a matter for the jury to determine . . . and the assessment of damages is peculiarly within its province." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Thus, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the plaintiffs did not incur noneconomic damages as a consequence of the December 2013 accident. In sum, the evidence of record supports the conclusion that the jury's damages award " falls within the necessarily uncertain limits of fair and reasonable compensation"; O'Brien v. Seyer, supra, 183 Conn. 208; and, accordingly, the present motion cannot be granted on the basis that the second verdict is inadequate as a matter of law.
B
Additionally, the plaintiffs claim that the second verdict is inconsistent. In this regard, the present action presents " a zero damages case." Thames River Recycling, Inc. v. Gallo, supra, 50 Conn.App. 805 n.20; see, e.g., Malmberg v. Lopez, 208 Conn. 675, 683, 546 A.2d 264 (1988). Specifically, " [i]n Malmberg, our Supreme Court concluded [that [a] verdict was ambiguous because the court was unable to determine whether the jury found no liability, or whether it found liability but no damages . . . A new trial was, 'therefore, necessary." (Citation omitted.) DiBartolomeo v. Hill, 41 Conn.App. 355, 359, 675 A.2d 1373 (1996). In the present case, as in DiBartolomeo, supra, 359, " the verdict is not ambiguous. Here, the defendants conceded liability for the accident and only the issue of damages was tried to the jury." See also Hughes v. Lamay, 89 Conn.App. 378, 386, 873 A.2d 1055, cert. denied, 275 Conn. 922, 883 A.2d 1244 (2005) (concluding that verdict for plaintiff that awarded zero economic and noneconomic damages was not inherently ambiguous where liability was established but " cause, nature, and extent" of injuries were in dispute). Therefore, the present motion cannot be granted on the basis that the second verdict is inherently ambiguous.
C
Lastly, the plaintiffs claim without elaboration that the second verdict is " a blatant disregard of the law and instructions of the trial court." With respect to this point, " [t]he stability of jury verdicts is and has been of concrete substance to our justice system and, 'n turn, to the role that system occupies in our society." McNamee v. Woodbury Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, 193 Conn. 15, 26, 475 A.2d 262 (1984). Thus, " [i]t is presumed that the jury follows the instructions given by the court." Gajewski v. Pavelo, 229 Conn. 829, 837, 643 A.2d 1276 (1994). " As a result, it is well established that, [i]n the absence of a showing that the jury failed or declined to follow the court's instructions, [courts] presume that it heeded them." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wiseman v. Armstrong, 295 Conn. 94, 113, 989 A.2d 1027 (2010). Here, the plaintiffs have made no such showing. Consequently, the present motion cannot be granted on the ground that, in returning the second verdict, the jury disregarded the law and the court's instructions.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the motion to set aside the verdict as to damages only and for additur is denied.