Summary
holding petitioner could not seek mandamus relief based upon claim previously raised in first motion for postconviction relief that was denied in Superior Court decision affirmed by Supreme Court
Summary of this case from Desmond v. BidenOpinion
No. 588, 2001
Decided: February 19, 2002
Court Below-Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for Kent County in C.A. No. 00M-06-004. Def. ID No. 88K01678DI.
Affirmed.
Unpublished opinion is below.
WARD T. EVANS, Petitioner Below, Appellant, v. STATE OF DELAWARE, Respondent Below, Appellee. No. 588, 2001 In the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware. Submitted: December 21, 2001 Decided: February 19, 2002
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and STEELE, Justices.
Carolyn Berger, Justice:
ORDER
This 19th day of February 2002, upon consideration of the appellant's opening brief and the appellee's motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that:
(1) The petitioner-appellant, Ward T. Evans, filed this appeal from the November 8, 2001 order of the Superior Court dismissing his petition for a writ of mandamus. The State of Delaware has moved to affirm the judgment of the Superior Court on the ground that it is manifest on the face of Evans' opening brief that the appeal is without merit. We agree and AFFIRM.
The Superior Court's November 8 order adopted a Commissioner's Report and Recommendations dated October 18, 2001.
(2) Evans was convicted of Rape in the First Degree in September 1982, following a jury trial in the Superior Court. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole. Evans' conviction was affirmed on direct appeal.
Evans v. State, Del. Supr., No. 190, 1983, Horsey, J. (June 21, 1984).
(3) In his petition for a writ of mandamus, and now on appeal, Evans claims that the Department of Justice has a duty to inform him of the "specific crime and criminal act" for which he was convicted. Evans claims that the indictment alleged only one act of sexual intercourse, whereas the State presented evidence of two acts. According to Evans, it is not clear which act of intercourse led to the jury's verdict, or whether the jury arrived at a unanimous verdict on one of the alleged acts. Evans contends that the information he seeks is not available in the indictment or in the trial transcript.
(4) The Superior Court may issue a writ of mandamus to a State officer, tribunal, board or agency to compel the performance of an official duty to which the petitioner has established a clear legal right. The issuance of a writ of mandamus is within the discretion of the Superior Court.
Clough v. State, 686 A.2d 158, 159 (Del. 1996).
Ingersoll v. Rollins Broad. of Del., Inc., 272 A.2d 336, 338 (Del. 1970).
(5) In this case, the Superior Court denied Evans' mandamus petition on the basis that the Department of Justice has no duty to answer Evans' request. We find no error or abuse of discretion in the Superior Court's decision. Evans had an adequate opportunity to challenge his rape conviction in his appeal to this Court and in his numerous applications for postconviction relief in the Superior Court. Indeed, in his first motion for postconviction relief, Evans raised the issue that he now raises in his petition for a writ of mandamus. By order dated May 7, 1986, this Court affirmed the denial of Evans' first motion for postconviction relief. Evans may not attempt to relitigate this claim by restating it in the form of a petition for extraordinary relief.
See Evans v. State, 2000 WL 313431 (Del.Supr.) (affirming the denial of Evans' ninth motion for postconviction relief).
Evans v. State, 1986 WL 16784 (Del.Supr.).
(6) A writ of mandamus is not available to correct alleged trial court errors that are, or were, subject to ordinary appellate review. This Court will not allow Evans, who had an adequate remedy in the appeal process, to invoke the extraordinary writ process as a substitute for appellate review.
Matushefske v. Herlihy, 214 A.2d 883, 885 (Del. 1965).
Id.
(7) It is manifest on the face of Evans' opening brief that the appeal is without merit. The issues presented on appeal are controlled by settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, there was no abuse of discretion.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is GRANTED. The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.