Opinion
C. A. No. 05A-08-001 RRC.
Submitted: June 4, 2007.
Decided: July 25, 2007.
On Appeal from a Decision of the Industrial Accident Board.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
David A. Arndt, Esquire, Jacobs Crumplar, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Claimant-Below/Appellant.
Scott L. Silar, Esquire. Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman Goggin. Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for Employer-Below/Appellee.
Dear Counsel:
Before this Court is the appeal of Irma Fawcett ("Appellant"), Executrix of the estate of Mitchell Fawcett from a decision of the Industrial Accident Board ("the Board") dated July 7, 2005. The Board held that Mr. Fawcett "realized" as of February 14, 2004 (when he first met with an attorney about a possible worker's compensation claim) that he "could have" contracted a compensable occupational disease and was therefore required to have notified Verizon of his claim within six months of February 14, 2004 pursuant to 19 Del. C. § 2342. The issue in this appeal is whether the Board's decision was correct in applying the six month notice provision of 19 Del. C. § 2342 to the date of February 14, 2004, in the absence of an expert's report then opining that Mr. Fawcett's lung cancer was in fact caused by his workplace exposure to asbestos, and whether the Board's decision was supported by sufficient evidence in its conclusion that on that date Mr. Fawcett knew "that [he] ha[d] contracted a compensable occupational disease. . .[and] that the disability . . . could have been caused or had resulted from [his] employment[.]"
Irma Fawcett filed this action on behalf of her deceased husband.
This Court holds that there was insufficient evidence before the Board for it to have found that February 14, 2004 was the operative date when Mr. Fawcett should have known, as a reasonable person, the nature, seriousness, and probable compensable nature of his disease, and that the Board thus incorrectly applied the six month notice provision of 19 Del. C. § 2342 to the date of February 14, 2004 when Mr. Fawcett first met with an attorney about his possible claim. Therefore, the decision of the Board to deny Appellant's claim is REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Although Appellant separately advances an argument that under Delaware Workers' Compensation Law a spouse's right to death benefit is independent of the deceased employee's claim and exists irrespective of whether the deceased employee failed to comply with the statutory notice provision, the Court need not reach this alternative argument.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The facts pertinent to this decision are included below.
Mitchell Fawcett worked for Diamond State Telephone Company (later known as Verizon) from the late 1940's until his retirement in 1986. He was part of Verizon's "downtown group" which covered the telephone system needs of many large center-city office buildings. Mr. Fawcett came into contact with asbestos fireproofing installation, asbestos pipe installation and asbestos containing ceiling tiles during the cable installation that he regularly performed. Mr. Fawcett's exposure to asbestos was a result of scraping asbestos insulation from support girders in the buildings to enable him to clamp telephone wires to the girder and run the telephone cables throughout the buildings. The initial process of opening the ceiling tiles would cause asbestos dust to fall from the ceiling and onto his person.
Tr. Beatson, IAB Hearing No. 1259411, at 5 (May 16, 2005).
Id. at 8-9.
Id. at 10.
Id.
Id. at 11.
Subsequently, Mr. Fawcett became ill in Fall 2003 and was diagnosed on or about November 11, 2003 with lung cancer.9 Immediately after the initial diagnosis, Mr. Fawcett, his wife, and his doctors discussed his cancer and his work with asbestos, but the doctors did not make a causal connection between his lung cancer and his asbestos at the initial time of diagnosis.
Tr. Fawcett, at 30.
Mr. Fawcett's doctors are never identified by name in the record.
Tr. Fawcett, at 31.
The diagnosis of lung cancer prompted Mr. Fawcett to seek advice of counsel about a potential legal claim against his former employer, Verizon, for asbestos exposure. After Mr. Fawcett decided to explore any legal claims he might have, he consulted with an attorney at Jacobs Crumplar on February 14, 2004 at the law office where they discussed Mr. Fawcett's exposure to asbestos while working with the phone company. At the time of this meeting, no doctor had advised Mr. Fawcett that his lung cancer was causally related to his past asbestos exposure, but Mr. Fawcett's attorney agreed to explore the possibility of a legal claim.
Id. at 73.
Appellant's Opening Brief, D.I. 9, at 4.
In June 2004, Mr. Fawcett died of lung cancer. His attorney then gathered his medical records and provided them to a medical expert, Dr. Jerrold Abraham. An expert report was received by Mr. Fawcett's attorney from Dr. Jerrold Abraham in October 2004 giving Mr. Fawcett's estate an opinion that Mr. Fawcett's lung cancer was causally related to his exposure to asbestos.
Tr. Fawcett, at 27-28.
Fawcett v. Verizon Delaware, Inc., IAB Hearing No. 1259411, at 8 (July 7, 2005).
Dr. Jerrold Abraham is referred to as an expert, but his area of expertise is never specifically stated. The exact date in October 2004 of Mr. Fawcett's attorney's receipt of this report is not clear from the record.
Fawcett v. Verizon Delaware, Inc., IAB Hearing No. 1259411, at 8 (July 7, 2005).
On November 3, 2004, the estate of Mitchell Fawcett, through his widow and executrix, Irma Fawcett, filed a petition with the Board to determine compensation. On that same date, she, through counsel, notified Verizon of the causal link between asbestos exposure and her husband's lung cancer.
Appellant's Opening Brief, D.I. 9, at 3.
In the initial pleadings, Mrs. Fawcett ("Appellant") sought payment of medical and funeral expenses. Mrs. Fawcett later amended the pleading to include an additional claim for ongoing death benefits. Tr. Fawcett, at 72-73.
At the hearing on May 16, 2005, the Board was presented with testimony from James Beatson regarding the nature of Mr. Fawcett's work at the telephone company. Mr. Beatson testified on behalf of the Appellant, and stated that he had worked with Mr. Fawcett for approximately 35 years. Mr. Beatson testified that both he and Mr. Fawcett were most likely exposed to asbestos while working for the telephone company.
Tr. Beatson, at 6-10.
Mrs. Fawcett also testified that it was her husband's idea to submit a claim for asbestos and that it was his idea to further investigate such a claim by consulting a lawyer. Mrs. Fawcett further stated that she had discussions with her husband regarding where he would have been exposed to asbestos.
Tr. Fawcett, at 31.
Id.
Furthermore, Dr. Susan Daum, a board certified doctor in both internal medicine and occupational medicine testified by deposition on behalf of Appellant. The Board said that "[Dr. Daum] noted that due to the nature of their work, telecommunications workers are exposed to friable asbestos that blows around them during their installation activities." Dr. Daum further testified that asbestos exposure was the cause of Mr. Fawcett's lung cancer. "The doctor noted that an October 2003 CT scan of [Mr. Fawcett's] lungs evidenced minimal pleural thickening. [Mr. Fawcett] had asbestosis and small pleural plaques in his lungs evidencing asbestos-related disease."
Tr. Daum, at 52.
Fawcett v. Verizon Delaware, Inc., IAB Hearing No. 1259411, at 4 (July 7, 2005).
Tr. Daum, at 60.
Fawcett v. Verizon Delaware, Inc., IAB Hearing No. 1259411, at 4 (July 7, 2005).
The Board, in its July 7, 2005 decision, held that Mrs. Fawcett's testimony was credible and ultimately dispositive as to when Mr. Fawcett acquired knowledge of the seriousness and probable compensable nature of his lung cancer and its causal relationship to his work for Verizon. The Board established February 14, 2004 as the date that Mr. Fawcett, as a reasonable person, realized that his lung cancer was related to his work at Verizon and his contact with asbestos. The Board stated that "Mrs. Fawcett referred in her testimony to discussions she had with [Mr. Fawcett] about his exposure to asbestos and his medical condition. Further, [Mr. Fawcett] had similar discussions with his physicians. All these discussions led [Mr. Fawcett] to a lawyer in February 2004."
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id.
Additionally, the Board stated that:
[p]ursuant to the Act, [Mr. Fawcett] would have been required to give Verizon notice of his occupational illness no later than August 14, 2004, or six months from the date he acquired the requisite knowledge. [Mr. Fawcett's] counsel tendered a notice letter to Verizon on the date they filed the petition, November 4, 2004. Unfortunately, notice was presented to Verizon nearly three months after the date prescribed by the Act.
Id.
The Board ultimately held that Appellant's petition satisfied the one-year statute of limitations imposed by 19 Del. C. § 2361, but that the remedy was barred by a failure to comply with the notice provision of 19 Del. C. § 2342, which states:
Unless the employer during the continuance of the employment has actual knowledge that the employee has contracted a compensable occupational disease or unless the employee, or someone in the employee's behalf, or some of the employee's dependents, or someone on their behalf, gives the employer written notice or claim that the employee has contracted one of the compensable occupational diseases, which notice to be effective shall be given within a period of 6 months after the date on which the employee first acquired such knowledge that the disability was, could have been caused or had resulted from the employee's employment, no compensation shall be payable on account of the death or disability by occupational disease of such employee.
The Board denied Appellant's petition, and this appeal was taken.
II. CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
Appellant contends that the Board's decision was erroneous because the Board incorrectly held as a matter of law that the six-month notice provision of 19 Del. C. § 2342 was effective on February 14, 2004, when Mr. Fawcett first met with an attorney, but where no expert opinion then existed establishing the causal relation between Mr. Fawcett's lung cancer and his workplace exposure to asbestos. Appellant argues in the Opening Brief that the applicable standard of review is whether the Board committed an error of law in so holding, but subsequently and alternatively in the Reply Brief argues that the Board's decision was not otherwise supported by substantial evidence.
Appellant's Opening Brief, D.I. 9, at 5.
Appellant asserts that as of February 14, 2004 Mr. Fawcett had not "acquired such knowledge that the disability was, could have been caused or had resulted from the employee's employment." Furthermore, Appellant argues that even though Mr. Fawcett displayed signs associated with asbestos related lung cancer, those signs did not suffice to put Mr. Fawcett on notice that his lung cancer was definitely caused by asbestos exposure. Appellant asserts that "[t]he mere fact that a claimant meets with an attorney cannot lead to an inference that a potential causal link between a disease and asbestos exposure is made."
Appellant's Opening Brief, D.I. 9, at 5-6.
Id. at 7.
Furthermore, Appellant asserts that "[t]he Board's determination in this case establishes a precedent whereby an employee who has a fleeting thought or question whether his cancer may be work related and sees an attorney to discuss that possibility sets in play a very narrow, six-month Statute of Limitations in order to file a claim." Appellant argues that "[i]t certainly is not unusual for a medical expert to forward an opinion that no asbestos exposure relationship exists between the disease a person has been diagnosed with."
Id. at 8.
Id.
Appellee responds that the appropriate standard of review is whether the Board's conclusion was supported by substantial evidence, and not whether the Board committed an error of law in its determination that February 14, 2004 was the operative date that Mr. Fawcett knew, as a reasonable person, the nature, seriousness, and probable compensable nature of his disease. Appellee contends that the decision of the Board was supported by substantial evidence because "the conversations that [Mr. Fawcett] had with his wife and doctor were of such a degree that [Mr. Fawcett] was prompted to seek advice of counsel and as such, was the appropriate date to use for the notice issue."
Appellee's Answering Brief, D.I. 13, at 7.
Appellee argues that "[t]he Board did not simply pick the meeting date as a good date to start the six (6) month provision under § 2342. Between the unfortunate diagnosis of cancer and the meeting with counsel, there was testimony from Mrs. Fawcett that she had a discussion with her husband about the work exposure and illness." Appellee asserts that these conversations demonstrate that Mr. Fawcett understood the causal nexus between exposure to asbestos and his subsequent development of lung cancer, and this knowledge prompted Mr. Fawcett to seek advice of counsel. Appellee further contends that "[r]ealization (and the timing) of the probable compensable nature of this illness was supported by the testimony of Mrs. Fawcett." Therefore, Appellee concludes that February 14, 2004 was, as found by the Board, the triggering date under 19 Del. C. § 2342 when "the employee first acquired such knowledge that the disability was, could have been caused or had resulted from the employee's employment[.]" Appellee maintains that because notice of a potential claim was not given within six months as provided in 19 Del. C. § 2342, the petition is barred.
Id.
Id.
Id.
19 Del. C. § 2342.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Supreme Court and this Court have repeatedly emphasized the limited appellate review of the factual findings of an administrative agency. The function of the reviewing Court is to determine whether the agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The appellate court does not weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility, or make its own factual findings. The reviewing Court must view the facts in a light most favorable to the party prevailing below; therefore, it merely determines if the evidence is legally adequate to support the agency's factual findings. When factual determinations are at issue, the reviewing Court should defer to the experience and specialized competence of the Board. If the decision is supported by substantial evidence, the Court must affirm the decision of an agency even if the Court might have, in the first instance, reached an opposite conclusion.
Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., 213 A.2d 64, 66-67 (Del. 1965); General Motors Corp. v. Freeman, 164 A.2d 686, 688 (Del. 1960);
Oceanport Ind. V. Wilmington Stevedores, 636 A.2d 892, 899 (Del. 1994); Battista v. Chrysler Corp., 517 A.2d 295, 297 (Del.Super.Ct. 1986), appeal dismissed, 515 A.2d 397 (1986).
Johnson, 213 A.2d at 66.
Chudnofsky v. Edwards, 208 A.2d 516, 518 (Del. 1965).
Histed v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours Co., 621 A.2d 340, 342 (Del. 1993); Julian v. Testerman, 740 A.2d 514, 519 (Del.Super.Ct. 1999), aff'd 737 A.2d 530 (Del. 1999).
Brogan v. Value City Furniture, 2002 WL 499721 (Del.Super.).
When a question of law is at issue, the scope of review is de novo, which requires the Court to determine whether the Board erred in formulating or applying legal principles. When an error of law has been committed, the Court is required to reverse and remand the decision so the correct legal standard can be applied to the facts.
Maurer v. Council on Police Training, 2007 WL 625903 *3 (Del.Super.).
Future Ford Sales v. PSC, 654 A.2d 837, 846 (Del. 1995).
Whether a claim before the Board is barred by a statute of limitations is usually a mixed question of law and fact that requires the Court to determine: (1) whether the Board applied the correct legal standard and, if so, (2) whether the factual findings of the Board were supported by substantial evidence.
Geroski v. Playtex Family Product, 1996 WL 69770, at *1 (Del.Supr.).
In the instant case, the parties disagree as to the proper standard of review. Appellant argues for the applicability of an error of law standard, while Verizon argues that the substantial evidence standard applies. Neither party directly addresses the contention of the other side as to the correct standard of review, but Appellant's position appears somewhat equivocal because error of law is asserted in the Opening Brief, but a substantial evidence standard is argued in the Reply Brief.
A similar issue was raised in the recent case of Smolka v. DaimlerChrysler. In Smolka, a claimant sought workers' compensation benefits for lung cancer due to alleged exposure to asbestos, but the Board held that the claimant was not entitled to workers' compensation benefits because the claim was time-barred under 19 Del. C. § 2342. The claimant, on appeal to this Court, asserted that an error of law and abuse of discretion standard applied, while the employer argued for application of the substantial evidence standard. This Court agrees with the approach announced in Smolka "that the proper standard of review [where the notice period of 19 Del. C. § 2342 is at issue] is whether the [Board] was presented with sufficient evidence on the record to support its decision to deny [Appellant's] petition and [whether] the [Board] properly applied that evidence to the applicable law." The Court will apply the Smolka test to this case.
Smolka v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 2004 WL 3958064, at *3 (Del.Super.).
IV. DISCUSSION
The issue in this appeal is whether the Board was correct in applying the six month notice provision of 19 Del. C. § 2342 to the date of February 14, 2004, in the absence of an expert's report then opining that Mr. Fawcett's lung cancer was in fact caused by his workplace exposure to asbestos, and whether the Board's decision is supported by sufficient evidence in its conclusion that on that date Mr. Fawcett knew "that [he] ha[d] contracted a compensable occupational disease. . .[and] that the disability . . . could have been caused or had resulted from [his] employment[.]"
The Claimant bears the burden of proof in establishing the contraction of an occupational illness or disease. Here, the Claimant was required by statute to file his action within one year from the time he acquired knowledge that his occupational disease was or could have been caused by his employment. "Further, the Claimant was required to have given his employer notice within 6 months of the date he acquired knowledge of the potential relation of his disease to his employment[;]" failing that, "no compensation shall be payable on account of the death or disability by occupational disease."
See Strawbridge Clothier v. Campbell, 492 A.2d 853, 854 (Del. 1985) ( citing Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., 213 A.2d 64 (Del. 1965)).
Fawcett v. Verizon Delaware, Inc., IAB Hearing No. 1259411, at 5 (July 7, 2005).
In a case where the time in which to provide notice is at issue, the sufficiency of evidence needed to support the Board's determination of the operative date depends on the level of knowledge the claimant possessed, and the manner in which the knowledge was acquired. A claimant should not be expected to display greater diagnostic skill than any other "uninformed layperson confronted with the early symptoms of a progressive condition." A claimant does not need to know the exact diagnosis or medical name for the condition if he or she knows enough about its nature to realize that it is both serious and work related.
Smolka, 2004 WL 3958064, at *7 (holding the that the decision of the Board was supported by substantial evidence "to support its determination that Claimant, as a reasonable person, should have recognized the nature, seriousness and probable compensable nature of his disease before February 20, 2002 and his notice to DaimlerChrysler of his disease on August 20, 2002 was outside the six month notice requirement of 19 Del. C. § 2342.").
Arthur Larson Lex Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 126.05[4] (2000).
Id.
Lung cancer is a debilitating disease that may be caused by a wide variety of carcinogens. Larson states that "the optimum rule . . . is a dual one: the period [for notice] begins to run when the disease has culminated in disability and when by reasonable diligence the Claimant could have discovered that his condition was a compensable one." There is sufficient evidence that Mr. Fawcett knew the serious nature of his disease at the time of its initial diagnosis in November 2003. A more difficult question is whether he recognized, or should have recognized, (and whether his widow recognized, or should have recognized, after his death in June 2004) that his lung cancer "could have been caused or had resulted from [his] employment."
Id. at § 53.04[1].
The Delaware Supreme Court has held that "[m]ere exposure to asbestos accompanied by symptomatology associated with asbestosis will not suffice to render a plaintiff chargeable with knowledge that his harm is attributable to asbestos exposure where there is uncertainty in medical diagnosis." Even though a medical diagnosis may not always be necessary to establish causation with respect to certain occupational illnesses, under the facts of this case, the opinion of a medical doctor would have been particularly useful to Mr. Fawcett in deciding whether he had a claim against Verizon. Without an export report definitively linking Mr. Fawcett's lung cancer to his workplace exposure, there was no reason for Mr. Fawcett to bring a claim against Verizon given the variety of carcinogens that can lead to lung cancer. Larson states that "it remains necessary in particular cases [those involving a disease that may have been caused by more than one factor] to prove by suitable medical evidence that the employment exposure did indeed cause or contribute to the disease." Because there was no conclusive diagnosis prior to Mr. Fawcett's death, the fact that he apparently thought that his condition was related to asbestos exposure is not enough. The Delaware Supreme Court has noted that the causal connection between exposure to asbestos and a particular asbestos related disease is not "within the common knowledge of laymen." Mr. Fawcett's discussions with his wife and attorney about potential causation should not suffice to render Mr. Fawcett, and/or his attorney, with knowledge of causation and the compensable nature of a potential claim. "[T]he purposes [of the notification period] are to enable the employer to provide immediate medical diagnosis and treatment with a view to minimize the seriousness of the injury and second to facilitate the earliest possible investigation of the facts surrounding the injury."
Collins v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 673 A.2d 159, 162 (Del. 1996) (holding that a plaintiff's subjective belief that he has an asbestos related ailment, in the absence of medical diagnostic support, is not enough to render plaintiff chargeable with knowledge that his condition is attributable to asbestos exposure).
Willis v. American Original, 1991 WL 215888 *2 (Del.Super.) (stating that for an occupational illness stemming from carpel tunnel syndrome, a doctor's diagnosis is just one way to acquire the requisite knowledge).
Arthur Larson Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 52.06[4][c] (2000).
Collins, 673 A.2d 159, 162 (stating that "[w]hile defendants argue that [claimant's] actions in consulting with an attorney indicates an awareness of a nexus between his physical condition and his work history of asbestos exposure, it is equally inferable that . . . counsel advised him that without medical verification he had no basis to bring suit.").
Money v. Manville Corp. Asbestos Disease Compensation Trust Fund, 596 A.2d 1372, 1376 (Del. 1991).
Arthur Larson Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 126.01 (2000).
Mr. Fawcett's failure to recognize the probable compensable nature of his illness was similar to the knowledge of a workers' compensation claimant in Persinger v. DaimlerChrysler Corporation. In that case, the Claimant was diagnosed in 1995 with hearing loss as part of a work related program, but was not told that the hearing loss was work related. In March 1999, the Claimant underwent another hearing test where he was told that his condition was work related. The Board found that the Claimant acquired knowledge of the probable compensable nature of his illness in 1995 because the diagnosis was part of a work related program. However, following an appeal to the Superior Court, this Court reversed the Board and held that the claimant had been aware of the nature and seriousness of his hearing loss in 1995, but had not been aware of the compensable nature until 1999, when he was told that the hearing loss was work related. The Persinger Court held that there was no "substantial evidence on the record to indicate that the injury for which compensation is sought was probably compensable."
Persinger v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 2000 WL 33113844, at *11 (Del.Super.).
Id.
Id. at *12.
Id.
Id. at *13.
Additionally, Mr. Fawcett's meeting with an attorney about a potential claim against his employer, coupled with other evidence such as Mrs. Fawcett's testimony, was not enough to give the Board substantial evidence to establish that Mr. Fawcett knew his injury was compensable.
Collins, 673 A.2d 159, 162 (stating that "[w]hile defendants argue that [claimant's] actions in consulting with an attorney indicates an awareness of a nexus between his physical condition and his work history of asbestos exposure, it is equally inferable that . . . counsel advised him that without medical verification he had no basis to bring suit.").
Mr. Fawcett's decision to consult an attorney is similar to the situation that unfolded in Smolka v. DaimlerChrysler Corporation. In that case, the Claimant was diagnosed with lung cancer in 1996. As part of a follow up exam in 1997, x-rays were taken of Claimant's lungs. The x-rays were examined by a board certified doctor of internal medicine at the request of Claimant's counsel. The x-rays showed findings consistent with a diagnosis of asbestosis. This Court held that the operative date for determining the when the statute of limitations began to run was the date of the diagnosis of asbestosis, not the date that Claimant met with an attorney.
Smolka v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 2004 WL 3958064, at *1 (Del.Super.).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 7.
As in Smolka, the operative date in Mr. Fawcett's case was the not the date when Mr. Fawcett chose to visit an attorney. Even though Mr. Fawcett had sought advice of counsel about a potential claim prior to when Dr. Abraham made a conclusive diagnosis, this does not establish that Mr. Fawcett had "actual knowledge that [he had] contracted a compensable occupational disease[.]"
Even though the Board did have the testimony of Mrs. Fawcett and the knowledge that Mr. Fawcett went to a lawyer, this evidence fails to establish that as of February 14, 2004, Mr. Fawcett knew "that [he] ha[d] contracted a compensable occupational disease. . .[and] that the disability . . . could have been caused or had resulted from [his] employment[.]" There is no evidence that the attorney thought on February 14, 2004 that the claim would result in compensation. In fact, had no expert opinion ever been produced linking Mr. Fawcett's cancer to his workplace exposure to asbestos, no claim presumably would have ever been brought against Verizon.
Id.
Although Mr. Fawcett's attorney could not have originally brought this claim in Superior Court (because of the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act), even if such a claim was hypothetically allowed, Superior Court Civil Rule 11 presumably would have prevented the filing of such a claim until an expert established a casual link between Mr. Fawcett's disease and asbestos exposure. Lee v. A.C. S. Co., Inc., 542 A.2d 352, 355 (Del.Super.Ct. 1987) (stating medical expert testimony is required to establish causation). The remedial purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act is to provide a more streamlined and efficient system of resolving claims than can be obtained through the Courts. An employee should not be held to more restrictive knowledge standard than imposed by the Courts.
V. CONCLUSION
The decision below was not supported by substantial evidence that Mr. Fawcett knew, as a reasonable person, the nature, seriousness, and probable compensable nature of his disease as of February 14, 2004. For the above reasons, the decision of the Industrial Accident Board is REVERSED AND REMANDED for further proceedings not inconsistent with this order.