Opinion
No. 4:20-CV-1804 AGF
01-15-2021
JOSEPH MICHAEL DEVON ENGEL, Plaintiff, v. CCA, et al., Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court upon review of a civil complaint filed by Joseph Michael Devon Engel (registration no. 1069055), an inmate at Eastern Reception, Diagnostic and Correctional Center ("ERDCC"). For the reasons explained below, plaintiff will be given leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and this action will be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil action in forma pauperis is required to pay the full amount of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in his or her prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist, collect an initial partial filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the prisoner's account, or (2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner's account for the prior six-month period. After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month's income credited to the prisoner's account. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The agency having custody of the prisoner will forward these monthly payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the prisoner's account exceeds $10, until the filing fee is fully paid. Id.
When plaintiff initiated this action, he did not file a separate motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that plaintiff has filed over one hundred and twenty (120) civil rights cases in this Court since September of 2020. In many of these cases, plaintiff did not include a separate motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee. Rather, within the complaint, he states: "Application to Proceed in District Court without Prepaying Fees or Costs. I only get $5.00 Dollars a month." ECF No. 1 at 2. Liberally construed, plaintiff can be understood to ask the Court to grant him leave to commence this action without prepayment of the required filing fee.
Plaintiff did not file a certified inmate account statement in this action, asserting "I have not [b]een able to obtain another copy of account." Id. The Court notes that plaintiff filed a certified inmate account statement for the relevant period in another case plaintiff had pending in the Eastern District of Missouri: see docket entry at ECF No. 11 filed on January 8, 2021, in Engel v. Corizon, et al., 4:20-CV-1695 NAB (E.D. Mo. filed Nov. 30, 2020). As such, the Court will reference that account statement to calculate plaintiff's initial partial filing fee here.
A review of plaintiff's account statement in the Engel v. Corizon, et al. case indicates an average monthly deposit of $28.11 and an average monthly balance of $0.04. The Court therefore finds plaintiff has insufficient funds to pay the entire filing fee. Accordingly, the Court will assess an initial partial filing fee of $5.62, which is 20 percent of plaintiff's average monthly deposit.
Legal Standard on Initial Review
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court may dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if, inter alia, it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. An action is frivolous if "it lacks an arguable basis in either law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989). Dismissals on this ground should only be ordered when legal theories are "indisputably meritless," or when the claims rely on factual allegations that are "clearly baseless." Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). "Clearly baseless" factual allegations include those that are "fanciful," "fantastic," and "delusional." Id. at 32-33 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325, 327). "As those words suggest, a finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them." Id. at 33.
An action is malicious when it is undertaken for the purpose of harassing or disparaging litigants rather than vindicating a cognizable right. Tapia-Ortiz v. Winter, 185 F.3d 8, 11 (2d Cir. 1999), Spencer v. Rhodes, 656 F. Supp. 458, 461-63 (E.D.N.C. 1987), aff'd 826 F.2d 1061 (4th Cir. 1987). An action is also malicious if it is part of a longstanding pattern of abusive and repetitious lawsuits or if it contains disrespectful or abusive language. In re Tyler, 839 F.2d 1290, 1293 (8th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). When determining whether an action is malicious, the Court need not look only to the complaint before it but may also look to plaintiff's other litigious conduct. Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1316 (4th Cir. 1996).
To determine whether an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court must engage in a two-step inquiry. First, the Court must identify the allegations in the complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950-51 (2009). These include "legal conclusions" and "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action [that are] supported by mere conclusory statements." Id. at 1949. Second, the Court must determine whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 1950-51. This is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 1950. The plaintiff is required to plead facts that show more than the "mere possibility of misconduct." Id. The Court must review the factual allegations in the complaint "to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief." Id. at 1951.
The Complaint
Plaintiff, who identifies himself as a sovereign citizen, is a self-represented litigant currently incarcerated at ERDCC in Bonne Terre, Missouri. The instant complaint is one of more than one hundred and twenty (120) civil rights actions plaintiff has recently filed in this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff prepared his handwritten complaint on two (2) sheets of notebook paper consisting of a list of the following defendants, which include: (1) CCA; (2) House FUM; (3) FUM Custody; (4) Sg.; (5) LT; (6) Captins [sic]; (7) Supertindent [sic]; (8) Assistant Warden; (9) Warden; (10) Director; (11) Assist Director; (12) MODOC; (13) ERDCC; (14) Assist ATT General; (15) ATT General; (16) LT Govener [sic]; (17) Governer [sic]; and (18) Sentor of Missouri [sic]. Plaintiff sues all defendants in their official and individual capacities and states he is bringing this action "for everyone in custody of ERDCC." ECF No. 1 at 2.
Plaintiff's allegations are stated in their entirety as follows:
This is in regards to the saf[e]ty and security of all the inmates in Both Wholes [sic] in ERDCC. So many mice, Rats, Mace, uncle[a]n clothes that[] its dis[g]usting. Badly [sic] mice is over runing [sic] this Housing Units Badly very unclean. Mice shit all over my cell every morning when I wake up. Jeff Co ain't that Bad for real.Id. Plaintiff describes his injuries as: "Rights, Hyginie [sic], Health, [and] Mind Raping." ECF No. 1 at 1.
For relief, plaintiff lists each defendant and requests a separate, arbitrary amount from each individual or entity spanning from "2 Million" to "45 Billion" dollars. Plaintiff also seeks "10,000,000,000 stocks in oil, coal, lead, zinc, plaintium [sic], steel, gold, silver, precious metals, beef, pork, chicken, vegs, corn, wheat, fruits, coffee, Starbucks, Frito Lay, Pepsi, Cocola [sic], Dr. Pep[p]er, Mount[a]in Dew, Gateway, Compaq, Dell, Apple, Windows, Android, All in Wear, Deep Web, Dark Web, Facebook, Snap Chat, Tic Toc, Google, Twitter, Channel[] 2, Fox, CBS, TBS, CNN, [and] MSNBC."
Discussion
The Court has carefully reviewed Plaintiff's original handwritten complaint and has determined it is subject to dismissal.
First, plaintiff alleges he is bringing this action on behalf of "all of the inmates in both wholes in ERDCC" and "everyone in custody of ERDCC." Plaintiff has no standing to bring claims on behalf of other prisoners. See Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985) (stating that "[a] prisoner cannot bring claims on behalf of other prisoners"); and Miner v. Brackney, 719 F.2d 954, 956 (8th Cir. 1983) (explaining that plaintiff did not have "standing to assert" a constitutional claim on behalf of another person). In other words, plaintiff must allege a personal loss. See Sargent, 780 F.2d at 1337. Furthermore, as plaintiff is not an attorney, he can only plead and conduct his own case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654 ("In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel[.]"). For these reasons, to the extent that plaintiff is attempting to bring claims on behalf of others, such claims must be dismissed.
Plaintiff has filed other complaints in this Court attempting to assert allegations on the behalf of others, which have been dismissed. See e.g., Engel v. MDOC, et al., 4:20-cv-1430-AGF (E.D.Mo. Oct. 1, 2020); Engel v. CO1, et al., 4:20-cv-1923-HEA (E.D.Mo. Dec. 28, 2020); and Engel v. St. Louis Sheriff's Dept., et al.,4:20-cv-1639-NCC (E.D.Mo. Nov. 19, 2020).
Second, plaintiff's claims are entirely conclusory. He alleges there are "so many" mice, rats, and unclean clothes in ERDCC and that he wakes up with "mice shit all over [his] cell every morning." Plaintiff does not allege how long he has been subjected to the described conditions or whether the named defendants are aware of the alleged pests. Conditions which deprive a prisoner of "the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities" can be cruel and unusual punishment. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). However, "the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons" and "persons convicted of serious crimes, cannot be free of discomfort." Id. at 349. A violation of the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual conditions resulting from prison conditions has both an objective and a subjective component. "[T]he deprivation alleged must be objectively, sufficiently serious," and "a prison official must be, as a subjective state of mind, deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's health or safety." Aswegan v. Henry, 49 F.3d 461, 464 (8th Cir. 1995).
In regard to conditions in a prisoner's cell, the Eighth Circuit has held:
"[C]onditions, such as a filthy cell, may be tolerable for a few days and intolerably cruel for weeks or months." Whitnack v. Douglas County, 16 F.3d 954, 958 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting Howard v. Adkison, 887 F.2d 134, 137 (8th Cir. 1989)). . . . We also note that "[w]hile the length of time a prisoner must endure an unsanitary cell is undoubtedly one factor in the constitutional calculus, the degree of filth endured is surely another." Whitnack, 16 F.3d at 958. In other words, "the length of time required before a constitutional violation is made out decreases as the level of filthiness endured increases." Id.Tokar v. Armontrout, 97 F.3d 1078, 1082 n.4 (8th Cir. 1996).
A prison official cannot be found deliberately indifferent under the Eighth Amendment unless the official knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to an inmate's health or safety. Id. Here, plaintiff does not allege that any of the eighteen (18) named defendants knew of and/or disregarded the conditions of which plaintiff complains nor does he allege that these defendants knew of and/or disregarded any excessive risk to his health or safety. See id. Thus, plaintiff's allegations wholly lack factual support and are not entitled to the presumption of truth. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Torti v. Hoag, 868 F.3d 666, 671 (8th Cir. 2017) ("Courts are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation, and factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level"). Even self-represented plaintiffs are required to allege facts in support of their claims, and the Court will not assume facts that are not alleged. See Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 2004). Furthermore, plaintiff's ambiguous allegations do not satisfy the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requirement that plaintiff establish a defendant's "causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights." See Mayorga v. Missouri, 442 F.3d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir. 2006).
Moreover, plaintiff identifies his injuries as "Rights, Hyginie [sic], Health, [and] Mind Raping." Plaintiff does not list a tangible medical injury lasting for a particular duration or that he required medical attention from the conditions. Plaintiff's failure to allege that he suffered any injury beyond conclusory allegations of "hygiene," "health" and "mind raping" defeats any contention of the objective severity of plaintiff's alleged constitutional deprivation or substantial risk to his health or safety. See Robinson v. Illinois State Corr. Ctr., 890 F. Supp. 715, 720 (N.D. Ill. 1995) ("[The prisoner's] failure to allege that he suffered any injury because of these conditions defeats any contention of their objective severity."). As such, the Court finds that plaintiff has failed to allege that his constitutional rights were violated as a result of pests or dirty laundry in his cell.
It also appears that the complaint is subject to dismissal because it is factually frivolous as described in Denton v. Hernandez. Plaintiff bizarrely alleges he is entitled to recover billions of dollars in damages from eighteen public officials and government entities as well as more than ten billion stocks from entities with no apparent connection to this action for allegations involving dirty clothing and pests. Considered as a whole, plaintiff's allegations, as provided in his complaint, and prayer for relief are "clearly baseless" under the standard articulated in Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. at 32-33, and the complaint is subject to dismissal for this reason, as well.
Finally, it appears this action is also subject to dismissal because it is malicious. See Spencer v. Rhodes, 656 F. Supp. 458, 461-63 (E.D.N.C. 1987), aff'd 826 F.2d 1061 (4th Cir. 1987) (an action is malicious when it is undertaken for the purpose of harassing the defendants rather than vindicating a cognizable right). Since filing this action, plaintiff has filed over one hundred and twenty (120) other complaints in this Court alleging that his civil rights have been violated by these defendants and other state and local entities and officials. Plaintiff submits the pleadings in bulk, and he specifies that he intends each set of pleadings to be docketed as an individual civil action. The nature of those pleadings and plaintiff's claims for damages are roughly the same as those in the instant action. It therefore appears that this action is part of an attempt to harass these defendants and others by bringing repetitious lawsuits, not a legitimate attempt to vindicate a cognizable right. See Spencer, 656 F. Supp. at 461-63; see also In re Billy Roy Tyler, 839 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1988) (noting that an action is malicious when it is a part of a longstanding pattern of abusive and repetitious lawsuits). This action is subject to dismissal for this reason, as well.
Plaintiff is cautioned to avoid the practice of repeatedly filing meritless lawsuits. First, a prisoner who has filed three or more actions or appeals that were dismissed for one of the reasons stated in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) is subject to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), which limits his future ability to proceed in forma pauperis. Second, the practice of repeatedly filing meritless lawsuits can be interpreted as an abuse of the judicial process, which can result in court-imposed limitations on the ability to bring future lawsuits. This Court is "vested with the discretion to impose sanctions upon a party under its inherent disciplinary power." Bass v. General Motors Corp., 150 F.3d 842, 851 (8th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). This includes the discretion to craft and impose sanctions to deter litigants from engaging in "conduct which abuses the judicial process." Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43-45 (1991). See Tyler, 839 F.2d at 1292 (affirming the district court's sua sponte determination that a litigant should be limited to filing one lawsuit per month pursuant to certain conditions precedent as a sanction for the litigant's repeated abuse of the judicial process). These powers stem from "the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases." Id. (quoting Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962)).
Having considered plaintiff's abusive litigation practices and the manner in which he prepared the instant complaint and other civil complaints, the Court concludes that it would be futile to permit plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint in this action. The Court will therefore dismiss this action at this time pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 3) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHERED ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel (ECF No. 2) is DENIED as moot.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff shall pay an initial filing fee of $5.62 within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order. Plaintiff is instructed to make his remittance payable to "Clerk, United States District Court," and to include upon it: (1) his name; (2) his prison registration number; (3) the case number; and (4) that the remittance is for an original proceeding.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A separate order of dismissal will be entered herewith.
Dated this 15th day of January 2021.
/s/_________
AUDREY G. FLEISSIG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE