Plaintiffs commenced this action against defendant insurer and the City of New York to recover for water damage arising from a break in the city's water main located approximately one block away from plaintiffs' property. Defendant insurer moved for dismissal of plaintiffs' action or, alternatively, for summary judgment. In its moving papers, defendant insurer urged that certain exclusionary provisions contained within the contract disclaim coverage for any damage resulting from floods, tidal waves, seeping groundwater, etc. Additionally, defendant insurer contended that the subject insurance contract is not an "all-risk" policy and that the language in section L of the insurance policy warrants a restrictive interpretation, effectively limiting coverage for water damage to losses caused by the insured's own in-premises plumbing system. The IAS court denied defendant's motion and granted plaintiffs' cross motion for summary judgment.

The exclusionary provisions of the insurance contract are no bar to plaintiffs' claim as they preclude only recovery for damages arising from natural causes, not from artificial devices (see, e.g., Popkin v Security Mut. Ins. Co., 48 A.D.2d 46). Additionally, we find the language in section L of the contract to be identical to language considered in De Witt Props. Assocs. v United States Fire Ins. Co. ( 33 N.Y.2d 785, 786) and found by the Court of Appeals to be "ambiguous".

The instant record lacks sufficient extrinsic evidence to discern the parties' true contract intentions. The opportunity must therefore be afforded to submit additional evidence to enable the trier of fact to resolve the ambiguity. Only if the proffered extrinsic evidence is equivocal does the question become one for the court to determine as a matter of law (State of New York v Home Indem. Co., 66 N.Y.2d 669, 671).

Concur — Sullivan, J.P., Carro, Wallach and Rubin, JJ.