The evidence supports an award of workmen's compensation based on a change in the claimant's condition after an original award, at which time the board found the claimant's disability had ceased, when at the change of condition hearing there was medical testimony that, while the claimant should no longer be disabled because of her physical injury caused by the accident, the emotional trauma resulting from the accident could cause claimant's pre-existing physical disabilities to worsen after the first award and again to disable the claimant.

ARGUED JUNE 8, 1966 — DECIDED JUNE 14, 1966 — REHEARING DENIED JUNE 29, 1966.

An employer and its workmen's compensation insurance carrier appeal from a judgment of the superior court denying their appeal from an award of the State Board of Workmen's Compensation awarding benefits to a claimant based on a finding that the claimant had a change in condition after a previous award in the case. Previous decisions of this court on appeals in this case are found in Employers Ins. Co. of Ala. v. Wright, 108 Ga. App. 380 ( 133 S.E.2d 39), and Employers Ins. Co. of Ala. v. Wright, 110 Ga. App. 773 ( 140 S.E.2d 51).

HALL, Judge.

1. The appellants contend that there was no evidence to support the board's award and the evidence demanded a finding that any disability suffered by the claimant since the previous award was not caused by any injury she received in the accident upon which that award was based.

The effect of the physician's testimony at the first hearing was that, while the claimant should no longer be disabled because of her physical injury caused by the accident (a rape), the emotional trauma could still affect her and be disabling. The hearing director and board found that her disability from employment had ceased on the date of the hearing and awarded her benefits to that date. The same physician's testimony on the change of condition hearing was to the effect that the claimant had not recovered from her emotional trauma and that this, in a woman of her age, could make worse disabling conditions than she otherwise would have, and that her physical condition had become progressively worse after the injury.

The question presented is whether the evidence supports a finding that a change in the claimant's condition due to the accident has occurred since the previous award. Baker v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 103 Ga. App. 100, 101 ( 118 S.E.2d 386). The evidence, including that outlined above, is sufficient to support a finding that, though the claimant may have had physical disabilities prior to and continuing after the accident, after the first award she became disabled from employment to some extent because these pre-existing conditions were aggravated by the still present emotional injury caused by the accident, and the evidence does not demand a finding that the claimant's disability was a result of her physical condition unaffected by that emotional injury. Baker v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., supra.

The previous award is conclusive of the fact that the claimant was disabled because of the accidental injury until the date of the hearing and that her disability had ceased on that date; it does not establish that disability caused by that injury, which according to the medical testimony at both hearings included the effects of emotional trauma, could not recur in the future. Psychological disability is compensable. Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Loftis, 103 Ga. App. 749 ( 120 S.E.2d 655); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Archer, 108 Ga. App. 563 ( 134 S.E.2d 204); 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law 616, § 42.22. The trial court did not err in denying the appeal.

2. In this court the claimant filed a cross appeal from the superior court's denial of her motion for penalties and attorney's fees. The trial court did not err in denying the claimant's motion for penalties and attorney's fees on the ground that the employer's appeal to the superior court was frivolous, as the ground of that appeal was not palpably without merit. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Thompson, 100 Ga. App. 677, 686 ( 112 S.E.2d 273).

Judgment affirmed on appeal and on cross appeal. Nichols, P. J., and Deen, J., concur.